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KOCK STEPHAN ADOLPHUS

Zimbabwe 1958-1965 Britain 1978-1998
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Sssshh...
Strange things started happening when journalist David Hellier got stuck into
investigating possible British Government connivance in illegal arms sales to Iraq.
My introduction to the arms world came one morning a few months before the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War. I had arranged a meeting with the former chairman of Astra, a defence manufacturer that had run into trouble.
As a financial journalist, I wanted to know why his company had plummeted from being a high-flying stock market sensation to its then position of virtual bankruptcy. What he told me left me bewildered and intrigued. It also changed the direction of my career for the next few years as I tried to pursue some of the things he said.
He alleged that during the 1980-88 war between Iraq and Iran the British Government had actively encouraged the sale of weapons to Iraq, and possibly Iran, in spite of a declared veto on doing so; that British banks were actively supporting this effort and had highly-trained teams helping them do so; and that people close to the British Government, including possibly the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s son Mark, were making large sums of money from the arms trade.
I decided to introduce my new contact to the defence correspondent of the newspaper on which I worked, the London-based Sunday Correspondent. Together we pursued leads, and several weeks before the Gulf War in 1991 we published stories revealing how Britain had helped arm Saddam Hussein.
[size=12]‘Sensitive work’[/SIZE]
Things seemed to be going well at that stage. The Sunday Correspondent was an exciting, independent newspaper whose editor was supportive of the work we were trying to do in uncovering Government hypocrisy in its relationship with Iraq. And our line of questioning was causing nervousness in some institutions – the Midland Bank, for example. This bank – one of the four major British banks – had many millions of financial credits to Iraq.
During a briefing session with the Midland’s press officer we asked about a certain consultant to the bank called Stephan Kock, who also happened to be a director of Astra. What role did he have? The bank’s press officer told us that he was involved in bringing mainly civilian business to the bank and that he came in on a regular basis.
We then asked whether this was the same Mr Kock who had been tried and fined for firing a shotgun at two men in a quiet road in Argyllshire. When asked in court why he had been carrying a gun, Kock is reported to have replied: ‘because of the sensitive nature of my work’. As soon as we recounted this tale, the bank’s press officer changed tack and tried to disown the man. He suggested that he rarely came to the bank any more, that he was very much a ‘part-time’ consultant.
Three years later Mr Kock appeared before a UK Parliamentary Select Committee looking into the Iraqi ‘supergun’ affair. This concerned the illegal export of military equipment from Britain to Iraq. To this day the Midland has never satisfactorily explained what sort of work Mr Kock did for the bank, nor why the bank was so supportive to Iraq during the 1980s even after Saddam Hussein’s genocidal gassing of thousands of Kurds.
Then, in the summer of 1990 the editor of the Sunday Correspondent was replaced by a new editor who showed little interest in the story. The paper had also started employing a former defence secretary, Sir John Nott, as a consultant. His job was to try to raise new funds for the paper. But he also considered it part of his duty to ask each of us what stories we were working on. I did not mention to him my interest in the arms to Iraq affair and felt there was little point in pushing the story much further.
Accidents and a death
During this period something happened to unsettle me. I was walking home one night on the pavement of a busy main road when a car slid onto the pavement and knocked me to the ground. I was shocked but not badly hurt. Though I believed this to be an accident my contacts in the defence world thought otherwise. They told me that it was also likely my phone was being tapped and that I was being followed. I had no evidence of this, but it was worrying all the same. On one occasion I spotted a photographer taking pictures of me with one of my contacts as we sat in a pub during one of his days on release from prison.
I then discovered that another journalist, who was working on the same story at the London Observer newspaper, had received a warning that something might happen if she continued her investigations. Her paper took this seriously and put her up in a hotel for a few days.
Other things happened to disturb me. One of my contacts died suddenly, days after giving me a lift to the trial of the former chief executive of Astra who was being charged with corruption. The person in question, Lionel Jones, complained on the way down to the trial about a boil on his neck. Whilst his sudden death appeared to me to be bad luck, again my contacts thought otherwise.
It soon became clear to me that I would need some sort of support from my newspaper if I were to continue working on the story. At the very least I would need somebody to talk to. This was not forthcoming at the re-styled Sunday Correspondent whose editors did not think I should be spending time on this story. I was effectively silenced. I moved on to the Independent newspaper, where I was able to work intermittently on the story whilst doing more regular financial journalism.
Then, in early summer 1992 the Parliamentary Select Committee stepped up its inquiries into the Iraqi ‘supergun’ affair. When did the Government know about the ‘supergun’? Why did it allow firms to carry on supplying it? And why, having arrested the people who did so, did customs officers then drop all charges against the accused?
For a few weeks the Independent became keen on the arms story. Alas, just as I was making progress and provoking the threat of injunctions from some fairly powerful people, the paper moved me on to another story which was considered more important. I decided to leave.
Secret links
I spent the next year making two television programmes for Channel 4 about the arms trade.
As our programmes neared completion a significant event occurred. Three executives from the firm Matrix-Churchill, charged with exporting machine tools to Iraq for military use, were cleared after documents read out in court showed how they had kept MI5 – the British Government security service – informed about their activities throughout.
At last the story caught the media’s attention. It was on every front page. The Government, worried by the prospect of a trial-by-media, set up an Inquiry under Lord Justice Scott to investigate some aspects of the scandal. At the time of writing the investigation is still under way.
Why had it all taken so long? Already, back in 1989 there were journalists on a number of leading newspapers who suspected that the Government had been playing a double game with Iraq; that it had been telling people one thing and doing something quite different. There were also journalists who realized that a number of business people who had been charged for various arms offences could never be successfully prosecuted because of what they knew about the Government’s misdemeanours.
The reasons for this delay and silence are manifold. First, there is the official secrecy that surrounds the arms trade and the difficulty in getting hold of official documentation. Second, the reluctance of the mainstream press to put adequate resources into challenging the powerful interests of the arms companies and their beneficiaries. And finally, the lack of interest shown by politicians on both the Right and the Left.
The result is this: weapons of mass destruction are sold to tyrannical regimes and the activities of banks and governments are only revealed when the main protagonists have long departed. The public, meanwhile, has the wool pulled over its eyes.
David Hellier is now a freelance journalist. He has recently worked as a consultant on a new film on the defence industry by John Pilger and David Munro.

http://www.newint.org/issue261/sssh.htm
The Big 'Allivane-Astra' Picture. The Trail of Illegal Weapons Sold To Iran And Iraq Starts In Washington And London

Greg Szymanski – Arctic Beacon January 30, 2006

The devil's playground in the Arab sand over the last 25 years has provided crooked politicians on both sides of the Atlantic a handsome profit. While hundreds of thousands of innocents have died a bloody death, the "masters of evil" in the illegal arms trade continue to sell their "dirty toys" under the cover of darkness and through a system of secret companies hidden from public scrutiny.

Many have died trying to expose their wicked game, including microbiologist Dr. David Kelly (2003) and Gerald Bull (1990), the former chairman of the Space Research Corporation.

Although both deaths remain suspicious and never thoroughly investigated, Dr. Kelly and Bull were extremely close and casting a dark light on the clandestine, illegal money-raising deals by U.S. and UK politicians in arming Iraq in Iran.

And in the specific case of Bull, he was in the midst of revealing when he turned up dead, the beneficiaries of "commissions," many of the recipients being high level politicians in Washington and London.

Even though observers close to Dr. Kelly and Bull have so solid evidence they were killed, it's interesting to note that most of the pair's damaging information has been redacted from official records, silenced by corrupted courts or kept from public view through a compliant press.

But whatever the sad case may be, it's obvious these "dirty politicians," doing the devil's handy work are hiding "something big and play for keeps."

And it's obvious from the results of the "killing fields" in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, they function only for power and profit with absolutely no conscience, not only killing innocents on the battlefield but killing-off those who get too close to exposing their "dirty games," as these killer-crooks live under the devilish credo of "what's one more drop of blood matter when the whole world is painted a bloody red anyway."

However, for the public record and for the world to know, there is a bulk of evidence showing these "masters of evil" not only include those Middle East leaders in collusion with the West, but those in power in Washington and London. Although some evidence has come forward, much of the incriminating files and documentation have been fiercely protected to this day, as these devilish politicians know all too well that the rancid odor of warm blood and rotting body parts from the illegal arms trade follows curious path right into 10 Downing Street and 1600 Pennsylvania Ave.

The Arming of Iraq and Iran

As Saddam Hussein sits rotting in a Baghdad jail awaiting a hangman's noose, the last thing Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush wants is for Hussein to spill the beans, tell the truth and talk.

They want him out of the picture since he could add even more damaging information to the solid body of evidence that over the period of 1982-90 Iraq and Iran were supplied by the U.S. and UK with WMD, including biological cultures and chemical precursors of nerve gases and radioactive material, including caesium-137.

John J. Drewe in 2003, noted the UK and U.S. were the major suppliers of these weapons and that details of the underlying contracts with overseas companies like Allivane International Limited and Astra Holdings PLC, pinning officials to the illegal sales, were beginning to surface in the 1980's, but have since been forgotten, as politicians have been mostly successful in quieting whistleblowers, bribing the courts and controlling the media.

One example Drewe calls attention to, saying it reveals only the tip of the iceberg of how UK/U.S. politicians profited, points to the fact how UK officials denied in 1992 awarding Iraq billions of Pounds of export credits to purchase weapons. But in February 2003 the government was caught lying when certain relevant paper, perhaps inadvertently declassified, disclosed some of the truth behind the illegal arms deals with Iran and Iraq.

An important aside also surfaced in 1999 in the UK saying that Drewe had spent over 18 months in custody awaiting trial. He was later sentenced to six years in prison for art fraud after having his assets frozen and deprived sufficient access to counsel, according to legal observers.

Back then, sketchy reports surfaced and it was alleged that there was an arms scandal behind the art fraud case, which eventually silenced Drewe. Throughout the case, Drewe claimed that he had been set up as fall guy for a widespread conspiracy that included Scotland Yard, the Ministry of Defense and the governments of at least seven nations he helped broker between British weapons manufacturers and Iran, Iraq

As is usual in such cases, the news media jumped to the defense of the State, presenting Drewe in a bad light. However, despite the bad press, he had his vocal supporters.

Gerald James, former Astra chairman, who avoided a long prison sentence in the Matrix Churchill arms-related case by showing that he had acted with the approval of the Ministry of Defense, offered evidence for three hours in Drewe's defense. Geoffrey Scriven also offered to give evidence that the Lord Chancellor secretly briefed judges and the courts have been corrupted regarding the Drewe matter.

And while the legal tensions mounted, the government back then quickly denied Drewe and other whistle blower allegations that Allivane International Limited ever existed, although records clearly showed it was formed in 1982 and traded until 1988.

Drewe also presented documentary evidence proving the existence and that Allivane was a front for British Special Intelligence Services, exporting arms to both Iraq and Iran. The company was also mentioned in the Scott report, most of which suppressed by the government.

Why Did UK and U.S. Partner-Up?

Behind the legal wrangling and government whitewashing, the motive behind selling weapons to the Middle East is simple: war is a profitable game. And the means to distribute, of course, is to then create a system complex, undetectable companies to first manufacture the weapons, then get them safely to the Middle East without UN detection and then, of course, repay politicians through handsome "commissions" with laundered money transferred secretly under the financial radar screen.

But how and why did the U.S. and UK partner-up to make this happen back in the early 1980's?

The plan, according to Drewe and others, originated in Washington as a joint UK/U.S. venture. On Dec. 17, 1983, information surfaced that Donald Rumsfeld delivered a letter from President Ronald Reagan to Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, as an agreement was reached between the two countries whereby Iraq would be supplied with munitions, including biological chemical and WMD, as well as being provided with loans from a U.S. bank.

To verify this trip, Howard Teicher, advisor to the U.S. National Security Council on the Middle East (1982-87), accompanied Rumsfeld and filed a subsequent 1995 affidavit swearing to the trip and the American deal to sell weapons to Iraq.

However, Rumsfeld and Reagan, two of the alleged private beneficiaries of the illegal weapon sales, had a problem. They had a big problem since UN arms embargoes were rigorously being enforced in the U.S., unlike in Europe.

So to avoid public scrutiny, they had to figure out a way to provide an alternative route for the illegal export of American munitions. To reach this diabolical end, the U.S. then set up a number of "front" companies" in Europe, in coordination with the CIA, MI6 and the UK's DTI and Foreign Office.

One such "front company," according to financial researchers silenced by the compliant press, crooked courts and bogus national security claims, was Allivane International Limited, which in 1983 received start-up money in the form of a grant from the British government. Contracts were then awarded to Allivane that in turn supplied Iraq with vast quantities of ammunition and weaponry conveniently manufactured in the U.S.

Drewe and several other financial researchers pointed out around this time a British arms company, Astra Holdings plc, grew as it was awarded lucrative contracts by the American government through the British embassy in Washington.

He added that between 1985 and 1990 Astra was the subcontractor to Allivane for the supply of GB Pounds billions-worth of munitions to both Iraq and Iran.

"Astra was then one of the UK arms companies targeted for destruction as the Iran-Iraq war ended," wrote Drewe in a report that has never surfaced in the mainstream press or in official proceedings concerning the illegal arms sales. Atsra records also show its board was compromised by Stefan Kock, a support agent for both the Security and Intelligence Services (MI6), in his capacity as consultant for the Midland Bank. He orchestrated the supply of armaments through "front" companies in deals of which the board remained ignorant, and which did not appear on the Astra books.

