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+--- Thread: Moldavia events (/thread-1303.html)
Moldavia events - Magda Hassan - 12-04-2009
Since the counter revolution in the former USSR Moldavia has become one of the poorest parts of Europe (poorer than many places in Africa even) many of the women of Moldovia have ended up being trafficked (see DPF youtube channel) as many people are enticed to look for work overseas and are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. In recent years the communist party has made a come back and the recent election has put them in office and they have much popular support. This is unacceptable to others. Romania, a NATO puppet state has its own aspirations to claim Moldavia as its own and some are agitating for an Anschluss.
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Who is behind Moldova's Twitter Revolution?
By José Miguel Alonso Trabanco
URL of this article: www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13147
Global Research, April 11, 2009
"A lot of what we [National Endowment for Democracy] do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA." -Allen Weinstein
It seems that those who anticipated the end of color revolutions have been proven wrong. So far, color revolutions have succeeded in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, they have failed in Belarus, Uzbekistan and Myanmar. Their common denominator is a wave of protests and sometimes riots whose purpose is to overthrow a local government, often held during electoral times or shortly afterwards. It has not gone unnoticed that the so called color revolutions have been backed (and engineered?) by enthusiastic western supporters including NGO's, diplomats, businessmen, governmental institutions and heads of state. In those countries where such political mobilizations have prevailed, pro-Western leaders have been enthroned as a result thereof. If one pays close attention to a map, it is impossible not to wonder if it is simply a coincidence that color revolutions have erupted in countries close to Russian and Chinese borders. It has to be pointed out that no color revolution has ever occurred in any country whose government is staunchly pro-Western.
Today, it is indeed quite likely that events taking place in Moldova are none other than the evident signs of the latest color revolution. Only a few days ago, elections were held there and the official announcement of preliminary results of the electoral process showed that the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (affiliated to the Party of the European Left) had received nearly 50% of the votes. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) certified that Moldovan parliamentary elections were free and fair. Nevertheless, protests attended by tens of thousands started shortly afterwards. However, these demonstrations can hardly be described as peaceful since media reports confirm that organized violence has targeted government facilities, including the parliament building as well as a presidential office. The script bears some similarities with Ukraine's Orange Revolution, which started with large protests demanding new elections once opposition politicians were discontent with electoral results.
It is telling that protestors have been photographed waving the flags of both Romania and the European Union. They have also requested the ouster of Moldova's current government, denouncing it as a "totalitarian regime" and demanded parliamentary elections to be re-scheduled. So far, Moldovan law enforcement has been overwhelmed and is unable to control these riots even though it has resorted to tear gas and water cannons. Moldovan senior government officials have stated that they regard these episodes of civil unrest as unlawful and that they will act accordingly. Furthermore, the Romanian ambassador in Moldova has been declared persona non grata and visa requirements for Romanian nationals have been established. Also, pro-Moldovan protesters rallies have taken place in many cities throughout Romania. Although no color has been chosen to name this color revolution, these events have already been termed as the Twitter Revolution because on-site reports indicate that protest organizers have made extensive use of social-networking tools in order to fuel discontent.
To determine whether or not any event is geopolitically significant, the timing is an element which always needs to be taken into account. The post Soviet space is one of the most active arenas of great power strategic competition and there are some meaningful recent precedents such as:
· The fact that Ukraine and Georgia have not been accepted as NATO members in spite of intense diplomatic pressure by prominent NATO members.
· Unlike other post Soviet states, Moldova's government had declared that Chişinău would remain neutral and that it would thus refuse to side with great powers, which more or less resembles the position taken by fellow former Soviet Republic Turkmenistan whose foreign policy must meet criteria of strict neutrality.
· The Russo-Georgian war in which Moscow inflicted a military defeat on strongly pro-Western Georgia.
· The announcement by the Kyrgyz government that the Manas air base will be closed.
· The European Union launched its Eastern Partnership project, designed by Poland and Sweden to reach out to Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia. This was seen in Moscow as an attempt to co-opt these countries and marginalize them away from Russian influence.
