14-09-2021, 11:54 AM
The CIA Cover-up: Misfeasance or Malfeasance?
By now it is clear that,when Alec Station Deputy Chief Tom Wilshire reported to the 9/11 Joint Intelligence Inquiry that “something apparently was dropped somewhere, and we don’t know where that was,” he was not being entirely truthful.[127]
In fact, he and his co-workers, including his superiors—Alec Station Chief Richard Blee and CIA Director Tenet—were engaged in the concealment of what appear to have been ongoing CIA-GID operations.
These CIA officials took a number of active steps to conceal these operations from the FBI and members of the Clinton and Bush administrations.
These operations involved some of those who would later be accused of having a role in 9/11 and were conducted in collaboration with elements of the Saudi GID. This protection of the alleged 9/11 hijackers may have had a benign explanation in its earlier phases, for example, as an attempt to surveil the “real terrorists” within al-Qaeda cells.
But following al-Mihdhar’s involvement in the USS Cole bombing, and particularly after Wilshire’s identification of al-Mihdhar as a serious threat and his subsequent failure to act on that threat in July 2001, this innocent explanation is arguably untenable.
Kevin Fenton, in his book Disconnecting the Dots, concluded that “by the summer of 2001, the purpose of withholding had become to allow the attacks to go forward.”[128]
[Source: amazon.com]
We do not have sufficient evidence to know the extent to which Blee, Wilshire, and perhaps Tenet may have been privy to the scope and scale of the attacks. That said, Blee’s comments that there would be “significant terrorist attacks against the United States in the coming weeks or months” and that these “attacks will be spectacular” provide some hints at what they expected.[129]
Dating back to 1999, Blee’s role in cultivating relationships with the Uzbekistan government and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance also indicates that they could have expected the likely outcome of these spectacular attacks would be an invasion of Afghanistan.
Following the events of 9/11, Tenet engaged in a cover-up, which included making false statements under oath to protect Blee and Wilshire. At the same time, he rewarded Blee with a plum promotion to Kabul station chief, where Blee would carry out his role in the NSPD-9 plans for the Afghan invasion, plans which had been drawn up on September 4 and 10, 2001.
Finally, Tenet’s own actions to protect a prisoner being held in connection with the USS Cole bombing seemingly belie the “bumbling CIA” narrative put forth by Wilshire in his testimony. Given that this prisoner was apparently Anwar al-Awlaki, Tenet appears to have engaged in a type of protection analogous to the actions of Wilshire and Blee with respect to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. After all, al-Awlaki had been in contact with those two alleged hijackers before the USS Cole bombing, and he purchased plane tickets or provided housing for five of the alleged hijackers after the bombing. Tenet’s actions demand explanation.
While the slow trickle of information into the mainstream press about Saudi involvement in 9/11 seems to advance a fallback “Saudis-did-it” cover story, the arguments developed in this piece indicate CIA complicity in whatever operations the Saudi security services were running.
CIA protection for alleged hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was crucial, as without this protection, the FBI would likely have arrested them and many of the other alleged hijackers. Indeed, without al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar’s protection, al Qaeda’s apparent involvement in the 9/11 attacks may not have been so apparent.
That is to say that without this protection, the U.S. foreign policy establishment would have been deprived of the pretext they needed to convince the American public and politicians, as well as international alliances and institutions like NATO and the UN Security Council, of the need to launch the Global War on Terror. Ascribing sole responsibility for the 9/11 attacks to al Qaeda was the most important element of this pretext.
The evidence belatedly assembled herein renders that pretext essentially untenable at this point. It is our hope that new information about Saudi involvement in 9/11 does not distract from the demonstrable complicity of the CIA and other elements of the national security bureaucracy.
By now it is clear that,when Alec Station Deputy Chief Tom Wilshire reported to the 9/11 Joint Intelligence Inquiry that “something apparently was dropped somewhere, and we don’t know where that was,” he was not being entirely truthful.[127]
In fact, he and his co-workers, including his superiors—Alec Station Chief Richard Blee and CIA Director Tenet—were engaged in the concealment of what appear to have been ongoing CIA-GID operations.
These CIA officials took a number of active steps to conceal these operations from the FBI and members of the Clinton and Bush administrations.
These operations involved some of those who would later be accused of having a role in 9/11 and were conducted in collaboration with elements of the Saudi GID. This protection of the alleged 9/11 hijackers may have had a benign explanation in its earlier phases, for example, as an attempt to surveil the “real terrorists” within al-Qaeda cells.
But following al-Mihdhar’s involvement in the USS Cole bombing, and particularly after Wilshire’s identification of al-Mihdhar as a serious threat and his subsequent failure to act on that threat in July 2001, this innocent explanation is arguably untenable.
