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Ergenekon (organization)

[Image: 180px-Milliyet_20_October_2008_%28Ergenekon%29.jpg] [Image: magnify-clip.png]



"Ergenekon" is the name given to an alleged clandestine, secular ultra-nationalist[1] organization in Turkey with ties to members of the country's military and security forces.[2] The group is accused of terrorism in Turkey.[3]
Its agenda has variously been described as Eurasianist,[4][5][6] and isolationist.[7] The defendants portray themselves as defenders of secularism, and national sovereignty. According to the indictment, the group's claim to legitimacy is that it allegedly protects national interests, which the defendants believe are incompatible with the rule of the Justice and Development Party and are harmed by Turkey's alleged concessions to the West.[8][9] In Turkey, the extensions of the state—the establishment—that are considered responsible for this are referred to as the "deep state".[10] The existence of the "deep state" was affirmed in Turkish opinion after the Susurluk scandal in 1996.[11]
Alleged members have been indicted on charges of plotting to foment unrest, among other things by assassinating intellectuals, politicians, judges, military staff, and religious leaders, with the ultimate goal of toppling the pro-Western incumbent government[12][13][14] in a coup that was planned to take place in 2009.[15][16] This follows allegations published in Nokta that several abortive coups with the same intent were planned a few years ago. The proximate motive behind these false flag activities is said to be to discredit the incumbent Justice and Development Party and derail Turkey's accession process to the European Union.[17][18]
Ergenekon's modus operandi has been compared to Operation Gladio's Turkish branch, the Counter-Guerrilla. It has been said that the people who constitute the "deep state" are members of, or make use of, this covert organization, which was established at the beginning of the Cold War to contain communism.[19][20][21] Furthermore, Ergenekon is allegedly a derivative of the Counter-Guerrilla.
Over a hundred people, including several generals, party officials, and a former secretary general of the National Security Council, have been detained or questioned since July 2008.[11][22] Hearings began on 20 October 2008, and are expected to continue for over a year.[23]
Commentators in the Turkish press have called Ergenekon "the case of the century".[24]

What is Ergenekon?

An organization named "Ergenekon" has been talked about since the Susurluk scandal, which exposed a similar gang. However, it is said that Ergenekon has undergone serious changes since then. The first person to publicly talk about the organization was retired naval officer Erol Mütercimler, who said in 1997:[25][26]
“ It is above the General Staff, the MİT and the Prime Minister. There are generals, heads of police departments, and businessmen in this organization. ” “ Defining it as a gang is an oversimplification. What is a gang? It is the engagement of a number of people in illegal affairs. You can not define Ergenekon as a gang. It is part of a big organization. Alparslan Türkeş and [retired general] Turgut Sunalp were members of Ergenekon. ” “ As I have worked for the state for many years, I know that forming such an organization necessitates a big budget. It is not easy to establish such an organization as Ergenekon. First of all, it requires a great staff. It needs businessmen, and perhaps drug traffickers. ” Mütercimler said he heard of the original organization's existence from retired general Memduh Ünlütürk, who was involved in the anti-communist Ziverbey interrogations following the 1971 coup.[27] Major general Ünlütürk told Mütercimler that Ergenekon was founded with the support of the CIA and the Pentagon.[28] Mütercimler was detained during the Ergenekon investigation for questioning before being released.[25]
Mütercimler and others, however, draw a distinction between the Ergenekon of today and the original one, which they equate with the Counter-Guerrilla; Operation Gladio's Turkish branch.[5][29][30] Today's Ergenekon is said to be a "splinter" off the old one.[31][32] The person whose testimony contributed most to the indictment, Tuncay Güney, described Ergenekon as a junta related to the Turkish Resistance Organization (Turkish: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, TMT) operating in North Cyprus; the TMT was established by founding members of the Counter-Guerrilla.[33] Former North Cyprus President Rauf Denktaş denied any connection of the TMT to Ergenekon.[34]
Another position is that while some of the suspects may be guilty of something, there is no organization to which they are all party, and that the only thing they have in common is opposition to the AKP.[35] There are also allegations that Ergenekon's agenda is in line with the policies of the NSC, elaborated in the top-secret "Red Book" (the National Security Policy Document).[36]
Mütercimler's account was also cited in the first book on the subject, Can Dündar and Celal Kazdağlı's Ergenekon (1997). In an article for Milliyet, Dündar compares Ergenekon with the Susurluk gang, and the Counter-Guerrilla; two other clandestine groups.[5] He says that the Susurluk gang had more funding and that its investigation had more popular support. Dündar also says that Ergenekon differs from the Counter-Guerrilla in that the former leans towards Russia, while the latter leans towards the United States. Claims of Ergenekon's Eurasian affinity are supported by the statements of the movement's chief advocate, Aleksandr Dugin, who called Ergenekon a "pro-Russian group". He said that he knew almost all of the suspects, and praised them for rallying the right and the left (i.e., the opponents of the pro-Western incumbent party, AKP). A salient manifestation of these anti-AKP efforts are the Republic Protests of 2007, under the leadership of Şener Eruygur.[37] The coalition between the left and right (wherein the nominally leftist CHP gravitated to the MHP) was noted by certain observers in the Turkish press in advance of the investigation.[38]
The chairman of the Susurluk commission, Mehmet Elkatmış, said that the Susurluk and Ergenekon gangs are identical except in name. He said that the left is not supportive of the Ergenekon investigation because of revelations that many crimes formerly thought to have been carried out by religious fundamentalists are now claimed to be false flag operations.[39] A noted retired intelligence agent, Mahir Kaynak, says that on the contrary Ergenekon is the antithesis of Susurluk; the former is predominantly military, while the latter was a paramilitary gang that was erected in opposition to the military.[40] Şamil Tayyar of the newspaper Star, who has written books on Ergenekon, says that Ergenekon is not a continuation of Susurluk, but the 9 March junta of the 1971 coup.[41]
The former director of the İstanbul Police Department's Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department (Turkish: Organize Suçlar Şubesi) said that today's Ergenekon is a military wing of the Susurluk gang.[42]
When the Russian newspaper Kommersant declared Dugin to be the brains behind Ergenekon,[4] Dugin responded that he had no part in illegal activities, but that he saw no crime in sharing their vision of Turkey's future—free from the influence of NATO and the United States.[43]
Perinçek had been participating in the conferences of Dugin's Eurasia Party since 1996 (before Dugin joined). Perinçek claims to be the ideologue of the party,[44] and to have influenced the Eurasia Party, rather than being under its influence.[45]

Structure

Based on documents prepared by one of the prosecutors, an article in Sabah says that the organization consists of six cells with the following personnel:[46]
  • Secret and civil cells liaisons: Veli Küçük and Muzaffer Tekin.
  • Lobbyists: M. Zekeriya Öztürk, Kemal Kerinçsiz, İsmail Yıldız, and Erkut Ersoy.
  • NGO head: Sevgi Erenerol. Kemal Kerinçsiz (assistant).
  • Theory, Propaganda, and Disinformation Department head: Doğu Perinçek.
  • Mafia structuring head: Veli Küçük. Muzaffer Tekin (assistant).
  • Underground contacts: Ali Yasak, Sami Hoştan, Semih Tufan Gülaltay, and Sedat Peker.
  • Terrorist organizations heads: Veli Küçük and Doğu Perinçek.
  • University structuring: Kemal Yalçın Alemdaroğlu, Emin Gürses, Habib Ümit Sayın.
  • Research and information gathering head: Mehmet Zekeriya Öztürk.
  • Judicial branch heads: Kemal Kerinçsiz, Fuat Turgut, and Nusret Senem.
Of those, the structure of only the "Theory" department has been revealed as of September 2008.[47][48]
Despite the seemingly high status of Veli Küçük in the organization—some have even called him the leader[49]—Şamil Tayyar of the Star daily says that Küçük is not "even among the top ten".[50] The identity of the "number one" member has been revealed by the MİT to the prosecutors, but will not be made public.[51] Some journalists have offered conflicting hints on who it might be, but do not openly name anyone due to a lack of concrete evidence. It is said that the top position is held for a six month term by an active army officer. By selecting active officers, the group maintains connections with the establishment.[52] Suspect-at-large Tuncay Güney says that the identity of the leader can be found by tracing the network's (as yet unknown) financier.[53]

Name

Two explanations have been put forth regarding the genesis of the organization's name, which is used by alleged members and mentioned in several of its documents.[54][55] The first is that the name derives from the Ergenekon myth; a place in Eurasia of mythological significance, esp. among nationalists (see Agartha).[56] Another hypothesis is that organization is named after retired colonel—and Veli Küçük's mentor—Necabettin Ergenekon.[57] Ergenekon distances himself from the group, saying that his name has been tarnished by association with "terrorists". Born in 1926, Erzurum as Necabettin Baltacı, he was suspected by later-assassinated state prosecutor Cevat Yurdakul as being behind a string of mysterious deaths in the 70s. Baltacı had his surname changed "some time in the '60s" to avoid confusion with another person by the same name, before retiring in 1982, says Zaman.[58][59]

Discovery

Although the investigation was officially launched in 2007, the existence of the organization was known beforehand. The files on Ergenekon were discovered after a spy called Tuncay Güney got detained in March 2001 for petty fraud. Some say the crime was a ploy to set the investigation in motion. A police search of his house turned up the six sacks of evidence on which the indictment is based.
One month later, a columnist on good terms with the government, Fehmi Koru, was the first to break the news,[60] under his usual pen name, Taha Kıvanç.[61] His article was based on a key Ergenekon report dated 29 October 1999 and titled "Ergenekon: Analysis, Structuring, Management, and Development Project".[62][63]

Tuncay Güney's testimony (2001)

