Quote:

Needed: Leaders Like JFK and Khrushchev

February 27, 2015

Three days ago, former U.S. diplomat William R. Polk, who served President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, warned that the West was risking a similar crisis in reverse by pressing NATO forces aggressively onto Russia's borders. He has now added this postscript about the need for wise leaders.
By William R. Polk
Several recipients of my analysis of and policy recommendations on the Ukrainian crisis have hit on a serious point my suggestion that in the course of the process aimed at ending the crisis Ukraine should be considered for membership in the European Union. A few people have doubted that Russia would be prepared to allow it. Their attitude is necessarily at this point uncertain or unknown.
Since everyone agrees that the crisis is very serious and I believe this may be a crucial piece of any solution, let me explain my suggestion:

President John F. Kennedy addressing the nation regarding the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

To succeed in the major objectives, which I believe are to (a) prevent a slide back into the Cold War, (b) prevent further actual and potential clashes between Russia and the West and between Russia and Ukraine and © help in the limited way we can to make Ukraine into a viable and reasonably healthy and secure nation-state, we need to put together a package;
That package cannot be seen by any party the leaders of the governments of the U.S., the EU, NATO, Russia or Ukraine as a humiliation; so there must be something in a successful negotiation and outcome for everyone. As we all know from our daily experiences at our individual level, lopsided deals don't work or last very long;
I believe that the Russians will demand, and are right to do so, that Ukraine forswear joining NATO and that we the EU and the U.S. affirm clearly and unequivocally that commitment and our obligation not to encourage it;
I believe that the leaders of Ukraine, the U.S. and probably of the member states of the EU will seek and feel they will need for their own domestic political purposes some sort of at least cosmetic reward for their commitment on the NATO abstention;
For Ukraine to be reasonably secure and reasonably progressive and (hopefully) less corrupt and politically unattractive in the future, it is going to require two things: on the one hand, an infusion of money and opening of trade and, on the other hand, both a role model to which it can relate and a friendly critic. Of course, it must do the job itself or the job will not be done. We outsiders cannot do it for Ukraine. And the job will be difficult.
Ukraine has a weak, corrupt and tyrannical government. The U.S. is, apparently, willing (not for the sake of Ukraine but for domestic politics) to supply or arrange most of the needed money but, again on the one hand, its record in "nation building" is appalling and nearly uniformly unsuccessful and, on the other hand, direct American intervention in Ukraine would certainly be opposed by Russia. Ergo, the only feasible agency to advance these goals is the European Union;
Is the EU or are its member states capable? Few outside observers think it is; many insiders agree. But, there are precedents that argue for optimism although they are now half a century out of date (e.g. the work of Hans Schuman, Paul Spaak and Jean Monnet that led to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the formation of the European Economic Community.)
Some of their work was carried on by informal groups like the Table Ronde, but statesmen of their stature were and are hard to find and public interest groups like the Table Ronde do not seem to have taken up this issue. However, I believe, that history that when faced with the challenge, Europeans will rise to the occasion when given the opportunity and faced with the challenge.
As in Napoleon's army, every soldier carried in his pack a marshal's baton. Batons will be available if the "soldiers" will carry them. If they do not, we must seek other actors, but they too will be hard to find at least in the near term;
Will the Russian government allow or accept such moves (Ukraine joining the EU and the EU performing a sort of mini-Marshal Plan venture in Ukraine)? I am sure that the immediate answer will be "no." But I also believe that the answer can become "yes" under appropriate circumstances.
What are they? The short answer is negotiation. As I pointed out in the paper on the Ukrainian crisis to which you refer, I have helped to negotiate two such crises, both of which were far more emotional and far more complex than the current impasse. So my experience tells me that whatever the initial reactions, there are ways to work toward a consensus.
The key elements on the Russian side are (a) the end of sanctions, (b) probably help in alleviating its currency and fiscal problems, © the end of the NATO threat and (d) agreement that Crimea will remain Russian in some cosmetically acceptable form.
Additionally, it would be beneficial to them and certainly to the EU and the U.S. if we could stand down the nuclear weapons on their frontiers and in eastern Europe from at least their "hair trigger" status or, better yet, removing them. Thus, we have in our hands the "tools" with which to work out a deal that could meet the Russian demands in return for their meeting ours;
What do we really want and, more crucially, what do we really need? Those two need to be distinguished. What many Westerners, particularly the American neocons and those who are in the arms business and/or for various reasons hate the Russians want is to humiliate President Vladimir Putin and thus, necessarily at the present time, the Russians. This is a foolish, self-defeating and very dangerous objective.
What we really need is actually very little. If we are sensible, hard-headed and hopefully wise, we should try to a) stop and reverse the descent into another Cold war, b) halt further spread or upgrading of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and © return to peaceful competition in place of military and espionage confrontation. Such confrontation could lead us again to the brink of an almost unimaginable war as I wrote in my essay on the crisis. If we are wise, we will act in such ways as will make it less likely;
Is the U.S. capable of wise actions? I confess that I have my doubts. It is so appealing in domestic politics to "stand tall" and take a loud public stance. It pays off for politicians (to get elected), military officers (who get promoted) and arms manufacturers (who get rich). Both American political parties wallow in war rhetoric because they think, and unfortunately I fear that they are right, the public loves it. We are rich in arm-chair generals and television soldiers.
It will take acts of statesmanship to avoid giving sway to the fun of Russia-bashing. I look around and find few statesmen. My dear friend Senator George McGovern was one of the last, and he was roundly defeated and is now dead. So, I suspect and fear we are unlikely to think and plan better ways;
If we do not, what will happen? Having been intimately involved in the only serious confrontation with nuclear weapons in hand, I know how hard it is to keep one's sanity. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, we were all exhausted. I presume the Russians were too. Many on both sides were all for having a go at one another.
Then, at least some of even the hawks knew how easy it was to move from conventional conflict to nuclear war either by design or by mistake. Or from simple exhaustion.
Fortunately, President Kennedy had his hand on the brake. Robert Kennedy, whom I had known in college and did not like, played an essential supporting role. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara took the role of the technician, without any clear position, but ready to supply the means for a nuclear war if that was decided upon. The rest of us (we were not many) played lesser roles.
During that week, I dealt with a number of senior commanders of our armed forces; they showed, in my conversations with them, surprisingly little knowledge or even information on what was likely to be involved if we pushed too hard. In fact, astonishing as it now seems, few even knew what the main strategic issues were. This was certainly true of, for example, the senior American naval commander, the chief of naval operations, Admiral Anderson.
Absent Kennedy and absent Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, both of whom reined in their hawks and kept themselves open to the compromise that literally saved the world. We don't have such men around today. Or at least I have not identified them. So, we are in a very fragile position and all of us need to lend our support to a wise, possible and peaceful policy.
If we do not, God help us.
William R. Polk is a veteran foreign policy consultant, author and professor who taught Middle Eastern studies at Harvard. President John F. Kennedy appointed Polk to the State Department's Policy Planning Council where he served during the Cuban Missile Crisis. His books include: Violent Politics: Insurgency and Terrorism; Understanding Iraq; Understanding Iran; Personal History: Living in Interesting Times;Distant Thunder: Reflections on the Dangers of Our Times; and Humpty Dumpty: The Fate of Regime Change.

Quote:SALE OF UKRAINE TO US HAS STARTED. The first lot - the Port near OdessaThis week marked the beginning of the direct phase raider attacks on economic asset of Ukraine. Americans bought port near Odessa, in Ilyichyovsk. «Siguler Guff & Company», became a new shareholder of equity fund , its share - 50%.
Now the main assets representing any interest in Ukraine for the West, are part of the chemical and engineering industries, land, railways, ports and energy sector. Ports are very important for the US because through them all over the world, Americans control the flow of goods. Control of key ports - geostrategy struggle for economic supremacy against the China . Thus, the United States controls the Suez and Panama canals, which can go through the goods from China to Europe. Control over Illichevsk - attempts to restore control over the Chinese "Silk Route" by land to Europe.
Reminder, that in the period of Euromaidan crises year ago Yanukovych signed a contract with China for the construction of a deepwater port in the Crimea, and after that, for some reason, in the Kiev situation deteriorated sharply and protests entered the stage of hostilities.
In Ukraine there are two major ports, intended for export steel products and large engineering: this notably Ilyichyovsk and ... Mariupol. Control over Mariupol by Kiev seems temporary, and only a naive person would not understand it. Consequently, the purchase of the port Ilichёvske- control over the remaining Ukrainian exports of mechanical engineering, steel industry, as well as for coal supplies to Ukraine, on which the work of Ukrainian thermal power plants depends on.
That's how Ukrainian state interests surrenders through government Raiders Yatsenyuk - Yaresko . The logic of events in Ukraine is simple: foreign Raiders found a common language with local Raiders. The devaluation of the Hryvnia is very beneficial to local Raiders accumulated substantial amounts of dollar and euro. They start buying on the cheap, several times lower than the market value of the remaining assets. Yatsenyuk and foreign ministers will ensure the legality of the last phase of the privatization and sale of the country, after which Ukraine will become a total ownership of several major oligarchic groups with fully economically enslaved people who, by the way, will think that they "recieved a freedom"
However, we wrote about this far in advance, immediately after the appointment of foreign emissaries Yaresko, Ambromavichusa and Kvitashvili a team of Georgians in the government of the victorious Euromaidan. The scheme of the country sales and total destruction of the state system is clearly described by us, read on.
The state "Ukraine", as a system and apparatus will be eliminated completely within a half year- one year. If in the 90s we were talking about privatization of enterprises, but now we are talking about state disinfusion of entire industries and spheres of life.
If this plans will realize, in the form Ukraine will be still on the map, but by the fact - is not.
By the way, a similar process has already passed in Libya, where now there are four regional associations, warring among themselves .