Kevin Fenton, in his book Disconnecting the Dots, concluded that “by the summer of 2001, the purpose of withholding had become to allow the attacks to go forward.”[128]
[Source: amazon.com]
We do not have sufficient evidence to know the extent to which Blee, Wilshire, and perhaps Tenet may have been privy to the scope and scale of the attacks. That said, Blee’s comments that there would be “significant terrorist attacks against the United States in the coming weeks or months” and that these “attacks will be spectacular” provide some hints at what they expected.[129]
Dating back to 1999, Blee’s role in cultivating relationships with the Uzbekistan government and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance also indicates that they could have expected the likely outcome of these spectacular attacks would be an invasion of Afghanistan.
Following the events of 9/11, Tenet engaged in a cover-up, which included making false statements under oath to protect Blee and Wilshire. At the same time, he rewarded Blee with a plum promotion to Kabul station chief, where Blee would carry out his role in the NSPD-9 plans for the Afghan invasion, plans which had been drawn up on September 4 and 10, 2001.
Finally, Tenet’s own actions to protect a prisoner being held in connection with the USS Cole bombing seemingly belie the “bumbling CIA” narrative put forth by Wilshire in his testimony. Given that this prisoner was apparently Anwar al-Awlaki, Tenet appears to have engaged in a type of protection analogous to the actions of Wilshire and Blee with respect to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. After all, al-Awlaki had been in contact with those two alleged hijackers before the USS Cole bombing, and he purchased plane tickets or provided housing for five of the alleged hijackers after the bombing. Tenet’s actions demand explanation.
While the slow trickle of information into the mainstream press about Saudi involvement in 9/11 seems to advance a fallback “Saudis-did-it” cover story, the arguments developed in this piece indicate CIA complicity in whatever operations the Saudi security services were running.
CIA protection for alleged hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was crucial, as without this protection, the FBI would likely have arrested them and many of the other alleged hijackers. Indeed, without al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar’s protection, al Qaeda’s apparent involvement in the 9/11 attacks may not have been so apparent.
That is to say that without this protection, the U.S. foreign policy establishment would have been deprived of the pretext they needed to convince the American public and politicians, as well as international alliances and institutions like NATO and the UN Security Council, of the need to launch the Global War on Terror. Ascribing sole responsibility for the 9/11 attacks to al Qaeda was the most important element of this pretext.
The evidence belatedly assembled herein renders that pretext essentially untenable at this point. It is our hope that new information about Saudi involvement in 9/11 does not distract from the demonstrable complicity of the CIA and other elements of the national security bureaucracy.
- Peter Dale Scott, “The Falsified War on Terror: How the US Has Protected Some of Its Enemies,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 11, no. 40 (October 1, 2013), https://apjjf.org/2013/11/40/Peter-Dale-...ticle.html. ↑
- Scott, “The Falsified War on Terror.” ↑
- Stephen Franklin, “Slain Muslim Had Link to Radical Cleric,” Chicago Tribune, July 11, 1993, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-x...story.html. ↑
- Douglas Jehl, “C.I.A. Officers Played Role In Sheik Visas,” The New York Times, July 22, 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/22/nyreg...visas.html. ↑
- Scott, “The Falsified War on Terror.” ↑
- “Ali Mohamed Case” (U.S. Department of Defense: Defense Human Resources Activity, n.d.), https://web.archive.org/web/20110227172332/http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/adr/counterterrorism/mohamed.htm. ↑
- John Kifner, “Police Think Kahane Slaying Suspect Acted Alone,” The New York Times, November 8, 1990, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/08/nyreg...alone.html. ↑
- “Ali Mohamed Case.” ↑
- Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 180. ↑
- Wright, The Looming Tower, 181. ↑
- Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI (New York: Regan Books, 2003), 30, 31, 32. ↑
- Wright, The Looming Tower, 181. ↑
- Scott, “The Falsified War on Terror.” ↑
- Selwyn Raab, “Jury Acquits Defendant in Kahane Trial,” The New York Times, December 22, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/22/nyreg...osition=46. ↑
- Ronald Sullivan, “Judge Gives Maximum Term in Kahane Case,” The New York Times, January 30, 1992, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/30/nyreg...osition=56. ↑
- Gil Stern and Stern Shefler, “‘Sharon Was Kahane Killer’s Target,’” Jerusalem Post, August 15, 2010, https://www.jpost.com/International/Shar...ers-target. ↑
- Scott, “The Falsified War on Terror.” ↑
- Estanislao Oziewicz and Tu Thanh Ha, “Canada freed top al-Qaeda operative,” The Globe and Mail, November 22, 2001, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/nat...le1034823/. ↑
- Scott, “The Falsified War on Terror.” ↑
- “Ali Mohamed Case.” ↑
- Ralph Blumenthal, “Tapes in Bombing Plot Show Informer and F.B.I. at Odds,” The New York Times, October 27, 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/27/nyreg...-odds.html. ↑
- Ralph Blumenthal, “Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb Used in Trade Center Blast,” The New York Times, October 28, 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/28/nyreg...blast.html. ↑
- Joseph Neffand and John Sullivan, “Al-Qaeda Terrorist Duped FBI, Army,” The News & Observer, October 21, 2001, reprinted at: https://web.archive.org/web/20030510044442/https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/554746/posts. ↑
- Neffand and Sullivan, “Al-Qaeda Terrorist Duped FBI, Army.” ↑
- Kevin Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots: How CIA and FBI officials helped enable 9/11 and evaded government investigations (Walterville, OR: Trine Day, 2011), 13, 14. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 15. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 13. ↑
- John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark: The CIA, NSA, and the Crimes of the War on Terror (New York: Hot Books, 2018), 25, 26. ↑
- “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001” (U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2002), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/joint-inquiry-intelligence-community-activities-and-after-terrorist-attacks-september-11-0#.