· Ukraine's decision to hold anticipated elections. It might be added that pro-Western Viktor Yuschchenko's candidacy does not look particularly promising.
The above demonstrates that the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and NATO has been intensifying. In fact, Russian senior politicians are already claiming that civil unrest in Moldova is been orchestrated by western intelligence survives. They have also emphasized that the ultimate goal is to accomplish regime change in Chişinău so NATO member Romania can swallow Moldova. It is no secret that hardline nationalists in Bucharest would like to achieve Anschluss with Moldova. Yet Western governments have refrained from voicing a strong support for the anti-government crowd in Moldova. However, it is necessary to explore what Western interests could consist of in this tiny post Soviet republic.
Why Moldova?
Moldova was one of the poorest and less developed republics of the Soviet Union, as well as the most densely populated. It is a landlocked country contiguous to Romania and Ukraine. Soviet planners had decided that Moldova would specialize in food production. Nevertheless, Moldova was not entirely homogeneous. The country's industrial infrastructure was built in Transnistria, a region mostly populated by people of Slavic ethnicity (i.e. Russians and Ukrainians). This region was responsible for a large of percentage of Moldova's GDP (40%) and it also contributed with almost the entire power generation of the Moldovan SSR. Toward the end of the Cold War, Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu had stated that the Kremlin had annexed Bessarabia (aka Moldova), which implied that he considered it as a part of Romania.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union changed little. The overall Moldovan economy is not specially outstanding since it exports wine, fruits and other beverages and food products. Moldova is a net importer of coal, oil and gas since if has no natural deposits of any of these resources. According to the CIA World Factbook, Moldova ranks 138th in a list of countries arranged by GDP.
Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova following the Soviet collapse because it was fearful of an increasingly nationalistic Moldova and the reemergence of pro-Romanian sentiment. This triggered a war between Chişinău and Transnistrian separatists. Russian forces were then deployed in order to end hostilities. The conflict has been frozen ever since. Nevertheless, the presence of Russian military personnel (which numbers nearly 3000) has allowed Transnistria to keep its de facto independence from Molvoda even though it still formally belongs to the latter. Indeed, Transnistria has its own authorities, military, law enforcement, currency, public services, flag, national anthem, constitution and coat of arms. Nearly half of Transnistrian exports are shipped to Russia.
Russia has supported Transnistria because it is inhabited by a considerable proportion of ethnic Russians loyal to Moscow; this must not be born in mind because people is Russia's scarcest resource. Furthermore, Transnistria is located in the easternmost region on Moldova and, more importantly, it borders Ukraine. Last but not least, Transnistria's small economy is based on heavy industry, textile production and power generation, which represents an additional atractive. As a result of Russian involvement, Chişinău has been careful not to be antagonistic toward Moscow.
Moldova's current president, Vladimir Voronin (the name can be misleading but he is, in fact, an ethnic Romanian), was elected in 2001 as the candidate of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova. Regardless of his party's name, his administration can be described a pragmatic; for instance, he decided to continue privatization plans first put forward by his predecessor. Back in 2002, he angered nationalists by designating the Russian language as a second official language. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to brand him as pro-Russian because his foreign policy has been seeking to balance Russian and Western interests without having to take sides. For example, his administration has expressed a desire to establish closer ties with the EU (which even runs a permanent mission in Chişinău) and cooperation with NATO and Russia, excluding membership in the Atlantic alliance or in the Russian-led CSTO. Furthermore, Voronin's government has stressed Moldova's need to preserve its independece instead of being absorbed by Romania. In short, he is neither pro-Russian (like Alexander Lukashenko) nor pro-Western (like Mikheil Saakashvili). Rather, his political position is closer to those of Ukraine's Kuchma, Georgia's Shevardnadze or even Turkmenistan's Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov.