Source: http://dnr-news.com/…/15580-rasprodazha-ukrainy-ssha-nachal…

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Quote:

Playing Chicken with Nuclear War

March 2, 2015

Exclusive: U.S.-Russian tensions keep escalating now surrounding the murder of Russian opposition figure Boris Nemtsov yet almost no one on the American side seems to worry about the possibility that the tough-guy rhetoric and proxy war in Ukraine might risk a nuclear conflagration, writes Robert Parry.
By Robert Parry
The United States and Russia still maintain vast nuclear arsenals of mutual assured destruction, putting the future of humanity in jeopardy every instant. But an unnerving nonchalance has settled over the American side which has become so casual about the risk of cataclysmic war that the West's propaganda and passions now ignore Russian fears and sensitivities.
A swaggering goofiness has come to dominate how the United States reacts to Russia, with American politicians and journalists dashing off tweets and op-eds, rushing to judgment about the perfidy of Moscow's leaders, blaming them for almost anything and everything.

A nuclear test detonation carried out in Nevada on April 18, 1953.

These days, playing with nuclear fire is seen as a sign of seriousness and courage. Anyone who urges caution and suggests there might be two sides to the U.S.-Russia story is dismissed as a wimp or a stooge. A what-me-worry "group think" has taken hold across the U.S. ideological spectrum. Fretting about nuclear annihilation is so 1960s.
So, immediately after last Friday night's murder of Russian opposition figure Boris Nemtsov, the West's media began insinuating that Russian President Vladimir Putin was somehow responsible even though there was no evidence or logic connecting him to the shooting, just 100 meters from the Kremlin, probably the last place Russian authorities would pick for a hit.
But that didn't stop the mainstream U.S. news media from casting blame on Putin. For instance, the New York Times published an op-ed by anti-Putin author Martha Gessen saying: "The scariest thing about the murder of Boris Nemtsov is that he himself did not scare anyone," suggesting that his very irrelevance was part of a sinister political message.
Though no one outside the actual killers seems to know yet why Nemtsov was gunned down, Gessen took the case several steps further explaining how while Putin probably didn't finger Nemtsov for death the Russian president was somehow still responsible. She wrote:
"In all likelihood no one in the Kremlin actually ordered the killing and this is part of the reason Mr. Nemtsov's murder marks the beginning of yet another new and frightening period in Russian history. The Kremlin has recently created a loose army of avengers who believe they are acting in the country's best interests, without receiving any explicit instructions. Despite his lack of political clout, Mr. Nemtsov was a logical first target for this menacing force."
So, rather than wait for actual evidence to emerge, the Times published Gessen's conclusions and then let her spin off some even more speculative interpretations. Yet, basing speculation upon speculation is almost always a bad idea, assuming you care about fairness and accuracy.
Remember how after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, some terrorism "experts" not only jumped to the false conclusion that the attack was a case of Islamic terrorism but that Oklahoma was chosen to send a message to Americans that no part of the country was safe. But the terrorist turned out to be a white right-wing extremist lashing out at the federal government.
While surely hard-line Russian nationalists, who resented Nemtsov's support for the U.S.-backed Ukrainian regime in Kiev, should be included on a list of early suspects, there are a number of other possibilities that investigators must also consider, including business enemies, jealous rivals and even adversaries within Russia's splintered opposition though that last one has become a target of particular ridicule in the West.
Yet, during my years at the Associated Press, one of my articles was about a CIA "psychological operations" manual which an agency contractor prepared for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels noting the value of assassinating someone on your own side to create a "martyr" for the cause. I'm in no way suggesting that such a motive was in play regarding Nemtsov's slaying but it's not as if this idea is entirely preposterous either.
My point is that even in this age of Twitter when everyone wants to broadcast his or her personal speculation about whodunit to every mystery, it would be wise for news organization to resist the temptation. Surely, if parallel circumstances occurred inside the United States, such guess work would be rightly dismissed as "conspiracy theory."
Nuclear Mischief
Plus, this latest rush to judgment isn't about some relatively innocuous topic like, say, how some footballs ended up under-inflated in an NFL game this situation involves how the United States will deal with Russia, which possesses some 8,000 nuclear warheads roughly the same size as the U.S. arsenal while the two countries have around 1,800 missiles on high-alert, i.e., ready to launch at nearly a moment's notice.
Over the weekend, I participated in a conference on nuclear dangers sponsored by the Helen Caldicott Foundation in New York City. On my Saturday afternoon panel was Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute who offered a sobering look at how the percentage chances of a nuclear war though perhaps low at any given moment add up over time to quite likely if not inevitable. He made the additional observation that those doomsday odds rise at times of high tensions between the United States and Russia.
As Baum noted, at such crisis moments, the people responsible for the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are more likely to read a possible computer glitch or some other false alarm as a genuine launch and are thus more likely to push their own nuclear button.
In other words, it makes good sense to avoid a replay of the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse by edging U.S. nuclear weapons up against Russia's borders, especially when U.S. politicians and commentators are engaging in Cold War-style Russia-bashing. Baiting the Russian bear may seem like great fun to the tough-talking politicians in Washington or the editors of the New York Times and Washington Post but this hostile rhetoric could be taken more seriously in Moscow.
When I spoke to the nuclear conference, I noted how the U.S. media/political system had helped create just that sort of crisis in Ukraine, with every "important" person jumping in on the side of the Kiev coup-makers in February 2014 when they overthrew elected President Viktor Yanukovych.
Since then, nearly every detail of that conflict has been seen through the prism of "our side good/their side bad." Facts that put "our side" in a negative light, such as the key role played by neo-Nazis and the Kiev regime's brutal "anti-terrorism operation," are downplayed or ignored.
Conversely, anything that makes the Ukrainians who are resisting Kiev's authority look bad gets hyped and even invented, such as one New York Times' lead story citing photos that supposedly proved Russian military involvement but quickly turned out to be fraudulent. [See Consortiumnews.com's "NYT Retracts Russian Photo Scoop."]
At pivotal moments in the crisis, such as the Feb. 20, 2014 sniper fire that killed both police and protesters and the July 17, 2014 shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 killing 298 passengers and crew, the U.S. political/media establishment has immediately pinned the blame on Yanukovych, the ethnic Russian rebels who are resisting his ouster, or Putin. Then, when evidence emerged going in the opposite direction toward "our side" a studied silence followed, allowing the earlier propaganda to stay in place as part of the preferred storyline.
A Pedestrian Dispute
One of the points of my talk was that the Ukrainian crisis emerged from a fairly pedestrian dispute, i.e., plans for expanding economic ties with the European Union while not destroying the historic business relationship with Russia. In November 2013, Yanukovych backed away from signing an EU association agreement when experts in Kiev announced that it would blow a $160 billion hole in Ukraine's economy. He asked for more time.
But Yanukovych's decision disappointed many western Ukrainians who favored the EU agreement. Tens of thousands poured into Kiev's Maidan square to protest. The demonstrations then were seized upon by far-right Ukrainian political forces who have long detested the country's ethnic Russians in the east and began dispatching organized "sotins" of 100 fighters each to begin firebombing police and seizing government buildings.
As the violence grew worse, U.S. neoconservatives also saw an opportunity, including Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, who told the protesters the United States was on their side, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Victoria Nuland, who passed out cookies to the protesters and plotted with U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt on who would become the new leaders of Ukraine. [See Consortiumnews.com's "NYT Still Pretends No Coup in Ukraine."]
Thus, a very manageable political problem in Ukraine was allowed to expand into a proxy war between nuclear-armed United States and Russia. Added to it were intense passions and extensive propaganda. In the West, the Ukraine crisis was presented as a morality play of people who "share our values" pitted against conniving Russians and their Hitler-like president Putin.
In Official Washington, anyone who dared suggest compromise was dismissed as a modern-day Neville Chamberlain practicing "appeasement." Everyone "serious" was set on stopping Putin now by shipping sophisticated weapons to the Ukrainian government so it could do battle against "Russian aggression."
The war fever was such that no one raised an eyebrow when Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko told Canada's CBC Radio last month that the West should no longer fear fighting nuclear-armed Russia and that Ukraine wanted arms for a "full-scale war" against Moscow.
"Everybody is afraid of fighting with a nuclear state. We are not anymore, in Ukraine," Prystaiko said. "However dangerous it sounds, we have to stop [Putin] somehow. For the sake of the Russian nation as well, not just for the Ukrainians and Europe. … What we expect from the world is that the world will stiffen up in the spine a little." [See Consortiumnews.com's "Ready for Nuclear War over Ukraine?"]
Instead of condemning Prystaiko's recklessness, more U.S. officials began lining up in support of sending lethal military hardware to Ukraine so it could fight Russia, including Director of National Intelligence James Clapper who said he favored the idea though it might provoke a "negative reaction" from Moscow.
Russian Regime Change
Even President Barack Obama and other U.S. leaders who have yet to publicly endorse arming the Kiev coup-makers enjoy boasting about how much pain they are inflicting on the Russian economy and its government. In effect, there is a U.S. strategy of making the Russian economy "scream," a first step toward a larger neocon goal to achieve "regime change" in Moscow.
Another point I made in my talk on Saturday was how the neocons are good at drafting "regime change" plans that sound great when discussed at a think tank or outlined on an op-ed page but often fail to survive in the real world, such as their 2003 plan for a smooth transition in Iraq to replace Saddam Hussein with someone of their choosing except that it didn't work out that way.
Perhaps the greatest danger from the new neocon dream for "regime change" in Moscow is that whoever follows Putin might not be the pliable yes man that the neocons envision, but a fierce Russian nationalist who would suddenly have control of their nuclear launch codes and might decide that it's time for the United States to make concessions or face annihilation.
Yet, what I find truly remarkable about the Ukraine crisis is that it was always relatively simple to resolve: Before the coup, Yanukovych agreed to reduced powers and early elections so he could be voted out of office. Then, either he or some new leadership could have crafted an economic arrangement that expanded ties to the EU while not severing them with Russia.
Even after the coup, the new regime could have negotiated a federalized system that granted more independence to the disenfranchised ethnic Russians of eastern Ukraine, rather than launch a brutal "anti-terrorist operation" against those resisting the new authorities. But Official Washington's "group think" has been single-minded: only bellicose anti-Russian sentiments are permitted and no suggestions of accommodation are allowed.
Still, spending time this weekend with people like Helen Caldicott, an Australian who has committed much of her life to campaigning against nuclear weapons, reminded me that this devil-may-care attitude toward a showdown with Russia, which has gripped the U.S. political/media establishment, is not universal. Not everyone agrees with Official Washington's nonchalance about playing a tough-guy game of nuclear chicken.
As part of the conference, Caldicott asked attendees to stay around for a late-afternoon showing of the 1959 movie, "On the Beach," which tells the story of the last survivors from a nuclear war as they prepare to die when the radioactive cloud that has eliminated life everywhere else finally reaches Australia. A mystery in the movie is how the final war began, who started it and why with the best guess being that some radar operator somewhere thought he saw something and someone reacted in haste.
Watching the movie reminded me that there was a time when Americans were serious about the existential threat from U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons, when there were films like "Dr. Strangelove," "Fail Safe," and "On the Beach." Now, there's a cavalier disinterest in those risks, a self-confidence that one can put his or her political or journalistic career first and just assume that some adult will step in before the worst happens.
Whether some adults show up to resolve the Ukraine crisis remains to be seen. It's also unclear if U.S. pundits and pols can restrain themselves from more rushes to judgment, as in the case of Boris Nemtsov. But a first step might be for the New York Times and other "serious" news organizations to return to traditional standards of journalism and check out the facts before jumping to a conclusion.
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s. You can buy his latest book, America's Stolen Narrative, either in print here or as an e-book (from Amazon andbarnesandnoble.com). You also can order Robert Parry's trilogy on the Bush Family and its connections to various right-wing operatives for only $34. The trilogy includes America's Stolen Narrative. For details on this offer, click here.