Main article: Tuncay Güney
The person whose statements to the police in 2001 formed "the backbone of the indictment"[64] was a spy named Tuncay Güney, alias "İpek". Güney is believed to be subordinate to Mehmet Eymür, formerly of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT)'s Counterterrorism Department. Eymür was discharged and his department disbanded in 1997. Güney's relationship to the MİT has been a matter of confusion; his boss was once a MİT employee, while the MİT says Güney was not (specifically, he was not a "registered informant") and that the MİT considered him a suspicious person.[65][66][67][68]
He had allegedly been tasked with infiltrating the gendarmerie's intelligence agency, JITEM, and Ergenekon in 1992.[69] Güney was apprehended in 2001 for issuing fake licenses and plates for luxury cars. He is still sentenced in absentia for this offense.[70] No charges have been brought against him in the frame of the Ergenekon investigation, some say as a result of a bargain struck with the authorities.[71] However, he is currently under investigation,[72] and State Prosecutor Ziya Hurşit Karayurt has proposed that he be subpoenaed.[73] The court is deliberating whether to consolidate his earlier case with the Ergenekon one.[74] In addition, legal proceedings have been initiated to obtain his testimony from abroad using Interpol.[75] Prosecutor Öz has prepared a list of 37 questions for Güney, who says he will co-operate if the questioning is done by the Canadian police.[76]
Güney has been said to conflate fact and fiction,[77][78] casting doubt over the indictment, which names him a "fugitive suspect" (Turkish: firari şüpheli).[79] Güney is seen as such an important figure that rival press groups have exchanged columns accusing one another of attempting to influence public opinion by questioning his credibility.[80][81][82] It is alleged that one the parties, Aydın Doğan, was asked not to publish material about Ergenekon, by Veli Küçük through Doğu Perinçek.[83] In December 2008, Güney said that a Hürriyet reporter offered him a bribe not to talk about the newspaper, one of whose senior members is allegedly in Ergenekon.[84] Hürriyet denied the allegations.[85][86]

Engin Bağbars' testimony (2006)

The convicted leader of a twenty-person narcotics gang, Engin Bağbars, gave a 10.5 hour testimony to the police about Ergenekon on 27 September 2006. He met Ergenekon suspect Muzaffer Tekin in 2005 through a person named Gökhan Başoğlu, who told him that the gang had infiltrated the intelligence agency and the military, and that they had their sights on heading the police force. Başoğlu also proposed to induct Bağbars into the Kuvayı Milliye Derneği. Bağbars says he was being groomed to carry out a disruptive act similar to Hrant Dink's assassination; he was given a Kalashnikov.[87]
Bağbars claims credit for uncovering Ergenekon. Intelligence analysts set to work after his testimony. Other sources say that this occurred on 24 May, at the Tekirdağ State Prosecutor's office.[88] Bağbars was present as a witness in the Ergenekon trial.

Grenades in Ümraniye (2007)

The investigation officially began after the Trabzon Gendarmerie Headquarters' tip-off line received an anonymous call on 12 June 2007 saying that grenades and C-4 explosives were to be found at Güngör Sokak № 2, Çakmak Mahallesi, Ümraniye ([Image: 18px-Erioll_world.svg.png]41°1′13.69″N 29°7′10.21″E / 41.0204694°N 29.1195028°E / 41.0204694; 29.1195028 (Site of the arms cache that started the Ergenekon investigation)Coordinates: [Image: 18px-Erioll_world.svg.png]41°1′13.69″N 29°7′10.21″E / 41.0204694°N 29.1195028°E / 41.0204694; 29.1195028 (Site of the arms cache that started the Ergenekon investigation)). A search warrant was immediately obtained from the Ümraniye 2. Peace Penal Court. 27 hand grenades (but no C-4) were found in a nylon-covered wooden chest on the roof of a slum at the stated address. According to the indictment, the caller was Şevki Yiğit, the father of the building's tenant, Ali Yiğit. Şevki found the bomb-filled chest by accident and asked his his son about them. Ali then asked the owner of the house, his uncle Mehmet Demirtaş about it. According to Yiğit, Demirtaş responded that there was a chest with military equipment on the roof belonging to ÖHD NCO Oktay Yıldırım, and instructed him to keep quiet about it. Ali Yiğit added that retired captain Muzaffer Tekin and retired NCO Mahmut Öztürk, both of the special forces, once stopped by his grocery store (adjacent to the slum, and owned by Demirtaş) in a black Mercedes while Yıldırım was present, that Yıldırım left only to return with Öztürk 15-20 minutes later in a yellow Opel Corsa, and that his father found the bombs 3-4 months later. Yiğit said that his father, who lives in Trabzon, might have placed the call since he was not on good terms with Demirtaş.[89][90]
The grenades were found to bear the same serial number as those used in 14 incidents throughout the country.[91][92][93] They were disposed of two weeks after their discovery on account of their not being preservable.[94]
A search of Yıldırım's office in Reina[95] and Muzaffer Tekin's house revealed a secret document titled "Ergenekon Lobi" about the group's plans. The information in the documents led the authorities to revisit the Tuncay Güney case.
Yıldırım later denied the charges, though his fingerprints were found on the chest. During his trial, he referred to Demirtaş as a former subordinate soldier of his, and said that the four reports about his fingerprints contradicted one another. Yıldırım also alleged that Ali Yiğit failed to distinguish Tekin from Öztürk when brought to Bayrampaşa Prison.[96] Cross-examining Yiğit, Yıldırım asked him if Demirtaş was present when the police searched for the grenades. Yiğit said "no", contradicting his earlier statement that Demirtaş had arrived after a phone call by the police. (Demirtaş said he was personally not present.)[97]
At the thirteenth hearing, Ali Yiğit said that he mistook someone for Muzaffer Tekin, with whom he shared a cell in Bayrampaşa prison and bonded well enough to look up to as a father figure. He also stated that he had moved out of the building twenty days before they were found. After learning about the grenades, he left his job at the grocery, and became a taxi driver. He was allegedly driving by the house when the police came, and told them that the place was his so that they would not break down the door. However, his uncle Demirtaş did not trust Yiğit and left the keys to Yiğit's brother. They fetched the keys, searched the house, had Yiğit confirm that the grenades had been found and that the house had not been harmed, then took him to the station to obtain his statement, described above. After being detained, Yiğit says he was intimidated by Demirtaş, Kerinçsiz, Yıldırım, and his lawyer. Yıldırım allegedly pressured Yiğit to incriminate his father (Şevki) by calling him a weapons smuggler.[97][98]
Demirtaş strongly denied having made the explanation about the origin of the chest, as alleged by Yiğit. Demirtaş alleged that Yiğit confided to him that he had only seen pictures of Tekin at the police station.[97] According to Radikal, the police threatened him with 39 years in jail if he did not blame Oktay Yıldırım.[99]

Investigation

The investigation was officially launched after an anonymous call in June 2007 to the Trabzon Gendarmerie turned up a chest of grenades belonging to members of the Special Forces Command (Turkish: Özel Harekât Dairesi, ÖHD). An investigation of the network of acquaintances of the suspects turned up more information and snowballed into the present situation. Members of the ÖHD were notably implicated in the covered-up Susurluk scandal from ten years earlier.
The bulk of the Ergenekon indictment was drawn from documents found in 2001 when a former National Intelligence Organization agent named Tuncay Güney got detained (his identity unknown to the police) for a minor offense. Some say this was deliberate, as he provided detailed information to the police about Ergenekon while in detention for an unrelated felony. The Istanbul police force closed the investigation by 2002 citing a lack of incriminating evidence.
Another significant development was the abortive coups of 2004. When the intelligence agencies got wind of an assassination threat towards Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt and yet another coup planned for 2009 (under Büyükanıt's successor, İlker Başbuğ), the investigation was kick-started. Around the same time, the dissolution of the incumbent Justice and Development Party was proposed.
Trial hearings began on 20 October 2008. Retired public prosecutor Mete Göktürk has estimated that they will last at least one year.[23]

Judiciary

See also: Legal system of the Republic of Turkey
The Istanbul Court of Assize for Organised- and Terror Crimes is handling the case, officially numbered 2007/1536 and sometimes referred to by the name of the location where a cache of weapons was found in 2007, Ümraniye.[100] The indictment number is 2008/623 and the base number (Turkish: esas numarasi) is 2008/968.
The original three prosecutors are Zekeriya Öz (prosecutor-in-chief), Mehmet Ali Pekgüzel and Nihat Taşkın.[101] The judge is Köksal Şengün.[102] Öz rides an armored Mercedes,[103] and is protected by a team of fifteen people.[104]
In September 2008, suspects Muzaffer Tekin, Ergün Poyraz, Kemal Kerinçsiz, Doğu Perinçek and Colonel Erdal Sarızeybek filed a criminal report against the prosecutors, citing “conducting a biased investigation, gross misconduct and exercises not fit to a prosecutor.”[105][106][107] The Minister of Justice, Mehmet Ali Şahin, rejected the inquiry,[108] finding no wrongdoing.[109][110]
In November 2008, the newspaper Cumhuriyet and its publisher, Yeni Gün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., launched a libel suit for 100,000 Lira against the three prosecutors. One of its leading columnists, İlhan Selçuk, is a defendant in the Ergenekon case.[111] Two more prosecutors have been assigned to the case to ensure the trial proceeds without delay.[112]


