• By Nathan Hodge
  
• April 13, 2010 |
  
• 5:46 pm |
  
• Categories: Af/Pak
  

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Quote:According to Der Spiegel, after the 2005 change of government: Roza Otunbayeva "pledged allegiance to a small group of partners and sponsors of the Kyrgyz revolution, to 'our American friends' at Freedom House..."

Quote:A Kyrgyz opposition supporter fires an automatic weapon near the main government building during a protest against the government in Bishkek. Picture: AFP/GETTY
The HWS (holographic weapon sight) attached to the AK gun in the hands of an opposition fighter is the product of the US L-3 Communications EOTech Corporation, 500 series, retail price 600 USD each one (four average monthly salaries in Kyrgyzstan). According to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of the USA, the commercial sales and exports of this equipment requires a license issued by the US Department of State and Department of Commerce. These models were not officially delivered to Kyrgyzstan or Russia. Hence this AK with an advanced HWS could NOT be used by a regular Kyrgyz special unit officer and then captured by a protester at the ‘battlefield’. The Telegraph snapshot clearly indicates that the ‘pro-Russian revolt’ in Bishkek was surprisingly supplied from a US military site in Kyrgyzstan or, perhaps, Afghanistan.

David Guyatt Wrote:

Quote:A Kyrgyz opposition supporter fires an automatic weapon near the main government building during a protest against the government in Bishkek. Picture: AFP/GETTY
The HWS (holographic weapon sight) attached to the AK gun in the hands of an opposition fighter is the product of the US L-3 Communications EOTech Corporation, 500 series, retail price 600 USD each one (four average monthly salaries in Kyrgyzstan). According to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of the USA, the commercial sales and exports of this equipment requires a license issued by the US Department of State and Department of Commerce. These models were not officially delivered to Kyrgyzstan or Russia. Hence this AK with an advanced HWS could NOT be used by a regular Kyrgyz special unit officer and then captured by a protester at the ‘battlefield’. The Telegraph snapshot clearly indicates that the ‘pro-Russian revolt’ in Bishkek was surprisingly supplied from a US military site in Kyrgyzstan or, perhaps, Afghanistan.

And that ladies and gentlemen tells you all you need to know.

Quote:Reports have appeared in the Russian media doubting the pedigree of the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Moscow seems to be edging away from the interim administration head, Roza Otunbayeva, a former Kyrgyz ambassador to London and Washington.

The reports hint at covert United States backing for the uprising in Bishkek. They claim a drug mafia incited the latest regime change in Bishkek with covert US support - "the geostrategic interests of the US and the international narco-mafia happily merged ... It was only logical to use the services of narco-barons to overthrow [former president Kurmanbek] Bakiyev, who demanded from the US more and more payments for his loyalty".

A Russian commentator told Ekho Moscow radio, "The revolution in Kyrgyzstan was organized by the drug business." Kyrgyzstan is a hub of drug trafficking. The acreage of poppy cultivation in Kyrgyzstan has exponentially increased and is comparable today to Afghanistan.

There have been reports in the Russian (and Chinese) press linking the US base in Manas with drug barons. Iranian intelligence captured the Jundallah terrorist leader, Abdulmalik Rigi, when he was traveling in a Kyrgyz aircraft en route to an alleged rendezvous in Manas.

The Russian media leaks enjoy some degree of official blessing. They highlight circumstantial evidence questioning the nature of the revolt in Bishkek. Meanwhile, the influential think-tank Stratfor has rushed the interpretation alleging a Russian hand. Between these claims and counter-claims, Moscow seems to be veering to the assessment that Washington has benefited from Otunbayeva's political consolidation in Bishkek.

As a Russian commentator put it, "There are further indications that Moscow is cautious about the new Kyrgyz administration ... The truth is that there are no 100% pro-Russian politicians in Kyrgyzstan's interim government ... and quite a few of them are definitely associated with the West."

Indeed, Otunbayeva told the Washington Post and Newsweek that the US lease on the Manas air base would be extended "automatically" and that "we will continue with such long-term relations" with the US.

US Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia Robert Blake said in Bishkek after two days of consultations with Otunbayeva that her leadership offered "a unique and historic opportunity to create a democracy that could be a model for Central Asia and the wide region".

Blake hailed the regime change in Bishkek as a "democratic transition" and promised US aid to "find quick ways to improve the economic and social situation".

The sporadic attacks on ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan (estimated to number 700,000) have also set alarm bells ringing in Moscow. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev ordered the military to take necessary measures. A Kremlin spokesman said these would include increased security for "Russian interests" in Kyrgyzstan.