Paul Rigby Wrote:Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands by Richard Sakwa review an unrivalled account

At last, a balanced assessment of the Ukrainian conflict the problems go far beyond Vladimir Putin

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/feb/19/frontline-ukraine-crisis-in-borderlands-richard-sakwa-review-account

Quote:When Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Ukraine's prime minister, told a German TV station recently that the Soviet Union invaded Germany, was this just blind ignorance? Or a kind of perverted wishful thinking? If the USSR really was the aggressor in 1941, it would suit Yatsenyuk's narrative of current geopolitics in which Russia is once again the only side that merits blame.

When Grzegorz Schetyna, Poland's deputy foreign minister, said Ukrainians liberated Auschwitz, did he not know that the Red Army was a multinational force in which Ukrainians certainly played a role but the bulk of the troops were Russian? Or was he looking for a new way to provoke the Kremlin?

Faced with these irresponsible distortions, and they are replicated in a hundred other prejudiced comments about Russian behaviour from western politicians as well as their eastern European colleagues, it is a relief to find a book on the Ukrainian conflict that is cool, balanced, and well sourced. Richard Sakwa makes repeated criticisms of Russian tactics and strategy, but he avoids lazy Putin-bashing and locates the origins of the Ukrainian conflict in a quarter-century of mistakes since the cold war ended. In his view, three long-simmering crises have boiled over to produce the violence that is engulfing eastern Ukraine. The first is the tension between two different models of Ukrainian statehood. One is what he calls the "monist" view, which asserts that the country is an autochthonous cultural and political unity and that the challenge of independence since 1991 has been to strengthen the Ukrainian language, repudiate the tsarist and Soviet imperial legacies, reduce the political weight of Russian-speakers and move the country away from Russia towards "Europe". The alternative "pluralist" view emphasises the different historical and cultural experiences of Ukraine's various regions and argues that building a modern democratic post-Soviet Ukrainian state is not just a matter of good governance and rule of law at the centre. It also requires an acceptance of bilingualism, mutual tolerance of different traditions, and devolution of power to the regions.

More than any other change of government in Kiev since 1991, the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych last year brought the triumph of the monist view, held most strongly in western Ukraine, whose leaders were determined this time to ensure the winner takes all.

The second crisis arises from the internationalisation of the struggle inside Ukraine which turned it into a geopolitical tug of war. Sakwa argues that this stems from the asymmetrical end of the cold war which shut Russia out of the European alliance system. While Mikhail Gorbachev and millions of other Russians saw the end of the cold war as a shared victory which might lead to the building of a "common European home", most western leaders saw Russia as a defeated nation whose interests could be brushed aside, and which must accept US hegemony in the new single-superpower world order or face isolation. Instead of dismantling Nato, the cold-war alliance was strengthened and expanded in spite of repeated warnings from western experts on Russia that this would create new tensions. Long before Putin came to power, Yeltsin had urged the west not to move Nato eastwards.

Even today at this late stage, a declaration of Ukrainian non-alignment as part of an internationally negotiated settlement, and UN Security Council guarantees of that status, would bring instant de-escalation and make a lasting ceasefire possible in eastern Ukraine.

The hawks in the Clinton administration ignored all this, Bush abandoned the anti-ballistic missile treaty and put rockets close to Russia's borders, and now a decade later, after Russia's angry reaction to provocations in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine today, we have what Sakwa rightly calls a "fateful geographical paradox: that Nato exists to manage the risks created by its existence".

The third crisis, also linked to the Nato issue, is the European Union's failure to stay true to the conflict resolution imperative that had been its original impetus. After 1989 there was much talk of the arrival of the "hour of Europe". Just as the need for Franco-German reconciliation inspired the EU's foundation, many hoped the cold war's end would lead to a broader east-west reconciliation across the old Iron Curtain. But the prospect of greater European independence worried key decision-makers in Washington, and Nato's role has been, in part, to maintain US primacy over Europe's foreign policy. From Bosnia in 1992 to Ukraine today, the last two decades have seen repeated occasions where US officials pleaded, half-sincerely, for a greater European role in handling geopolitical crises in Europe while simultaneously denigrating and sidelining Europe's efforts. Last year's "Fuck the EU" comment by Victoria Nuland, Obama's neocon assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, was the pithiest expression of this.

Sakwa writes with barely suppressed anger of Europe's failure, arguing that instead of a vision embracing the whole continent, the EU has become little more than the civilian wing of the Atlantic alliance.

Within the framework of these three crises, Sakwa gives the best analysis yet in book form of events on the ground in eastern Ukraine as well as in Kiev, Washington, Brussels and Moscow. He covers the disputes between the "resolvers" (who want a negotiated solution) and the "war party" in each capital.

He describes the rows over sanctions that have split European leaders, and points out how Ukraine's president, Petro Poroshenko, is under constant pressure from Nuland's favourite Ukrainian, the more militant Yatsenyuk, to rely on military force.

As for Putin, Sakwa sees him not so much as the driver of the crisis but as a regulator of factional interests and a temporiser who has to balance pressure from more rightwing Russian nationalists as well as from the insurgents in Ukraine, who get weapons and help from Russia but are not the Kremlin's puppets.

Frontline Ukraine highlights several points that have become almost taboo in western accounts: the civilian casualties in eastern Ukraine caused by Ukrainian army shelling, the physical assaults on leftwing candidates in last year's election and the failure to complete investigations of last February's sniper activity in Kiev (much of it thought to have been by anti-Yanukovych fighters) or of the Odessa massacre in which dozens of anti-Kiev protesters were burnt alive in a building set on fire by nationalists or clubbed to death when they jumped from windows.

The most disturbing novelty of the Ukrainian crisis is the way Putin and other Russian leaders are routinely demonised. At the height of the cold war when the dispute between Moscow and the west was far more dangerous, backed as it was by the danger of nuclear catastrophe, Brezhnev and Andropov were never treated to such public insults by western commentators and politicians.

Equally alarming, though not new, is the one-sided nature of western political, media and thinktank coverage. The spectre of senator Joseph McCarthy stalks the stage, marginalising those who offer a balanced analysis of why we have got to where we are and what compromises could save us. I hope Sakwa's book does not itself become a victim, condemned as insufficiently anti-Russian to be reviewed.