Drewe continued:

"The existing paper trail demonstrates that consignments of munitions, chemicals and radioactive material were sent from America to the Faldingworth depot of Astra Defence Systems, and then on to destinations such as the Al Fao organisation in Baghdad. Gerald James, the former chairman of Astra Holdings, obtained the labels marked Al Fao, with evidence of instructions from Rexon that they should be removed before the shipment left Faldingworth.

"All the Astra files, appropriated in seventeen raids by the Ministry of Defense Police and DTI personnel on the offices of the former chairman, Gerald James, are held secret by the DTI. They show huge "commissions" paid on these off-balance-sheet deals, their amounts and their recipients.

"These files are among a body of documentation which is being fiercely protected by government officials, to this day, from every attempt to bring them into public scrutiny. The government is succeeding in its efforts only because it has the benefit of collusion by the courts. This did emerge in the Scott report. Although the courts were aware that those being prosecuted of breaching the arms embargo were doing so on the instructions of the government, they allowed this information to be withheld "in the public interest".

Former Astra Chairman Speaks Out Backing Drewe: Why Is Nobody Listening?

Before dissecting the complex interrelationships among the "front companies," the many political and private players on both sides of the Atlantic, including the Bush family, Rumsfeld, Reagan, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, her many level officials, Kock's vital role as MI6 infiltrator and overseer, the suppression of the infamous but little known Scott Report, the role of Peter Levine as former British defense official made chairman of Lloyd's of London, it's wise to look at the public statement made by former Astra Holdings PLC Chairman from 1980-90, Gerald Reaveley James, head of the company which became a leading ammunition and weapons manufacture and supplier to Iraq and Iran.

Much of James' statements regarding the Scott Report and the corrupt British legal system have never been adequately reported by the compliant press or followed up by investigators, as it appears to have fallen into the same "deep black hole" where Dr. Kelly and Bull's illegal arms sales information has also been laid to rest.

Before reading James's lengthy comments, remember the Scott Report he refers to has for the most part been suppressed from the public record, as well as the MI6 and CIA role in overseeing the illegal arms deals and the money trail leading back to the U.S. and UK politicians who put the whole devious plan together.

Although James's statements, made as an invited guest and speaker at a UK conference of the Environmental Law Center, are lengthy and only one man's recollection and experience, they are left with only a few insignificant deletions for clarity due to the past suppression of information on this aspect of the sale of arms to Iran and Iraq and his role as Chairman of the company in the middle of the illegal deals.

A more in depth look story of Astra can be found in James' little known book, published in the UK by Little Brown, called "In the Public Interest."

Here are his statements:

"I am reminded of the very appropriate quote from Edmund Burke (1729-97) "It is necessary only for the good man to do nothing for evil to triumph."

"The Astra case and my case reflect much that has been to the fore in recent years in not only scandals around arms companies like Astra, Matrix Churchill, Ordtec, Forgemasters, Walter Somers, Ferranti and other companies like Polly Peck, BCCI and Maxwell but also in the Scott Inquiry, the BSE Inquiry and the Lloyds of London affair and other scandals. The underlying problem is secret unaccountable government which bypasses Parliament and how the law is administered in the UK, gives aid and succor to such a state of affairs. The most common device is the concealment of evidence and manipulation of cases. There is a tendency when challenged for those in authority to talk of conspiracy theories. My experience is that those who do so are usually part of the conspiracy.

"My company Astra gave rise to much of the circumstances which created the Scott Inquiry, the Supergun revelations (we reported it first), the Aitken affair, the murder of Gerald Bull in Brussels in March 1990 and much else.

"Until March 1990 and between 1980 and 1990 I was chairman of Astra Holdings PLC ("Astra") which became a leading ammunition and weapons manufacturer. By the late 1980's Astra had factories in the United States (9), Canada (2), Belgium (5), United Kingdom (5) and administrative headquarters in Washington Dc, Brussels and London and employed 4,000 personnel.

"Astra became involved in covert weapons and ammunitions operations organised by MI5 and MI6 and the CIA, the MOD, DOD, FCO and the State Department and the DTI. To such an extent was Astra involved with its principal subsidiaries, Walters, Accudyne, Kilgore USA PRB Belgium, BMARC UK; in the covert trade manipulations of Foreign Policy. In 1989/90, following a reappraisal of Foreign Policy in the light of the demise of the Cold War and changing circumstances in the Middle East, where it became apparent the US, UK and EEC had transferred Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical weapons technology as well as conventional weapons to countries like Iran and Iraq, and the discovery Pakistan had the atomic bomb, the whole covert network was reorganized.

"This involved the collapsing of companies like Astra, Ferranti/ISC, Polly Peck, BCCI, Maxwell Group etc and the prosecution of lesser fry Companies and their directors ~ companies like Matrix Churchill, BNJ, Ordtec, Euromac, SRC, Forgemasters, Walter Somers are examples. The directors of Astra were to a large extent ignorant of the full range of covert activities carried out in their name but aware of some of these activities and the likely destination of their goods. As however all operations were sanctioned by the DTI, MOD, FCO, and in the U.S. by the DOD and the State Department and in Belgium by the Belgian Government, not too many questions were raised initially.

"However, in late 1988 and 1989 it became clear to me as Chairmen that the clandestine operations far exceeded anything remotely sanctioned by the full Board and I set out to investigate in depth. I became aware that certain plants were used to secretly store and ship goods; that monies were being transferred to other operations without book records or board approval in secret commission payments; that our paper work and parallel bank accounts were being used to process arms shipments from major UK defense companies like British Aerospace, Royal Ordnance, GEC Marconi, Thorn EMI etc. A leading British Defence Journalist wrote a report which was largely kept secret which indicated 100m was stolen from the Export Credit Guarantee Department ("ECGD") in a fictitious subcontract for propellant which BMARC, an Astra subsidiary, had secretly obtained in 1998 from Royal Ordnance.

"I also became concerned about payments to and business with MI6/CIA front company Allivane which had occurred between 1983 and 1988 via Astra. Is also became clear that all our main operations were involved in covert operations in the USA, Belgium and the UK, and that Astra, when it acquired these companies, had inherited a hard core of MI6, MI5, DIA agents who operated behind the back of the original directors and who treated them as "useful idiots".

"All our main companies were involved with Space Research Corporation ("SRC") and the late Dr Gerald Bull who was behind the Supergun and other secret projects which Astra companies were also involved in. In 1989 I realized we had a hugely dangerous individual on our main Board and the BMARC Board who was an MI6 agent.

"This individual, Stepahnus Adolphus Kock had high level political connections to Thatcher, Hesletine, Younger, Hanley, etc as well as MI5 and MI6 connections. It is now clear to me that he was involved in the murder of Dr Gerald Bull in Brussels on 22nd march 1990 and Jonathan Moyle in Santiago, Chile on 31st March 1990. BMARC was the only company outside the Atomic Weapons research Establishment and Government Arms depots with the capability to store nuclear bombs like Redbeard and WE177.

"By early 1990 my probing had become a major problem and a plot was hatched to remove me as Chairman shortly before the Supergun and other revelations and Bull's murder. A new dummy board was formed in reality by Kock with two MI6/MI5 stooges ran the company into the ground over the next two years. In order to explain away the destruction of the company with a 350m order book and a market capitalization of 120m desperate attempts were made to find evidence of malpractice by the original directors. Gumbley, my Managing Director, who had been with Bull until an hour before he was shot had discussed with Bull suing UK Government and senior civil servants using Bull's extensive knowledge of high level corruption and illegal operations.

"It had been agreed I would return with Gumbley to agree with lawyers how to proceed a week later. I had discussed such matters with Bull some six months previous but no further action had been taken. Gumbley was immediately framed up for corrupting an MOD official and jailed for 9 months and after desperately trying to find something on me and failing, Kock and MI6/MI5 decided to institute through Peter Lilley and the DTI a DTI Inquiry. Lilley was Secretary of state at the DTI at the time.

"The DTI Inquiry lasted three years and cost 2.5m plus (as much as the Scott Inquiry). The announcement of the Inquiry and the misleading press statements issued by the DTI and Government ensured the downfall of Astra. Crooks and MI5, MI6, agents or informers were put in charge of Astra, including Kock, Roy Barber FCA and Tony McCann. Barber and McCann whose managerial and industrial competence and experience were negligible paid themselves 330,000 and 280,000 respectively. Barber took 100,000 in the first month. Barber's annual payment was more than I received in salary and expenses as Chairman over ten years while I built the company. PRB was sold off immediately for 3m to avoid embarrassing revelations. MI5, MI6 and MOD police and Customs launched 17 raids on Astra premises in order to steal any sales and other documentation incriminating Government.

"No new orders were obtained in spite of the Gulf War and the company ran on the 350m order book we had left for two years, before it was put into receivership on 2nd February 1992 on the eve of me giving evidence to the House of Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee re Supergun, Project Babylon and arms to Iraq (and Iran etc). Press coverage was hue and adverse. This facilitated, as clearly city interests like Banks and Astra's main shareholders 3i, Prudential and Clerical and medical cooperated with Government for their own interest and purposes against the interests of smaller shareholders ( a parallel with Lloyds techniques).

"Kock had a cover as a consultant in Midland Bank's secret arms department, Midland and Industrial Trade Services ("MITS"). This was staffed by ex service officers, MI5, MI6, agents and intelligence affiliated bankers. Midland with the Bank of Boston were Astra's main bankers and dominated by MI6 CIA agents. Kock was also said to be head of Group 13, the Government's assassination and dirty tricks squad according to Richard John Rainey Unwin, a close associate of Knock himself who was a contract MI6 agent and Consultant to Astra. Kock and Unwin, with Martin Laing Construction, negotiated the 2bn Malaysian defence deal before George Younger, the Defense Secretary even knew of it.

"The MOD police arrested several of my colleagues, framed Grumbley up. I was subjected to harassment, burglaries; I was arrested by Customs, investigated by the Inland Revenue, subjected to surveillance, threats, bugging, telephone tapping (all documented), a DTI Inquiry which lasted 3 years and a DTI prosecution which lasted 4 years. In addition I had to give copious evidence to the Scott Inquiry over 4 years, 2 DTI Select Committees, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Defense Select Committee, Public Accounts Select Committee, Public Services Select committee, Police (SOI), a huge law suit in the United States (Dooley case). My family suffered considerably, my two eldest sons army careers suffered, my youngest son's education because of adverse publicity, my brother was killed in an accident never satisfactory explained which could have been intended for me.

In the course of my own experiences I took considerable note and interest in parallel cases like Matrix Churchill, Ordtec, Euromac, Atlantic Commercial, BNJ, SRC, Forgemasters, Walter Somers, Polly Peck, Foxley Ferranti/ISC, BCCI, Maxwell etc. All these cases and others and the Astra case involved the gross abuse of power by Government and its agencies and servants, concealment of key evidence, intimidation, threats, false and selective prosecutions, manipulation of evidence, perversion of the course of justice. It has also been clearly demonstrated that there is no separation of powers within the United Kingdom. Key legal appointments like Lord Chancellor and attorney General, Solicitor General are wholly political.

"It has also been clearly demonstrated that Parliament has no control of knowledge of events and that a vast apparatus of permanent unelected Government exists. This permanent Government consists of senior civil servants, intelligence and security officers, key figures in certain city and financial institutions (including Lloyds of London), key industrialists and directors of major monopolistic companies, senior politicians. The Lord Chancellors Office which is responsible for the appointment of Judges, Clerks of the House of Commons select Committees and approval of Chairmen of such committees and the approval of the Queen's Counsel, holds a total control of the legal administrative framework and has strong connections to the security and intelligence services.

"We have seen from the arms to Iran, Iraq affairs, the Sandline affair and other scandals that politicians and Parliament have little or no control and are more like players in a pantomime put on for the general public and gullible public.

"Secrecy breeds corruption, secrecy is power, information is power particularly confidential information. There is no accountability and the calibre of MP deteriorates with each Parliament. The young politician with no experience outside is naive and powerless and many now have a blind loyalty to their party. Ironically the hereditary peers of the House of Lords provided one of the last vestiges of honesty and independence now largely destroyed by self-important and self-deluding figures like Blair and Baroness Jay.

"It has never been more vital for people to challenge the views of politicians and opinion formers. We live in an age where much if not most of the media is controlled. The legal mechanism and Judges and the court system need to be beyond reproach. Sadly they are not and the chronicle of abuse and manipulation of cases is appalling. Judges are not independent in most government related cases and are no different to salaried and pensioned civil servants. The independence of the Judiciary is an allusion fostered by the Judiciary. Too often a Judicial Inquiry is a system for cover up and concealment. Too often the courts are influenced by political considerations as in the Scott Inquiry and the recent Lloyds of London case. Perhaps with pressure this can be changed."

Editor's Note: Read part II Tuesday how Gerald Bull's sworn statement before his death, never investigated, nails high level politicians with setting up an intricate scheme to get away with huge commissions while selling illegal weapons to Iran and Iraq. Also, see how Lord Peter Levene, former British Defense Secretary and made Lloyd's of London chairman in 2002, plays a pivotal role in the weapons sales. And there is much, much more.

The Devil Is in The Details But Crooked Politicians Are Devious At Hiding Their Dirty Work in the Illegal Arms Sales To Iran And Iraq

By Greg Szymanski – Arctic Beacon.com January 31, 2006

The body count in the Middle East since the UK and U.S. supplied the area with illegal arms in the 1980's is staggering. The exact number is unknown, as official counts have been manipulated. But it's safe to say hundreds of thousands, mostly innocent men, women, children and elderly, have been needlessly slaughtered in barbaric fashion.