Allegations
The investigation exposed alleged links between an armed attack on the Turkish Council of State in 2006 that left a judge dead,[113] a bombing of a secularist newspaper,[113] threats and attacks against people accused of being unpatriotic and the 1996 Susurluk incident, as well as links to the plans of some groups in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to overthrow the present government. According to the investigation, Ergenekon had a role in the murder of Hrant Dink, a prominent journalist of Armenian descent[13][114][115] Italian priest Father Andrea Santoro in February 2006 and the brutal murders of three Christians, one a German national, killed in the province of Malatya in April 2007.[116] Furthermore, files about JİTEM related the assassination of former JİTEM commander Cem Ersever, killed in November 1993, to Ergenekon.[116] A former JİTEM member, Abdülkadir Aygan, said that JİTEM is the military wing of Ergenekon.[117]
Documents seized in the investigation if authentic would show that the group planned a bomb attack in İstanbul's Taksim Square, triggering chaos that would be used as a pretext for military intervention. It is also alleged that those detained were involved in provocation and agitation during the Gazi incidents of 1995, when tens of people died in clashes with the police in demonstrations after an attack at an Alevi coffeehouse in the neighborhood.[118]
Recently uncovered evidence suggests that the 1993 death of General Eşref Bitlis, and that of journalist Uğur Mumcu may be related to Ergenekon.[119] Both Bitlis and Mumcu were investigating how Jalal Talabani, one of the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq and, as of 2008, president of Iraq, came into possession of 100,000 firearms belonging to the Turkish Armed Forces.[120]
Some evidence has been notably omitted from the indictment: the "coup diaries" of general Özden Örnek and certain military documents. The diaries were not included as the prosecutor concluded that, despite being authentic,[121] they were but obtained illegally, said Alper Görmüş, the editor-in-chief of the journal that originally published them.[122] Regarding the military documents, the Armed Forces said that they contained confidential information that could "spark an international crisis".[123]

Militant links

According to Zaman, there are links between Ergenekon and numerous militant organizations, such as the "Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the extreme-left Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), the Islamist organization Hizbullah, the ultranationalist Turkish Revenge Brigades (TİT), the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army (TİKKO), the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party(MLKP) and the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), an extreme group wishing to reinstate the Islamic Caliphate".[48]
Zaman quoted a senior intelligence officer, Bülent Orakoğlu, as having said that the PKK, Dev Sol, Hezbollah, and Hizb ut-Tahrir are artificial organizations set up by the network, and that Abdullah Öcalan himself is an Ergenekon member.[124] Zaman also writes that the former PKK leader, Şemdin Sakık, said in his testimony that the Ergenekon network was in close contact with the group and even co-operated with it on several occasions. According to Sakık, he was brought to Turkey by a group of men led by Mahmut Yıldırım, also known as Yeşil (Green)—a convicted mafia leader whose name had surfaced in the report on the Susurluk scandal.[125] He is believed to have been killed shortly after the Susurluk scandal.[126]
Sakık said the Ergenekon gang planned to co-operate with a number of terrorist organizations, including the PKK, to achieve its objectives. "This cooperation was realized with Doğu Perinçek (the leader of the Workers' Party) and several other figures. Cemil Bayık (a senior PKK leader) was also among these figures," he remarked.[127] In another Zaman article, JITEM informant Abdulkadir Aygan made a similar remark.[128]
Zaman's claims have been disputed.[129] The testimony of Sakık was not released to the press, hence it is not official. PKK's imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, declared before court that Sakık had killed 33 people on Ergenekon's orders.[130]
Öcalan dismissed allegations made by intelligence officer Bülent Orakoğlu concerning himself, but he did say that a group inside the PKK, which he called the Zaza Group, had links with Ergenekon. He said that this group was led by Sait Çürükkaya and tried to seize control of the PKK, adding "Particularly in the Diyarbakır-Muş-Bingöl triangle, they have staged intensive and bloody attacks."[131]
Kurdish Democrat Ahmet Acar alleged that Öcalan instructed the PKK-friendly Democratic Society Party (DTP) to remain silent about Ergenekon.[132]
Lieutenant Mehmet Ali Çelebi, detained in the Ergenekon investigations, allegedly had links with the extreme Islamist group Hizb-ut Tahrir.[133] Çelebi was allegedly the key which made possible the arrest of five Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in September 2008.[131] Hizb-ut Tahrir refutes the allegations.[134]
Responding to allegations in Taraf, DHKP/C issued a press release ridiculing claims of its connection to Ergenekon.[135]


Continued[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ergenekon_network#cite_note-134"]
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2009 coup plan

One of the most persistent allegations is that the organization has been planning to execute a coup in 2009. The alleged masterminds behind this coup plot are generals Kemal Yavuz and Tuncer Kılınç; Yavuz co-ordinating the Ankara troops, and Kılınç the Istanbul troops. Both generals were detained in January 2009. The co-ordination is allegedly done through grass roots headquarters (Turkish: Karargâh evleri).[136] The Turkish police said the round-up was triggered by orders Ibrahim Sahin gave to assassinate 12 Armenian leaders in Sivas.[137]

Suspects

Main article: List of suspects in the Ergenekon investigation
86 people were indicted in July 2008, 48 of whom were detained.[113][138] Journalist Claire Berlinksi writes "Many of the accused are, if not guilty as charged, guilty of something…If you put all the defendants in a room together, they’d kill each other".[35]
Kuddusi Okkır, detained for allegedly being the financial supplier of the Ergenekon network, died from cancer only a few days after he was released. According to his wife, Sabriye Okkır, he was in stable condition prior to his arrest on 23 June 2007. She claims that the authorities have done nothing to save her husband's life and filed a complaint to the Ministry of Justice.[139] Shortly after that the ministry opened an investigation to determine the accuracy of those claims.[140][141]
High-ranking generals (Hurşit Tolon and Şener Eruygur), for whom a separate indictment is being prepared,[142] are for the first time being tried in a civilian court. Tolon disavows any relationship to the organization and says that he was scapegoated.[143] Retired military judge Ümit Kardaş said that the detainment of Tolon and Eruygur was done with the consent of the high command, reflecting its disowning of neonationalism (Turkish: ulusalcılık).[144]
A fresh wave of detentions in January 2009 netted 37 more people, including some generals, after consulting the high command, which swiftly gave permission.[145] (The Minister of Defense, Vecdi Gönül, was not consulted.[146]) One of them, Tuncer Kılınç, is the former secretary general of the National Security Council (formerly a military institution). Immediately before the arrests, well-connected journalist Şamil Tayyar speculated on whether Kılınç is the leader. (Tayyar is coincidentally promoting his new book on Ergenekon, Kıt’a Dur.)[147][148][149] Twelve of the arrests took place in Sivas, where weapons were also found. According to Zaman, the Sivas raid is connected to numerous plots mentioned in the indictment.[150] Police chief İbrahim Şahin allegedly made phone calls to order the attack.[151][152] Two of the twelve were released the next day.[153] A map indicating the location of arms caches was found on detainee İbrahim Şahin; the former chief of the police force's Special Operations Department (Turkish: Özel Harekat Dairesi). Excavations are underway; numerous weapons have been found.[154] This wave was particularly divisive, as it included numerous senior military officials. There is a concern that the move was politically motivated, and will affect the direction of the investigation.[155]
Most suspects face at least ten years in prison. The suspected ringleaders, Doğu Perinçek, Mehmet Fikri Karadağ, Veli Küçük, İlhan Selçuk and Muzaffer Tekin will be held responsible for criminal acts perpetrated by subordinates, and receive life sentences.[156]

Munitions

A common objection raised by detractors of the investigation is that the group does not have the wherewithal to carry out large-scale militant acts. This section aims to clarify what is known about the organization's munitions. This is also of relevance to linking acts carried out by the organization, as it has been alleged that weapons of the same type and serial number were found in several locations. Debate has focused in particular on the grenades, which can be uniquely identified by the fuse type (Turkish: fünye grubu) and batch number (Turkish: kafile numarası).[157]
According to police officials, "HGR DM 41" indicates German origin, SPLITTER denotes a fragmentation grenade, "COMP-B" means composition B, "LOS" indicates European production up to NATO standards, while the number following "FMP" indicates the batch.[158]
Akhisar and Eyüp One of the two grenades recovered in Akhisar, Manisa had the serial number HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 24. Another grenade from Eyüp, İstanbul had the serial number HGR DM 41 COMP-B LOS FMR-24.[158]
Urla, İzmir (1999) One of the ten grenades had the serial number HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 16.[158]
Şemdinli (2005) Two grenades used in the Şemdinli incident on 9 November 2005 were found to bear the serial number HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 134.[159]
Cumhuriyet (2006) Alparslan bombed the offices of the newspaper Cumhuriyet in May 2006. The grenades did not go off in his first two attempts; he succeeded on his third. The NATO standard, Makine ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKE) model 44 grenades had the following serial numbers:[157]
  • TAPA M 204 A 2/KF-MKE-91 12-77 (5 May 2006)
  • TAPA M 204 A 2/KF-MKE-173 9-85 (10 May 2006)
  • TAPA M 204 A 2/KF-MKE-91 12-77 (11 May 2006)
The part before the slash denotes the fuse type, while the part after it denotes the batch number. For example, the batch number of the first entry means 'batch 91, December 1977'. The army bought 8800 such grenades from the MKE in 1978.[94]
Ümraniye, İstanbul (12 June 2007) The serial numbers of some of the 27 grenades found in Ümraniye are:[159]
  • HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 16
  • HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 24
  • HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 22
  • TAPA M 204 A2/KF-MKE-169 5-85[157]
These grenades are registered to the Hasdal barracks in Istanbul.[160]
Fikret Emek (26 June 2007) The recovered materiel included 11kg of C-3, a telescopic rifle, a Kalashnikov, a shotgun, M-16 shells, 12 grenades (10 from the MKE), smoke bombs, 12 210g TNT setups, 6 500g TNT moulds, a 1.5kg TNT mould, a 1 kg demolition block, ignition munitions. This is sufficient to flatten a twelve-floor reinforced concrete structure, with each floor over 400 m2.[161] The grenades have serial number TAPA M204 A2/KF-MKE-91 12-77, matching the ones from the Cumhuriyet attack.[157][103]
Trabzon (13 December 2008) With the help of a tip-off on 3 December 2008,[162] the Trabzon police found nine grenades of the same batch number as those in Ümraniye. In nearby Yomra, the police seized a gun and eight 7.65 mm bullets for it, a Kalashnikov rifle and three chargers, a total of 420 7.62 mm Kalashnikov bullets and a grenade. In the city, eight grenades were found; seven hidden inside a washing machine, and another in an oven. Trabzon governor Nuri Okutan said that none of the suspects were public officials or members of the military.[163] The serial numbers of the Trabzon grenades are:[159]
  • HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 143
  • HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 197
  • HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 125
The grenades in Ümraniye had also been found following a tip-off in Trabzon. However, the former tip-off was to the gendarmerie rather than the police.[162]
Mustafa Dönmez (7 January 2009) 22 grenades, over 100 bullets, 1 Kalashnikov, and 4 pistols were found in Dönmez's vacation house in Sakarya.[103]
İbrahim Şahin (7 January 2009) Three drawings and 9 unlicensed Glock pistols were found in the home of special forces police chief İbrahim Şahin. The drawings led to the excavation of 8000 bullets (mostly Uzi), 2 light-weight anti-tank weapons, 1 kg of plastic explosives, 10 hand grenades whose serial numbers had been removed and 10 smoke bombs. The recovered weapons were determined to be buried in July 2008 (the month generals Eruygur and Tolon were detained). They are reported to be different from the ones that were entrusted to Şahin's department and went missing after Susurluk scandal.[164]