Jonathan Steele is a former Guardian Moscow correspondent, and author of Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev and the Mirage of Democracy. To order Frontline Ukraine for £15.19 (RRP £18.99), go to bookshop.theguardian.com or call 0330 333 6846.

Quote:You might have thought that a serious book on the Ukraine crisis, written by a distinguished academic in good clear English, and published by a reputable house, might have gained quite a bit of attention at a time when that country is at the centre of many people's concerns.

But some readers here now understand that publishing, and especially the reviewing of books, are not the simple marketplaces of ideas which we would all wish them to be.

And so, as far as a I can discover, this book :

Frontline Ukraine : Crisis in the Borderlands , by Richard Sakwa. Published by I.B.Tauris

…though it came out some months ago, has only been reviewed in one place in Britain, the Guardian newspaper, by Jonathan Steele, the first-rate foreign correspondent whose rigour and enterprise (when we were both stationed in Moscow) quite persuaded me to overlook his former sympathy for the left-wing cause ( most notably expressed in a 1977 book Socialism with a German Face' about the old East Germany, which seemed to me at the time to be ah, excessively kind).

Mr Steele's review can be read here:

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/feb/19/frontline-ukraine-crisis-in-borderlands-richard-sakwa-review-account

I have said elsewhere that I would myself be happier if the book were more hostile to my position on this conflict. Sometimes I feel that it is almost too good to be true, to have my own conclusions confirmed so powerfully, and I would certainly like to see the book reviewed by a knowledgeable proponent of the NATO neo-conservative position. Why hasn't it been?

But even so I recommend it to any reader of mine who is remotely interested in disentangling the reality from the knotted nets of propaganda in which it is currently shrouded.

Like George Friedman's interesting interview in the Moscow newspaper Kommersant' ( you can read it here http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/01/20/2561 ) , the book has shifted my own view.

I have tended to see the *basic* dispute in Ukraine as being yet another outbreak of the old German push into the east, carried out under the new, nice flag of the EU, a liberal, federative empire in which the vassal states are tactfully allowed limited sovereignty as long as they don't challenge the fundamental politico-economic dominance of Germany. I still think this is a strong element in the EU's thrust in this direction.

But I have tended to neglect another feature of the new Europe, also set out in Adam Tooze's brilliant The Deluge' the firm determination of the USA to mould Europe in its own image (a determination these days expressed mainly through the EU and NATO).

I should have paid more attention to the famous words F*** the EU!' spoken by the USA's Assistant Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland, in a phone call publicised to the world by (presumably) Russian intelligence. The EU isn't half as enthusiastic about following the old eastern road as is the USA. Indeed, it's a bit of a foot-dragger.

The driving force in this crisis is the USA, with the EU being reluctantly tugged along behind. And if Mr Friedman is right (and I think he is) , the roots of it lie in Russia's decision to obstruct the West's intervention in Syria.

Perhaps the key to the whole thing (rather dispiriting in that it shows the USA really hasn't learned anything important from the Iraq debacle) is the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine' of 1992, named after the neo-con's neo-con, Paul Wolfowitz, and summed up by Professor Sakwa (p.211) thus: The doctrine asserted that the US should prevent "any country from dominating any region of the world that might be a springboard to threaten unipolar and exclusive US dominance"'.

Note how neatly this meshes with what George Friedman says in his interview.

Now, there are dozens of fascinating things in Professor Sakwa's book, and my copy is scored with annotations and references. I could spend a week summarising it for you. (By the way, the Professor himself is very familiar with this complex region, and might be expected, thanks to his Polish ancestry, to take a different line. His father was in the Polish Army in 1939, escaped to Hungary in the chaos of defeat, and ended up serving in Anders's Second Corps, fighting with the British Army at El Alamein, Benghazi, Tobruk and then through Italy via Monte Cassino. Then he was in exile during the years of Polish Communism. Like Vaclav Klaus, another critic of current western policy, Professor Sakwa can hardly be dismissed as a naif who doesn't understand about Russia, or accused of beinga 'fellow-travlelr' or 'useful idiot'.

He is now concerned at how we created yet another crisis' (p xiii) .

But I would much prefer that you read it for yourself, and so will have to limit my references quite sternly.

There are good explanations of the undoubted anti-Semitism and Nazi sympathies of some strands in Ukrainian politics. Similar nastiness, by the way, is to be found loose in some of the Baltic States. I mention this n because it justified classifying the whole movement as Neo-Nazi', which is obviously false, but because it tells us something very interesting about the nature of nationalism and Russophobia in this part of the world. No serious or fair description of the crisis can ignore it. Yet, in the portrayal of Russia as Mordor, and the Ukraine as Utopia, western media simply leave out almost everything about Ukraine that doesn't appeal to their audiences, the economic near collapse, the Judophobia and Russophobia (the derogatory word Moskal', for instance, in common use), the worship of the dubious (this word is very generous, I think) Stepan Bandera by many of the Western ultra-nationalists, the violence against dissenters from the Maidan view ( see http://rt.com/news/ukraine-presidential-candidates-attacked-516/). The survival and continued power of Ukraine's oligarchs after a revolution supposedly aimed at cleaning up the country is also never mentioned. We all know about Viktor Yanukovych;s tasteless mansion, but the book provides some interesting details on President Poroshenko's residence (it looks rather like the White House) , which I have not seen elsewhere.

The detailed description of how and why the Association Agreement led to such trouble is excellent. I had not realised that, since the Lisbon Treaty, alignment with NATO is an essential part of EU membership (and association) hence the unavoidable political and military clauses in the agreement.

So is the filleting of the excuse-making and apologetics of those who still pretend that Yanukovych was lawfully removed from office: the explicit threat of violence from the Maidan, the failure to muster the requisite vote, the presence of armed men during the vote, the failure to follow the constitutional rules (set beside the available lawful deal, overridden by the Maidan, under which Yanukovych would have faced early elections and been forced to make constitutional changes).

Then here we have Ms Nuland again, boasting of the $5 billion (eat your heart out, the EU, with your paltry £300 million) http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2013/dec/218804.htm which the USA has 'invested in Ukraine. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the United States has supported Ukrainians as they build democratic skills and institutions, as they promote civic participation and good governance, all of which are preconditions for Ukraine to achieve its European aspirations. We've invested over $5 billion to assist Ukraine in these and other goals that will ensure a secure and prosperous and democratic Ukraine.

It's worth noting that in this speech, in December 2013, she still envisages the supposedly intolerable Yanukovych as a possible partner.

Other points well made are the strange effect of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, which has created the very tension against which it now seeks to reassure border nations, by encouraging them, too, to join, the non-binding nature of the much-trumpeted Budapest memorandum, the lack of coverage of the ghastly events in Odessa, the continuing lack of a proper independent investigation into the Kiev mass shootings in February 2014 .

Also examined is the Russian fear of losing Sevastopol, an entirely justified fear given that President Yushchenko had chosen to say in Georgia, during the war of August 2008, that Russia's basing rights in the city would end in 2017. The disappearance; of the Right Sector' and Svoboda' vote in recent elections is explained by their transfer to the radical Party led by Oleh Lyashko.

Professor Sakwa also explores Russia's behaviour in other border disputes , with Norway and China, in which it has been far form aggressive. And he points out that Ukraine's nationalists have made their country's life far more difficult by their rigid nationalist approach to the many citizens of that country who, while viewing themselves as Ukrainian, do not share the history or passions of the ultra-nationalists in the West.

Likewise he warns simple-minded analysts that the conflict in the East of Ukraine is not desired by Russia's elite, which does not wish to be drawn into another foreign entanglement (all Russian strategists recall the disastrous result of the Afghan intervention). But it may be desired by Russian ultra-nationalists, not necessarily controllable.

He points out that Russia has not, as it did in Crimea, intervened decisively in Eastern Ukraine to ensure secession. And he suggests that those Russian nationalists are acting in many cases independently of Moscow in the Donetsk and Lugansk areas. Putin seeks to control them and limit them, but fears them as well.

In general, the book is an intelligent, well-researched and thoughtful attempt to explain the major crisis of our time. Anybody, whatever he or she might think of the issue, would benefit from reading it. It is shocking that it is not better known, and I can only assume that its obscurity, so far is caused by the fact that it does not fit the crude propaganda narrative of the Putin is Hitler' viewpoint.

How odd that we should all have learned so little from the Iraq debacle. This time the WMD' are non-existent Russian plans to expand and/or attack the Baltic states. And of course the misrepresentation of both sides in the Ukrainian controversy is necessary for the portrayal of Putin as Hitler and his supporters as Nazis, and opponents of belligerence as Nazi fellow-travellers. The inconvenient fact , that if there are Nazis in this story , they tend to be on the good' side must be ignored. Let us hope the hysteria subsides before it carries us into another stupid war.

Lauren Johnson Wrote:A Mozgovoy is the commander of the Ghost Battalion. Here is his statement and plus commentary by Kazzura:

[video=youtube_share;Hv6UvdZXjB0]http://youtu.be/Hv6UvdZXjB0[/video]

7/03/15 around 17:00, an attempt to blow up Alexei's car was made at the Mikhailovka checkpoint. Luckily he only suffered light injuries.
Soon after the assassination attempt Alexei Borisovich has recorded his appeal.
Commentary from Kotaro Kazzura:

Now a comment from myself, don't read it if you kinda don't have own opinion, don't know the facts etc. the events happening in Donbass and events that caused them and stuff, just because I don't to have my opinion be ( unintentionally or intentionally ) imposed to anyone.