The battle in the Arab sand is, in fact, the ultimate testament of man's inhumanity to man.

It is also the ultimate testament of how UK and U.S. foreign policy has not facilitated peace, but instead provoked war by providing the very weapons that have kept the bloody conflict going on for decades.

But hard evidence to nail the "masters of evil" in the arms trade has always been hidden.

In fact, solid proof that high level U.S. and UK officials illegally profited from massive sales of biological, chemical and WMD weaponry to Iran and Iraq has always been conveniently swept under the rug by corrupt courts and a compliant media.

And these public servants acting without a conscience, serving evil not good, have given crooked Western politicians like Thatcher, Reagan, Bush, Blair, Rumsfeld and their many loyal minions a free ride to collect handsome commissions through "front companies" as well as a free ride to continue to do the devil's dirty work - to this very day - by selling illegal arms throughout the world.

Although flimsy evidence has surfaced in the past to nail the scoundrels, most of the incriminating evidence has been successfully buried by the White House and 10 Downing St., buried in the form of people "who knew too much and were about to talk" or through using MI6 and CIA muscle to hide or destroy incriminating documentation.

As the war against Iraq rages on today and politicians try to justify the Western attack, one significant factor is being kept secret - the Scott Report - a factor which known could put all the "masters of evil' behind bars.

In fact, several whistle blowers - two who may have been murdered - say "the smoking gun" that could blow the lid off the entire arms scandal relates directly to the Scott Report on the "Arms to Iraq" affair of the mid-90's and to those aspects that Sir Richard Scott omitted from his report submitted in the UK.

The report kept secret also was referred to as "proof positive" by both microbiologist Dr. David Kelley and Gerald Bull, two whistle blowers suspiciously killed for trying to go public about the details of how governments on both sides of the Atlantic provided Iraq and Iran with illegal weaponry.

And both the UK and U.S governments are still hiding these explosive documents in hopes the affair is ultimately forgotten with the passage of time. In fact, observers suggest that is why Kelley and Bull were killed, as they were getting too close to the ticking time bomb buried in the details of the Scott Report.

Further, savvy politicians realized if the details were ever made public it would mean the end to their scam and immediately expose how the Western public paid for the arms enabling Iraq to fight Iran during their long war of the 1980's, as well as showing how politicians profited handsomely.

Although much of the Scott Report is under lock and key, it was revealed how the UK in complicity with the U.S. was breaching UN embargo guideline regarding weapons supplied to Iraq. However, what remained hidden according to several whistle blowers, was the massive size of the breach and the financial trails implicating high level politicians.

However, according to whistle blower John Drewe, some of the "telling clues" to the secrets in the Scott Report have already entered the public domain.

"Some telling clues did enter the public domain. These were such events as the prosecution in 1992 of the directors of Matrix Churchill for breaching the UK arms embargo on supplying arms to Iraq, as described above," said Drewe. "After government lawyers connived to withhold evidence in several fabricated prosecutions which barely reached the public domain, directors were convicted and imprisoned. All later had their convictions quashed.

"The reports showing that they were acting on government instructions, and that what they had supplied was not in fact embargoed, were withheld from the defense. After these men and women had been convicted and served prison sentences, secret government memoranda came to light showing how their convictions had been secured by fabricating evidence - with the knowledge of prosecuting lawyers, including Alan Moses and Andrew Collins. It may be significant that lawyers such as Sir Alan Moses and Sir Andrew Collins, who were involved in these trials, were made judges and selected to preside over the trials of those with knowledge of the export of weapons to Iraq and Iran. Moses judged David Shayler (2003). Collins judged Mohammed Hashemi (1999), who organized the supply of Iran with munitions from America and the UK over the period 1979-91."

"Another skirmish which reached public awareness was the "Supergun" affair, as referred to above. Gerald Bull, a weapons scientist, founded the Space Research Corporation (SRC), which by 1985 was making a significant contribution to Iraqi weaponry, such as new types of gun and extended-range ammunition. In 1988 SRC started Project 839 ("Project Babylon"), the construction of a 1000mm artillery piece with a range of 700 km. The public became aware of this when executives of Walter Somers and Sheffield Forgemasters, companies involved in the manufacture of the gun barrels, were arrested in 1990. The aspect of the "Supergun" affair which attracted rather less media attention was what happened to Bull. He was murdered in Belgium in 1990."

Was Gerald Bull Killed For Giving This Sworn Statement, Among Other Sensitive Inside Information He Was To Reveal

Further, a sworn affidavit signed by Bull on Jan. 17, 1990, before his death in a bloody fashion, his body found with two or three bullet wounds to the back of the head, revealed how payments were made from the Iranian Defense Dept. to Sir Gordon Reese on behalf of former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with U.S. government complicity.

"In March, 1987, I had two meetings with John Cuckney, one of the advisors to Margaret Thatcher on the Iraqi contracts, personally arranged for the Midland International Trade Services (Defense Equipment Finance Department) to advance the loans for the project?Cuckney told me he had been authorized by the Prime Minister, to whom he reported directly.

"I should explain I was left in no doubt that Thatcher was also being briefed by Gordon Reese, who was advising her on the contracts with both Iran and Iraq?

"Cuckney arranged for Midland to advance SRC, via NM Rothschild and Galverston Securities, 60 percent of the cost of the first stage of Project 839. In November 1988, Midland entered into a contract with Amir Saadi to completely underwrite the purchase of the propellant from PRB for the said project. Herve de Carmoy having personally initiated negotiations. In 1988, de Carmoy moved from his post as Director of the International Banking Division to the Midland Bank to SGB and became Managing Director of Gechem owners of PRB. I was given assurance by by de Carmoy in January 1989 that SGB would allow SRC to purchase PRB. (Details of Midland Bank and Amir Saadi negotiations contained in exhibit marked GVB 12).

"On Aug. 14, 1989, I was informed that Peter Levine, the director of defense, had personally intervened to prevent this acquisition by SRC. I telephoned Cuckney and explained the position. Cuckney assured me that the instructions came from Margaret Thatcher personally, after the United States government had made strong representations. I had advised Cuckney that he and the Thatcher family had received some of the largest payments from the Iraq contracts in order to secure future success of the projects. Cuckney then advised me there was a policy reappraisal. He said he would make sure the points I had raised were brought to the attention of the right people and that in the meantime I should avoid discussing these matters with anyone if I was not to prejudice my opinion."

Lord Peter Levene, Former British Defense Secretary made Lloyd's of London Chairman in 2002, Pivotal Role in the Illegal Arms Trade

According to credible UK sources, Peter Levene, now Lord Levene of Portspoken, made Lloyd's of London chairman in 2002, performed a top level and pivotal role in the illegal supply of weaponry to UN embargoed destinations from 1985 until after the first Gulf War. Observers note one unfortunate consequence of these illegal and clandestine arrangements was that the American and British soldiers sent to Gulf War I found themselves being attacked by weaponry made in Birmingham UK and plants across the U.S.

Levene denies the allegations like the other crooked politicians involved in the scheme. However, Sir William Jaffray of London in February of 2004 provided the following documentation, proving there is a reason to believe otherwise.

Jaffray's explosive comments point a strong finger at Lord Levene's role in the illegal arms trade, as well as his role in Lloyd's of London, in turn, protected against a massive investor fraud suit regarding withholding the devastating outcome of asbestos litigation about bankrupt the huge insurance carrier without proper investor disclosure.

Here is a portion of Jaffray's statements which have received little or no press attention or official investigation follow-up:

"In 1991, Levene authorized the supply of 1500 units of the Precision Guidance System (PGS) to CATIC of the People's Republic of China. A UK company, ISC-Ferranti, collapsed in 1989. The PGS was an inertial guidance system, which can be fitted to a missile to guide it accurately to its target. These units were ex-Ferranti stock and Mohammed Hashemi, the representative of the Iranian Defense Industries (IDI), arranged with the MOD in London the onward supply to the P.R. China, and thence to Iran. The entire transaction has been fully documented, including the identities of the officials of IDI, and the sums of money paid via Iranian banks. This state-of-the-art missile delivery system was secretly delivered to one of the world's most brutal theocracies. In 1991, Chinese and North Korean technicians modified the Iranian Scud II missiles to carry a warhead of 1000 Kg over a distance of 1500 Km with accurate guidance from the PGS supplied by the UK. A proportion of these units was shipped to N. Korea as part of the joint project. The Iranian Shooting Star missile, carrying a much larger warhead and with an increased range, also incorporates this PGS. It is the UK which is responsible for the ability of Iranian missiles to reach Israel and Saudi Arabia.

"The evidence that the UK supplied China and Iran with the PGS, and that this transaction was authorized by Peter Levene, has been concealed from the public. There is overwhelming evidence, running to hundreds of pages of documents, which demonstrates how effectively the facts have been hidden. This is exemplified by the Savill memorandum of 22 June 1995, stating that the MOD and DTI agreed on a policy that no information would be supplied to Parliament on the subject of weapons sold to foreign customers by Astra Defense Systems.

"Gerald Bull and Terence Byrne have both filed statements specifically alleging that the officials and politicians pocketed large sums of money, listed as 'commissions', on the sale of weapons to Iran and Iraq. One of the named officials is Peter Levene. One named politician is Margaret Thatcher. The allegations are very specific, and are echoed by the Iranians and Iraqis who paid the money into the offshore companies set up by relations of Levene and Thatcher.

"In autumn 2002, Peter Levene was put in charge of Lloyd's, a government appointment. He came equipped with deep knowledge of the arms business, if not the insurance business. After the catastrophe of the black hole arising from the export credit defaults on arms exports, the UK government needed an alternative source of credit to maintain its arms export business.

"It became evident that the government needed Lloyd's for political purposes. By 1995/96 the Treasury & Civil Service Committee had quietly dropped its inquiry into the losses incurred by Lloyd's. At this time, all 51 Conservative MPs with debts to Lloyd's had been written off, thus rescuing the Major government from collapse. Lloyd's had siphoned off some 34 million from other Names or investors. Fifteen MPs were saved from imminent bankruptcy. This matter was brought to the attention of Parliament in a letter written by opposition MP, Peter Hain (now Leader of the House of Commons), to John Major. Hain pointed out that the MPs had benefited from retrospective stop loss policies. This is of course embezzlement. Also implicated was Thatcher's Attorney-General, Sir Nicholas Lyell.

"Further, Lloyd's received reassurance from the government that it would be protected from charges of fraud. In this, the judiciary was enlisted. Those judges who were members of Lloyd's received special terms in the wording of their settlement agreements, though the nature and extent of any similar financial pay-off is not yet known. Thus Judge Cresswell produced a judgment in November 2000 acquitting Lloyd's of all charges of impropriety. It is likely that Cresswell's ruling reflected the position at a higher level, probably the Privy Council, where a fraud judgment on Lloyd's would certainly not be viewed as 'in the national interest'. Indeed, as John Mays (a Lloyd's man in charge of the Equitas reserving project) observed to a Name in 1998, litigation in the British and European courts would be futile.

"In his role as arms procurer during the mass illegal supply of UK weaponry to embargoed countries alone, Peter Levene is indictable for crimes (along with many others). His bringing into the Lloyd's fold, as an individual with no particular insurance expertise, arouses suspicions as to the exploitation of the expertise he does bring."

More Proof of High-Level Corruption

In March 2005, a Netherlands prosecutor reported that a man by the name of Frans van Anraat was a middle man with high-level British and American connections, alleged to have supplied thousands of tons of agents for poison gas to the former Iraqi government in the 1980-88 war with Iran and against its own Kurdish people.

Van Anraat is suspected of having had direct contact with Iraqi authorities and using front companies of British and American origin, working through a Panamanian company based in Lugano, Switzerland, according to the international probe which led to his arrest.

UN weapons inspection agencies have described Van Anraat as one of the most important middlemen in Iraq 's acquisition of chemical weapons raw materials.

An article by Richard Norton-Taylor in the Guardian (1999) reports on purchases made by Tagell UK Ltd on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mohammed Hashemi (aka Jamsid Naini) was a director of a UK registered company, located at 12, Roebuck House, Stag Place, London S.W.1. This company, according to Norton-Taylor's article, was set up with the knowledge and consent of th Ministry of Defense to enable the UK to supply covertly defense equipment to Iran with total complicity with the U.S. government.

The report refers to the purchase by the UK of false end-user certificates, and the construction of motor gun-boats for the Naval Division of the Iranian revolutionary guard. Hashemi has provided evidence of how the motor gun-boats were tested at Portsmouth by the Royal Navy and how the procurement department at the Ministry of Defense supervised the project.

Regarding the role of high-level officials in London and Washington, the use of MI6 and CIA undercover agents and Lord Levene's role, Jaffray added:

"It was the U.K. which supplied Iran with WMDs and the missile guidance systems to deliver these weapons. Tagell UK Ltd was the vehicle set up to implement this policy. Kock, a serving member of the SIS, refers specifically to the role of the UK government at the highest possible level. Indeed the memoranda disclosed by the SIS demonstrates Kock's importance to them, and his role in acting for the SIS in the Supergun supplied to Iraq, and as a director of the arms manufacturer, Astra Holdings and Astra Defence Systems (BMARC). The claim that Peter Levene tendered advice regarding the contracts negotiated by Tagell UK Ltd is contained in a body of documentation which includes the trading records of this company.