Nonetheless, it is not far-fetched to assume that NATO in general and the US in particular are interested in regime change in Moldova. The main goal would be to overthrow the current Moldovan government and have it replaced by rulers more antagonistic toward Moscow. If such attempt succeeds, a new government in Moldova could be harangued into expelling Russian troops from Transnistria in an effort to rollback Russian military presence away from Eastern Europe, an effort meant to diminish Russian influence in the post Soviet space and to undermine Russia's prestige there and elsewhere. Moreover, it could be a Western reminder to Moscow that the slightest Russian distraction will be taken advantage of by NATO. A hypothetical pro-Western Moldova could even be later incorporated into NATO member Romania, moving the alliance borders eastward bypassing ordinary acceptance protocols for new members.
It remains to be seen if the Kremlin was caught by surprise and it is unclear how it will ultimately react to an eventual regime change in Chişinău, particularly if any new government attempts to take over Transnistria by force, much like Georgia did last year concerning South Ossetia. What is clear, however, is that Moscow does not want to be trapped into a conflict which could drain financial, military, diplomatic and political resources. Yet, Russian decision makers do not like what they are witnessing in Moldova; it is a script that had seen at play before. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that Russia will resort to its intelligence assets it operates overseas in order to counter anti-Russian moves in Moldova before any deployment of troops is seriously considered. It is still too early to accurately foresee what defining developments will take place in Moldova and how they will unfold. If the current Moldovan government survives, the Twitter Revolution there could backfire. If that is indeed the case, Moldova's rulers could end up openly embracing Moscow as a result of real or alleged Western covert support for anti-government forces.
Russian accusations regarding the involvement of Western intelligence agencies has not been proved because all clandestine operations operate on the principle of plausible denial. Nonetheless, there are circumstantial facts which seem to demonstrate foreign intervention. For instance, some Western semi official institutions and NGO's openly acknowledged their activities in Moldova. For example:
· The USAID website concerning the agency's activities in Moldova mentions that some of them include "Moldova Citizen Participation Program", "Strengthening Democratic Political Activism in Moldova" and "Internet Access and Training Program". The latter is noteworthy because online social networks have been employed in order to increase anti-government activism. USAID's website specifies that "[its program] provides local communities with free access to the internet and to extensive training in all aspects of information technology". It goes on to explain that "Target groups include local government officials, journalists, students, local NGO representatives, professors and healthcare providers..."
Those examples are particularly revealing if one takes into consideration that those organizations were prominent participants in previous color revolutions. That is, both the players and the Modus Operandi remains largely unchanged. A notorious protagonist and organizer of the Twitter Revolution is journalist Natalia Morar who used to work as press secretary for "The Other Russia", a strange coalition of anti-Putin political groups which encompasses hardline nationalists, communists and pro-Western activists.
In short, bearing in mind all of the above, it looks like a new episode of geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West is unfolding in Moldova. This battle is not over yet and whatever its outcome turns out to be, its strategic implications will be deep because they will send strong shockwaves throughout Eastern Europe and the post Soviet space. The stakes are certainly being raised in this new round of the Great Game. A few years ago, notorious neocon pundit Charles Krauthammer observed that "This [Ukraine's Orange Revolution] is about Russia first, democracy second". The same phrase applies to Moldova's Twitter Revolution.
José Miguel Alonso Trabanco is an independent writer based in Mexico specialising in geopoltical and military affairs. He has a degree in International Relations from the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Studies, Mexico City. His focus is on contemporary and historic geopolitics, the world's balance of power, the international system's architecture and the emergence of new powers.
Moldavia events - Magda Hassan - 14-04-2009
http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13791469&PageNum=0
Itar-Tass
April 14, 2009
Operation like “colour revolution” was tried in Moldova - opinion
-“They wished to use the moment to stage an operation like a ‘colour revolution’. The events in Belgrade, Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev took place according to such a scenario.”
MADRID - An attempt to stage an operation patterned on “colour revolutions” was made in Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, the Moldovan president, said in an interview with the Spanish newspaper El Pais.
He said citizens of Serbia and Romania had masterminded pogroms in Chisinau.