Response

Many people have criticized the manner in which the Ergenekon investigation is being conducted, citing in particular the length of the indictment,[165] wiretapping in breach of privacy laws,[166][167] illegal collection of evidence,[168] and political motivations.[129][169] The media's coverage of the investigation has also been criticized—for bombarding readers with speculations,[170] and releasing misinformation outright.[171][172]
Some have said that the investigation is intended to clamp down on the incumbent party's secular opposition, pointing to the coincident timing of the dissolution case against the AKP and the Ergenekon probe.[173] Superficially, the chronology surrounding the two events would seem to suggest otherwise, as the AKP dissolution case was started on 14 March 2008,[174] whereas the bombs in Ümraniye which exposed the network were discovered nine months earlier, on 13 June 2007.[175] However, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) had presented a diagram of the network to prime minister Erdogan and the chief of staff in 2003—well before the investigation.[176] Furthermore, the government had the Ergenekon files since 2001.[177] Ankara University's Baskın Oran sees such reactions as indicative of the left's inability to accurately assess the situation, and says that the state is simply purging itself of undemocratic elements.[178] Murat Belge of Istanbul Bilgi University thinks there is a connection between the dissolution case against the AKP and the Ergenekon investigation, and says the Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul Günay admits as much.[179] Belge was tortured in 1972 by Veli Küçük at the infamous Ziverbey villa; a Counter-Guerrilla intimidation operation.[17]
Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Mark Parris, said that one of the most important actors in the current crisis in Turkey are the unknown third forces behind the Ergenekon probe that may be acting on behalf of the prime minister, or that the prime minister may or may not know about. The alleged unknown forces, organized in the Police Intelligence department and has prosecutors, seem to be united against the front that want to topple Erdogan and are determined to stop them.[180][181]
In August 2008, 300 intellectuals from Turkey declared their support for the investigation and called upon all civil and military institutions to deepen the investigation in order to reveal the rest of the people tied to Ergenekon.[182]
In September 2008, the Justice and Development Party became mired in a corruption scandal related to the Deniz Feneri ("Lighthouse") charity based in Germany. The Doğan Media Group, in particular, jumped on the scandal, leading to a public feud between its owner, Aydın Doğan, and the prime minister, Erdoğan.[183] The former chief of the MİT's defunct Counter-Terrorism Department, Mehmet Eymür, described the affair as a retaliation by Ergenekon.[184][185]

Trial hearings

The trials were held up when some of the suspects' lawyers exercised their right to have the indictment—all 2,455 pages of it—read out loud.[186] Most of the time from the third hearing on 27 October to the eleventh on 10 November was devoted to reading it.[187]
In a separate trial, the Şişli Second Criminal Court concluded that the organization does not exist and sentenced author Zihni Çakır to 18 months in prison for "violating the secrecy of an ongoing legal investigation"[188] and chided him libeling the Turkish Armed Forces.[189] The judge who penned the verdict, Hakkı Yalçınkaya, was shown to have a suspicious relationship with Kemal Kerinçsiz, according to a phone conversation from December 2007, recorded under warrant. Yalçınkaya was one of the judges on the case of Hrant Dink; a person Kerinçsiz was particularly critical of.[190]
Suspect Ali Yiğit, whose uncle owned the house in Ümraniye, testified at the thirteenth hearing that the bombs in the house belonged to Oktay Yıldırım.[191]
At the twenty third hearing, defendants Mehmet Zekeriya Öztürk and Vatan Bölükbaşoğlu were questioned about their alleged possession of pornography. Öztürk said the laptop in which the images were found was not his. Bölükbaşoğlu said the images attributed to him may have been planted by the police.[192] Fikret Emek, who retired from the Special Forces Command (Turkish: Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı) in 2004, was questioned about explosives and guns he had allegedly captured from the PKK and entrusted to his mother in Eskişehir. Emek said that the weapons were with his mother for fifteen years, and no longer functional. The TNT was allegedly from 1950, and the grenades from 1977-78 and 1984. Judge Köksal Şengün questioned Emek over why he did not turn over the capture weapons to the military, and Emek condeded that he had made a mistake.[161]
At the twenty sixth hearing on December 15, Veli Küçük's lawyer, his daughter Zeynep, pointed out discrepancies between statements attributed to his father mentioned in different parts of the indictment and its annexes.[193] The lawyer also pointed out contradictions in the statements of Osman Yıldırım (convicted of bombing Cumhuriyet).[194] Veli Küçük said he was bewildered that the "state" had framed him. Former JITEM operative Abdülkadir Aygan and Susurluk Commission member Fikri Sağlar both interpreted this as a message from Küçük to his peers in the deep state ("the Establishment") that he would confess unless they soon come to his rescue.[195][196]