Cf. Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 61. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 46. ↑
- James Risen, “David H. Blee, 83, C.I.A. Spy Who Revised Defector Policy,” The New York Times, August 17, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/17/us/da...olicy.html. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 47. ↑
- Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 [New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 451-452. Blee is known as “Rich” throughout this book. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 47. ↑
- Coll, Ghost Wars, 456. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 46. ↑
- Coll, Ghost Wars, 456. ↑
- Coll, Ghost Wars, 459. ↑
- Ned Zeman, et al., “The Path to 9/11: Lost Warnings and Fatal Errors,” Vanity Fair, December 19, 2004, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2004/11/...-11-200411. ↑
- Coll, Ghost Wars, 461, 471, 472. ↑
- Coll, Ghost Wars, 539, 540. ↑
- Peter Dale Scott and Aaron Good, “Was the Now-Forgotten Murder of One Man on September 9, 2001 a Crucial Pre-condition for 9/11?” CovertAction Magazine, December 9, 2020. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 380. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 371. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 42. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 43, 44, 45. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 115, 116, 117. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 267. Wilshire is referred to by the pseudonym “John” throughout the report. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 284. ↑
- Chris Whipple, “‘The Attacks Will Be Spectacular’: An exclusive look at how the Bush administration ignored this warning from the CIA months before 9/11, along with others that were far more detailed than previously revealed,” Politico, November 12, 2015, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/...sh-213353/. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 267. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 270, 271, 272, 273. ↑
- Whipple, “‘The Attacks Will Be Spectacular.’” ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 289, 290. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 246. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 247. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 225. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 273. ↑
- Harry Samit, “Short Notice Legat Checks,” Email, August 15, 2001, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_eMail..._Moussaoui. ↑
- The 9/11 Commission Report, Justice Department OIG report, and an FBI agent in the Minneapolis Field Office, Coleen Rowley—all indicate that this arrest was done to prevent Moussaoui from becoming a possible imminent threat: Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 273; “The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui,” in A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (Office of the Inspector General, 2004), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/fi...apter4.htm.;
Coleen Rowley, “Coleen Rowley’s Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller: An Edited Version of the Agent’s 13-Page Letter,” Time, May 21, 2002, https://web.archive.org/web/200206011459...97,00.html.
Despite the imminent danger FBI agents on the ground saw, there has been speculation that Moussaoui was likely not involved in 9/11, and this is frequently mustered as a point in defense of the FBI’s inaction in this case. But despite alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s insistence that Moussaoui was being trained for a “second wave” of attacks, which was to follow 9/11, “The 9/11 Commission Report” indicates that Moussaoui was likely being trained as a possible pilot for the 9/11 plot. There are a number of reasons for this, including the fact that Binalshibh was ordered by KSM to give Moussaoui money “within the framework” of the 9/11 plot, and that these funds were being provided so Moussaoui could pay for flight training at a time when KSM indicated he was not planning a second wave attack. This would strongly indicate that Moussaoui was intended to have a role in the 9/11 plot: Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 246-247. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 246. ↑
- Charles Frahm, “Re: Fwd: 199M-MP-60130(Zacarias Moussaoui),” Email, August 24, 2001, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_eMail..._Moussaoui. ↑
- Rowley, “Coleen Rowley’s Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller: An Edited Version of the Agent’s 13-Page Letter.” ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 274; Philip Shenon, “The Terrible Missed Chance,” Newsweek, September
4, 2001. ↑
- Rowley, “Coleen Rowley’s Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller: An Edited Version of the Agent’s 13-Page Letter.” ↑
- “The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui.” ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 295. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 294. ↑
- Rowley, “Coleen Rowley’s Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller: An Edited Version of the Agent’s 13-Page Letter.” ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 296, 297. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 297. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 297, 298. ↑
- “The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui.” ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 296. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 299. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 291, 292. ↑
