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Scott Report Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment & Dual-Use Goods to Iraq - Printable Version

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Scott Report Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment & Dual-Use Goods to Iraq - Magda Hassan - 03-02-2010

The Scott Report (the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions) was a judicial inquiry commissioned in 1992 after reports of arms sales in the 1980s to Iraq by British companies surfaced. The report was conducted by Sir Richard Scott, then a Lord Justice of Appeal. It was published in 1996. Much of the report was secret.
Background

In the late 1980s, Matrix Churchill, a British (Coventry) aerospace quality machine tools manufacturer, that had been bought by the Iraqi government, and was exporting machines used in weapons manufacture to Iraq. According to the International Atomic Energy Authority, its products later found in Iraq, were among the highest quality of their kind in the world. They were 'dual use' machines that 'could' be used to manufacture weapons parts. Such exports are subject to government control, and Matrix Churchill had the appropriate government permissions, following a 1988 relaxation of export controls. Crucially, however, this relaxation had not been announced to parliament - indeed, when asked in parliament whether controls had been relaxed, the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry replied incorrectly that they had not.[citation needed]
Matrix Churchill were contacted by HM Customs and Excise, under suspicion of exporting arms components to Iraq without permission. They had this permission but this was denied by the government, in line with the most recently announced policy on the matter. Matrix Churchill's directors were therefore prosecuted in 1991 by Customs and Excise for breaching export controls.
The trial did not go well for the government - public interest immunity certificates obtained by the government to suppress some critical evidence (supposedly on grounds of national security) were quickly overturned by the trial judge, forcing the documents to be handed over to the defence. The trial eventually collapsed when former minister Alan Clark admitted he had been 'economical with the actualité' in answer to parliamentary questions over export licenses to Iraq.
The Report

The Scott Report represents possibly the most exhaustive study produced to that date of the individual responsibility of ministers to Parliament. Scott comments on the difficulty of extracting from departments the required documents (some 130,000 of them in all) and notes how Customs and Excise could not find out what Ministry of Defence export policy was, and how intelligence reports were not passed on to those who needed to know. The Economist commented that "Sir Richard exposed an excessively secretive government machine, riddled with incompetence, slippery with the truth and willing to mislead Parliament". The report characterised the nature of the government as:
The main objectives of governments are the implementation of their policies and the discomfiture of opposition; they do not submit with enthusiasm to the restraints of accountability … governments are little disposed to volunteer information that may expose them to criticism … The enforcement of accountability depends largely on the ability of Parliament to prise information from governments which are inclined to be defensively secretive where they are most vulnerable to challenge.
Scott identified three main areas of democratic concern. First, the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 was emergency legislation passed at the outbreak of the Second World War. It allowed the government to issue regulations which were not subject to resolutions in Parliament, for the duration of the emergency, which would make it a criminal offence to export particular goods to particular countries. While the Act should have been lapsed in 1945, it remained in force, and had been modified in 1990 so as to become part of the Import and Export Control Act 1990. [1]
The second area was the failure of ministerial accountability; the principle that "for every action of a servant of the crown a minister is answerable to Parliament".
The third area was that of Public Interest Immunity certificates, which had been issued during the Matrix Churchill trial. As a result of these certificates, innocent men were in danger of being sent to prison, because the government would not allow the defence counsel to see the documents that would exonerate their clients. While some of these contained potentially sensitive intelligence material, many were simply internal communications: the certificates were intended to protect the Ministers and civil servants who had written the communications, rather than the public interest. Scott states:
The government is entirely frank in its desire to continue using "class" claims in order to protect communications between ministers and civil servants from disclosure in litigation. One argument put forward is that, unless these communications are protected, the necessary candour between ministers and civil servants will suffer. I have to say that I regard this "candour" argument … as unacceptable.
Publication

The publication of the report was seen by many as the nadir of the 1990s Conservative governments of the UK. Prior to the report's publication, those ministers who were criticised were given the opportunity to comment and request revisions. The 1,806 page report was published, along with a press pack which included a few relatively positive extracts from the report presented as if representative of the entire report, at 3:30pm. Given a then largely pro-government press, this proved effective at stalling an extensive analysis in the media.
The report had to be debated in parliament. Ministers criticised in the report were given advanced access to the report and briefed extensively on how to defend themselves against the report's criticisms. In contrast, according to senior Labour MP Robin Cook, the opposition were given just two hours to read the million-plus words, during which scrutiny they were supervised and prevented from making copies of the report. Finally, the Prime Minister, John Major, stated that a vote against the Government would be in effect a vote of no confidence, ensuring that Conservative MPs would not vote against, while a vote for was a vote exonerating the Government of any wrongdoing. Robin Cook worked with a team of researchers to scrutinise the report, and delivered "what was regarded as a bravura performance". [2] Nonetheless, the Government won the vote 320-319.
References