References


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    İşkencecilerin başında General Memduh Ünlütürk bulunmaktadır."
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  49. ^ "Ergenekon 1992'de Gebze'de kuruldu" (in Turkish). Yeni Şafak. 2008-08-04. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=04.08....1&i=132848. Retrieved on 2008-12-17. "Ergenekon 1992'de Veli Küçük'ün Gebze'deki makam odasında yapılan bir toplantıyla birlikte kuruldu. Kurucusu Veli Küçük'tür. Toplantıda Veli Amca, Sedat Peker ve iki kişi daha vardı."
  50. ^ Karabat, Ayse (2008-03-02). "EU process victim of and solution to Ergenekon". Sunday's Zaman. http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detay...&link=3266. Retrieved on 2008-10-23. "Consider that the biggest name so far in Ergenekon is Veli Küçük, and he is not even among the top 10 of the Ergenekon leadership."
  51. ^ Ocak, Serkan (2008-12-26). "1 numara’yı sadece mahkeme görebilir" (in Turkish). Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?a...eID=914404. Retrieved on 2008-12-27.
  52. ^ Tayyar, Şamil (2008-12-03). "Son yazımdır 1 Numara’ya dair" (in Turkish). Star. http://www.stargazete.com/gazete/yazar/s...152622.htm. Retrieved on 2008-12-19.
  53. ^ Subasi, Cemal; Ongun, Selin (2008-08-07). "1 numara kim?" (in Turkish). Tempo 1079. http://www.tempodergisi.com.tr/politika/16140/. Retrieved on 2008-11-16.
  54. ^ "Ergenekon iddianamesi açıklanıyor... İddianamede ne var, ne yok?" (in Turkish). Milliyet. Anadolu Agency. 2008-07-15. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/default.aspx?...eID=893264. Retrieved on 2008-11-19. "Bu örgüt ismi, soruşturmayı yapan savcılarımız tarafından konulmuş bir isim değildir. Zira Cumhuriyet Savcılarının yapmış bulundukları soruşturmalarda herhangi bir isim konulmaz. Böyle bir uygulama söz konusu değildir. İddianamede yer alan ve kamuoyunda ’Ergenekon’ olarak vasıflandırılan bu isim, bir örgütün yapılanmasında örgüt mensubu olarak iddia edilen kişilerin kendilerinin örgütlerine verdikleri bir isimdir. Bu itibarla bu şekilde zikredilmiştir."
  55. ^ (in Turkish)Ergenekon İddianamesi. Milliyet. pp. 32. http://i.milliyet.com.tr/ergenekon/iddia...x?sayfa=32. Retrieved on 2008-11-19. "Türk tarihine ait önemli bir kavram ve bilinen Türk Destanının da adı olan Ergenekon ile terör örgütü kelimelerinin iddianamede yan yana getirilmesi Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığımızın tercihi olmayıp, sözü edilen örgütün ele geçen yazılı dokümanlarında 'Ergenekon' olarak adlandırılmasının zorunlu bir sonucudur."
  56. ^ Becerikli, Uğur (2008-02-01). "Operasyonda Ergenekon ismi MHP'lileri kızdırdı". Sabah. http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/02/01/hab...E0075.html. Retrieved on 2008-11-19.
  57. ^ (in Turkish)Ergenekon İddianamesi. Milliyet. pp. 1094. http://i.milliyet.com.tr/ergenekon/iddia...sayfa=1094. Retrieved on 2008-11-19.
  58. ^ "Veli Küçük'ün komutanı Ergenekon: Vatan hainleri soyadımı kirletti" (in Turkish). Zaman. 2008-07-19. http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno...i-kirletti. Retrieved on 2008-11-19.
  59. ^ Insel, Ahmet (2008-12-07). "Özel Harp Dairesi’nden Jitem’e" (in Turkish). Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?a...eID=911847. Retrieved on 2008-12-27.
  60. ^ "‘Ergenekon Temel Belgesi’ni ortaya Fehmi Koru çıkarmış" (in Turkish). Milliyet. 2008-09-23. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Default.aspx?...ri=siyaset. Retrieved on 2008-09-23.
  61. ^ Kıvanç, Taha (2001-04-30). "Hayaller gerçek galiba" (in Turkish). Yeni Şafak. http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2001/NISAN...ivanc.html. Retrieved on 2008-09-23.
  62. ^ Alus, Esra (2008-07-29). "Ergenekon banka kuracak, ticaret yapacakmış!" (in Turkish). Milliyet. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Guncel/HaberD...kon%20bank!. Retrieved on 2008-08-10.
  63. ^ "Ergenekon İddianamesi" (in Turkish). Milliyet: p. 32. http://i.milliyet.com.tr/ergenekon/iddia...x?sayfa=32. Retrieved on 2008-09-23.
  64. ^ Güney, Sedat (2008-09-25). "Ex-police chief Saçan probed over Ergenekon cover-up allegations". Today's Zaman. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=154262. Retrieved on 2008-11-15.
  65. ^ Arslan, Adem Yavuz (2009-01-07). "İşte Türkiye'yi sarsacak o gizli belge" (in Turkish). Bugün. http://www.bugun.com.tr/haber_detay.asp?haberID=50231. Retrieved on 2009-01-07.
  66. ^ Berkan, Ismet (2009-01-08). "Manipülasyon ve Ergenekon". Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?a...egoryID=97. Retrieved on 2009-01-07.
  67. ^ Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (2008-11-26) (in Turkish). Response to an article in the newspaper Sabah. Press release. http://www.mit.gov.tr/basin39.html. Retrieved on 2008-11-27.
  68. ^ "MİT'ten Güney açıklaması" (in Turkish). Sabah. 2008-11-27. http://www.sabah.com.tr/haber,53F384A2EA...596F4.html. Retrieved on 2008-11-27.
  69. ^ "MİT sent Güney to infiltrate Ergenekon, document shows". Today's Zaman. 2008-11-27. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...&bolum=101. Retrieved on 2008-11-27.
  70. ^ Gürol, Nezih (2008-08-29). "Tuncay Güney’in davası 7 yıldır sürüyor" (in Turkish). Milliyet. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/Haber...20davalari. Retrieved on 2008-11-16.
  71. ^ Ocak, Serkan (2008-11-07). "‘Güney’in ifadesinden 42 sayfa eksik’" (in Turkish). Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?a...eID=907267. Retrieved on 2008-12-04. "Bu kişiden çıkan belgelerden dolayı birçok sanık huzurdadır. Ancak bu kişi hakkında dava açılmıyor. Bunu engelleyen nedir? Savcıyla bu kişi arasında bir anlaşmamı vardır."
  72. ^ "Tuncay Güney'e terör örgütü üyeliğinden soruşturma". Radikal. Anadolu Agency. 2008-12-04. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?a...eID=911405. Retrieved on 2008-12-04.
  73. ^ "Güney'e dair davalar için 'Ergenekon' incelenecek" (in Turkish). CNN TÜRK. 2008-10-27. http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/10/2...index.html. Retrieved on 2008-12-10.
  74. ^ Maman, Kamil (2008-12-14). "Tuncay Güney'in cip davasının Ergenekon'la birleştirilmesi gündemde" (in Turkish). Zaman. http://zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=770...i-gundemde. Retrieved on 2008-12-18.
  75. ^ "Tuncay Güney'in ifadesi için hukuki işlem başlatılacak" (in Turkish). Zaman. 2008-12-18. http://zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=771...slatilacak. Retrieved on 2008-12-18.
  76. ^ Kazanci, Murat; Canikligil, Razi (2009-01-08). "Öz’ün 37 sorusuna Güney’den jet yanıt: Ben de soracağım" (in Turkish). Hürriyet. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/10728436.asp. Retrieved on 2009-01-07. "Beni kim sorgulayacak, Türk polisi mi? Yoksa Kanada polisi mi? Kanada’da demokrasi var. Nasıl olacağını bilmiyorum. Avukatımı da çağırırım, gelirler, oturur konuşuruz. Ben de onlara bir 37 soru hazırlarım. Bu soruları size de veririm aynı onlar gibi gazetede yayımlarız."
  77. ^ Önal, Ayşe (2008-07-24). "Veli Küçük beni işten kovdurttu" (in Turkish). Yeni Şafak. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=24.07....1&i=130671. Retrieved on 2008-11-21. "Tuncay doğruları, içine inanılmaz senaryolar ekleyerek anlatıyor."
  78. ^ Semin Gümüşel, Sibel Düler, Adem Demir (2008-11-04). "Tuncay Güney kimdir?" (in Turkish). Newsweek Türkiye. http://www.newsweekturkiye.com/haberler/...ney-kimdir. Retrieved on 2008-12-02. "Avukatı olarak bana doğru söylemiyorsa kimseye söylemiyordur. Hakkındaki bilgi kirliliğine Tuncay bizzat sebep oluyor, popüler olmayı ve gündemde olmayı seviyor. İddialarının yüzde 90'nı kendi yarattığı dünyaya has."
  79. ^ "Kilit haham iddianamede yok". Hürriyet. Dogan News Agency. 2008-07-14. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/943324...9&sz=36900. Retrieved on 2008-11-19. "Ceza Muhakemesi Kanununda iddianamenin iadesi için 15 günlük inceleme süresi içerisinde soruşturma dosyasındaki kısıt kararına rağmen tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla, Tuncay Güney'in ne sanık olarak ne de itirafçı olarak iddianamede ifadesinin alınmadığını öğrenmiş bulunmaktayız. İddianamenin iadesini düzenleyen maddede suçun sübûtuna etki edeceği mutlak sayılan mevcut bir delil toplanmadan düzenlenen iddianamenin iade edileceği hususu düzenlenmiştir. Bu çerçevede, güya Ergenekon Örgütünün kuruluş metinlerini yazdığını kendi ağzıyla ifade eden Tuncay Güney'in iddianamede ifadesinin yer almaması esaslı bir eksikliktir. Yani Tuncay Güney de var ise Ergenekon Örgütünün mensubu ve suçlusudur. Bu halde olsa olsa Tuncay Güney itirafçı olabilecektir. Ancak bunun içinde Tuncay Güney'in ifadesine başvurulmuş olması gerekmektedir."
  80. ^ Altintas, E Baris (2008-12-03). "Ergenekon critics use Güney as ploy". Today's Zaman. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=160499. Retrieved on 2008-12-02.
  81. ^ Ergin, Sedat (2008-12-02). "Tuncay Güney ve Zaman gazetesi" (in Turkish). Milliyet. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aT...gin&ver=69. Retrieved on 2008-12-04.
  82. ^ Ergin, Sedat (2008-12-04). "Zaman gazetesine yanıtlar -ikinci bölüm" (in Turkish). Milliyet. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aT...at%20Ergin. Retrieved on 2008-12-04.