Mozgovoi openly states that he knows who's behind this (and it's not the Ukrainians) obviously the same force as in case with Batman' aka Bednov, and he realizes that the purpose of such action is to split the militia, provoking fights inside of LPR between "obedient" People's Militia (that gets supplies from RF and pretty much does only what Kremlin wants) and "not obedient" independent commanders like Alexei, who manage to endure it without official RF supplies and have freedom not to do every retarded thing sent from Kremlin (like assaulting the airport just because Ukraine promised to give it in exchange for territories around Mariupol, but kept it, so it was fine to attack the airport, but only the airport, not Peski and Avdeyevka, the key positions the airport is still shelled from even today). So the plan is likely to split the militia, declare all "independent" troops "traitors" and deal with them, keeping only obedient forces without any particular ideology, that would join back the Ukraine without problems and become something like territorial defense battalions there, just because now Kremlin thinks that it's cheaper to force Donbass join Ukraine back in exchange for cancellation of some of the sanctions and getting rid of need to support it. Yesterday another commander Bondar, suffered similar assassination attempt (MON mines were used), luckily he survived too.

Quote:The murder of Nemtsov and the subsequent march to the walls of the Kremlin is not the thing in itself. It is a part of a process.

Lets examine under which circumstances did Nemtsov's murder take place? He was not killed in a vacuum, but in the framework of a most intense political process, right?

Boris Nemtsov actively spoke out about the Ukrainian issue, so let's start there.

Americans do not hide the fact that they helped the [Kiev] junta accomplish a coup d'etat in Ukraine. On this account, US President Obama made the following statement:

"President (Vladimir) Putin made a decision about Crimea and Ukraine, not because of some grand strategy, but because he was caught off guard with the protests on the Maidan and the escape of (ex-President of Ukraine, Victor) Yanukovych, after we helped in the transfer of power (in Ukraine)".

The coup d'etat in Ukraine quickly turned into a cold war of unprecedented intensity waged by the US against Russia. Euromaidan, which became, according to the announcements of the American elites, a link in the chain South Ossetia - Bolotnaya protests in Moscow - Magnitsky list and the law of Dima Yakovlev - Syria - Ukraine , and was the first phase of the new stage of the war.

Euromaidan was followed by the reunification of Crimea with Russia, and a desperately wicked unleashing of war in Donbass by the junta (recall the statement of Bezler that his weapons were sold by Poroshenko). And now, Donbass which seemingly was following the script #PutinDumped, the junta and the United States instead of a planned transfer of tension to Russia, received the following picture:

1) The militia in a military sense became so strong that it is able to smash UAF, arranging many cauldrons

2) The defeat of UAF in the form of Debaltsevo cauldron resulted in political capitulation of the junta in Minsk. Lavrov mentioned it briefly and succinctly:

Минск 2 Лавров

RT Russian: Sergey Lavrov: Minsk talks "are going better the super"

So what should the junta and the United States do next? If they will comply with Minsk-2 agreements, it automatically means the collapse of the junta and, accordingly, the collapse of American policy in Ukraine. And the U.S. can't lose Ukraine, the stakes are too high, not to mention the fact that they already severely damaged their reputation by defeats in South Ossethia and Syria.

Can they achieve a military victory in Donbass? No. They can only achieve a sequel of the series Izvarino-Debaltsevo-... And weapons supply from the US (and the Americans will definitely begin to openly sell arms to the banderites) will not solve anything. The militia will have something to answer with (will get more weapons in the new cauldrons). What if the U.S. will send instructors to the junta, unable to cope with the new weapons? The militia will also get instructors. What if the US will send in private military companies? It will not change anything. What if the US will bring in the troops? Russia will then bring in the troops in response. And the result of this chain - a nuclear war. And the Americans loose all the prior stages.

Political war? Putin has made it clear that he will not give up Donbass. Here the junta and the United States have no options.

Economic war? Obama has already stated that "the sanctions of the West tore the Russian economy "to pieces"." And the US contribution to the economic turmoil in our country is really great, but everyone understands that the economy of the junta either way will collapse first. Therefore, they cannot rely only on the economic war.

So what should they do? Can anybody explain a real way out of the situation for the junta and the United States?

They have only one choice - to remove Putin, who did not dump [Donbass]. And force the pro-Western Russian elite to dump Donbass.

But how can the junta and the United States remove Putin? What tools do they have? They can march with baloons on Bolotnaya, as in 2011-2012 until the second coming of Christ. The Bolotnaya rallies 3 years ago were one big show for Medvedev, who was supposed to sign one signature. But he did not. But today, there is no one to sign - Putin is the first person in the state.

Thus, a relatively peaceful street is a thing of the past. But the street factor is not removed from the agenda, this is what Nemtsov said about it on January 25, 2015 on "Hromadske.TV":

"I think the problem, including of peace with Ukraine, is decided by the street. If out on the street, to the anti-war march came out a million people... I think it would solve the problem...".

The Americans need the street, but it must be a new street a la Grushevsky in Moscow.

To ensure that the street is not peaceful, a radicalization of the protest is required. Please note that all the talking heads at Nemtsov's march talked about the "terrible atmosphere in the society, that Putin, even if not involved in the murder of Boris Nemtsov, is still to blame, since he contributed to the creation of the atmosphere of intolerance and violence in society", etc. Here is an example from Maksim Katz:

"Putin is to blame. If he is the customer, then it's his fault as a customer. If not, as an instigator of hate, hysteria and anger in the society"

[It is interesting that these same words are coming from the State Department, Western media, Ukrainian media and Russian opposition media - is it because it comes from one source, from which they all take their orders? - KR]

In addition, they passionately threaten each other with stories about "the raging black hundreds, nurtured by Putin". That is, de facto reproduce the rhetoric of Euromaidan about "titushki" [Ukrainian anti-maidan activists labeled as a street muscle of Yanukovich - KR].

And what are the talking heads referring to? Right, the "Antimaidan" march. We think the participants of "Antimaidan" are sincere, concerned patriots of our country, for which they only wish all the best. But in politics sometimes you try for the better but it turns out... otherwise.

So let us analyze the Antimaidan march (again emphasizing that we believe its members are sincere patriots of our country), as a political event:

1) Antimaidan came out on the streets of Moscow before Maidan. Not at the same time, not after, but before! So who did they resist in the absence of Maidan?

2) The situation in principle did not require taking to the streets, especially in this manner. At that time the potential Maidan had planned to take to the streets on the outskirts of Moscow, and it's not very clear, how it could be dangerous? They can protest in Maryino until eternity with a zero (or negative) political result.

3) The political result of Antimaidan automatically became a warming up of an upcoming Maidan, which used the event in it's favor

4) The Antimaidan arranged something like a festival, with a show for flexing the muscles. That is introduced to the agenda a radicalization and a picture for propaganda on the subject of "black hundreds".

Antimaidan march in Moscow:




The participants of Antimaidan certainly did not want to get such a political result. But someone wanted. Someone initiated it. And this was hardly Chubais. Somehow it's hard to imagine Chubais, walking the corridors of the Kremlin, asking: "how do we organize Antimaidan"?

So this event had to be created (not necessarily directly) by someone not liberal, i.e., simply speaking, conservative, right?

That is, the liberals received an active conservative partner. The partner appeared, but the problem called "Maryino" remained. To arrange Maidan on the outskirts of Moscow - is a strange endeavor. They needed the very downtown Moscow, and they got it.

Nemtsov was killed in a manner that would bring maximum political result for [the Russian] Maidan. The theory about amateur black hundreds in principle is excluded. No amateurs can execute this near the walls of the Kremlin. A theory that "Putin ordered Nemtsov" is even more delusional. It is unclear how a long ago recycled politician could be a threat to Putin. Not to mention the fact that if it was not organized by Putin's enemies, then they would minimize the political costs, and not explicitly maximized them.

In the end, the murder of Nemtsov became a factor, transforming Maryino into Vasilyevsky Spusk and sharply radicalizing the street.

Moscow Maidan is rapidly moving towards "Grushevskogo" in Moscow. Even the bloody Euromaidan did not begin like that. Compare the degree of intensity of the first phase - #TheyAreJustKids vs. the murder of Nemtsov at the walls of the Kremlin.

On Grushevskogo, as everyone knows, worked the Banderites, and not liberals, who stood at that time on the square with flags. That is a coup d'etat in Ukraine was possible only because of a union of the Ukrainian liberals and Ukrainian fascists. A fascist partner is needed by the liberals in Russia. Nothing sticks without it. If on Grushevskogo in Kiev worked the banderites, then on "Grushevskogo" in Moscow should work the vlasovites [the followers of Vlasov, who cooperated with Hitler - KR]. But only fascists are not enough, they still need to disable the law enforcement. And this can be done only by the law enforcement themselves, playing on the side of the rebels.

So who is the security or if you will, the conservative partner of the liberals? What is the conservative wing of the coup d'etat, existing together with the liberal wing?