Scott Report Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment & Dual-Use Goods to Iraq - Magda Hassan - 03-02-2010

[size=12]CONTENTS[/SIZE]

[size=12]Volume One[/SIZE]
PART 1

SECTION A
INTRODUCTION
Chapter One
Introduction Chapter Two The Institution of the Inquiry Chapter Three Terms of Reference
SECTION B
PROCEDURES
Chapter One
Chapter Two Chapter Three SECTION C THE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM Chapter One
Government Powers under the Import, Export and Customs

Powers (Defence) Act 1939
Background - Pre 1939
Cl.l
The 1939 Act
C1.20
The Use of the 1939 Act after the Cessation of Hostilities
C1.28
The Import and Export Control Act 1990
C1.66
Export Control Orders
C1.122
Chapter Two
Export Licensing Procedures
The Department of Trade and Industry
C2.3
The Ministry of Defence

C2.20
The Foreign & Commonwealth Office

C2.39
Licences
C2.50
Open Individual Export Licences and Open General Export Licences
C2.52
Temporary Licences
C2.58
Interdepartmental Procedures
C2.63 The Security Export Controls Working Party C2.66 The Restricted Enforcement Unit C2.67 The Working Group on Iraqi Procurement C2.73 Chapter Three The Role of Customs & Excise in Export Control General
C3.1
The Customs & Excise Management Act 1979 C3.11 Customs Exports Procedures C3.66
PART 2
SECTION D ARMS AND DEFENCE-RELATED EXPORTS TO IRAQ
Chapter One
The Howe Guidelines The Introduction of the Howe Guidelines D1.3 Sales to Iran D1.5 Sales to Iraq D1.10 The Discussions Leading up to the Howe Guidelines
D1.17 The Procedures Instituted to Implement the Howe Guidelines
D1.95 The MOD Working Group
D1.103 The Interdepartmental Committee
D1.116 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office
D1.124 The Ministry of Defence
D1.126 The Department of Trade and Industry
D1.142 The Announcement of the Howe Guidelines
D1.145 Chapter Two Applications of the Guidelines in the period December 1984 to August 1988 Introduction D2.1 The Visit to London of Tariq Aziz D2.3 The Ministerial Meeting on 19 June 1986
D2.9 US Arms Shipments to Iran
D2.19 The Ministerial Meeting on 3 March 1987
D2.23 Availability of Supplies from Foreign Sources
D2.24 The Policy of Impartiality and Even-handedness
D2.27 Publicity
D2.30 Licensing Procedures and Cryptographic Equipment D2.37 The Effect of Iranian Attacks on Shipping in the Gulf
D2.40 Temporary Licences
D2.46 Defence Attache Reports
D2.52 ECGD Arrangements
D2.65
Specific Cases
The Repair Waiver
D2.122
Hovercraft
D2.126
Helicopters
D2.140
Small Boats
D2.148
The Integrated Weapons Complex
D2.168
The Iraqi Naval Base at Basra
D2.180
Radar
D2.185
Power Drives
D2.194
Night Vision Equipment
D2.200
Cymbeline Radar
D2.209
Land Rovers (military use)
D2.211
Armoured Recovery Vehicle Spares
D2.218
Tank Track Links
D2.229
Engines for Viper MK22/9 Aircraft
D2.231
Avon Engines for Hunter Aircraft
D2.232
Chemical Warfare Precursors and Equipment
D2.239
Machine Tools
D2.260
Lethal Defence Equipment
D2.360
Tripod Engineering Ltd
D2.362
Computer Systems
D2.403
Quickfire Artillery Fire Control System
D2.411 Public Statements of Government Policy on Exports to Iraq D2.419 Summary D2.427
Chapter Three
Defence Sales Policy after the Cease-Fire
The Effect of the Cease-fire on the Guidelines D3.1
The Effect of the Salman Rushdie Affair
D3.66
Procedural Changes
D3.126 Exchange of Ministers D3.132 Progress Towards a Review of the Guidelines D3.140 D3.152 Guidelines for the Export of Defence Equipment for Exhibitions D3.166 ECGD Policy after the Cease-fire D3.172 Guidelines for Military Training
D3.186
Chapter Four
Government Statements on Defence Sales Policy After the