Voronin said the arrival of nine persons from Serbia, as well as of agents of the Romanian secret services had been registered in Chisinau. “They wished to use the moment to stage an operation like a ‘colour revolution’. The events in Belgrade, Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev took place according to such a scenario,” Voronin stressed.
“The events have been filmed, so we can identify the offenders who attacked policemen. We are going to arrest and prosecute them,” the Moldovan president said.
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http://news-en.trend.az/important/opinion/1455433.html
Trend News Agency
April 14, 2009
Attempt for “color revolution” in Moldova: Moldavian president
There was an attempt to realize "color revolution" in Moldova, Moldavian President Vladimir Voronin said in his interview with the Spanish Pais newspaper.
Voronin said citizens of Serbia and Romanian led pogroms in Kishinev, Vesti TV channel reported. "We revealed that 9 people from Serbia and agents of the Romanian special service arrived in Kishinev on April 7," Voronin said. "They wanted to use a milestone and organize one of operations which is called "color revolution". The developments in Belgrade, Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev took place inline with the same scenario."
"We photographed everybody and can identify people breaking laws and attacking the police. We will arrest and sue them at law," ITAR TASS quoted Voronin.
Moldavia events - Magda Hassan - 01-05-2009
The Events in Moldova: Questions and Answers
The hot topic of discussion on our e-mail platform in recent days has been the bewildering events in Moldova after the recent disputed parliamentary elections there. Comrade V., a member of the Rezistenţa Populară group in Chişinău, kindly agreed to answer some of our questions.
1. What are the concrete contradictions between the pro-Voronin and opposition bourgeois groups?
The main contradictions between these groups center on personal commercial interests. There are no essential ideological or socioeconomic contradictions between them; or rather, these differences are purely ornamental. If we compare their political platforms, then we’ll see that all their promises—to raise wages to European levels; to increase pensions and stipends to the minimum living standard or higher—are completely populist because none of the parties explains where they plan to get the money.
In essence, what we’re seeing now is a struggle for spheres of influence in the commercial structures and for political power. This time round, Voronin decided not to stand on ceremony—to push the opposition into the background and not take them into account in any way. The ruling oligarchy decided to resort to falsifying the results (there are such cases), but the only thing it didn’t take into account was the possibility of popular demonstrations.
Obviously, power is being consolidated in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is what always accompanies a consolidation of capital and the means of production.
2. Why has the idea of unification with Romania come up now? Or is this constantly in the background of Moldovan politics?
The theme of unification with Romania and the issue of what the language should be called [i.e. Romanian vs. Moldovan] are the usual bogeymen that are pulled out of the closet when the electorate needs to be taken in hand. (That is, this is done so that the electorate understands whom to support, including during the elections. In the end, this plays into the hands of the PCRM.) Yes, there is a minority of the populace—mostly, the remnants of the intelligentsia—who still rave about reunification, but the mass of the population prefers to live in an independent country, especially now that the crisis is sweeping the world. Our country might be a swamp, but it’s a warm, familiar swamp. But young people really have nowhere to turn. Maybe they would like to find well-paid work here, but under the current capitalist regime they aren’t given this opportunity. That is why they’re often inclined to support anyone whomsoever as long as at least something changes.
3. How much basis is there to Voronin’s claims that the Romanian secret services were involved [in organizing the unrest]?
During his entire administration, Voronin has been doing his best to strengthen his own system of state security. The creation, equipping and maintenance of the Information and Security Service (SIS) and the Supreme Security Council have probably put a big dent in the budget. You could spot SIS agents at every demo that happened in Chişinău. But now it turns out that they slept through an attack by foreign secret agents! Well, if that’s the case (since this is what Voronin says), then the SIS isn’t worth a farthing. So now they should be punished to the full extent of the law for their incompetence.