Let's give a word to Nemtsov:

Немцов Примаков

Boris Nemtsov:

"If not the opposition, but a veteran of KGB and soviet politics, Primakov, talks about the need for decentralization, autonomy of the regions and better relations with the West, then it is a diagnosis: "Evgeny Primakov offered a liberal way out of the crisis: more money to the regions""

Nemtsov directly connects the speech of Yevgeny Primakov at the "Mercury Club" with the basic requirements of the white-ribonnists - decentralization and normalization of relations with the West (i.e. capitulation before the West). In fact we are talking about the liberals and conservatives solving the same problem with two hands. These are the words of Nemtsov (we don't blame Primakov for anything), whether he was right or not, but Primakov, in any case, can not play the entire combination on his own.

In order to try to understand who is the conservative counterpart of the liberals working on the coup d'etat, we should look at the interview of Borodai, published in "Expert Online". The first Prime Minister of DPR made a number of important statements, to discuss which on a level "can you criticize Strelkov or not" is an insult to the patriotic line. We urge you to consider Borodai's interview not as a personal issue, but as part of the ongoing process from a perspective of a person close to Strelkov.

Borodai and Strelkov before the war in Donbass worked for oligarch Malofeyev. Boroday - as a PR consultant, and Strelkov - as a head of security. Then, according to Dugin, Malofeev received a "mandate for Novorossia" and became "a shadow, but the key figure" of the game in Donbass. This is how Dugin explains the fact that Malofeev's PR consultant, Muscovite Borodai, who had no relation to Donbass, became the first Prime Minister of DPR, and the head of Malofeev's security service, not related to Donbass Muskovite Strelkov became the first Minister of Defense of DPR. Quoting Dugin:

"At the level of big business among the Orthodox magnates, close to Putin, one of the important figures, who from the outset took a strictly Patriotic position, was Konstantin Malofeev, previously known more for his links with the Orthodox Church and charitable projects (Basil the Great Foundation)... He and his close friends and colleagues, Igor Strelkov and Alexander Borodai took a very active part in the Crimean events ... This explains Strelkov and Boroday, polite people in Slavyansk and the subject-matter of Orthodoxy, Russian identity and Eurasian geopolitics, which dominated in Donetsk Revolution. Malofeyev was though a shadow, but a key figure in continuation of the Russian Spring... the mandate of Malofeyev to Novorossia was recalled."

Boroday and Strelkov hold a joint press conference in Donetsk:

In an interview published in "Expert Online", Borodai states the following:

"He [Strelkov] simply felt that he had done too much to simply die. He craved glory all his life. Military honors, accolades. Not for nothing he was so angry at his agency, which prior to the events fired him "without the right to wear the uniform". And at the arrival to Donetsk he had already earned his glory. But he wanted "to touch the glory" with his hands. And he had a very exaggerated idea of how he will be greeted in Russia. I know his hopes and dreams. This is what he wanted: "Kremlin. St George's hall. Igor stands tall in a brand new navy uniform of a general. The President approaches him. Awarding a star of the Hero of Russia. Then hugs him and shedding a man tear, whispers, "Thank you, son." Then turns to the audience and says, "Now I know who I can leave Russia to." The audience gasps, stunned and envious...". Something like that. Well, it did not come true... why try to avenge the unfulfilled fantasy? It hurts the mission. The same mission, for which he risked his life, for which people were killed..."

Let's leave aside the "man tear", and focus on the fact of Borodai's statement about Strelkov's presidential ambitions. Regarding the overall painful ambition of offended Strelkov, then we can see it clearly without Borodai. Sufficient to read Strelkov's comments on the forum of re-enactors.

Next Borodai clarifies what price Strelkov is willing to pay for his ambitions and describes the specific plan of Strelkov:

"I need to point to one more fact. Igor made some things happen in recent months. He had finally become a political figure of a national scale. Whether they want to notice it at the Kremlin and the Old square or not. Another thing is that he is not just an oppositional politician, but extremely destructive. His calculation is simple: the country is in crisis, the authorities will not last long, and in the inevitable civil war Igor Girkin-Strelkov will lead the part of the "patriotic forces" and will become a dictator of what will remain of Russia. Personally, I think the chances for the implementation of this simple program are quite minimal. But, unfortunately, they are still there. I think some readers will wonder whether this option is that bad? Bad. Not least because, firstly, the realization of Igor Strelkov as a full-fledged political leader is only possible through a bloody civil war. And secondly, Igor will be a very low quality dictator".

In this context, we cannot skip the following quotation from a speech of Khodorkovsky called "Russia before and after Putin":

"Does this group have enough forces to become the engine? How much? We can rely on data from different studies. For example, the annexation of Crimea, in the form chosen by President Putin, when he openly lied about the presence of the military at the peninsula, when members of parliament, in violation of all norms of international law were encouraged to vote by armed men. Now, the people who support the idea of the rule of law, despite the aggressive propaganda, the pressure of the society, according to various estimates, number from 10 to 16%. This is 11-17 million. If you think about it, just of these people we could make a successful and not the smallest European country".

In fact we are talking about the same scenario under the name "Russia before and after Putin". After Putin both conservatives and liberals are counting on the coming to power thanks to a collapse of the country. The junction of their aspirations creates a scenario in which Strelkov becomes a dictator of a not very small European country (what will remain from Russia). Would you say, postmodern nonsense? Of course, postmodern. Why, is the contemporary world politics, in the style of "Je suis Charlie" not a postmodern nonsense, connecting with the contra-modern?

Next Strelkov's partner [Borodai] describes how "the Malofeyev team" implemented this scenario:

"Strelkov said in an interview with Prokhanov that before retreating from Slavyansk he had a phone conversation with someone who gave him strict orders not to pull out from the city. He was promised help in deblocking of Slavyansk. But to his question, when will the help come, he did not receive a good answer. And that's when he decided to retreat. Why, in this case, if Strelkov retreated from Slavyansk without an order there were no consequenses?

- As you understand, Igor did not speak with me."

Strelkov in an interview to the newspaper "Zavtra" (Prokhanov) stated that he abandoned Slavyansk despite the order. Quote:

"I had a categorical order - not to leave Slavyansk. And when I reported that I intend to leave, they repeated several times not to go, to defend Slavyansk to the end."You will be deblocked, defend Slavyansk". I ask: "How will you help?" Silence. And I have a thousand people and thousands of their family members. I did not have a right to sacrifice them. So I decided to break out".

History has shown that the unblocking would have happened in the beginning of August, when the second wave of militia came. But by that time Strelkov already, contrary to the order and his own word, surrendered Slavyansk. But it was not limited to just Slavyansk, Strelkov consequently surrenders all the cities under his control: Kramatorsk, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka, and so on (in total, half of the territory of Donetsk Republic) and runs to Donetsk. To illustrate, citing Boroday:

"To understand, "how it was" we should start from the arrival of Igor from Slavyansk. He then also liberated from our presence not only Slavyansk, but a huge part of the territory of DPR, many large settlements: Kramatorsk, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka, Artemovsk. With a large population. In some cases, with convenient defense positions."

The fact of giving up of half the size of DPR is obvious, and needs no sources. What is important that Strelkov abandoned half the territory of DPR despite the order of not Borodai, but someone else. And can you guess where such orders could come from?

In his interview Borodai modestly skips the war between Malofeyev's team (Strelkov, Boroday) and Besler, which was to result in carnage between the militia and, in conjunction with the retreat from territories, to bury the anti-fascist resistance of Donbass. Instead of a serious consideration of this fact, Borodai just says:

"By the way, after leaving Slavyansk, he was not going to Donetsk. He planned to stay in Gorlovka. But it did not happen. "Bes" (Besler) was not hospitable enough".

Forgetting to mention about how he (Borodai) in early July (prior to leaving half the territory of DPR) announced ... ATO against Besler! And DPR TV announced that Besler's militia should disarm, otherwise they will be destroyed. Read more about it here - http://ruskom.livejournal.com/567981.html

Borodai near police HQ in Donetsk, July 1, 2014:

Later Kotych (aka Strelkov aka Girkin) wrote that Borodai had a problem with Besler:

Strelkov: "Jesus Christ! Just watched the interview of Borodai together with Besler on Day TV. What a surprise! Borodai, who in Donetsk considered Besler his "worst enemy" and was constantly afraid that Besler will "sweep" him (for Borodai Besler was his worst nightmare) now is sitting down discussing the perspectives of Novorossia! And both are full of sh$t"


"Vostok" (Hodakovsky) and "Oplot" (Zakharchenko) then refused to execute the order of Boroday to sweep Besler, realizing that a fight between militias will only lead to one result - banderite entry into Donetsk. After that, Strelkov, despite the order, gives up Slavyansk and goes to sweep Besler, but... breaks his teeth. This is what a militiaman from Gorlovka wrote about this:


Evgeny Kryzhin: In our HQ no one fights with anyone. But everyone remembers well how Vsevolodych (Strelkov) sh#t himself when his column tried to dig in in Yenakievo, but was forced to run to Donetsk, or else would have to be buried there in it's entirety.

Responding to your question, he went to Yenakievo first, before Gorlovka. Tried to dig in, but was politely told to go f#ck himself.

Well.. first Miner's division came to Yenakievo. And after a certain time, after the final surrender of Slavyansk - came Strelkov with his entourage. Tried to arrest grandpa and everyone [Besler]. Was unpleasantly surprised by a number of weapons, pointed at him immediately, and quickly left for Donetsk.