Moscow seems unsure whether the attacks on the Russians are isolated incidents. An overall slide toward anarchy is palpable with armed gangs taking the law into their hands and the clans in southern Kyrgyzstan rooting for Bakiyev's reinstatement. At any rate, Medvedev manifestly changed tack on Tuesday after talks with visiting Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov. He clearly distanced Russia from identifying with Otunbayeva's interim government. Medvedev said:
Essentially, we need to revive the state, the state does not exist at this time, it has been deposed. We are hoping that the interim administration will make all the necessary measures to achieve that, as anarchy will have a negative effect on the interests of the Kyrgyz people and also their neighbors. Legitimization of the authorities is extremely important, which means there need to be elections, not a de facto fulfillment of powers. Only in this case can [Russia's] economic cooperation be developed.

Russia has extended humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstan, but full-fledged economic cooperation will be possible only after the proper institutions of power have been created. Uzbekistan's president shares this view.
The joint Russian-Uzbek stance challenged the interim government not to regard itself as a legally constituted administration, no matter Washington's robust backing for it.

Clearly, Moscow and Tashkent are pushing Otunbayeva to not make any major policy decisions (such as over the US Manas base). She should instead focus on ordering fresh elections that form a newly elected government.

Otunbayeva had indicated her preference for far-reaching constitutional reforms to be worked out first that would transform Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentary democracy from the current presidential system of government. Moscow sees this as a ploy by the interim government to postpone elections and cling onto power with US backing.

Meanwhile, Bakiyev, who fled to Kazakhstan last weekend, has since shifted to Belarus. It is unclear whether Minsk acted on its own to give asylum to Bakiyev. Soon after reaching Minsk, Bakiyev announced that he hadn't yet resigned from office. "There is no power which will make me resign from the presidential post. Kyrgyzstan will not be anyone's colony," he said. Bakiyev called on world leaders not to recognize Otunbayeva's government.

Bakiyev's stance puts Washington in a bind. The US got along splendidly with Bakiyev and it is getting into stride equally splendidly with Otunbayeva. But it has no means of persuading Bakiyev to agree to a lawful, orderly transition of power to Otunbayeva.

Nor can Washington politically underwrite Otunbayeva's government if its legitimacy is doubted in the region (and within Kyrgyzstan itself). Besides, Otunbayeva is not acquitting herself well in stemming the country's slide toward clan struggle, fragmentation and anarchy.

During his two-day visit to Moscow, Karimov made it clear that Tashkent took a dim view of the regime change in Bishkek.

Using strong language, Karimov said, "There is a serious danger that what's happening in Kyrgyzstan will take on a permanent character. The illusion is created that it's easy to overthrow any lawfully elected government." He warned that instability in Kyrgyzstan may "infect" other Central Asian states.

Russia and Uzbekistan have found it expedient to join hands. Medvedev stressed that his talks with Karimov in Moscow were "trusting and engaging with regard to all aspects of our bilateral relations, international and regional affairs". Karimov reciprocated, "Uzbekistan sees Russia as a reliable, trusted partner, which shows that Russia plays a critical role in ensuring peace and stability throughout the world, but in Central Asia in particular."

"Our viewpoints coincided completely," Karimov asserted. He added, "What is going on today in Kyrgyzstan is in nobody's interests - and above all, it is not in the interests of countries bordering Kyrgyzstan."

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also underscored the regional alignment. "Uzbekistan is the key country in Central Asia. We have special relations with Uzbekistan," he said.

Conceivably, Russia and Uzbekistan will now expect the Kyrgyz developments to be brought onto the agenda of the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is scheduled to take place in Tashkent in June.

A semi-official Russian commentary said, "The summit may help to work out mechanisms to ensure security in the country and in the whole region." The SCO secretary general (who is based in Beijing) visited Bishkek last week and met Otunbayeva.

Washington faces a potential diplomatic headache here. It needs to ensure the forthcoming SCO summit doesn't becomes a replay of the 2005 summit, which questioned the raison d'etre of the American military presence in Central Asia.

If Washington forces the pace of the great game, a backlash may ensue, which could snowball into calls for the eviction of the US from the Manas base, as some influential sections of Kyrgyz opinion are already demanding.

If that were to happen, the big question would be whether Otunbayeva would be able to get the American chestnuts out of the fire. Hailing from the southern city of Osh but having lived her adult life in the capital, which is dominated by northern clans, she lacks a social or political base and is at a disadvantage.

The geopolitical reality is that Kyrgyzstan has to harmonize with the interests of the regional powers - Russia and Uzbekistan in particular - as should the US, in the larger interests of regional stability. The fact remains that Russian and Uzbek (and Kazakh) influence within Kyrgyz society and politics remains preponderant. And China too has legitimate interests.

