Jim DiEugenio Wrote:

Cliff Varnell Wrote:

Tracy Riddle Wrote:All of this misses the bigger problem - that an invasion of Cuba was doomed to fail because the revolutionary regime was popular with most Cubans, and had a large, combat-experienced army with ideal terrain to defend. It's the reason why JFK didn't want to invade Cuba during the Missile Crisis. As Marine Corps Commandant David Schoup pointed out by displaying a map of Cuba with a small red dot overlaying it. He said that the red dot represented the island of Tarawa, which took three days and 18,000 Marines to capture.

I couldn't agree more -- as a military operation Op Zapata was doomed all along.

However, as a bureaucratic operation designed to get rid of Allen Dulles it was a smashing success.

LOL, ROTF, LMAO

This has gotten to be one of the most absurdly humorous threads I can recall here.

More contentless dismissal.

When it comes to saying nothing with the most, you're the best, Jim!

Like I said, there is nothing more grotesque than one lame theorist teaming up with another to advance ideas that simply are not justified by the evidence, and which ignore certain key facts.

And yet you cannot produce any evidence of pressure from the CIA to force Kennedy to commit US forces -- other than Cabell's pathetic D-Day 4am phone call.

Tell us why Dulles went to Puerto Rico, Jim, if his intent was to pressure Kennedy.

One of the key points that Lyman Kirkpatrick made in his report was this: OK, let us assume for the sake of argument that Castro's Air Force was neutralized. What would that have left on the ground?

About 35,000 Cuban regulars supported by Soviet tanks, mortar and artillery and motorized companies, against about 1,100 exiles who already had one supply ship sunk and one stuck on the reef. This meant ammunition, radios and aviation fuel was lost.(What do you think the last was for Scott?) This greatly crippled their ability to communicate, and also to counter the Cuban troops arriving at the water's edge. Kirkpatrick goes on to say that this was made worse since the CIA told Kennedy there was no police force at Playa Giron, but there was! And Castro also knew when the last ship had left Central America. Therefore since he had been on full alert for a week, he was able to get thousands of his troops to the front within hours. This was another lie by the CIA. They had told Kennedy that, because of the element of surprise, Castro would not be able to mass a counterattack for days.

Yes, the CIA lied to Kennedy.

But Kennedy asked Admiral Burke the chances of success --50/50. Kennedy knew he was taking a gamble based on the success of the popular uprising, and all the principals knew that no US forces would be committed.

That was established US policy one month before D-Day.

To insist as Jim DiEugenio does that the CIA seriously pressured Kennedy to change that policy is unsupported by the evidence.

DiEugenio falls in love with his own Pet Theories, but can't back them up.

Secondly, there were no defections. Period. So it was Castro's regular army of about 35,000 men, with all of the armored weapons available enabling it to hit the exiles with long range artillery shells and short range mortar shells, and then tanks to push forward and polish them off--against a force of about 1,100 men who had two supply ships already inoperative. Kirkpatrick then adds that this was not the worst part. The worst part was the fact that Castro still had a 200,000 man reserve militia he could call upon if needed. But his implication is that it was not needed here. Because it was all over in about 24 hours. And not because of the air cover issue, but because the CIA had planned this thing so poorly, and had anticipated things that did not happen. Like the fact that Castro had rolled up the last resistance weeks before. Therefore, there was no possibility of getting any support on the island.

No one is challenging this.

What does this have to do with your absurd, a-historical Pet Theory that the CIA was trying to force Kennedy to change established, consensus policy?

But beyond that, there was not any hope of going guerrilla either. Because Playa Giron was 85 miles from the mountains. And that 85 miles was swamp not dirt. But further, to show another lie the CIA dumped on Kennedy, the exiles had no training in guerrilla warfare or how to survive under those conditions. Bobby Kennedy made sure that this got in the record of the Taylor Report by supplying exiles who had been trained by the Agency. You should read Dulles' ridiculous and mendacious response to that testimony.

No one is challenging this.

Again, this does not support your lame claim that the CIA applied any kind of real pressure on Kennedy.

See, the whole thing about the "cancelled D Day raids" was simply a dual edged myth that the CIA, specifically Dulles, Hunt, and Bissell, manufactured afterwards to cover the fact that they knew the operation could not succeed unless the USA participated directly. In fact, as Talbot discovered, the Pentagon had written a paper saying just that. But Bissell, who controlled the paper flow going to JFK on this, made sure the president did not see it.

And all the principals knew there would be no direct US involvement.

It had been ruled out a month ahead of time.

If Dulles and Bissell thought differently it only shows how out of touch they were.

When I write "dual edged myth" what I mean is this:

1.) There were no cancelled D Day air strikes.

And no cancelled D-Day-1 air strikes. Bundy changed the plan to allow D-Day-2 false flag strikes, but cutting that fleet from 16 planes to 8 doomed it.