"It should be noted that these records refer to commission payments to U.K. politicians and officials. Typically, the money was paid to members of their families for 'consultancy fees.' Although it has been admitted that politicians in France, Germany, and Italy accepted bribes through members of their families, the gagging orders imposed by judges such as Andrew Collins, prevent the information about Tagell UK Ltd from reaching the public domain in the U.K.

"Finally, Hashemi has noted that large quantities of munitions were supplied to Iraq via Saudi Arabia under the Al-Yamamah contract with the United Kingdom. According to Phillip Sales, senior Treasury Counsel, all the details of this contract will remain known to only two people. The intention of officials to deceive the British people is contained in document no 7 which speaks for itself.

"It should never be forgotten that corrupt politicians and officials lined their pockets with commissions on weapons exported to embargoed countries in breach of international law. And the British taxpayer continues to be punished with extortionate stealth taxes to make up a loss of between 73 Billion and 120 Billion of U.K. overseas assets dissipated in support of this illegal trade."

Editor's Note: Read Part III Wednesday as MI6 internal documents are revealed, confirming government corruption at the highest levels concerning weapons sold to Iran and Iraq. Also, see internal Astra Holdings PLC documents, listing millions of commissions paid, a handsome portion then funneled down to the crooked politicians on both sides of the Atlantic who originally put the devious arms-sales plan together.

MI6 secret documents and Astra Commission Documents Reveal How Politicians Reaped Huge Profits Off Illegal Middle East Arms Sales


By Greg Szymanski – Arctic Beacon February 1, 2006

MI6 and CIA infiltration of the government's illegal arms trade is vital so plans go off without a hitch.

In the case of the shipments to Iraq and Iran starting in the early 1980's, Western politicians used numerous agents, but none were more important than MI6 agent Stephan Kock.

Former Astra Holdings PLC Chairman, Gerald Reaveley James, the head of a company used by Western politicians to bypass UN embargoes to get illegal arms to Iraq and Iran, exposed Kock's MI6 cover as a consultant working in Midland Bank's secret arms department, Midland and Industrial Trade Services (MITS), overseeing the financial operations for one of the main lending institutions.

James also had firsthand knowledge that the MITS office was staffed by numerous ex-intelligence officers, MI5 and MI6 agents and government-compromised bankers. At the time of the arms shipments to Iran, Midland and the Bank of Boston were Astra's main bankers and dominated by MI6 and CIA agents.

"Kock was also said to be head of Group 13, the government's assassination and dirty tricks squad according to Richard John Rainey Unwin, a close associate of Kock himself who was a contract MI6 agent and Consultant to Astra. Kock and Unwin, with Martin Laing Construction, negotiated the 2 billion Pound Malaysian defense deal before George Younger, the Defense Secretary even knew about of it," said James about his knowledge of Kock's shady dealings.

Besides James, several other arms whistle blowers called attention to Kock's undercover activities, alleging they also had firsthand knowledge during the 1980's he was representing himself as a consultant for Midland Bank.

Although hearsay evidence even from credible sources is often doubted, the following hard evidence should lay to rest any doubts to Kock's role and his assignment to make sure the arms deals went of "quietly and without a hitch," as well as making sure large "kickback commissions" got back to politicians in London and Washington unnoticed.

In a letter dated June 16, 1989, on Midland Bank stationary, sent from Kock to Mohammed Hashemi, a representative of the Iranian Defense Ministry and of Tagell UK Limited, a major company working with Astra in the arms trade to Iraq and Iran, consultant Kock reassures Hashemi high level British officials, including Lord Peter Levene, were "making sure" the CATIC arms contract to the Middle East would "proceed smoothly."

"I am writing to thank you and your colleague, Mr. Dastjerdi, for the splendid hospitality last Tuesday, and to let you know the results of the enquiries I have made on your behalf. Let me assure you that the UK government at the highest possible level regards the contract with CATIC as important and has taken steps to endure that matters proceed smoothly to completion," wrote Kock in the business letter, a copy of which sent to the Arctic Beacon.

"The export license with CATIC as the consignee, reference 1/730.5790/89 will be returned to Tagell UK. My Defense Equipment Finance Department has received the financial documents and the two separate Tagell UK contracts (with CATIC and IMS) from Mr. Dastjerdi. I am in close contact with Peter Levene, who is charge of procurement at the Ministry of Defense. His advice is that the contract for the initial purchase of the PGS should be with IMS and not the manufacturer, ISC-Ferranti. It appears they will not continue trading.

"I will be on London on Monday 26 June to meet officers from the Defense Export Sales Organization. This should provide an excellent opportunity to discuss some of the other matters you raised on Tuesday and I would be glad if you would join us for lunch. We could meet at my London office at 1pm."

Kock signed the letter as a consultant, citing Lord Levene's sanction of the PGS to China and then to Iran. In a statement by Sir William Jaffray in 2004, he alleged firsthand knowledge that in 1991, Lord Levene authorized the supply of 1500 units of the Precision Guidance System (PGS) to CATIC of the People's Republic of China through a a UK company, ISC-Ferranti, which collapsed in 1989.

The PGS was an inertial guidance system, which can be fitted to a missile to guide it accurately to its target. These units were ex-Ferranti stock and Hashemi, the representative of the Iranian Defense Industries (IDI), arranged with the MOD in London the onward supply to the P.R. China, and thence to Iran. The entire transaction has been fully documented, according to Jaffray, including the identities of the officials of IDI, and the sums of money paid via Iranian banks.

Further in a April 28, 1987 letter from Kock of Midland Bank PLC to the Secretary of State for Defense, George Younger, showing his key role in negotiating a top secret defense deal with Malaysia, arms which would eventually end up in Iran and Iraq.

Kock writes:

"I have for some months now been in close discussions with the Malaysian Ministry of Defense regarding a major project as yet classified as secret.

"The time has now come where we feel it very necessary to give you details of this major project which in our view hold significant importance, not only for British defense equipment manufacturer's, but strategically and politically to.

"In view of the official visit by the Malaysian Premier and is defense chiefs in June we would ask for a meeting as soon as convenient?

"We are in fact meeting the Chief of staff in London unofficially on the 12th of May as part of an ongoing dialogue. I have personally briefed the Director S.A.S. and he is as yet the only other person informed on the project."

Besides the correspondence explaining Kock's role in the Middle East arms deals, copies of an MI6 internal memo, tracking Kock's every move after his duties were completed, show just how concerned British intelligence was in the early 1990's to keep Kock silent and from talking to the press.

This secret intelligence service memo, obtained by the Arctic Beacon depicts, Kock as a longtime reliable agent, but at the time of the writing MI6 officials were concerned that he turned into somewhat of a loose canon.

"Kock has been an enthusiastic and effective agent. But in the last few years or so pressure of work seems to have affected him and he has developed a growing obsession about his personal security. He now seems to clamor for simultaneous contact with SIS and MI5 and his Special Branch and has become somewhat of an intelligence nuisance.

"His main role was a provider of (blacked out) but he also reported on the Defense industry. In addition he was used by the Joint section for Chinese targeting?

"Between September 1987 and January 1990 we met Kock periodically in London. For the most part, this contact was instigated by Kock and entailed him reporting on various arms-related matters?In October 1989 he volunteered information on the involvement of the Belgium company PRB, recently bought by Astra, in the supply of propellants for the Iraqi supergun project.

"This involvement antedated Astra's purchase of the company but we believe it relevant to the DTI inquiry into Astra which is referred to in the press. Elements of Kock's reporting were included in material about the "supergun circulated to government departments at the time by SIS.

"According to his account, Kock's role in relation to the Astra Holdings/PRB business was creditable?

"In January 1990 Kock was involved in a shooting incident outside his home in Scotland. Since that time we have not initiated contact with him, but we have from time to time seen him, at his insistence, because we seek to keep his goodwill and to preempt any other more damaging approaches, for example, to the press. While, for obvious reasons, we regard his judgment as unsound, we believe we need to keep his goodwill?"

It is obvious from the MI6 internal report that UK policy was to keep a lid on the illegal Iraqi and Iranian arms deals, as well as to conceal millions of hidden commissions on contracts which eventually funneled back into the pockets of high-level politicians on both sides of the Atlantic.

UK policy, as evidenced in a 1995 internal memorandum written by Hugh Savell close to the arms investigation, also outlined a concerted legal strategy to keep the contents of the Astra papers concealed from Parliament and the press, a strategy that to date has proved successful.

Below is a detailed list of some of the commissions from Astra Holdings PLC, referring to Tagell UK Ltd. And the offshore companies which UK and U.S. politicians have interests and connections. It should be noted that the payee-companies would then secretly funnel some of the money to greedy politicians whose tracks were completely covered by the complexity and location of the overseas companies accepting payment.

The following is a partial list, showing the enormous profits made by the illegal sale of weapons to Iran and Iraq, weapons eventually used against U.S. and UK soldiers. Also it should be noted that serious investigations need to take place, tracing the payee-companies listed in the documents below to the actual unscrupulous politicians and businessmen who illegally profited.

Click link to see list of illegal commissions: View Commissions Here

Editor's Note: Read the final part of the series tomorrow as the strange deaths of Dr. David Kelly and arms-businessman, Gerald Bull, are analyzed. The stunning conclusion reveals we are no closer today than we were in the 1980's of getting at the real culprits - The UK and U.S. governments - both guilty as sin for selling illegal weapons to Iran and Iraq.

The Illegal Government Arms Trade. When You Try To Take Away 'The Toys of the Big Boys,' They Play For Keeps


By Greg Szymanski – Artic Beacon February 2, 2006

Although 13 years apart, two key figures about to blow the lid off the illegal arms sales to Iran and Iraq both turned up dead, one a reported suicide and the other shot three times to the back of the head outside his Brussels apartment.

Both deaths have drawn media attention, but none of the reports have ever led to a serious investigation.

The closest any brave prosecutor ever got to getting at the truth was a 2003 report that a Belgium prosecutor was considering reopening a probe into the March 22, 1990, murder of Canadian born Dr. Gerald Bull, founder of Space Research Corporation (SRC).

But after reports surfaced that there had been Mossad/CIA/MI6 involvement in Bull's murder, the Belgium prosecutor's never went any farther amid speculations that he was about to be killed himself if he pursued the investigation.

Before the investigation was quashed, the following is English translation of what appeared in a Belgium magazine about the initial report.

"On Friday, the Belgian daily Derniere Heure published a report saying Belgian police and the State Prosecutor have information from a "reliable source" that identified a Mossad agent, a member of an "elite unit," as one of Bull's assassins. The report said the source of the information is in a Central American country "previously controlled by Britain" the country is most likely Belize. The information source said a piece of jewelry or a bracelet was taken from Bull and kept by the suspect.

"Members of Bull's family and investigative reporters suggested that Bull was in contact with members of Israel's intelligence services, and provided them with inside information about the Iraqi super-gun project.

"One theory held that the Mossad killed him for failing to provide accurate information about the Iraqi program to extend the range of Scud missiles and improve their accuracy."

Other theories floated around that Bull was killed on the direction of UK and U.S. officials concerned he was ready to "spill the beans" about the illegal arms trade, pinning high-level politicians with receiving millions in illegal kickbacks on the arms contracts.

Whatever the case, it was obvious Bull knew too much and had to be eliminated, his murder sending a clear message to others like him either shut up or expect the same fate.

Although Bull was a "hot government item," how deep did he really go into the murky waters of the worldwide arms trade?

From the outset, Bull's involvement of the Iraqi arms dealing was directly responsible in the late 1970s for the development of advanced guns as well as full-bore and base-bleed ammunition technologies within South Africa.

Years after, in the mid 1980's, he brought more advanced expertise to Iraq. A key product of Bull's endeavors, the G-5 155mm self-propelled howitzer has surfaced in original form or similar weapons within Chile, Austria, Germany, Belgium and Iraq.

A 1987 report about Bull in a Canadian Defense Weekly publication had this to say about the gunned-down arms whistle blower:

"In 1980 on June 16, Bull was convicted on criminal charges in a Rutland, Vermont court for smuggling gun barrels and ammunition to South Africa. He later pleaded guilty in Montreal, on August 14 of the same year, to violating U.N. arms sanctions also against South Africa. The Quebec court fined SRC $55,000.

"The Canadian convictions involved "shipments of howitzer parts" both directly and indirectly to South Africa. On the U.S. charges, Bull eventually served a short prison sentence in the United States and paid several thousands of dollars in fines."

And after he was murdered in his Brussels apartment, a series of revelations tied him and his company, SRC, to voluminous arms dealings with Iraq, including development of the fabled Iraqi 600 kilometer-range, forty-meter-barrel "Supergun".

Evidence of the monstrous gun surfaced, but British officials quickly tried to distance themselves from involvement with Bull, who was depicted as a renegade when in fact he was acting on behalf both the UK and U.S. governments.

The Canadian Defense magazine provided further details of the weaponry sold to Iraq, but what the publication failed to mention was that all the sales were done with UK and U.S. government complicity in blatant violation of UN embargoes.

Here is the Canadian report:

It was later found that SRC's technology development ties with the Iraqis included the Scud B, extensive 155mm gun and ammunition development, as well as 210mm self-propelled howitzers manufactured in facilities north of Baghdad, and the overall 155mm GC-45 artillery system.