  83. ^ Tayyar, Şamil (2008-11-12). "Aydın Doğan Ergenekon’dan nasıl sıyırdı?" (in Turkish). Star. http://www.stargazete.com/gazete/yazar/a...146923.htm. Retrieved on 2008-11-16.
  84. ^ FarukArslan.com (2008-12-10) (in Turkish). Tuncay Güney Hürriyet'i yalanladı. Press release. http://www.farukarslan.com/articles/publ..._669.shtml. Retrieved on 2008-12-11.
  85. ^ "Hürriyet: Tuncay Güney iftira atıyor" (in Turkish). Yeni Şafak. 2008-12-12. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=12.12.2008&i=155593. Retrieved on 2008-12-13.
  86. ^ Tanış, Tolga (2008-12-12). "HÜRRİYET MUHABİRİ, YENİ ŞAFAK'IN İDDİALARINA YANIT VERDİ" (in Turkish). Medyatava. http://www.medyatava.com/haber.asp?id=49050. Retrieved on 2008-12-24.
  87. ^ "Ergenekon beni büyük bir eyleme hazırlıyordu" (in Turkish). Yeni Şafak. 2008-02-25. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=25.02.2008&i=102027. Retrieved on 2008-12-13.
  88. ^ "Kalaşnikof verip ‘hazırlan’ dediler" (in Turkish). Star. 2008-02-27. http://www.stargazete.com/politika/kalas...-88860.htm. Retrieved on 2008-12-13.
  89. ^ "Ergenekon İddianamesi" (in Turkish). Milliyet: pp. 33,34. http://i.milliyet.com.tr/ergenekon/iddia...x?sayfa=33. Retrieved on 2008-12-10.
  90. ^ Şardan, Tolga; Tahincioğlu, Gökçer (2008-07-23). "Bombanın kilidi Tekin" (in Turkish). Milliyet. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/default.aspx?...eID=970060. Retrieved on 2008-12-10.
  91. ^ Tayyar, Şamil (2008-11-19). "Açıklıyorum" (in Turkish). Star. http://www.stargazete.com/gazete/yazar/a...-92746.htm. Retrieved on 2008-11-19. "Aslında Ergenekon operasyonu, 12 Haziran 2007 günü Ümraniye Çakmak Mahallesi Güngör Sokak’taki bir gecekonduya yapılan baskınla başladı. O gecekonduda 27 el bombası bulundu. Bu bombalarla aynı seriden bombaların Türkiye’nin değişik bölgelerindeki 14 ayrı olayda kullanıldığı tespit edildi."
  92. ^ "Ergenekon bombaları Türkiye’yi kuşatmış" (in Turkish). Star. 2008-08-09. http://www.stargazete.com/politika/ergen...119627.htm. Retrieved on 2008-11-19.
  93. ^ For details, refer to folder 415PDF of the annex.(Turkish)
  94. ^ a b Saymaz, Ismail (2008-07-19). "Ergenekon'da 'bomba' skandalı" (in Turkish). Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?a...egoryID=77. Retrieved on 2008-11-19. "Ayrıca Ümraniye bombalarının bulunduktan 14 gün sonra ‘saklanamadığı’ gerekçesiyle imha edildiği ortaya çıkmıştı."
  95. ^ "Ergenekon Reina'ya göz dikmiş" (in Turkish). Yeni Şafak. 2008-08-23. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=23.08.2008&i=135990. Retrieved on 2008-11-16.
  96. ^ "Ergenekon'da sorgulama başladı" (in Turkish). CNN TÜRK. 2008-11-11. http://cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/11/11/er...index.html. Retrieved on 2008-12-10.
  97. ^ a b c "'Ümraniye'deki bombalar Yıldırım'a ait'" (in Turkish). CNN TÜRK. 2008-11-13. http://cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/11/13/um...index.html. Retrieved on 2008-12-10.
  98. ^ Erdal, Busra; Acar, Erkan (2008-11-14). "Testimony: Ümraniye bombs were Ergenekon’s". Today's Zaman. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=158713. Retrieved on 2008-12-11.
  99. ^ Ocak, Serkan (2008-11-13). "Ergenekon'da sanıklar birbirini suçladı" (in Turkish). Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?a...egoryID=77. Retrieved on 2008-12-11. "Polislerin adına sohbet dedikleri sorgularda bana içlerinden sadece Mahmut Öztürk ve Oktay Yıldırım tanıdığım onlarca insanın fotoğrafını gösterdiler. Bombaların Oktay Yıldırım’a ait olduğunu söylemem için telkinde bulunuldu. Onun adını söylememem halinde 39 yıl hapis yatacağım söylendi."
  100. ^ "Ergenekon bomb link in unresolved cold cases". Today's Zaman. 2008-08-02. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...&bolum=100. Retrieved on 2008-08-14.
  101. ^ "Ergenekon indictment reopens gendarmerie major’s murder case". Today's Zaman. 2008-08-13. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=150071. Retrieved on 2008-08-14.
  102. ^ Erdogan, Eyup (2008-07-25). "Ergenekon düğümünü o çözecek" (in Turkish). Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?a...eID=890274. Retrieved on 2008-09-15.
  103. ^ a b c Güneç, Sedat; Sancar, Alper (2009-01-10). "Kazdıkça cephane çıkıyor" (in Turkish). Zaman. http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno...ne-cikiyor. Retrieved on 2009-01-09.
  104. ^ Demirkan, Öge (2008-11-29). "Bu 3 isim de MİT’e sorulsun" (in Turkish). Vatan. http://w9.gazetevatan.com/haberdetay.asp...tegoryid=1. Retrieved on 2008-11-30.
  105. ^ TK/TB (2008-09-09). "Ergenekon Case Prosecutors Under Investigation". Bianet. http://bianet.org/english/kategori/engli...estigation. Retrieved on 2008-09-11.
  106. ^ "Ergenekon savcılarına kötü haber" (in Turkish). Radikal. 2008-09-08. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?a...egoryID=77. Retrieved on 2008-09-08.
  107. ^ Akkaya, Betul (2008-09-10). "Inquiry against Öz reminiscent of Sarıkaya incident". Today's Zaman. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=152712. Retrieved on 2008-09-10.
  108. ^ "Turk gov't rejects inquiry for Ergenekon prosecutors". Hürriyet. 2008-09-12. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domes...3&sz=31204. Retrieved on 2008-09-12.
  109. ^ Ministry of Justice (2008-09-12) (in Turkish). Kamuoyunda 'Ergenekon' Olarak Bilinen Soruşturmayı Yürüten Savcılarla İlgili Şikayetler Hakkında Basın Açıklaması. Press release. http://www.adalet.gov.tr/duyurular/2008/...iklama.htm. Retrieved on 2008-09-12. "Özetle; söz konusu ihbar ve şikayetler üzerine 2802 sayılı Hâkimler ve Savcılar Kanunu çerçevesinde gerekli inceleme yaptırılmış olup, ilgili Cumhuriyet savcıları ve hâkim hakkında ileri sürülen iddiaların, 'Cumhuriyet savcısının delillerin toplanması, değerlendirilmesi ve suçun vasıflandırılması, hâkimin ise, yargı yetkisi ve takdir hakkı kapsamında kaldığı, adı geçen Cumhuriyet savcıları ile hâkimin bu hak ve yetkilerini herhangi bir şekilde kötüye kullandıklarına dair delil elde edilemediği' anlaşıldığından, ilgililer hakkında soruşturma izni verilmemiştir."
  110. ^ "No investigation into Ergenekon prosecutors, Justice Ministry announces". Today's Zaman. 2008-09-13. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=153032. Retrieved on 2008-09-12.
  111. ^ "Ergenekon savcıları hakkındaki dava başladı" (in Turkish). CNN Turk. 2008-11-27. http://cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/11/27/er...index.html. Retrieved on 2008-11-27.
  112. ^ "Öz dışında 2 ayrı savcı daha görevlendirildi" (in Turkish). CNN Türk. 2008-11-26. http://cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/11/26/oz...index.html. Retrieved on 2008-11-27.
  113. ^ a b c "Turkey charges 86 for 'coup plot'". BBC News. 2008-07-14. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7504900.stm. Retrieved on 2009-01-09.
  114. ^ Düzel, Neşe (2008-07-08). "Ali Bayramoğlu: 'Darbe toplantılarına gazeteciler katıldı'" (in Turkish). Taraf. http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazar.asp?mid=1157. Retrieved on 2008-07-12.
  115. ^ Montgomery, Devin (2008-07-12). "Turkey arrests two ex-generals for alleged coup plot". JURIST. http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/20...ls-for.php. Retrieved on 2008-07-07.
  116. ^ a b Ergenekon indictment reopens gendarmerie major’s murder case, Today's Zaman, 13 August 2008.
  117. ^ Kuseyri, Murat (2008-10-04). "JİTEM Ergenekon’un askeri kanadıdır" (in Turkish). Evrensel. http://www.evrensel.net/haber.php?haber_id=38255. Retrieved on 2008-10-21.
  118. ^ Balci, Kerim; Karabat, Ayse (2009-07-20). "Ergenekon investigation to shed light on Turkey’s dark history". Today's Zaman. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=147963. Retrieved on 2009-01-07.
  119. ^ Bitlis is mentioned in the indictment's annex; see for example file 323 (Turkish)
  120. ^ "Ergenekon linked to Mumcu murder". Today's Zaman. 2008-08-05. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=149402. Retrieved on 2008-08-14.
  121. ^ Baransu, Mehmet; Kuseyri, Alas (2008-03-26). "Darbe belgelendi" (in Turkish). Taraf. http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber.asp?id=3665. Retrieved on 2008-11-05.
  122. ^ "Özden Paşa'dan çok önemli açıklamalar" (in Turkish). Hürriyet. Anadolu Agency. 2008-07-07. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/h...2008-07-07. Retrieved on 2008-10-23. "Hakkında açılan davanın son duruşmasında bu habere dayanarak savcılığın aldığı raporun istenmesini talep ettiklerini belirten Görmüş, buna itiraz edildiğini, ayrıca “günlük”lerin yer aldığı CD'lerin yasa dışı yollardan ele geçirildiği ve hukuksal değeri olmadığının savunulduğunu anlattı."
  123. ^ "Ergenekon’da ne işi var" (in Turkish). Star. 2008-08-31. http://www.stargazete.com/politika/ergen...124540.htm. Retrieved on 2008-10-23.
  124. ^ "İstihbaratçıdan şok iddia: Apo Ergenekon üyesidir" (in Turkish). Zaman. 2008-09-22. http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno...n-uyesidir. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
  125. ^ 1998 Report from the [url=http://
Deep State Coup Averted in Turkey