4. How strong was people’s interest in the elections themselves?
If you believe the statistics, 59.5% of the electorate voted in these elections. That is, people didn’t ignore the elections, but this percentage is lower than for the previous elections in 2005 (64.84%) and 2001 (67.52%). Many people say that elections have gradually turned into a farce or (at best) a festival. The majority is equally irritated by the red-orange hydra of Voronin and Roşca (Christian Democratic People’s Party), and the yellow-green-blue “cuttlefish” of Urechean (Alliance Our Moldova)-Filat (Liberal Democratic Party)-Chirtoacă (Liberal Party). People have bigger fish to fry. For example, how to live on a pension of 600 lei, to pay for utilities when the monthly heating bill alone comes to 900 lei. Or how to live on a monthly wage of 2,000 lei (and sometimes much less)—that is, how to clothe and feed your children, pay for kindergarten, school, university fees, medical care, and those very same crazy utilities bills. As they try every way they can to eliminate the class contradictions from their policies, the bourgeois parties are forced by other means to curry favor with the voters. This includes playing the “anticommunism” and “reunification with Romania” cards or promising entry into the EU—they really just have nothing else to offer people. But it’s unlikely that they will fulfill even these promises because opening the borders with the EU would lead to an even greater exodus of the population, who won’t be willing to work here for kopecks.
5. Considering the fact that the unrest didn’t begin immediately after the elections, is the opposition’s behavior directly linked to the election results?
The opposition began stirring things up before the elections in fact. It tried to stoke passions as much as possible. You have to hand it to them: in this they were successful. I think that if the communists had avoided falsifying the results, the opposition would have got what it considered it was in its rights to ask for—that it be taken into account. Then it would have immediately set about divvying up the portfolios and seats in parliament with the PCRM. But the PCRM ran such a smooth operation and spent so much money (officially, they spent around 5.5 million lei on the campaign—more than any other party) that they ended up outwitting themselves as well. Instead of a triumphal procession in celebration of their third administration, they got an organized popular revolt. Although it wasn’t carried to its logical conclusion, it showed that the PCRM, which to this point has done its all to support business, has no support amongst the masses.
6. All political forces claim that they had nothing to do with the demonstrations. What really mobilized people?
I think that the mobilizing factor was the hopeless situation of a particular social group (I wouldn’t begin to divide it according to language)—young people, who were counting on certain changes in the social, educational, and economic spheres, and who long ago lost confidence in Voronin personally and in the grouping of capitalists he has consolidated around himself. One thing is clear: in the absence of coherent social and political demands by the opposition, this social group will gradually radicalize. At present, around two hundred of the people who participated in the riots have been detained by the police. They’re facing fifteen years in prison for taking part in a coup—that is how Voronin has labeled the popular revolt against his regime. We’ll soon find out whether the leaders of the opposition will be arrested or whether our vigilant SIS will “slip up” again and let them escape into neighboring Romania. Whatever happens, the appearance in our country of political prisoners will do little to strengthen the Voronin regime and the country’s “stability.”
7. What is the role of the imperial powers in the current situation? Does the US want to bring down the Voronin regime? Is the EU interested in bringing Moldova into its fold? What are Russia’s interests?
As for international imperialism, I myself said on live TV that the Voronin regime has been supported in particular by the US ambassador in Moldova. Suffice it to say that the “red-orange” compact between CPSU apparatchik and ex-interior minister Voronin and pro-Romanian nationalist Iurie Roşca was concluded in the safety of the US embassy.
(This compact was reached after the 2005 elections when Voronin didn’t have the necessary number of votes in the parliament for re-election. This is precisely why, in the present elections, the voters “rolled” the Christian Democratic People’s Party. Roşca himself didn’t gain the minimum 6% required for re-election and thus lost his seat in the new parliament.
“Practically speaking, close and active collaboration between the CDPP and the PCRM (although it was hidden from the public eye) began earlier. (For example, during the government crisis in late 2000/early 2001, when the PCRM parliamentary faction teamed up with the CDPP faction and tried to oust the government of President Peter Lucinschi on several occasions.) But the birth of a genuine “red-orange,” purely pro-American regime in the form it exists today happened after parliamentary elections in March 2005.”)
During the entire period of its administration, the Voronin regime has closely cooperated with the World Bank and the IMF, in particular with the SCERS program, which provides loans for economic development and poverty reduction. But what the World Bank and the IMF essentially demand is liberalization of the economy and privatization of the principal state sector enterprises.