"Other developments that Bull is believed to have been helping Iraq with included the amazing 1000/405mm (1000mm smooth bore saboted down to 405mm) Ultra Long Range (ULR) gun with a 2.32 meter long shell having a mass of around 1,800 kilograms. (See The Wednesday Report, April 18 and August 15.)

"Iraq first acquired the G-5 155mm artillery piece in the early 1980s from South Africa. Later in 1986-87, a time when Bull's influence increased in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein, who was at the time angry with South Africa, switched to Austria as a principal supplier. The first of Iraq's G-5s were built by South African firm Lyttelton Engineering Works of Verwoerdberg and sold through Pretoria's roguish export firm, Armscor.

"The original gun barrels were built by Krykor while Summerset Chemicals (both of South Africa) built the explosive charges for the gun. With technology transfers from South Africa and later Austria, coupled with Gerry Bull's direct assistance, the Iraqis now have the complete manufacturing capacity for powder, shells and barrels. It is estimated that Iraq can manufacture 1,000 replacement barrels per year.

"Today (1987) more than two hundred G-5 155mm howitzers exist within the arsenals of Iraq. The gun is capable of firing a shell some 40 kilometers, greater than any modern artillery of its type. The G-5 and its ammunition employ one of Bull's favorite techniques. The accuracy of the gun is greatly enhanced by firing base-bleed ammunition. Extra powder is burned at the base of the projectile as it exits the barrel, thus stabilizing the shell. The technology of the gun is brilliant."

So Bull was erased from the picture and depicted as an outlaw arms dealer at a time when investigations were heating up regarding the illegal deals brokered with Iran and Iraq by the UK and U.S. governments.

But what about microbiologist and weapon's inspector, Dr David Kelley, who was said to have committed suicide in 2003? In regards to Dr. Kelley, two serious questions need to be asked and whether the answers have any serious bearing on his untimely death?

What did Dr. Kelley about the supply by the UK of biological and chemical materials and defense equipment to Iraq before the start of the first Gulf War?

And what did he know in relation to whether Iraq possessed WMD's in 2003 at the time the present government asserted that such a threat justified their invasion of Iraq?

It must be remembered that Dr. Kelly was the senior microbiologist at Porton Down at the time the sale of biological cultures to Iraq was authorized in 1985-6. Over the period 1985-7, Porton Down supplied Iraq with bacterial cultures, including C. botulinum and B. anthracis and a formal admission of the role of Porton Down was also published in 1992.

These bacterial cultures were then used to mass produce biological weapons which were deployed by Iraq on Iran whose civilian population suffered massive casualties from the deployment of chemical weapons.

At the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, Dr Kelly joined the UN Weapons Inspector's team and over a period of seven years, he made a total of 37 trips to Iraq until the inspections ceased.

He was instrumental on every aspect of reporting and reported on the weapons arsenal and manufacture of biological weapons, including those financed by the United Kingdom and manufactured using UK expertise, cultures and equipment.

Being ideally placed to know of the existence of the weapons, and who supplied them, it might be thought these matters might have had some bearing on Dr Kelly's death. But, strangely, they were never investigated or even considered in any formal hearings held, most notably the Hutton enquiry.

In a notable report written in 2004 by Sir William Jaffray and another in 2003 by John Drewe, both men commented how important aspects known by Dr. Kelley may have led to his death, especially aspects concerning radioactive material sent to Iraq with UK and U.S. approval.

Drewe wrote:

"In addition to biological weapons, chemical precursors to anticholinesterase inhibitors and ammunition, it has been established that at least one contract entailed supplying Iraq with radioactive material. The listed material is not plutonium or a fissile isotope of uranium, but consists of radiocaesium (Cs-137) in significant quantities. The documentation indicates that the shipment was stored at the Astra Defence Systems depot at Faldingworth and then air freighted to Iraq (Ref: 9).

"The contracts for the supply of radiocaesium from the UK to Iraq by companies such as Allivane International Limited are on record. Such contracts demonstrate the huge quantities of prohibited material, including nerve-gas precursors, bacteria and culture media sold by the UK to Iraq over the period 1982-88 (Ref: 10).

"A deposition from a former employee of Allivane has appended to it contracts and shipping records indicating that hundreds of curies of substances such as radiocaesium (Cs-137) and radioiodine (I-131) were shipped from the UK to Iraq (Ref: 11).

"A former employee of the Ministry of Defense who dealt with Allivane International (1983-86) has given a statement confirming that during this time the Ministry of Defense specifically authorized companies such as Allivane International to supply munitions to Iran and Iraq. Huge quantities of conventional ammunition, such as 155mm artillery shells, were delivered to Allivane from the depots of Royal Ordnance (Ref: 12).

"It must have been apparent to the government that this ammunition would be deployed by Iraq against Iran. It must also have been clear that...
Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume Three
Section F Supergun
Chapter 3 Government Knowledge - January 1989 until December 1989


Excerpt:
ASTRA HOLDINGS PLC

ASTRA HOLDINGS PLC
F3.19 Astra Holdings plc (Astra) completed its acquisition of PRB on 11 September 1989. [size=12]*14 Stephan Kock was a non-executive director of Astra at the time of the acquisition. *15 According to Mr Kock’s evidence to TISC, he went with others to visit the PRB plants in Belgium on 19/20 September 1989. At the PRB plant at Kaulile he was told by the manager that PRB were involved in exporting unusual propellants. *16 Mr Kock reported the matter to colleagues in the company and discussed it with them. He also says that he telephoned the intelligence services on 22 September 1989. *17 He next came down to London from his home in Scotland on 11 October 1989 and “made a full report”. Intelligence documents confirm that Mr Kock telephoned from Scotland to ask for an urgent meeting. Intelligence documents also suggest that on 10 October, a preliminary meeting was held with Mr Kock at which he mentioned the take-over by Astra of PRB and suggested that “PRB’s books indicated some shady dealings in the past”. It appears that the preliminary meeting was soon followed by another meeting. The source report on the meeting records the following information: [/SIZE]
“PRB of Belgium.

1. The British arms firm ASTRA Holdings has recently acquired a wholly owned subsidiary in Belgium ‘PRB sa’. A rumour circulating in the Astra Boardroom is that PRB has been (and probably continues to be) engaged in some shady business which involve supplying rocket propellant to the Iraqis. The rumour goes that a weapons system - probably a ‘155mm enhanced shell’ is being sold by a consortium .... The warhead could be chemical or nuclear device ....”

A copy of the report was sent to SIS.
F3.20 Quite independently of Mr Kock, other information was simultaneously put forward by Astra for the consideration of the British authorities. After completion of the acquisition, Mr Christopher Gumbley, chief executive of Astra at the time of the acquisition of PRB, was also told of PRB contracts of “a sensitive nature”. PRB managers had indicated that “the contracts, particularly for propellants, had a capability which was for - and they hinted towards this - nuclear and chemical weapons systems”. [size=12]*18 Mr Gumbley was also told expressly that the contract for propellant was intended for delivery to Iraq through the use of Jordan. The propellant was for a very large gun. [/SIZE]
F3.21 It was at about this time that MOD/DESO had begun to have its own suspicions about PRB. Mr Robert Primrose was Director of Marketing Services (D Mktg Svcs) at DESO between 30 April 1986 and 30 April 1991. The role of Marketing Services was to assemble, analyse and disseminate information on world markets for defence exports; and on the performance of UK industry in these markets. Mr Primrose has told the Inquiry that his concerns about PRB predated the disclosure of information about PRB by Astra to the MOD. He had no concrete evidence; rather “only an undefined suspicion which developed gradually during August and early September 1989, that PRB might have been approached, directly or through third parties, to supply artillery ammunition, or ammunition components, to Iraq or Iran more probably Iraq.” This suspicion stemmed mainly from Mr Primrose’s “general knowledge of the kind of defence procurement exercises which Iraq and Iran had mounted during the war; a little public information about PRB ....; and indications from a number of quarters that both Iraq and Iran had embarked on a new round of re-equipment and replenishment of their forces following the cease-fire.” [size=12]*19[/SIZE]
F3.22 Mr Primrose’s immediate superior was Mr Roger Harding. Mr Harding was the Director General of Marketing Services (DGMktg). [size=12]*20 Mr Primrose shared his initial concern with Mr Harding on 23 September 1989. Mr Primrose had noted that Mr Harding was due to have an “informal meeting .... with Astra that weekend” and he hoped that Mr Harding would raise the matter at the meeting. Mr Harding agreed to do so. He has told the Inquiry that he and Mr Primrose believed that the most sensible action would be a “low key approach to the executives I already knew at Astra.” *21 His first opportunity to talk to an Astra executive occurred at the Royal Naval Equipment Exhibition at Portsmouth in September 1989, when he saw Mr Gumbley. He told Mr Gumbley that he had heard rumours that there might be problems connected with contracts which Astra were inheriting in consequence of their purchase of PRB. He suggested that Mr Gumbley should check them out to make sure that “he had not ‘done a Ferranti’.” This was a reference to publicity about the ill-fated merger of Ferranti and ISC as a result of which Ferranti had acquired suspect ISC contracts. Mr Gumbley agreed to review the PRB contracts.[/SIZE]
F3.23 On 26 October 1989, Mr Gumbley and Mr Jolly (also of Astra) attended a meeting in Mr Harding’s office. DESO was represented by Mr Harding and Mr Primrose. Mr Gumbley tabled a document entitled ‘Contracts: Third Party destinations.’ [size=12]*22 The first three items on the list were:[/SIZE]
“CONTRACTS: THIRD PARTY DESTINATIONS
NR Country Product Remarks 1 Jordan (1) High Energy propellent See Annexure 2 Jordan (2) Propellent powder See Annexure 3 Jordan 130mm LR/BB ammunition See Annexure..." The comments in ‘Annex 2’ to the list included the following:
“....
1. JORDAN
1.1 Project BABYLON: Phase 1 (end user IRAQ)

* PRB Contract No 5397 signed February 1989

* Product M8M high energy propellent: qty 235 tons

* Value scheduled for delivery by 31/3/90 £1.96m

* Order routed from Jordan to PRB via SRC (Dr Bull)

* Delivery presently suspended due to technical difficulties

* Belgian government export licence approved

1.2 Project BABYLON: Phase 2 (end user IRAQ-SMPE)

* Sales prospect for large quantity propellent

* Value £5.5m

* Scheduled visit by J L Jourdain in November 1989 to begin negotiations with contract signature January 1990

* Partial delivery within October 1990

* PRB anticipate export licence approval for Iraq will be sanctioned by Belgian government early 1990

1.3 Project: 130mm Long Range Base Bleed Ammunition

* PRB forecast sale of 130mm LR/BB within 31/3/89

* Value £11m Quantity 20000 rounds ....”

In discussion, Mr Gumbley said that he suspected, although he had no direct evidence, that the first and second contracts “might be missile-related and might be intended for Iraq”. He also “felt that No 3 was for Iraq”. Mr Gumbley added, as to the Iraqi-related contracts, that he was inclined to withdraw from them even if they were approved by the Belgian Government. Mr Harding was recorded as having said that he recognised the primacy of the Belgian Government in “all export matters conducted by Belgian firms”, but he agreed “that Astra should give serious thought to their public image in UK and elsewhere”. Mr Gumbley, for his part, offered to seek further information on the contracts and pass this to DESO so that more specific advice could be given.
F3.24 Between 26 October and the date of the next MOD meeting with Mr Gumbley on 3 November, Mr Primrose, Mr Harding and Mr Tidy had a discussion [size=12]*23 about how to take forward action on the information provided by Mr Gumbley. It was decided that the matter “did not involve any direct or potential [breach] of UK law or regulations” and that it should be referred to the intelligence services. Mr Primrose was asked to act accordingly. After the discussion, Mr Primrose contacted SIS to pass on orally all the information which he had received. Although DESO officials considered SIS to be the appropriate agency to takeforward any necessary action in the light of Mr Gumbley’s information, Mr Primrose also briefed a close contact in the DIS in early November. *24 This is a matter more fully dealt with below. *25 [/SIZE]
F3.25 Mr Gumbley returned to DESO on 3 November 1989. He met Mr Primrose, who was on his own, and provided him with further details of PRB’s activities. Mr Primrose’s record of the meeting was incorporated in a minute to Mr Harding of the same date. [size=12]*26 The note was copied to Mr McDonald and to Mr Tidy. Mr Gumbley’s primary concern remained the supply of high energy propellants, ostensibly to Jordan but, in his view, almost certainly intended for Iraq. Although Mr Gumbley was still awaiting details of the chemical composition and shape of the charges, he was able to say that he had been told:[/SIZE]
“... that the propellant is of a special high energy composition and that it would be in the shape of short grains (sticks). Much more alarming to him was an allegation that they were to be used in a very large artillery piece in Iraq, mounted on rails and using several bags of grains and igniters in series to produce a weapon of strategic range. The direct involvement of Dr G V Bull of SRC in the Iraqi project was a further indicator of the type of technology. [He] mentioned the possibility of nuclear shells ....”

Mr Primrose reiterated DESO’s advice that the supply of propellants was a matter for the Belgian authorities and advised Mr Gumbley that he should consult them if he suspected Iraqi involvement. Mr Primrose was, he said, left with the clear impression that Mr Gumbley:
“... did not intend to supply the propellant; that he might consider divesting Astra of the propellant plants to SRC if the Belgian government agreed; and that he intended to raise the whole matter with the original owners Société Générale. He also promised to keep us informed and to tell us about the chemical and physical details of the propellant when these come to hand.