There was no beachhead attained--and Kennedy had made it clear he wanted those launched from the island.

How was that going to happen unless Castro's air force had been taken out?

Kennedy should have looked at the D-Day-1 recon photos and called off the operation.

2.) They would have made no difference to the ultimate outcome anyway. For the simple reason that Zapata was mismanaged in every possible way you can imagine.

And not just mismanaged only by the CIA. The Pentagon, the State Department, the National Security Council and Kennedy himself all screwed up.

But if anyone screwed up on purpose, looks like Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy.

And Kirkpatrick takes literally dozens of pages showing how this was the case. Pages that, evidently, Scott wants to ignore. Because it shows that, for the CIA, the Cuban exiles were expendable.

And to Rusk and Bundy the top level of the CIA was expendable.

Dulles and Bissell understood that the operation had simply no opportunity to succeed unless American forces were directly involved.

Stephen Kinzer makes a great case that Dulles didn't understand anything.

http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/11/jfk-bay-of-pigs-allendulles.html

Of course, that flies against Jim DiEugenio's most cherished Pet Theories.

Bissell applied zero (0)pressure on Kennedy.

Tell us why Dulles went to Puerto Rico, Jim!

And, misjudging Kennedy, that is what they were banking on.

There was nothing to bank on.

US policy was clear, reached by consensus a month earlier.

Any last minute change was not bureaucratically possible: no direct US involvement. Period.

Dulles and Hunt then made up this whole D Day bombing excuse to cover their own butts about the CIA's treachery. And Phillips and Hunt then spread it among the Cubans. And they bought into it. And they are still buying into it. And Scott listens to them.

And Dulles, Cabell and Bissell had to go to cover for Rusk's and Bundy's treachery -- and Kennedy's incompetence.

Quote: Playa Giron was 85 miles from the mountains. And that 85 miles was swamp not dirt. But further, to show another lie the CIA dumped on Kennedy, the exiles had no training in guerrilla warfare or how to survive under those conditions.

Drew Phipps Wrote:

Quote: Playa Giron was 85 miles from the mountains. And that 85 miles was swamp not dirt. But further, to show another lie the CIA dumped on Kennedy, the exiles had no training in guerrilla warfare or how to survive under those conditions.

Lake Pontchartrain in Louisiana is plenty swampy. Wasn't that the site of the "guerrilla warfare training center" that the FBI raided on 8/1/63? And didn't the CIA ultimately admit that it had a "guerrilla warfare training center"?

Quote: He read it right after the Taylor Report. And he then made his decision to fire the top level of the CIA.

Quote:Therefore since he had been on full alert for a week, he was able to get thousands of his troops to the front within hours. This was another lie by the CIA. They had told Kennedy that, because of the element of surprise, Castro would not be able to mass a counterattack for days.

Jim DiEugenio Wrote:1. Cabell, Dulles and Bissell were forced into resigning, they did not resign of their own free will. Big difference. For example, when Kennedy confronted Dulles after the reports were in, he said words to the effect that if this was a parliamentary system, he would have to resign. But since it was a presidential system, Dulles would have to go.
2. The main body of the invading force was in Central America. They did not get guerrilla training.

3. Every person who JFK consulted during the collapse advised him to save the operation with American forces. In addition to Cabell, this included Nixon and Burke. And when Dulles returned from Puerto Rico, around the second day, who did he go visit? Nixon.

Quote:On March 16, 1961, CIA officials outlined for President Kennedy the revisions to the Zapata plan that the President had called for on the previous day. The President's appointment book indicates that the meeting took place in the White House from 4:15 to 5:23 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Gray. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is clear from his subsequent debriefing on the meeting that Admiral Burke also attended. According to Gray's notes on the meeting:

"At meeting with the President, CIA presented revised concepts for the landing at Zapata wherein there would be air drops at first light with [Page 160]the landing at night and all of the ships away from the objective area by dawn. The President decided to go ahead with the Zapata planning; to see what we could do about increasing support to the guerrillas inside the country; to interrogate one member of the force to determine what he knows; and he reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 hours prior to the landing." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961, by General Gray; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

On March 17 Admiral Burke provided the JCS with additional details about the discussion of the revised Zapata plan. According to Burke, the President wanted to know what the consequences would be if the operation failed. He asked Burke how he viewed the operation's chance of success. Burke indicated that he had given the President a probability figure of about 50 percent. President Kennedy also inquired what would happen if it developed after the invasion that the Cuban exile force were pinned down and being slaughtered on the beach. If they were to be re-embarked, the President wanted to know where they could be taken. According to Burke's account of the meeting: "It was decided they would not be re-embarked because there was no place to go. Once they were landed they were there." In the course of the discussion, it was emphasized that the plan was dependent on a general uprising in Cuba, and that the entire operation would fail without such an uprising.