- “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly,” DCI Update: Terrorist Threat Review, August 23, 2001, https://coop.vaed.uscourts.gov/moussaoui...se/660.pdf. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 262. ↑
- “‘Meet the Press’ Transcript for May 6, 2007,” NBC News, May 6, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna18416169. ↑
- “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.” ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 275. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 85. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 47. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 380. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 8, 9. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 120, 121. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 121, 122. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 277. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 276, 277. ↑
- Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, “The Kingdom and the Towers,” Vanity Fair, June 30, 2011, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/08/...011-201108. ↑
- Michael Isikoff, “The Saudi Money Trail,” Newsweek, December 1, 2001, https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-money-trail-140813.; Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 232, 233. ↑
- Isikoff, “The Saudi Money Trail.” ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 111, 112. ↑
- Stephen Kalin and Reem Shamseddine, “Purge of Saudi Princes, Businessmen Widens, Travel Curbs Imposed,” Reuters (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, November 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi...SKBN1D60S6. ↑
- “Dallah Al Baraka Group,” D&B Business Directory, n.d., https://www.dnb.com/business-directory/c...1ca97.html. ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 111, 112. ↑
- Judicial Watch, “FBI Documents Raise Additional Questions About Saudi and al-Aulaqi Connections to 9/11 Attacks,” February 12, 2014, reprinted at: https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-re...tacks.html. ↑
- Isikoff, “The Saudi Money Trail.” ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 154. ↑
- Isikoff, “The Saudi Money Trail.” ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 112. ↑
- Isikoff, “The Saudi Money Trail.” ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 154. ↑
- Isikoff, “The Saudi Money Trail.” ↑
- Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 150. ↑
- James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006), 186-187. ↑
- James Risen, State of War, 186-187. ↑
- Prince Turki al-Faisal, “Allied Against Terrorism,” The Washington Post, September 17, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/o...9fdb38a9d/. ↑
- Peter Dale Scott, “Launching the U.S. Terror War: the CIA, 9/11, Afghanistan, and Central Asia,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 12, no. 3 (March 12, 2012), https://apjjf.org/2013/11/40/Peter-Dale-...ticle.html. ↑
- Alex Rubinstein, “Did the CIA pressure Yemen to release al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki?” Substack, March 22, 2021, https://realalexrubi.substack.com/p/leak...to-release. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 270, 271, 272, 273. ↑
- Brian Whitaker, “Piecing Together the Terrorist Jigsaw,” The Guardian, October 15, 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/o...anwhitaker. Cf. Fenton, 186, 187 ↑
- Rubinstein, “Did the CIA pressure Yemen to release al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki?” ↑
- Rubinstein, “Did the CIA pressure Yemen to release al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki?” ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 221. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 230. ↑
- Judicial Watch, “Docs Indicate FBI Knew Terrorist Anwar al-Aulaqi Purchased Airline Tickets for 9/11 Hijackers,” January 3, 2013, http://web.archive.org/web/2020022013051...-pentagon/. ↑
- Catherine Herridge, “Al Qaeda Leader Dined at the Pentagon Just Months After 9/11,” Fox News, October 10, 2010, https://www.foxnews.com/us/exclusive-al-...after-9-11. ↑
- Judicial Watch, “New Docs Reveal FBI Surveillance Team Trailed Terrorist al-Aulaqi to Pentagon for His Luncheon Speech to DOD Brass,” September 11, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/202002111246...dod-brass/. ↑
- Judicial Watch, “Docs Indicate FBI Knew Terrorist Anwar al-Aulaqi Purchased Airline Tickets for 9/11 Hijackers.” ↑
- Judicial Watch, “New Docs Reveal FBI Surveillance Team Trailed Terrorist al-Aulaqi to Pentagon for His Luncheon Speech to DOD Brass.” ↑
- Judicial Watch, “Docs Indicate FBI Knew Terrorist Anwar al-Aulaqi Purchased Airline Tickets for 9/11 Hijackers.” ↑
- J.M. Berger, “Anwar Al-Awlaki’s Links to the September 11 Hijackers,” The Atlantic, September 9, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/internationa...rs/244796/. ↑
- Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 221 (Endnote 33). ↑
- Jordy Yager, “Rep. Peter King investigating links between Anwar al-Awlaki, 9/11 hijackers,” The Hill, August 16, 2011, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/17704...-hijackers. ↑
- Judicial Watch, “New Documents Show FBI Kept Channels Open to Al-Aulaqi Despite Terrorist Designation,” September 30, 2014, reprinted at: https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/judici...09756.html. ↑
- “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.” Cf. Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 61. ↑
- Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 372. ↑
- Whipple, “‘The Attacks Will Be Spectacular.’” ↑