10. I have refrained from introducing into this minute any collateral information which we have to hand about SRC, Dr Bull, Iraq etc; but you are aware that there is a considerable body of such material ....” [size=12]*27
[/SIZE]

F3.26 Mr Primrose spoke to Mr Q on the telephone after his second meeting with Mr Gumbley. Mr Q remembers Mr Primrose telling him about a “rather bizarre” story which he had been told by a British company. The company, which was not named, had indicated:

“... that propellant of abnormal characteristics was being manufactured in Belgium, ostensibly for Jordan but in truth intended for an Iraqi end user. [Mr Primrose] was unsure whether to believe the story, and if he did, which government departments should be informed and how. [He - Mr Q] replied that [he] had other straws in the wind along the same lines so that, taking all the indicators together, [they] ought to take the story seriously however bizarre it sounded. As to government departments [they] agreed that the matter did not fit neatly into any one pigeon-hole but DTI and FCO had an obvious interest as well as MOD ....” [size=12]*28[/SIZE]
Mr Primrose agreed to record what he had been told.
F3.27 In early November 1989, a meeting was arranged at the Grantham offices of BMARC which was attended by Gerald James, Stephan Kock, an SAS officer and Mr Q. Evidence given to TISC by Mr James was that “the objective alleged [of the meeting] was to look at equipment purchases. Instead [Mr Q] spent most of the time grilling James about the Jordan contract and who had knowledge of it.” [size=12]*29 Mr Q’s account of the meeting was recorded in a MOD brief for the Minister (DP)’s appearance before TISC. Mr Q is reported to have said that the meeting was set up to discuss equipment for the Special Forces, that he was invited by an SAS officer to be present and that he took the opportunity to assure Mr James that the information provided by Astra about PRB’s Iraqi propellant contract was being taken very seriously. *30 [/SIZE]
F3.28 On 13 November 1989, Mr Primrose sent to Mr Q a letter headed ‘PRB’. [size=12]*31 Mr Primrose enclosed with his letter an “exact transcript” of the information passed to MOD/DESO on 26 October, as well as a “slightly edited” version of the note of the meeting on 3 November. The purpose of editing the copy of the 3 November note was, according to Mr Primrose, to underline an oral agreement that he had reached with Mr Gumbley, namely, that Astra would not be identified in intelligence reporting to “UK or Allied customers as collaborating with UK intelligence; and that their private commercial affairs should not be published more widely than necessary ....” Mr Primrose accepts that his editing was hurried and quite transparent and that the company was readily identifiable by anyone with no more than a “slender knowledge” of the defence industry. *32 In fact, Mr Q had already known by 6 November that Astra was the company concerned. In oral questioning at the Inquiry, it became apparent that Mr Primrose had deleted more than he needed to if his purpose was to exclude details identifying Astra and Mr Gumbley. Thus, for example, the version which was sent to Mr Q excluded the reference to Mr Gumbley’s mentioning the “possibility of nuclear shells”. But, be that as it may, the fact is that Mr Q was provided with a great deal of highly pertinent information. Taken on its own, the story of a so-called “monster gun” might have been discounted as a rather wild story by Mr Q; but, taken with the other straws in the wind, it seemed to him that this was a matter worth pursuing. *33 [/SIZE]
F3.29 It is worth noting one point in Mr Primrose’s letter to which I shall refer again. He records Mr Q as having suggested on the telephone that an official, but confidential, démarche should be made to the Belgian Government in relation to the PRB propellant exports. At the time Mr Primrose considered this to be the best permanent solution to the problem. But, in his view, a démarche needed to be made quickly. [size=12]*34 The request for the démarche was eventually made to the FCO on 15 December 1989.[/SIZE]
F3.30 A meeting between Mr Q, Mr Primrose and members of the board of Astra took place on 23 November 1989. There were two matters which were explored at the meeting. First, it was sought to clarify the technical question of what precisely the device was for which Iraq was procuring such an abnormal propellant. Mr Q recounts this part of the discussion in a lucid, lively manner and I shall quote his written evidence in full:
“... The technical part of the meeting was a little confused at first in that Mr PRIMROSE and ASTRA were considering the possibility that the propellant was for some novel form of rocket motor rather than a gun for which it was considered far too thick. The thickness (web thickness) was the key parameter in that it determined the time required for the propellant to burn up. This time was far too short for any reasonable rocket or ballistic missile but too long for a gun of any reasonable size. Therefore this propellant had to be for a gun of monster proportions, around 100 metres in length. This tied in with the other sketchy evidence I had and I must confess to being very excited at the realisation that we were on the verge of uncovering a completely new concept in weapons. It struck me at the time that the situation was comparable to that moment in 1942 when Dr R V JONES realised that the Germans were developing the V2 rocket ....” [size=12]*35
[/SIZE]

The second matter discussed was the question how the British Government could seek to achieve the disengagement of Astra without infringing Belgian law. It was assumed by those present at the meeting that the contract to supply the propellant was valid under Belgian law. [size=12]*36 A number of points for further action were then agreed by those who were there. In a letter to Mr Q recording the discussion at the meeting with Astra, Mr Primrose said that Astra had been advised by the Government representatives to monitor “very closely” the activities of PRB in negotiating any further related contracts and to take advice from the authorities at every stage. *37 Mr Primrose said in the same letter that, after the meeting with Astra, he and Mr Q had agreed that the concerns of the British Government should be communicated to the Belgian Government as soon as practicable and, in any event, by the end of 1989. They had noted that, once Astra assumed full control in January 1990, the perception both domestically and internationally would be that PRB’s activities were carried out under the direction of Astra. In those circumstances, Mr Primrose said in his letter to Mr Q, “any activity which could be seen as violating the spirit of the MTCR and other relevant policy decisions will be attributed to the UK firm”. DESO’s view, said Mr Primrose, was that Astra should “terminate this line of business” and that the correct way to achieve this was for the British Government to persuade the Belgian Government to review its export licence policy. *38 This was a reference to the démarche which, on 13 November, had already been suggested by Mr Q to Mr Primrose. Finally, it is important to draw attention to the fact that Mr Primrose and Mr Q agreed that all relevant information “should be reported to Ministers as a matter of urgency”. In fact, MOD Ministers were never told. *39 [/SIZE]

Endnotes:
*14 - Memorandum by Gerald James to TISC: HC 86-x: p.350
*15 - Mr Kock’s evidence to TISC: HC 86-xii: Questions 3036-37. Mr Kock has confirmed to the Inquiry that, subject to two points, the minutes of his evidence to TISC have been accurately recorded, although he does also say that some of the questions put to him were based on “assumption” or “incorrect evidence” by “others”.
*16 - Evidence to TISC (Mr Kock): HC 86-xii: Questions 3044-3060; 3116-3119. I have already referred (supra) to a propellant contract between PRB and the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces.
*17 - TISC (Ibid): Q 3239
*18 - TISC: HC 86-xii: Evidence of Mr Gumbley: Question 2870
*19 - Mr Primrose’s first written statement to the Inquiry dated 11 May 1993: paragraph 3
*20 - The functions of DGMktg are described in paragraph F3.84 infra
*21 - paragraph 13 and p. 5 of Mr Harding’s first written statement to the Inquiry dated 20 May 1993
*22 - MOD/125.1
*23 - Mr Tidy, as AUS DES Admin, had oversight within DESO of export control and enforcement matters
*24 - Mr Primrose’s first written statement: p. 2
*25 - see also paragraph F3.85 infra
*26 - MOD/125.7
*27 - MOD/125.7 (Ibid): I have assumed that Mr Primrose was referring to the information held by the intelligence services about SRC’s Learfan project and, more generally, about Dr Bull’s activities over the years unrelated to Iraq
*28 - Mr Q’s first written statement dated 26 April 1993: paragraph 2a
*29 - paragraph 10(b) of the Appendix to Mr James’ memorandum to TISC: HC 86-x
*30 - MOD/212: Letter from Mr Keen (MOD) to the Inquiry dated 19 May 1993, paragraph 4c of a brief from Nicolas Bevan to the Minister(DP) dated 25 February 1992 prepared for the Minister’s appearance at TISC;
*31 - MOD/125.19
*32 - Mr Primrose’s first written statement, p. 3
*33 - transcript of Mr Q’s oral evidence to the Inquiry on 18 May 1993: pp. 5/6
*34 - MOD/125.19
*35 - Mr Q’s first written statement: paragraph 3
*36 - Mr Q’s first written statement: paragraph 3
*37 - MOD/125.27
*38 - In his written comments to the Inquiry, Mr Primrose said that the intention was not to ask the Belgian Government to review “their whole export policy”; rather to look a the two export licences with a view to discovering whether false end-user certificates had been used
*39 - see paragraphs F3.83 et seq

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.
Ah, what a lovely dark web Thatcher's crowd wove.

I met Koch (twice as I recall) and also Gerald James, back in my bad old days. Or, at least I knew of Gerald back then, as we did business with him and Astra -- but only met him to talk about these matters some years later.

Koch, who was believed to have been the head of an assassination squad before he became a banker --- a natural career progression one might argue -- had direct access to Thatchler during those years. Which goes some way to explaining the power of the spook crowd during her period in office.

Not nearly enough is made of the fact that it was the US, UK and Europe who directly furnished Saddam with his inventory of WMD in the first place. This has become an inconvenient truth to be ignored by the politcal elite.

Therefore, using WMD as a reason for regime change (once the bin Laden blame-storming for 911 had be shown to be false), as Blair has recently done, is also just a "limited hangout" excuse.
Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume Three
Section F Supergun
Chapter 3 Government Knowledge - January 1989 until December 1989


Excerpt:
ASTRA HOLDINGS PLC

ASTRA HOLDINGS PLC
F3.19 Astra Holdings plc (Astra) completed its acquisition of PRB on 11 September 1989. [size=12]*14 Stephan Kock was a non-executive director of Astra at the time of the acquisition. *15 According to Mr Kock’s evidence to TISC, he went with others to visit the PRB plants in Belgium on 19/20 September 1989. At the PRB plant at Kaulile he was told by the manager that PRB were involved in exporting unusual propellants. *16 Mr Kock reported the matter to colleagues in the company and discussed it with them. He also says that he telephoned the intelligence services on 22 September 1989. *17 He next came down to London from his home in Scotland on 11 October 1989 and “made a full report”. Intelligence documents confirm that Mr Kock telephoned from Scotland to ask for an urgent meeting. Intelligence documents also suggest that on 10 October, a preliminary meeting was held with Mr Kock at which he mentioned the take-over by Astra of PRB and suggested that “PRB’s books indicated some shady dealings in the past”. It appears that the preliminary meeting was soon followed by another meeting. The source report on the meeting records the following information: [/SIZE]
“PRB of Belgium.

1. The British arms firm ASTRA Holdings has recently acquired a wholly owned subsidiary in Belgium ‘PRB sa’. A rumour circulating in the Astra Boardroom is that PRB has been (and probably continues to be) engaged in some shady business which involve supplying rocket propellant to the Iraqis. The rumour goes that a weapons system - probably a ‘155mm enhanced shell’ is being sold by a consortium .... The warhead could be chemical or nuclear device ....”

A copy of the report was sent to SIS.
F3.20 Quite independently of Mr Kock, other information was simultaneously put forward by Astra for the consideration of the British authorities. After completion of the acquisition, Mr Christopher Gumbley, chief executive of Astra at the time of the acquisition of PRB, was also told of PRB contracts of “a sensitive nature”. PRB managers had indicated that “the contracts, particularly for propellants, had a capability which was for - and they hinted towards this - nuclear and chemical weapons systems”. [size=12]*18 Mr Gumbley was also told expressly that the contract for propellant was intended for delivery to Iraq through the use of Jordan. The propellant was for a very large gun. [/SIZE]
F3.21 It was at about this time that MOD/DESO had begun to have its own suspicions about PRB. Mr Robert Primrose was Director of Marketing Services (D Mktg Svcs) at DESO between 30 April 1986 and 30 April 1991. The role of Marketing Services was to assemble, analyse and disseminate information on world markets for defence exports; and on the performance of UK industry in these markets. Mr Primrose has told the Inquiry that his concerns about PRB predated the disclosure of information about PRB by Astra to the MOD. He had no concrete evidence; rather “only an undefined suspicion which developed gradually during August and early September 1989, that PRB might have been approached, directly or through third parties, to supply artillery ammunition, or ammunition components, to Iraq or Iran more probably Iraq.” This suspicion stemmed mainly from Mr Primrose’s “general knowledge of the kind of defence procurement exercises which Iraq and Iran had mounted during the war; a little public information about PRB ....; and indications from a number of quarters that both Iraq and Iran had embarked on a new round of re-equipment and replenishment of their forces following the cease-fire.” [size=12]*19[/SIZE]
F3.22 Mr Primrose’s immediate superior was Mr Roger Harding. Mr Harding was the Director General of Marketing Services (DGMktg). [size=12]*20 Mr Primrose shared his initial concern with Mr Harding on 23 September 1989. Mr Primrose had noted that Mr Harding was due to have an “informal meeting .... with Astra that weekend” and he hoped that Mr Harding would raise the matter at the meeting. Mr Harding agreed to do so. He has told the Inquiry that he and Mr Primrose believed that the most sensible action would be a “low key approach to the executives I already knew at Astra.” *21 His first opportunity to talk to an Astra executive occurred at the Royal Naval Equipment Exhibition at Portsmouth in September 1989, when he saw Mr Gumbley. He told Mr Gumbley that he had heard rumours that there might be problems connected with contracts which Astra were inheriting in consequence of their purchase of PRB. He suggested that Mr Gumbley should check them out to make sure that “he had not ‘done a Ferranti’.” This was a reference to publicity about the ill-fated merger of Ferranti and ISC as a result of which Ferranti had acquired suspect ISC contracts. Mr Gumbley agreed to review the PRB contracts.[/SIZE]
F3.23 On 26 October 1989, Mr Gumbley and Mr Jolly (also of Astra) attended a meeting in Mr Harding’s office. DESO was represented by Mr Harding and Mr Primrose. Mr Gumbley tabled a document entitled ‘Contracts: Third Party destinations.’ [size=12]*22 The first three items on the list were:[/SIZE]
“CONTRACTS: THIRD PARTY DESTINATIONS
NR Country Product Remarks 1 Jordan (1) High Energy propellent See Annexure 2 Jordan (2) Propellent powder See Annexure 3 Jordan 130mm LR/BB ammunition See Annexure..." The comments in ‘Annex 2’ to the list included the following:
“....
1. JORDAN
1.1 Project BABYLON: Phase 1 (end user IRAQ)

* PRB Contract No 5397 signed February 1989

* Product M8M high energy propellent: qty 235 tons

* Value scheduled for delivery by 31/3/90 £1.96m

* Order routed from Jordan to PRB via SRC (Dr Bull)

* Delivery presently suspended due to technical difficulties

* Belgian government export licence approved

1.2 Project BABYLON: Phase 2 (end user IRAQ-SMPE)

* Sales prospect for large quantity propellent

* Value £5.5m

* Scheduled visit by J L Jourdain in November 1989 to begin negotiations with contract signature January 1990

* Partial delivery within October 1990

* PRB anticipate export licence approval for Iraq will be sanctioned by Belgian government early 1990

1.3 Project: 130mm Long Range Base Bleed Ammunition

* PRB forecast sale of 130mm LR/BB within 31/3/89

* Value £11m Quantity 20000 rounds ....”