Read more about it here - http://friend.livejournal.com/1530728.html

The fact that Strelkov was going to power sweep Donetsk, is clear from the screams of Strelkov's PR helpers, who a few days before (!) him capitulating half of the territory of DPR, loudly howled that "Donetsk is rotten", and then transferred this howl into the format "Strelkov ingeniously-heroically left half the territory of DPR and now is going to clean up the rotten Donetsk to take the power into his own hands". Strelkov himself, if you remember, on the day of retreat from Slavyansk, only just escaping to Donetsk, immediately declared himself a military dictator of Donetsk. Appointing himself a military dictator, Strelkov continues to give up the territory in the area of Donetsk (Karlovka, for example) and even in LPR. Thus Mozgovoy, on the order of Strelkov, gives up Lisichansk. And all this happened under a red-hot howl of Strelkov PR pool (uniting most of the talking heads of the Patriotic Runet [Russian Internet]) on the subject of #RussiaIsNotHelping, #PutinDumped and #B%chBringInTheTroops.

Рожин Кассад colonelcassad
Boris Rozhin aka blogger Colonel Cassad

For example, here's what the official Strelkov's PR "rep" Colonel Cassad (whom Borodai calls an SBU agent) wrote on the night from July 4th to 5th (at the moment when Slavyansk was surrendered, but no one knew about it):

"Against the background of the deteriorating situation near Slavyansk, in the Russian social media continues to grow a wave of misunderstanding and frustration turning into hatred. Statements of Strelkov about the imminent fall of Slavyansk, brought to the foreground the issue of "Russia's silence" or the so-called PCP [Putin's Clever Plan]. In front of our eyes in the information space unfolds a division of the post-Crimean pro-Putin patriotic majority, when one part accuses the other of treachery and treason, and the other - of the work for the State Department. If we consider the situation from the point of view of the United States, which some patriotic circles are very afraid of, that in itself this discourse is an enormous achievement, as in just a few months they managed to reverse the situation so that instead of a universal support, they effortlessly got the situation in the spirit of rhetorical questions of Milyukov: "Is this stupidity or treason?"
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Against the background of what is happening in Donbass, first comes a disappointment, then public rifts, when persons like Dugin are already openly screaming about a betrayal.

The authorities themselves will survive the loss of illusions of this section of the patriots and their possible retreat into opposition. This is not the problem, in the event of defeat in Donbass, Russia without participating directly, will actually bury the ideological line of the last 3 years, when the public form of ideological mainstream will part with the real content and no "Crimea-is-ours" will help here, because those who shouted it in March, will always remember the slogans in the spirit of "Putin-Dumped". For the patriots, it will be an open wound in the spirit of 1993, the consequences of which will be felt for decades, regardless of who will rule in the Kremlin. And what conservative-right ideology can then be discussed if the right-wing conservatives are now the first ones screaming about betrayal?

Moreover, the misunderstanding of Russian policy in Ukraine, affects not only the most recent followers of Putin, but also the old sympathizers, for whom the situation in Donbass is even more important than Crimea, which is not surprising in light of the terrible scenes of genocide, which are shown in the media and the blogosphere. I have already seen similar processes during the Libyan war, but that war was far away and not about us, when this war is close and they are killing our own. Then the officialdom clearly hung it on Medvedev, blaming him. Now there is no such scapegoat."

Here Rozhin is simultaneously accusing Putin for betraying Libya, says that Strelkov's Slavyansk epic ultimately has the following result:

"From the point of view of the United States... in itself this discourse [defined by Strelkov's PR helpers - Friend] for them is a huge achievement, as in just a few months they managed to reverse the situation so that instead of a universal support, they effortlessly got the situation in the spirit of rhetorical questions of Milyukov "Is this stupidity or treason?""


Strelkov rally in Moscow: "Betrayal is worse then sanctions":

The next day Rozhin states the following:

"Convenient for the Kremlin situation, when the lack of assistance could be attributed to the confusion and vacillation among the militia, and along the way to give money to people like Tsarev on loud but meaningless activities, risks to swiftly terminate after the beginning of active hostilities in the suburbs of Donetsk... the point here is that if the junta will really unleash mass terror, then in accordance with the growing disappointment in PCP [Putin's Clever Plan], these victims will be blamed not on Strelkov. Strelkov clearly said that the point of holding on to Slavyansk was that we held the city (which intercepts communications of the junta on the Northern borders of DPR) and await the arrival of the Russian troops."

Similar statements were made by Gubarev, who, together with representatives of Strelkov's general staff asserted that #RussiaIsNotHelping (against the backdrop of picturesquely shaking a rusty gun) and charged Putin with responsibility for Strelkov abandoning half of the territory of DPR, quote:

"The responsibility is now on of the respected by me authorities of Russia for this, a heavy responsibility":

[In the above video Kurginyan also speaks about his prior experience in South Ossethia and Transnistria, and his genuine shock about Strelkov's departure from Slavyansk, because he, Kurginyan, knows, that Strelkov had plenty of ammo (and knows how much), calling Strelkov a liar for saying he had received no weapons (and for blaming Putin). Kurginyan also talked about the fact that Russia cannot help the militia officially, but that's were Russian civic organizations, like his own "Sut Vremeny" ("The Essence of Time") come in, and modestly said that he played no small part himself in supplying the militia with everything they needed (including his own small private military company based on his own organization "Sut Vremeny", which he said he could have never imagine he would be engaged in before). Later in another video he mentioned that he is not a fan of the term "Voentorg", all of which makes you wonder if Kurginyan himself was the face of "Voentorg," at least at that stage.

Also in video you can spot Cassad aka Boris Rozhin (claimed to be Strelkov's PR aid) listening in the background - KR]

In all the media paints the following picture:

1) Strelkov came to Slavyansk, only in order to provide a springboard for the arrival of the Russian troops. #B$tchBringInTheTroops!

2) Strelkov is heroically fighting in Donbass, but #RussiaIsNotHelping!

3) Strelkov gives up half the territory of DPR and is going to take Donetsk, but its all Putin's fault. Strelkov have warned him that he is unable to fight on his own and demanded to bring the troops, but Putin did not listen. #PutinDumped!

The expected result is "the junta will really unleash mass terror... in accordance with the growing disappointment in PCP, these victims will be blamed not on Strelkov", they will be blamed on Putin. Which will lead to "the division of the post-Crimean pro-Putin patriotic majority" and "no "Crimea-is-ours" will help here, because those who shouted it in March, will always remember the slogans in the spirit of "Putin-Dumped"".

The beneficiaries of all this are the United States which "just in a few months managed to reverse the situation so that instead of a universal support, they effortlessly got the situation in the spirit of rhetorical questions of Milyukov "Is this stupidity or treason?"".

The reasons for the failure of the "Borodaev's ATO" (i.e. the artificially organized in-fighting between militia, in which, besides Bezler, Strelkov had to sweep "Vostok" and "Oplot") are clear (in particular, without shedding the light to this, it wouldn't be stopped):

[In the video above Kurginyan passionately asks a few questions:

1. What was the reason for Strelkov to give up Slavyansk?

2. What about the people who are being slaughtered there now?

3. Who gave him a corridor and were did the negotiations took place? (and everyone knows about it, he retreated without losses, indicating it was arranged)

4. Why did Strelkov give his word that he will stay there until the end?

5. I (Kurginyan) give my word, that Strelkov got everything (artillery, anti-tank etc) he needed, there is no longer a technical imbalance, so why is he crying that there is no aid???

6. Why did he depart at the very moment when the technical imbalance dissipated, and when there was no pressure on the city from the Ukrainian side? [also the word is all that aid was left behind for the Ukrainians]

7. Three days before the surrender, the Ukrainian side began preparing camps for the residents/militia of Slavyansk, how did they know about the upcoming withdrawal?

8. Why are the commanders being pushed against each other? (a classic method of victory without battle)

9. Why was Strelkov supposed to (trying to) perform some punitive functions against the other militia groups immediately after the departure from Slavyansk?

Conclusion: This was a military crime, and Strelkov has to answer for it. The situation is dire, but it needs to be brought before the masses, and it can be reversed.

Elsewhere, Kurgynyan also wondered why was Strelkov the only commander who got so much attention in the media and blogosphere? And why promote someone as if for an election, when the nearest election was several years away, unless there would be an early election? -KR]

However, the team of Malofeyev tried to bring their blitzkrieg in Donbass to the end - Strelkov tried to surrender Donetsk, citing Borodai:

"Antyufyev has the documentary evidence of the attempts to surrender Donetsk by Strelkov. Besler says that he has the document of Strelkov's order to surrender Gorlovka (which was sabotaged by Bes (Besler)). Khmury, aka General Petrovsky, " a man of Strelkov", remembered how Igor gave him the order to go along with spetsnaz to Snezhnoye, which had to be held until the approach of the main forces of the legion running from Donetsk, headed by the Minister of Defense of DPR. Khmury also did not appreciate the greatness of the idea and refused to obey the order... And there is Zakharchenko, Khodakovsky, Kononov... All these people were then the "military elite" of DPR. So why don't the adepts of Strelkov, if they are so sure of his infallibility, ask each of them a direct question: "Was there an attempt to surrender, or not?"