by Christopher Deliso balkanalysis.com
On 22 January, Turkish police arrested 33 individuals, some connected with the military, in the largest concerted action against the "deep state" – that shadowy underworld linking extremists and criminals from the spheres of military, political, judicial and the academy. Some were accused of belonging to an ultranationalist group, Ergenekon, that was allegedly "preparing a series of bomb attacks aimed at fomenting chaos ahead of a coup in 2009 against Turkey's center-right government, whose European Union-linked reforms are opposed by ultranationalists." The ultranationalists (who also distrust the Erdogan government for its alleged Islamist agenda) were plotting to assassinate prominent cultural figures, such as Nobel-prize winning novelist Orhan Pamuk, journalist Fehmi Koru, and possibly Kurdish politicians. The deaths of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, two Italian priests and three Protestant missionaries have already been blamed on ultranationalists associated with the Ergenekon group.
The police had been investigating the group for the past few years, compiling in the process a dossier of some 7,000 pages. The current operation was sparked following a police raid in Istanbul this past summer, which recovered weapons (and some low-ranking military men). But the big fish, including two retired generals, were only caught in the recent police operation. While it seems to have been a major victory for the government and for Turkey in general, many have expressed cynicism that a completely thorough investigation will ever be accomplished. Because the case involves high-ranking officials from the military – that self-appointed guarantor of Turkey's secular, constitutional order – "it remains to be seen whether the cases will be brought to trial," states the Guardian.
But it is not so simple as just a matter of upholding army pride. The activities of the gang, which apparently ranged from false-flag terrorist attacks and assassinations to drug smuggling and espionage, are closely intertwined with the fortunes and affairs of the ruling class in Turkey. As editors and local commentators have been saying, to really act against the deep state is almost unimaginable; no one knows where the trail might ultimately lead.
Deep Background: The Cold War, NATO and the Rise of the Deep State
We do, however, know where it started – and why. Indeed, it is more than a bit ironic that the major recurring threat to society and political stability in Turkey over the past 60 years, the "Deep State," was actually enabled by the country's Western allies, and first of all, America. After WWII and with the creation of NATO, the military alliance created "secret armies" throughout Europe, consisting of so-called "stay behind" forces, charged with waging sabotage campaigns and resistance in the case of a Soviet invasion. However, they became prone to corruption, interference with domestic politics and society, and were in some cases involved with brutality against Leftists and the citizenry in general. While the most famous of NATO's secret armies was the Gladio operation in Italy, it was arguable in Turkey that this dangerous policy had the most serious long-term consequences, with the creation of a stay-behind force known as the Counter-Guerrillas.
The core of this covert paramilitary force was made up of right-wing radicals and fascists who espoused a narrative of inherent Turkish greatness and racial superiority, in the context of not only Turkey itself but of the ethnically Turkic republics of Central Asia (then under Soviet control); there were also the fond dreams of the bygone Ottoman Empire which, in its heyday, spread across the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans.
The Counter-Guerrillas were officially a part of the Turkish Army's Special Warfare Department, and housed in the US Military Aid Mission building in Ankara, according to a Los Angeles Times report from 1998. This department received funding and training from U.S. advisors to establish, as in other NATO states,"stay behind" squads of civilian irregulars who would theoretically vex the invading Soviets. Stocking the staff was accomplished partially through a nationwide "youth group," the Grey Wolves, established in 1969 under the aegis of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and its leader, Alparslan Türkes. This Counter-Guerrilla member and ultranationalist politician dreamed of creating the mythical "Turan" – a pan-Turkic empire which would stretch through the Central Asian republics, and include the Uighur Turks of western China's Xinjiang province.
Naturally, the Counter-Guerrillas and Grey Wolves also operated closely with Turkey's intelligence service, the MIT, and were used by right-wing governments to suppress civil liberties. Military coups in 1971 and 1980, and chronic massacres of civilian demonstrators throughout the 1970s, were all led by Counter-Guerrilla/Grey Wolves elements. The American intelligence services at times appear to have been supportive, regardless of the ominous implications for democracy. Immediately after the 1980 military coup that brought General Kenan Evren to power, American CIA Ankara station chief Paul Henze reportedly cabled Washington exulting, "our boys have done it." At that time, the Grey Wolves had 200,000 registered members and one million sympathizers nationwide, though the Turkish Deep State was still in embryonic form compared to the decade that was to come.
When domestic political fortunes changed, important figures such as Colonel Türkes, and other Grey Wolves were arrested. However, those who volunteered to fight against Kurdish and Armenian groups were often released. With the outbreak of war against the Kurdish PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers Party) in the 1980s, the covert force turned to "black ops" such as torturing and killing Kurds while disguised in PKK uniforms. Further, an Islamic terrorist organization, Turkish Hizbollah (not related to Hizbollah in Lebanon) was reportedly created by the Turkish military and the MIT in the 1980s, to divide the rebelling Kurds in the southeast. In all, up to 20,000 Islamic fighters, most of them Kurds, were indoctrinated and organized into proxy terrorist and assassination squads. Throughout the 1990s, Turkish Hizbollah murdered over 3,000 businessmen and ordinary civilians in assassinations and bombings. This monstrous creation was modeled on America's apparent success in Afghanistan, where it had created bin Laden's mujahedin to fight the Soviets.
The state's role with Turkish Hizbollah was confirmed in February 2000, when former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller admitted publicly that she had ordered the military to arm the group six years earlier. Çiller justified the jihadis as a necessary part of Turkey's own war on terror. In his book Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds, the former New York Times bureau chief in Istanbul, Stephen Kinzer, recounted Ms Çiller's scandalous statements. "Yes, it was my signature on the order to deliver those weapons," she said. "We met and made a decision. We decided that terror was the main issue and that whatever was necessary to stop it would be done... The military chief of staff, the governors, the police – everyone worked together on it."
The deep state also played a major role in heroin smuggling from Afghanistan through Turkey, a route which now accounts for around 90 percent of heroin smuggled into Europe. Like everything else, there were no clear-cut lines of control between political parties, ethnicities, or services. By 1998, for example, at least 15 MIT officers had been killed in the vicious internal battle between the intelligence service and the police over control of the drug trade. "Only criminal networks working in close cooperation with the police and the army could possibly organize trafficking on such a scale," concluded Le Monde Diplomatique. The celebrated former FBI translator and whistleblower Sibel Edmonds writes that "the Turkish government, MIT and the Turkish military, not only sanctions, but also actively participates in and oversees the narcotics activities and networks."
One such network was discovered in 1998, when Turkish police were accused of using their European embassies to aid smuggling. Huseyin Baybasin, known as "Europe's Pablo Escobar," masterminded the drug flow to Britain. According to the Guardian, the Kurdish kingpin was granted asylum there in 1995, in exchange for informing the British Customs & Excise service about Turkish officials involved in heroin trafficking. After his arrest in Holland soon thereafter, Baybasin disclosed that he had received "the assistance of Turkish embassies and consulates while moving huge shipments of drugs around Europe, and that Turkish army officers serving with NATO in Belgium were also involved. "The government kept all doors open for us," he said for the Guardian. "We could do as we pleased." A senior UK Customs officer stated that the drug barons evaded arrest, as they were "protected" at a high level.
The one single incident that encapsulates what the Turkish deep state is all about for many Turks occurred on November 3, 1996 near the town of Susurluk, on the Izmir-Istanbul road. A car crash there killed what would seem an unusual group of friends: the counterterrorism police chief, a Turkish beauty queen, and her lover, the former Grey Wolves leader and drug smuggler Abdullah Catli. Pistols with silencers and machine guns, plus false diplomatic passports, were found in the mangled car's trunk. The only survivor, Kurdish parliamentarian Sedat Bucak, was a tribal chief who administered a swathe of land in the Kurdish southeast as a liegeman of the government. He guarded it with his private army, and "thus acquired the power of life and death over the area's inhabitants," reported the French newspaper. For his part, Catli "was a heroin trafficker on Interpol's wanted list [and] was carrying a diplomatic passport signed by none other than the Turkish Interior Minister himself."
Catli's team of hired assassins were alleged to have worked from a "list" kept by Prime Minister Çiller. According to Le Monde Diplomatique, she hailed him as a "great patriot" at his ignominious funeral. Catli was known for racketeering people by warning them that they were on "Çiller's list"; if they paid up, he could get their names removed. However, "having pocketed the money, he then went on to have them kidnapped and killed, and sometimes tortured beforehand."
Signs of Continuity: Activities, Ideology and Personnel
The dramatic recent arrests of the Ergenekon gang show that the descendents of NATO's secret army in Turkey remain serious threats to internal stability – the extent to which seems to have surprised many Turks, judging from the tone of recent media reactions. Yet it also seems that there is now a popular will to oppose them, stronger perhaps than in years past. This week, across the Turkish media, the cry has gone out to slay the beast once and for all. While the American media seems content to not follow the story through to its logical conclusion, the Turks know better. Respected Turkish columnist Ali Bayramoglu sums it all up:
"…one looking for Ergenekon need not go too far. This is the story of Ergenekon – the Turkish Gladio – from the assassination of [journalist] Abdi I.pekçi [in 1979] to 'the massacre of March 16' [in 1978, when seven students at an Istanbul university were killed in a bomb attack], then peaking in Susurluk and possibly involved in the Council of State shooting [of a senior judge in 2006]."
Indeed, the similarities are striking, and not only in the use of strategic and deceptive organized violence for political ends. The very name of today's troublemakers, Ergenekon, is rhetorically loaded: as the Turkish Daily News reminds,
"…the name 'Ergenekon' implies an ideological link to the Turkish far-right, as in Turkic genesis mythology, it is believed that a gray wolf showed the Turks the way out of their legendary homeland, [the valley of] 'Ergenekon.' Turkish ultranationalists have used the name 'Grey Wolf' for decades."
Recent reports have also attested to a continued reliance on heroin smuggling for funding false-flag terrorism within Turkey. Turkish newspaper Zaman reports:
"…Germany's Niedersachsen State's anti-drug department, the LKA, which tapped the phones of some of the Ergenekon members as part of a narcotics investigation, proved that Ergenekon members were indeed in the drug business as well. The records of a Nov. 20, 2003 phone conversation between retired Capt. Muzaffer Tekin, arrested in June of last year as the owner of the munitions depot found in an Istanbul shantytown that started the Ergenekon operation, and Yilmaz Tavukçuoglu, an alleged drug trafficker, shows that Ergenekon used drug money to fund its activities."
Together with the continuity of violent activities intended, as in years past, to presage a military takeover, the Deep State's rumblings continue to be fuelled by drug profits and enlivened by the old fascistic brand of nationalism. An example is the professor and intellectual figurehead of the movement, Ümit Sayin, who in November urged followers to stage a coup d'état, describing himself "as being anti-Semitic, saying that Jewish people were fanatical, racist and in favor of religious law. 'Hitler was right about certain things,' he said."
In addition, the same cast of characters, some with direct connections to events of years past such as the Susurluk scandal, have been targets of the latest police action. The ringleader of the Ergenekon group, according to the Turkish media, is Veli Küçük, "a retired general who is also the alleged founder of a secret intelligence unit in the gendarmerie," a man who had hovered on the periphery of previous Deep State investigations; though Küçük's surreptitious squad, the JITEM, allegedly "carried out bombings and killings for which other groups were widely blamed," he somehow always managed to not be implicated (a Kurdish former informant quoted by Zaman charges that the general is covering for figures even higher-up sympathetic to the coup attempt).
Another former military man, retired army colonel Fikret Karadag, "also heads the Association for the Union of Patriotic Forces (VKGB)," one of several activist groups that have followed in the footsteps of the 1960s-era quasi-political organizations that fed the original Grey Wolves movement. Sami Hostan, another suspect, was "a key figure in the Susurluk investigation." Also arrested was Sevgi Erenerol, a former political ally of Alparslan Türkes, and spokeswoman for the so-called "Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate," a church without a congregation, simply a front and meeting place for nationalist agitators.
The most recent reports claim that Gen. Küçük "had tried to ring 'influential friends' just before his arrest on Jan. 22." Aware that police were closing in, the former general "made eight phone calls to 'influential friends,' telling them that the police were waiting at the door to take him into custody, and asked for help – but his pleas for help were rejected."
However, despite this eleventh-hour setback, other new information reveals the intricate web of plotters, from low-level assassins to high officials, involved in the plot. Zaman adds:
"…a plot to kill Turkey's only Nobel Prize-winning author, Orhan Pamuk, was also among Ergenekon's plans. Newspapers printed transcripts of recorded phone conversations between Spc. Sgt. Muhammed Yüce, Ret. Col. Fikri Karadag and Selim Akkurt, the trigger-man hired to do the job, whose phones were tapped with a court order. Officials say that Yüce, who was also arrested for being part of the Ergenekon organization, said in a phone conversation with the hit-man that he had spoken to Karadag about the planned Pamuk assassination. Yüce told Akkus, that an Istanbul businessman would financially support them as would a prosecutor and a judge in Istanbul's Kadiköy district.
Akkurt, who spoke in a worried tone, is quoted as saying he was concerned he might end up like Mehmet Ali Agca, a deep-state assassin who also shot the pope in the '70s. Akkurt expressed a desire to be like O.S., the teenager who shot Dink in January of last year, saying: 'He has trillions of lira in his account. Plus, those around him have become heroes.' In response to these words, Yüce was quoted as having said: 'You, me and Fuci will take care of Orhan Pamuk. We will have YTL [New Turkish Lira] 2 million in our accounts. Are you with me on this one?' Akkurt is heard giving an affirmative response to Yüce's question in the recordings.
Shortly after his conversation with Akkurt, Yüce sent a text message to a relative in which he wrote: 'We will take care of Orhan after the conference. They will put in [YTL] 5 billion into our account. They will give us a gas station and a villa. Sedat Peker will take care of us while we're in jail.' Peker is an ultranationalist mafia leader with apparent links to deep-state figures."
For Turkish sociologist Cem Özatalay, a wide consensus of powers had grown concerned enough to instigate the recent action: "it is clear that the USA, the General Staff and the AKP [Turkey's ruling party] have agreed to break the back of Ergenekon." Indeed, it is interesting to note that the robust action against the ultranationalist group unfolded not long after Turkish President Abdullah Gül returned from meetings with US President Bush in the White House. And, despite the significant participation of disgruntled elements in the army and former military officials in the plot, it seems clear that the Turkish military as an institution would prefer to keep the uneasy peace with the allegedly 'Islamist' government of Prime Minister Erdogan, rather than engage in old adventures that would diminish Turkey's standing abroad and quite possibly affect its ability to access Western military technology at a time when Turkey is trying to create an independent defense industry of its own. In denying army support for the coup attempt, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff General Yasar Buyukanit recently stated that "at every opportunity, there have been in the past and there continue to be efforts to link the armed forces with these kinds of things."
Uncharted Territory
Aside from keeping foreign policy leverage and ensuring defense industry cooperation, there might be a third reason why there was not wide support in the Turkish establishment, either civilian and military, for a coup, though at bottom it does have import for watchers of Turkey's deep state activities. This is the planned participation of Turkey (along with other American allies in the Middle East and North Africa) in an American-led program, GNEP, to create nuclear power plants as a means for alleviating energy strain and dependence on oil. On 22 January, as the Ergenekon arrests were going down in Turkey, Washington announced that the country would get the green light to go ahead with the program.
Aside from the rather alarming possible implications of juicing up, say, Saudi Arabia, there are other items of interest here, the most relevant being the question of why an agreement on nuclear technology transfer to NATO-ally Turkey had not been achieved long ago. Indeed, why not? As the AFP reported:
"…the deal stalled shortly after being signed in July 2000 because US agencies received 'information implicating Turkish private entities in certain activities directly relating to nuclear proliferation,' the White House said… 'the pertinent issues have been sufficiently resolved.'"
Whether through a remarkable harmonic convergence of events or just plain coincidence, the GTEP deal is peaking just at the moment Turkey appears to be gaining the upper hand in the struggle against the deep state – and, not to mention, at just the same moment that London's Sunday Times has come out with a serial investigation on what would seem to be exactly this subject: the role of Turkish deep state figures in the theft of American nuclear secrets, at precisely the moment American security agencies were stumbling across "information implicating Turkish private entities in certain activities directly relating to nuclear proliferation."
Some have speculated that legalizing the nuclear trade with Turkey is the Bush administration's way of retroactively legalizing the activities of any of the shadowy governmental figures that the Times alleges were involved with the illicit commerce, so that they cannot be touched in the event that their alleged misdoings are exposed. I do not know enough about how such legislation works to be able to comment on the likelihood of this or not, but even if so, it would seem a rather small element of what is a global program with objectives beyond securing the legacies of a few bad apple bureaucrats.
However, it certainly is remarkable that none of the Western media bodies reporting on the GNEP developments, or on the recent arrests in Turkey, have examined these events in the larger context of the historic US/NATO role in creating the Turkish deep state, and of what the Times alleges, not to mention attempting to put all the pieces together.
Maybe the pieces fit; maybe they don't. Yet unless the mainstream media (the only media well-funded enough to undertake a proper investigation) starts to take an interest, we will never know. After all, no one in officialdom is talking about the Times' allegations and yet, somehow, "the pertinent issues have been sufficiently resolved," says the White House. In other words, Turkey's proliferation violations have been solved – even though they have never been properly explained, or even admitted, by the powers that be.