By virtue of their interests, Russia, the EU, and the US would rather that Voronin stay in power. To be more specific, Russia doesn’t want another Georgia here. The EU is already conducting its own set of reforms: it is introducing its own system of education per the Bologna Process, including fees-based tuition and contract teaching, as well as its own system of medical insurance. (From my own experience, I can say that people are not very enthusiastic about these reforms.) The US is pushing its banking and loans system. Romania has extended its citizenship rights to the Moldovan population. (Until recently, people could get Romanian passports at the Romanian embassy. Voronin legalized dual citizenship, and so several of our parliamentarians have Romanian citizenship.)
How would the US profit by “whacking” the Voronin regime? Voronin more or less suits both the US and Russia. Russia is afraid of Romania, the EU, and NATO expanding onto Moldovan territory. As long as Russia keeps Transnistria as its ace in the hole in its dealings with Voronin, he’ll have to take Russia’s opinion into account. If the opposition comes to power, they might give up Transnistria and then Russia would just have to lump it. (It is clear that Transnistria is huge problem for the Moldovan political elite, a problem it isn’t capable of solving. That is why the opposition also seriously considers the option of joining Romania even without this region. As for who to give it to, one famous liberal politician declared that Russia could have a concession on it for thirty years!)
As for the US, I’ve already said that it was the US that encouraged Roşca to accept Voronin’s offer of an alliance. That means that Voronin suited the US then and he continues to suit them now: he does everything the World Bank and the IMF tell him to do. The overthrow of the Voronin regime would strengthen Romania’s position here; the US would probably have to step aside if Moldova joined the EU.
But no one in the EU is in hurry to take in Moldova. It’s the poorest country in Eastern Europe, but on the other hand it’s quite eager to please. Even without membership of the EU, it is conducting all the liberal reforms—reforms in education per the Bologna Process; reforms of its medical provision system; economic reforms via privatization. That is, it’s doing everything to become a capitalist country. (The communist symbols mean nothing.) But if the opposition comes to power and, let’s say, holds a referendum and it suddenly passes (which I seriously doubt), or Romania suddenly decides to open its borders and let us in, to rig up some kind of union with Moldova, then in this case the Moldovan leadership would lose its independence. It would no longer be possible to apply simple stupid pressure on it and blackmail it with loans and credits. You would have to go through Romania and the EU, and that’s not quite the same thing as direct pressure.
So all this spy mania isn’t worth a damn thing. Actual geopolitical interests don’t warrant such insinuations.
8. Western media have made a lot of the role of the “Twitter” generation in organizing the protests, citing in particular the work of liberal journalist Natalia Morar and her Think Moldova group. One US website even went so far as to claim that since young Moldovans can’t reasonably afford the iPhones (or other mobile devices) and high-speed Internet access necessary to carry out such complex actions, then this technology might have been supplied to them by US-front organizations. What is your reaction to such claims?
Maybe Morar was even able to organize some kind of flash mob consisting of six people. What, there weren’t flash mobs here before then?
Those students aren’t actually all that poor. At very least, having a decked-out mobile phone is considered the norm in their circles. It’s a matter of prestige, as they say.
9. The western media have also made much of the fact that, apparently, this is a confrontation between “liberals” in the opposition and the ruling “communists.” Are the communists really communists? What’s up with their name?
The communists emerged as an opposition to the liberal democratic forces that took power after 1993. As one of our comrades noted, this was something like the Zyuganov phenomenon in Russia. But when they themselves came to power, they rejected social and political change, and Voronin declared that there was no alternative to capitalist development in Moldova.
After this, the PCRM started to lose its activists and supporters. At present, there are no convinced, principled activists in its ranks (that is, no one who isn’t a paid-off party hack). Several of the members in our group (Rezistenţa Populară) left the PCRM after they came to power.
But, as you understand, they kept the name for cover.
http://chtodelat.wordpress.com/2009/04/11/the-events-in-moldova-questions-and-answers/