However there is no need to ask anyone. Strelkov himself said that he had given the order to surrender Donetsk, but the militia did not obey. Read more about it here -http://friend.livejournal.com/1576692.html

And then... then there was the Boeing and reports in some federal mass media that the junta in reality wanted to shoot down the Aircraft No. 1 [Putin's plane], i.e., to destroy Putin:

If they succeeded, then Russia would have passed to the stage of "Russia: before and AFTER Putin". But this plan failed. Read more about it here - http://gurianov-pavel.livejournal.com/62587.html

Resignation of Borodai and Strelkov was the final stage of the loss of this dirty game in Donbass, which was aptly described by Strelkov's PR aid. But this does not mean that the subject moving the figures of Boroday and Strelkov in Donbass, was eliminated from the game.

Strelkov, after the resignation, announces about the establishment of the movement "Novorossia", which was actually created on the basis of Cassad's media group. From this stage they place the focus on the information war against DPR, LPR and Russia. While retaining positions in Donbass. For example, the media group "Cassad", according to its own statements, created a website for the official government news of DPR and started pursuing information war against Zakharchenko, and using him to target Putin: http://friend.livejournal.com/1560203.html

Insults of Putin are now covered with a fig leaf of "Putinism". It looks like this: "I am for Putin, but he understands nothing, he is surrounded with bastards and traitors, who constantly mess with his head". For clarity, here are a few comments of Kotych (Strelkov-Girkin) about Minsk-2:

"How long do you think Putin will put up with reports that the daily shelling of Donetsk is done by the militia? 1) a week 2.) a month 3) 3 months 4) until Surkov's resignation 5) I am a conscious ukrop and I will never cease the shelling"

Emelya: "Glad the US is not participating in these talks. When they divided Yugoslavia, the Yankees not only shoved their nose everywhere, but also put their feet on the negotiating table. Is Europe really shaking the America off?"

Kotych: "The master usually sends his servants to the talks with the street vendors"

"The agreement is a meaningless peace of paper. Donetsk is still under fire. Russian media is silent. Ukrainians are not moving the heavy equipment. LPR and DPR are... In reality this peace of paper is worth nothing to the Ukrainians. The war will go on, but the peacemaker-bureaucrats have transferred to Putin personally the responsibility for each ripped arm and leg, for each "ceasefire" shelling. And when Minsk-2 will be drained down the toilet just like Minsk-1, the president will be personally held accountable. Is this an achievement? I think it's a betrayal"

"They will not withdraw the heavy equipment, because "to promise - is not to marry" Mobilizations are not done for peace. We can only guess - when will Minsk-3, Minsk-4 take place. Because dances on rakes have firmly entered the foreign policy of the Kremlin. Or simply, someone really likes travelling to Minsk"

Don't you think that these "Putinists" are depicting Putin as completely inadequate, not only as head of state, but just as a person?

In fact, the "Putinists" in "Strelkov and Co." on equal footing with the liberals have created a framework in which ANY step of Putin is interpreted as a betrayal. And it is interpreted as such from both sides, as from a liberal, and from the "patriotic-pro-Putin" side. You are not dumping Donbass, and with it, Crimea and the entire Russia? Then you are smeared by the liberals. You are not bringing in the troops, that is, in the end, are not dumping Donbass? Then you are smeared by the "patriots-Putinists" (strelkovtsy).

But the question arises. How can they get away with it? Who is the owner of the project? Clearly not Malofeev, who in principle can not exercise this on his own.

Konstantin Malofeev:

It requires a subject with fundamentally different capabilities. Something about such subject mentioned Maxim Kalashnikov, stating that:

"Konstantin Malofeev, in fact, started a rebellion in Donbass, parachuted Strelkov, by the decision of one of the towers of the Kremlin. Do you understand that there are a few towers in the Kremlin, as there are several politicians in the Kremlin. Which tower, I can't say for sure, but Malofeyev, in fact, spent his money under the guarantee of one of these towers".

Read more about it here - http://friend.livejournal.com/1734363.html

So what is this tower of the Kremlin, under whose direction operates Malofeev? It is unlikely that we are talking directly about the liberals, right?

Above: Maxim Kalashnikov speaking at the congress of the movement "Novorossia" with a proposal to create in Russia the "National guard," uncontrolled by the president and headed by Strelkov

Anti-Putin and, ultimately, an obviously anti-Russian union of the conservatives and liberals under the general supervision of the U.S., is only possible with the building of corresponding bridges between these groups. The bridges, leading to the destruction of our country.

About what kind of bridge it is explained Strelkov's curator, retired major-General of the FSB Gennady Tendetnik (known in Live Journal as @detnix), who served in the 5th Directorate of the KGB, later renamed to the "Z" department (Protection [Zashita - Russian] of the Constitutional Order).

The son of Tendetnik, Pavel, is the head of the office of military cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Turkmenistan (that is intimately associated with US intelligence).

In the interview with "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" Tendetnik stated the following:

"During Soviet times, we have always kept track on the smart, talented people and always in one way or another had made contact with them. Mandatory. And we almost had no recruits for blackmail or money. 98% were recruited, as we used to say, on a "moral and patriotic" basis. When I left Novosibirsk, I had nearly 30 agents, and these were very important and worthy people. I had to say goodbye to all of them. I was drunk for 30 days in a row. Then many of them came to Moscow for a visit with families.

I will tell you more. The democratic revolution of 1991, all of these democratic unions, and so on. This is 50% - active agents of the 5th Directorate of the KGB, the"Z" department (Protection of the Constitutional Order). They were told, "okay, you guys, democracy is here. We have to let you go". And we took the most intelligent, courageous, beautiful, interesting. Naturally, they took charge of this process. But not under our guidance."

Do you understand that now the march for Nemtsov brings out literally the same "released" agents? So one hand is protesting against the war in Donbass, and the second hand is stirring the pot in Donbass.

And how can anyone say after that, that agent Girkin [Strelkov] is not connected by any bridge with agent Navalny?

KR: And who was the most talented, handsome, intelligent, bright and promising in Russian politics in the 1990's? That's right, the straight A student, physical scientist/turned governor at 32 years old, Boris Nemtsov. A "freedom fighter" who lived in a two level penthouse with the view of the Kremlin and was friends with John McCain until a week ago...

From Chechens to the Right Sector to CANVAS to Vanguard: Nemtsov's case - theories against facts

Quote:Translated by Kristina Rus

Tatyana Volkova's blog is banned in Ukraine and she claims to have insider sources "among friends and family". She also claims that Nemtsov's murder investigators found the killers thanks to her tip about Aslan Alkhanov. This is her take on Nemtsov's murder. KR


The case of the murder of Boris Nemtsov is surrounded by many theories, most of which fall into two categories: fabricated speculation, and theories specially prepared to protect the organizers. Active participation in this is taken by the organizers themselves, who have gotten in touch with the FSB.

From the information published so far it is known that the chain of intermediaries-organizers is practically neutralized: Aslan Alkhanov committed suicide; Beslan Shavanov died during an attempt to arrest him.

Basmanny court of Moscow sanctioned the arrest of the alleged driver of the vehicle, the passenger of which, lieutenant Zaur Dadaev, murdered Boris Nemtsov, and confessed to his involvement in court.

Another former police officer, Anzor Gubashev was also arrested (allegedly the shooter, who killed Nemtsov), as well as other persons who helped them, whose names have already been published.

When as a result of my report on the night of the murder, the FSB followed the trail of Aslan Alkhanov, the organizers of the murder became suspicious, because unlike other organizers and performers, Mr. Alkhanov tried to understand the essence of the mission.

As I reported, the order came from the colleague of Dmitry Yarosh, agent of CANVAS. However, behind the Ukrainian side are, as in all operations initiated recently from the territory of Ukraine, American state agencies and the American private military companies.

These PMC's, without exception, are all owned by corporations controlled by our old friend, asset management company, Vanguard. When it became clear that, thanks to my sources, FSB found the tracks of the murderers "too early", people from Vanguard on their own initiative came in contact with the investigation and gave up the executioners.

They did not risk much. One of the most important tasks of the provocation with the murder of Nemtsov was to push against Kadyrov against Putin. Therefore the performers were contacted not by Americans, and not even by Ukrainians, and the order was presented not in the form of treason, but as a noble deed, with a hint that it was almost "sanctioned by Kadyrov himself": to destroy the enemy of Islam, the enemy of Russia, and a very bad man, Boris Nemtsov.

The task was to do this using people, whom Kadyrov trusted, offering them to do a "good deed", and to earn very good money. Judging by the behavior of Dadaev in court, he still did not understand that he risked himself and killed not for his religion or beliefs, but for the profits of a private foreign company. According to the statements of Ramzan Kadyrov, he realizes that he had been set up, but has no clue by whom.

The customers disclosed the organizers, the performers and their companions, giving FSB information about people in Moscow and Grozny. Now - at least at the time of this post - a new, modified mission of the killers is almost achieved. They "proved" to the Kremlin their "innocence" by helping solve the murder, and giving up the lowest link. Even if anyone of the performers realized anything, their testimony would be inconsistent, and the investigation will not believe them.

Aslan Alkhanov, the closest connection to the customers, is dead. Some investigators have come to the easy conclusion, and don't want to dig further. But I will continue this investigation. As opposed to authors of theories, I have facts. Let's see how stubborn they are.