In discussion, Mr Gumbley said that he suspected, although he had no direct evidence, that the first and second contracts “might be missile-related and might be intended for Iraq”. He also “felt that No 3 was for Iraq”. Mr Gumbley added, as to the Iraqi-related contracts, that he was inclined to withdraw from them even if they were approved by the Belgian Government. Mr Harding was recorded as having said that he recognised the primacy of the Belgian Government in “all export matters conducted by Belgian firms”, but he agreed “that Astra should give serious thought to their public image in UK and elsewhere”. Mr Gumbley, for his part, offered to seek further information on the contracts and pass this to DESO so that more specific advice could be given.
F3.24 Between 26 October and the date of the next MOD meeting with Mr Gumbley on 3 November, Mr Primrose, Mr Harding and Mr Tidy had a discussion [size=12]*23 about how to take forward action on the information provided by Mr Gumbley. It was decided that the matter “did not involve any direct or potential [breach] of UK law or regulations” and that it should be referred to the intelligence services. Mr Primrose was asked to act accordingly. After the discussion, Mr Primrose contacted SIS to pass on orally all the information which he had received. Although DESO officials considered SIS to be the appropriate agency to takeforward any necessary action in the light of Mr Gumbley’s information, Mr Primrose also briefed a close contact in the DIS in early November. *24 This is a matter more fully dealt with below. *25 [/SIZE]
F3.25 Mr Gumbley returned to DESO on 3 November 1989. He met Mr Primrose, who was on his own, and provided him with further details of PRB’s activities. Mr Primrose’s record of the meeting was incorporated in a minute to Mr Harding of the same date. [size=12]*26 The note was copied to Mr McDonald and to Mr Tidy. Mr Gumbley’s primary concern remained the supply of high energy propellants, ostensibly to Jordan but, in his view, almost certainly intended for Iraq. Although Mr Gumbley was still awaiting details of the chemical composition and shape of the charges, he was able to say that he had been told:[/SIZE]
“... that the propellant is of a special high energy composition and that it would be in the shape of short grains (sticks). Much more alarming to him was an allegation that they were to be used in a very large artillery piece in Iraq, mounted on rails and using several bags of grains and igniters in series to produce a weapon of strategic range. The direct involvement of Dr G V Bull of SRC in the Iraqi project was a further indicator of the type of technology. [He] mentioned the possibility of nuclear shells ....”

Mr Primrose reiterated DESO’s advice that the supply of propellants was a matter for the Belgian authorities and advised Mr Gumbley that he should consult them if he suspected Iraqi involvement. Mr Primrose was, he said, left with the clear impression that Mr Gumbley:
“... did not intend to supply the propellant; that he might consider divesting Astra of the propellant plants to SRC if the Belgian government agreed; and that he intended to raise the whole matter with the original owners Société Générale. He also promised to keep us informed and to tell us about the chemical and physical details of the propellant when these come to hand.

10. I have refrained from introducing into this minute any collateral information which we have to hand about SRC, Dr Bull, Iraq etc; but you are aware that there is a considerable body of such material ....” [size=12]*27
[/SIZE]

F3.26 Mr Primrose spoke to Mr Q on the telephone after his second meeting with Mr Gumbley. Mr Q remembers Mr Primrose telling him about a “rather bizarre” story which he had been told by a British company. The company, which was not named, had indicated:
“... that propellant of abnormal characteristics was being manufactured in Belgium, ostensibly for Jordan but in truth intended for an Iraqi end user. [Mr Primrose] was unsure whether to believe the story, and if he did, which government departments should be informed and how. [He - Mr Q] replied that [he] had other straws in the wind along the same lines so that, taking all the indicators together, [they] ought to take the story seriously however bizarre it sounded. As to government departments [they] agreed that the matter did not fit neatly into any one pigeon-hole but DTI and FCO had an obvious interest as well as MOD ....” [size=12]*28
[/SIZE]

Mr Primrose agreed to record what he had been told.
F3.27 In early November 1989, a meeting was arranged at the Grantham offices of BMARC which was attended by Gerald James, Stephan Kock, an SAS officer and Mr Q. Evidence given to TISC by Mr James was that “the objective alleged [of the meeting] was to look at equipment purchases. Instead [Mr Q] spent most of the time grilling James about the Jordan contract and who had knowledge of it.” [size=12]*29 Mr Q’s account of the meeting was recorded in a MOD brief for the Minister (DP)’s appearance before TISC. Mr Q is reported to have said that the meeting was set up to discuss equipment for the Special Forces, that he was invited by an SAS officer to be present and that he took the opportunity to assure Mr James that the information provided by Astra about PRB’s Iraqi propellant contract was being taken very seriously. *30 [/SIZE]
F3.28 On 13 November 1989, Mr Primrose sent to Mr Q a letter headed ‘PRB’. [size=12]*31 Mr Primrose enclosed with his letter an “exact transcript” of the information passed to MOD/DESO on 26 October, as well as a “slightly edited” version of the note of the meeting on 3 November. The purpose of editing the copy of the 3 November note was, according to Mr Primrose, to underline an oral agreement that he had reached with Mr Gumbley, namely, that Astra would not be identified in intelligence reporting to “UK or Allied customers as collaborating with UK intelligence; and that their private commercial affairs should not be published more widely than necessary ....” Mr Primrose accepts that his editing was hurried and quite transparent and that the company was readily identifiable by anyone with no more than a “slender knowledge” of the defence industry. *32 In fact, Mr Q had already known by 6 November that Astra was the company concerned. In oral questioning at the Inquiry, it became apparent that Mr Primrose had deleted more than he needed to if his purpose was to exclude details identifying Astra and Mr Gumbley. Thus, for example, the version which was sent to Mr Q excluded the reference to Mr Gumbley’s mentioning the “possibility of nuclear shells”. But, be that as it may, the fact is that Mr Q was provided with a great deal of highly pertinent information. Taken on its own, the story of a so-called “monster gun” might have been discounted as a rather wild story by Mr Q; but, taken with the other straws in the wind, it seemed to him that this was a matter worth pursuing. *33 [/SIZE]
F3.29 It is worth noting one point in Mr Primrose’s letter to which I shall refer again. He records Mr Q as having suggested on the telephone that an official, but confidential, démarche should be made to the Belgian Government in relation to the PRB propellant exports. At the time Mr Primrose considered this to be the best permanent solution to the problem. But, in his view, a démarche needed to be made quickly. [size=12]*34 The request for the démarche was eventually made to the FCO on 15 December 1989.[/SIZE]
F3.30 A meeting between Mr Q, Mr Primrose and members of the board of Astra took place on 23 November 1989. There were two matters which were explored at the meeting. First, it was sought to clarify the technical question of what precisely the device was for which Iraq was procuring such an abnormal propellant. Mr Q recounts this part of the discussion in a lucid, lively manner and I shall quote his written evidence in full:
“... The technical part of the meeting was a little confused at first in that Mr PRIMROSE and ASTRA were considering the possibility that the propellant was for some novel form of rocket motor rather than a gun for which it was considered far too thick. The thickness (web thickness) was the key parameter in that it determined the time required for the propellant to burn up. This time was far too short for any reasonable rocket or ballistic missile but too long for a gun of any reasonable size. Therefore this propellant had to be for a gun of monster proportions, around 100 metres in length. This tied in with the other sketchy evidence I had and I must confess to being very excited at the realisation that we were on the verge of uncovering a completely new concept in weapons. It struck me at the time that the situation was comparable to that moment in 1942 when Dr R V JONES realised that the Germans were developing the V2 rocket ....” [size=12]*35
[/SIZE]

The second matter discussed was the question how the British Government could seek to achieve the disengagement of Astra without infringing Belgian law. It was assumed by those present at the meeting that the contract to supply the propellant was valid under Belgian law. [size=12]*36 A number of points for further action were then agreed by those who were there. In a letter to Mr Q recording the discussion at the meeting with Astra, Mr Primrose said that Astra had been advised by the Government representatives to monitor “very closely” the activities of PRB in negotiating any further related contracts and to take advice from the authorities at every stage. *37 Mr Primrose said in the same letter that, after the meeting with Astra, he and Mr Q had agreed that the concerns of the British Government should be communicated to the Belgian Government as soon as practicable and, in any event, by the end of 1989. They had noted that, once Astra assumed full control in January 1990, the perception both domestically and internationally would be that PRB’s activities were carried out under the direction of Astra. In those circumstances, Mr Primrose said in his letter to Mr Q, “any activity which could be seen as violating the spirit of the MTCR and other relevant policy decisions will be attributed to the UK firm”. DESO’s view, said Mr Primrose, was that Astra should “terminate this line of business” and that the correct way to achieve this was for the British Government to persuade the Belgian Government to review its export licence policy. *38 This was a reference to the démarche which, on 13 November, had already been suggested by Mr Q to Mr Primrose. Finally, it is important to draw attention to the fact that Mr Primrose and Mr Q agreed that all relevant information “should be reported to Ministers as a matter of urgency”. In fact, MOD Ministers were never told. *39 [/SIZE]

Endnotes:
*14 - Memorandum by Gerald James to TISC: HC 86-x: p.350
*15 - Mr Kock’s evidence to TISC: HC 86-xii: Questions 3036-37. Mr Kock has confirmed to the Inquiry that, subject to two points, the minutes of his evidence to TISC have been accurately recorded, although he does also say that some of the questions put to him were based on “assumption” or “incorrect evidence” by “others”.
*16 - Evidence to TISC (Mr Kock): HC 86-xii: Questions 3044-3060; 3116-3119. I have already referred (supra) to a propellant contract between PRB and the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces.
*17 - TISC (Ibid): Q 3239
*18 - TISC: HC 86-xii: Evidence of Mr Gumbley: Question 2870
*19 - Mr Primrose’s first written statement to the Inquiry dated 11 May 1993: paragraph 3
*20 - The functions of DGMktg are described in paragraph F3.84 infra
*21 - paragraph 13 and p. 5 of Mr Harding’s first written statement to the Inquiry dated 20 May 1993
*22 - MOD/125.1
*23 - Mr Tidy, as AUS DES Admin, had oversight within DESO of export control and enforcement matters
*24 - Mr Primrose’s first written statement: p. 2
*25 - see also paragraph F3.85 infra
*26 - MOD/125.7
*27 - MOD/125.7 (Ibid): I have assumed that Mr Primrose was referring to the information held by the intelligence services about SRC’s Learfan project and, more generally, about Dr Bull’s activities over the years unrelated to Iraq
*28 - Mr Q’s first written statement dated 26 April 1993: paragraph 2a
*29 - paragraph 10(b) of the Appendix to Mr James’ memorandum to TISC: HC 86-x
*30 - MOD/212: Letter from Mr Keen (MOD) to the Inquiry dated 19 May 1993, paragraph 4c of a brief from Nicolas Bevan to the Minister(DP) dated 25 February 1992 prepared for the Minister’s appearance at TISC;
*31 - MOD/125.19
*32 - Mr Primrose’s first written statement, p. 3
*33 - transcript of Mr Q’s oral evidence to the Inquiry on 18 May 1993: pp. 5/6
*34 - MOD/125.19
*35 - Mr Q’s first written statement: paragraph 3
*36 - Mr Q’s first written statement: paragraph 3
*37 - MOD/125.27
*38 - In his written comments to the Inquiry, Mr Primrose said that the intention was not to ask the Belgian Government to review “their whole export policy”; rather to look a the two export licences with a view to discovering whether false end-user certificates had been used
*39 - see paragraphs F3.83 et seq

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.
FRONT PAGE


Intelligence, N. 81, 8 June 1998, p. 1


BELGIUM

THATCHER, ASTRA, IRAQ & MURDER OF GERALD BULL


The international press has been caught sleeping ... or has
intentionally ignored a "block-buster": 40 pages of raw
intelligence data from MI5 and MI6 directly implicating the
inner circle of British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, in
the murder of Gerald Bull in Brussels on 22 March 1990. That
is what Walter De Bock revealed in the Flemish daily, "De
Morgen", on 15 April and which has generated in the
international press ... two articles. The documents have been
passed on to the Belgian judge, Christian De Valkeneer, who has
been investigating the Bull murder and recently decided to
reopen the case on the basis of this documentation.