The Kremlin will not fall into the same bear trap twice. In Georgia under somewhat similar circumstances the US took generous help from Russia in the stormy winter of 2003 to clear the debris of the "Rose" revolution and "stabilize" the ground situation before promptly installing Mikheil Saakashvili, who has been a thorn in the flesh for Moscow ever since.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

Quote:Russia may regret Kyrgyzstan coup

The Kremlin is not known for its support of pro-democracy movements, and it may have bitten off more than it can chew

It's beyond argument, two weeks after the overthrow of Kyrgyzstan's president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, that Russia played a critical, possibly decisive role in his downfall. But as ethnic violence, score-settling, and political confusion continue to roil the impoverished central Asian country, the coming question is whether a clever-boots Kremlin has bitten off more than it can chew.

Having tendered his handwritten resignation by fax to the interim government last week, Bakiyev insisted today, from the relative safety of Minsk, that he was still in charge. "I will do everything to restore constitutional order … only death can stop me," he said dramatically. "I call on international leaders not to recognise the authority of this illegitimate gang."

Bakiyev's southern supporters, centred on Dzhalal-Abad in the Ferghana valley (where most residents are ethnic Uzbeks) are also stubbornly refusing to recognise the administration formed by former foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva. Meanwhile fighting broke out around the capital, Bishkek, this week involving minority ethnic Russians and Meskhetian Turks.

Otunbayeva says she wants to create a parliamentary republic and hold free, democratic elections. That would be a welcome change. The Bakiyev era was blighted by repression, human rights abuses and corruption, with the exiled president accused of embezzling $200m. But it is uncertain whether she has the clout to hold the country together.

Cohesion is not the only imponderable. The fact that Russia recognised the interim government within hours of the coup taking place, while the US and the EU have yet to do so, shows how the Kyrgyzstan upheaval is also turning conventional political calculation on its head.

Vladimir Putin's Kremlin is not known for its support for pro-democracy movements in the former Soviet "near abroad", either in central Asia or the Caucasus. It has worked hard to reverse such tendencies – notably in Ukraine, which recently elected a pro-Moscow president and has now agreed to continue to host Russia's Black Sea fleet. Paradoxically, in Kyrgyzstan, it finds itself as foremost sponsor of a popular, anti-authoritarian revolution.

Washington, on the other hand, has in theory promoted a "freedom agenda" in these same regions and the Middle East. Barack Obama is now under fire at home for placing strategic and security considerations ahead of Kyrgyz democratic self-determination, although George Bush did much the same.

"US policy toward Kyrgyzstan has focused almost exclusively on keeping open its military base at Manas [a key supply hub for Afghanistan]," wrote David Kramer in Foreign Policy. "Many who are now serving in the interim government still feel betrayed by the US for giving Bakiyev a free pass as long as Manas stayed open."

According to analyst Tom Malinowski, Washington's duplicitous, self-interested approach is evident elsewhere in the region as it battles Russia and China for geopolitical advantage.

"US policymakers increasingly view central Asia as a transit point to somewhere else. It is a region through which oil and natural gas flow to Europe, reducing US allies' dependence on Russia. It is a region through which fuel, food and spare parts flow to US and Nato forces in Afghanistan," Malinowski said. Officials had coined a new name for the region, he added: the "northern distribution network".

The way Russia encouraged and manipulated the political opposition to Bakiyev also confounds stereotypical behaviour. Bakiyev's authoritarianism did not worry the Kremlin but his perceived double-crossing of Russia did, so they used American-style "soft power" tools to undermine him.

In the months before the uprising, financial assistance was withdrawn, Russian-language television and website outlets highlighted Bakiyev's alleged crimes, energy prices were forced up by tariff increases (as in Ukraine and Belarus), trade and banking regulations were tightened, and opposition figures were courted in Moscow. By the time the coup began, Bakiyev was already destabilised. This was an almost exact copy of US tactics preceding the Georgia and Ukraine "colour revolutions".

Now Russia is rightly worried about what it has wrought. President Dmitri Medvedev warned recently of anarchy and a "second Afghanistan". This week the Russian military was told to be ready to protect ethnic Russians – 20% of Kyrgyzstan's population.

It probably won't come to direct intervention. But the downside for the Kremlin of its too-clever Kyrgyz coup is becoming clearer. A democratic Kyrgyzstan may prove less biddable than Moscow would wish. The level-headed Otunbayeva may yet refuse to evict the Americans from Manas. Political divisions may become lethally corrosive. And, most dangerous of all, ethnic violence combining with popular discontent and Islamist agitation in the Ferghana valley linking south Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, may spark a wider conflagration.

It's happened before and it could happen again. Such are the perils of externally incited regime change.

Magda Hassan Wrote:The FBI's Eurasian Unit...