Coup plotters similar to secret groups in Europe: Prosecutors

ISTANBUL - Hürriyet Daily News

Prosecutors of the plot case say the name Ergenekon stands for Turkey's secret organization, likening it to the counter guerrilla groups in Europe

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Istanbul's Silivri courthouse. AA photo


Ergenekon is a counter guerrilla organization similar to groups in Europe like Italy's secret organization Gladio, prosecutors have said in their final opinion in the coup-plot case.

"Ergenekon,' is the name of a secret organization in Turkey, like counter guerrilla groups in Europe, according to the evidence belonging to the Ergenekon terror organization," read the final opinion, prepared by the public prosecutors Mehmet Ali Pekgüzel, Nihat Taşkın and Murat Dalkuş, Anatolia news agency reported.

A secret paramilitary organization called Gladio was revealed in Italy and dismantled after sensitive investigations.

Prosecutors also said the Susurluk case, named after the town of Susurluk, where a fatal car crash in 1996 revealed the links between state security officers, organized criminals and politicians, was a revelation of the Ergenekon organization.

"A structure revealed 11 years ago after the Susurluk accident was in fact a small cell of the Ergenekon organization. Ergenekon' is a term belonging to Turkish culture, similar to the examples in Europe," said the final opinion. The term "Ergenekon" comes from a Turkish epic describing a mountain called Ergenekon as the birthplace of the Turks.

Wanted murder suspect Abdullah Çatlı, Police Chief Hüseyin Kocadağ and Deputy Sedat Bucak were found in the same car, which crashed with a truck near Susurluk in 1996.

"Despite the public support for shedding light on this case, only 14 people were prosecuted in the Susurluk case," said the prosecutors. The prosecutors also claimed that the existence of an organization called Ergenekon was certain, based on the evidence, documents and ammunition found belonging to the organization. The next hearing of the Ergenekon case will be held on April 8.

Prosecutors have demanded aggravated life imprisonment for a number of suspects, including former Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and Republican People's Party (CHP) lawmakers Mustafa Balbay, Mehmet Haberal and Sinan Aygün, Doğan News Agency reported.

The prosecutors also demanded aggravated life sentences for Gen. Nusret Taşdeler, former generals Hasan Iğsız, Hurşit Tolon and Şener Eruygur, as well as journalist Tuncay Özkan, on accusations of attempting to overthrow the government by force. The next trial will be held April 8.

MP's to remain arrested


The court ruled on March 18 that 67 suspects, including BaÅŸbuÄŸ, Balbay and Haberal, should remain under arrest, while rejecting the prosecutor's demands that six people currently under arrest should be freed pending trial, as well as a request that the court arrest 20 suspects currently being tried without arrest.

The court also rejected demands from defense lawyers that the judge should be recused from the case due to the trial's prolonged nature.

Meanwhile, the suspects have rejected the prosecutor's demand of aggravated life imprisonment, declaring the probe to be political.

"The target of this case is the republic's values, institutions, and [the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal] Atatürk's principles and revolutions. For these reasons, we reject the prosecutor's opinion on the alleged accusations," said a joint statement from the suspects that was read by lawyer Serkan Günel on March 18 to reporters during a break in the trial.

"Prosecutors have disregarded the laws. The fundamental principles of the law have been violated. The evidence in favor of the suspects has been ignored," said the statement.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ergenek...sCatID=338
Courageous truth-telling from the prosecution.

We shall see where this goes...