Gerald Bull was a Canadian engineer who had been working in
Belgium and secretly collaborating with the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein in developing the "Super Cannon" which was
supposed to be able to hit Israel from Iraq. Quite normally,
the murder inquiry got under way by investigating the possible
involvement of Mossad, but after six years, including two years
of intensive work just after the murder, De Valkeneer shelved
the inquiry with little or nothing to prove Israeli
implication. It now appears that Mossad's nemesis, the Tory
British defense and intelligence establishment (the "Old Boy"
network), is the real culprit and handily turned the inquiry
toward Mossad to cover its own tracks and, in particular, those
of Stephan Adolph Kock, the central figure of the Bull murder
and apparently the direct liaison to the Conservative Old Boy
network and the Thatcher inner circle (see our biography of
Kock in INT, n. 76 16). Following the "De Morgen" revelations,
the "Independent" published a one-page article entitled "Who is
Stephan Kock?" on 26 April. The only other article on the
affair was published by the Sunday magazine, "Business Times".
Needless to say, publication of MI5 and MI6 documents in the
British press would have been met with a rigorous "D Notice"
before public release.

Bull was a serious rival to the Thatcher-Old Boy clique since
they were involved in truly "cut-throat" competition on the
same market: illegally furnishing arms to Iraq during the
Iraq-Iran war. Much more so than Bull, the Thatcher-Old Boy
clique -- a very pro-NATO and pro-US group -- was illegally
furnishing both sides, making sure neither side gained a
strategic advantage, while making tremendous profits. Bull
knew this and apparently had extensive documentation on the
Thatcher-Old Boy clique's secret arms traffic, but this
"insurance policy" didn't save him from British "Big Boy
rules". Judge De Valkeneer is now focusing his investigation
on a mysterious visit to Brussels of a four-member SAS team
lead by Kock and including Terry Hardy, "MoD" (British Ministry
of Defence), Colonel Ian Jack, SHAPE liaison officer to the SAS
and other British special forces, Michael Blane, British
"Tactical Support Staff". Kock is described as a former SAS
officer, an MI5 agent and -- which is exceptional -- also an
MI6 agent, and a director of Astra Holdings with which Bull had
been fighting "tooth and nail" for the ownership of the Belgian
PRB munitions firm, formerly the Pouderies Reunies de Belgique.
In this fight with the Thatcher-Old Boy clique, Bull lost the
battle for PRB and then his life.

On 2 March 1990, a fax message, with the heading "Visit of UK
MoD Special Forces Staff to PRB", announced the arrival in
Brussels of the above four-member team for a supposed 19-21
March visit to PRB facilities. The team was particularly
interested in looking into the possible production of special
forces explosive devices by PRB, according to the fax. PRB had
never produced such devices and was in no way equipped to do
so. The team supposedly left Brussels for London on the
evening of 21 March. The next day Bull was killed and this
team's visit to Brussels is the center of Judge De Valkeneer's
new investigation. De Valkeneer also has a 6 March 1990
document from Astra announcing the team's arrival and intention
to visit four PRB ammunition factories. Besides Kock, an Astra
director, none of the team members had previously had anything
to do with PRB.

Just before his death on 22 March, Bull had a five-hour meeting
with Chris Gumbley, until just a few days previously director
general of Astra Holdings, in Brussels. The meeting was also
attended by two lawyers, one a Swiss who had also worked as a
PRB representative, and a Belgian who was Bull's lawyer.
Gumbley had been brutally ejected by Kock from Astra management
and Astra chairman of the board, Gerald James, had his board
chairmanship taken away from him, but was left as an ordinary
board member. This "coup" was executed by Kock alone, who was
Astra's new executive director apparently acting on behalf of
the Thatcher-Old Boy clique. After this "coup", and several
weeks before his death, Bull met with James.

Since the murder of Bull, Kock denied, in several different
official British inquiries, that he had traveled to Brussels at
the time, but later admitted he had been in Brussels in March
1990. According to "De Morgen", Kock was the only person aware
of the meeting between Gumbley and Bull because Gumbley had
told him. He was also the top MI5 and MI6 agent for
information concerning illegal international arms traffic and
therefore would have known about Bull's involvement in the
Iraqi Super Cannon and probably also about Bull's knowledge of
the Thatcher-Old Boy clique's international arms trafficking.
Indeed, this seems to have been the subject of the Gumbley-Bull
meeting.

The owner of PRB, Societe Generale, had been trying to sell the
company to either Bull or Astra -- then under James and Gumbley
-- without letting either know until the very end they were
competing against each other. When Astra bought control of
PRB, both Bull and Astra wanted to know how they had been
manipulated. Bull, having worked with PRB since the 1970s,
including for his arms deals and Super Cannon work for Iraq,
knew very well that PRB was insolvent and, without the secret
Iraq deals, would have been bankrupt long ago. Astra
management, under James and Gumbley, did not know this and
thought they were purchasing a dynamic munitions manufacturer.
Bull soon learned Astra's position, and, probably feeling that
both he and the James-Gumbley Astra management had been
manipulated by Societe Generale and the Thatcher-Old Boy clique
(Bull's real competitors), Bull apparently sought revenge by
"cluing them in". This is not at all what Kock and the
Thatcher-Old Boy clique wanted. James and Gumbley were kicked
out and Bull was "terminated with extreme prejudice" (CIA, not
MI6 terminology).

The "termination" of Bull did not come any too early. During
his 22 March meeting with James and Gumbley, Bull gave them
explosive information on deep involvement of senior British
Conservative Party officials in massive illegal weapons
contracts with Iran and Iraq extending over many years. Some
of this came out in the "Iraqgate" scandal involving Matrix
Churchill (see INT, n. 55 12, n. 59 29 & n. 79 28). Via Kock,
the Thatcher inner circle probably knew what was happening in
Brussels. James and Gumbley had had trouble with Thatcher's
Tory government and the Thatcher inner circle which was
secretly furnishing Iran and Iraq with arms to keep them
strategically balanced.

In the center of the Thatcher-Old Boy clique is the Midland
Bank, MI6 and the SAS. In the 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher
came to power, a leading figure at Midland was French
aristocrat, Count Herve de Carmoy, who headed a secret
department in charge of financing the illegal British arms
traffic with Iraq and Iran. In 1988, de Carmoy left the
Midland to take up a senior job at the Societe Generale and,
indirectly, the PRB. Later, at Societe Generale, de Carmoy was
succeeded by the Belgian aristocrat and former Belgian military
counter-espionage officer, Viscount Steve Davignon, who also
negotiated with Bull and Astra. Societe Generale, Midland Bank
and the Thatcher-Old Boy clique all knew about PRB's real
situation and hid it from the James-Gumbley management of Astra
which bought control of PRB just before being disposed of.
James told "De Morgen" that Kock was a top MI6 and MI5
informant and also in direct contact with the Thatcher inner
circle via Richard Unwin, also a MI6 officer who was directly
linked to Gerald Howarth, chief of Thatcher's cabinet. In
1997, Howarth was elected a Tory MP against a "New Labour"
candidate.

"De Morgen" considered the principal question behind this
affair to be why the Thatcher-Old Boy clique was so interested
in Astra and PRB. The Thatcher defense industry in the 1980s
was involved in massive illegal arms trade to Iran and Iraq and
they wanted to maintain a monopoly and suppress any leaks.
After the Iraq-Iran war, the British defense industry continued
to export arms to Iraq which helped build up the Iraq armed
forces, led to the invasion of Kuwait and made the Gulf War
possible. This traffic passed through complicated networks
involving third parties, and the Thatcher-Old Boy clique
controlled them with Kock as coordinator and "enforcer". In
early 1990, James and Gumbley became a risk for this vast
operation and were pushed aside. They decided to contact Bull
who could tell them much more about the network and the central
role of the Thatcher-Old Boy clique. Bull was out for revenge,
sided with James and Gumbley, and furnished massive
documentation and specialized lawyers to "blow" the British
network and expose the Thatcher government. James met Bull
briefly, then Gumbley decided to secretly meet Bull for five
hours on 22 March just before Bull's murder. After that,
Gumbley and James underwent serious harassment in Great
Britain.

After Bull's murder, PRB changed its name and became Gechem,
sold off its ammunitions production capacity and kept only
synthetic foam production. James and Gumbley tried to fight
back under difficult circumstances and Kock seems to have "done
further service" for the Thatcher-Old Boy clique. Recently,
James claims to have seen documents, supposedly from the CIA or
the US State Department, stating that Kock was much more active
than previously known. One document reportedly mentions that
Kock, on 26 March-2 April 1990, just after the Bull murder, was
"shadowed" in Santiago, Chile, at the Hotel Carrera with
another MI6 officer, Roger Holdness. Holdness was probably the
"Michael Blane" who was a member of the team which visited
Brussels.

On 31 March 1990, in Hotel Carrera room 406, Jonathan Moyle,
British defense journalist working as editor of "Defence
Helicopter World", was murdered as a poorly-disguised
"suicide". Moyle was investigating the very same thing up
against which Bull had come: secret British involvement in
weapons traffic to Iraq, this time involving helicopters (see
"Great Britain/Chile - Death of Journalist J. Moyle", INT, n.
76 34). The official British inquiry into Moyle's death ran
into serious obstacles and eventually led nowhere, probably due
to the fact that the British prime minister's son, Mark
Thatcher, was linked to Chilian arms dealer, Carlos Cardoen,
who Moyle was investigating. Cardoen, since condemned in a US
court, has consistently claimed his Iraqi weapons sales were
known and "verified" by British and US military attaches based
in Santiago. Judge De Valkeneer has indeed a hefty task cut
out for himself.
http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence/readme/81sum

Copyright @ Walter De Bock and "De Morgen", 1998
In the Public Interest: A devastating account of the Thatcher Government's involvement in the covert arms trade



Gerald James
Little, Brown and Company
1995
I briefly met Gerald James once at a meeting of MOJO, the group organised by former Birmingham Six member Paddy Hill. It was an incongruous setting in which to come across a former paratrooper and successful city accountant, but James had a fascinating tale to tell, the bones of the story which is told more fully in this book.
As a former member of the Monday Club, and friend of MI6's George Kennedy Young, James was by his own admission part of the Tory clique that brought Thatcher to power, the very group that would bring down his company ten years later. "On the face of it," he writes, "this is the great irony of my story."

In 1981, James became chairman of Astra Fireworks, which he planned to turn into a major arms manufacturer. This strategy chimed perfectly with the increased militarisation of the British economy under Thatcher.
James' insight into the nature of that economy is one of the biggest strengths of the book. "The illicit arms trade of the 1980s was no less than the 'magic' at the heart of the Margaret Thatcher's economic miracle," he writes.
The key 'big five' deals were with Oman (1981), Jordan (1985-87), Saudia Arabia (Al Yamamah 1986 onwards), Malaysia (the Pergau Dam deal 1988 and 1991) and Indonesia (1990 onwards.)
Much of the arms from several of these deals actually ended up with the combatants in the Iran-Iraq War. In many cases the arms were never paid for, but the flow of North Sea oil revenue, in the form of export credits for failed deals, acted as a major subsidy to the city.
James believes that after the 1988 Iran-Iraq ceasefire, the British Government sought to protect the largest British arms manufacturers from exposure by implementing a damage limitation strategy that would sacrifice some of the smaller players.
James' efforts to protect Astra's interests brought him into conflict with Stephan Kock, a director of the company who James claims was working for MI6, which wanted to continue using Astra for covert deals.
James was ousted in a boardroom struggle in March 1990. Chief Executive Chris Gumbley resigned shortly afterwards. Gumbley then travelled to Brussels to meet Iraqi supergun designer Gerald Bull, in an attempt to secure evidence that Astra was being victimised. Bull was assassinated an hour after the meeting. Gumbley was later sentenced to nine months in prison for corruption.
Ironically, during the Gulf War, James' son Christian was to be one of the many British soldiers who would come across British ammunition in the hands of Iraqi forces.
The book features walk-on parts for Jonathen Aitken, a director of Astra subsidiary BMARC, and Mark Thatcher, who appears as an associate of the so-called 'Savoy Mafia' of arms dealers.
It is a remarkable story that goes to heart of how Thatcher reshaped Britain and its place in the world with consequences that are still unfolding.
Thanks a bunch for all this Magda.

Devastating stuff isn't it?

I searched for James's book on Amazon - book details & cover photo shown but none for sale. AbeBooks has dozens of copies and I've got one for just 63p + £2.75 P&P!

This whole saga leads right up to the David Kelly killing. I've been vascillating about becoming a bit more specialised in my own researchings. This looks to me like VERY fertile ground.
It's an excellent book Peter and I'm certain you will find it very fertile. Gerald had many excellent contacts - and thus insights - into the dark crannies and nooks of the world which didn't stop at the Astra affair.
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