Cease-fire
Letters from the FCO in 1989 D4.1 Letters from the MOD in 1989 D4.17 1990 Letters D4.22 Answers to PQs D4.25
[size=12]Volume Two[/SIZE]
SECTION D CONTINUED Chapter Five Iraqi Arms and Defence Equipment Procurement after the Cease-fire The November 1987 Report and its Consequences D5.2 Dr Habobi D5.5 Information about Iraqi Procurement after the Cease-fire D5.25 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook's Iraq Arms Manufacture Paper D5.64 Chapter Six Specific Export Licence Applications after the Cease-fire Hawk
D6.1
The Hawk Project and Mr David Hastie
D6.29
Machine Tools:
Temporary Licences for November 1988 Baghdad Trade Fair
D6.55
ELAs November 1988 to February 1989
D6.73
ELAs November 1989
D6.107
ELAs for Temporary Licences in 1989 and 1990
D6.194
ELAs -1990
D6.221 Computer Systems D6.269 Thermal Imagers and Night Vision Equipment D6.290 Consarc Engineering Limited: Vacuum Furnaces D6.312 Polibur Engineering LTD D6.337 Badger Catalytic Limited D6.343 Terrafix Limited D6.348 PD Technical Mouldings Limited D6.359 PMK Electronic Consultants LTD D6.370 Depleted Uranium - Amersham International Limited and Testrade Limited
D6.388
Marconi Command and Control Systems Limited and Marconi Company Limited D6.406 Plessey Radar Limited: Radar Jammer D6.428 Marconi and Ferranti Air Defence Training Simulators D6.437 Marconi Command and Control Systems ST800 Series Instrumentation Radar System D6.449 Marconi Secure Radio Systems: GR 083 ACT Mobile Digital Radio Communication System D6.455 Explosive Bolts D6.468 Postscript D6.485
Chapter Seven
Other Allegations of Illegal Arms Exports to Iraq Royal Ordnance I D7.1
Ammunition Boxes found in Iraq and Kuwait
D7.6
Propellant and Weapons Cartels
D7.10
Consideration of Royal Ordnance's Proposal to Export a Rocket Plant to Iraq
D7.16
Information Supplied by Mr Gumbley to the MOD
D7.20 Global Technical and Management Services International LTD D7.24
Background to the Inquiry's Investigation of Global
D7.24
Embassy Involvement
D7.28
Customs Investigation
D7.35 Terex Equipment LTD D7.45 Astra Holdings plc/British Manufacture and Research Company Limited/Astra Pyrotechnics Limited D7.56
Twin 30mm Naval Gun
D7.60
Baghdad International Exhibition
D7.63
Diversionary Routes
D7.69
35 mm Ammunition to Iraq via Cyprus
D7.71
Project Lisi
D7.75
Booster Pellets
D7.80
Skyguard Air Defence Systems and training of Gun Crews
D7.83
The Briefing for Mr Clark
D7.92
Letter from Mr Aitken to Mr James dated 8 March 1985
D7.93
Astra Pyrotechnics LTD
D7.95 Chapter Eight Summary SECTION E DIVERSIONARY ROUTES Chapter One Introduction Chapter Two Jordan Chapter Three Egypt Chapter Four Kuwait Chapter Five The United Arab Emirates Chapter Six Saudi Arabia Chapter Seven Austria and Portugal Austria E7.1 Portugal E7.4 Chapter Eight Open Individual Export Licences Chapter Nine Marconi Underwater Systems Limited - Stonefish Mines Background E9.1 AWP Application of 13 June 1988 E9.6 AWP Application of 12 September 1988 E9.8 British Government Knowledge of the Connection between Cardoen and Iraq E9.10 E9.13 Revalidation of AWP Clearance dated 4 April 1990 E9.16 Telex of 23 August 1990 E9.18 Parliamentary Question: Defence Sales to Chile E9.26 Chapter Ten Ordnance Technologies Limited The Connection between Allivane, Aerotechnology and Ordtec E10.2 The Contract between Ordtec and SRC E10.3 The Licences E10.7 Allivane - Ordtec E10.12 The Exports E10.19 Information available to Government about Ordtec E10.24 Termination of Contact between Mr Grecian and the Intelligence Agencies E10.56 [size=12]Volume Three [/SIZE]
SECTION F
SUPERGUN Chapter One Limitations on the Scope of the Report Chapter Two Government Knowledge - November 1987 until December 1988 November 1987 to June 1988 F2.1 June - August 1988 F2.18 Sir Hal Miller and the 'Third Agency' F2.29 Forgemasters (July 1988) F2.73 The Resuscitation of the Walter Somers' Order in August 1988 F2.77 November 1988 F2.86 Mr I4 and the Customs F2.98 Propellant contract F2.100 Frank Machon F2.101 Chapter Three Government Knowledge - January 1989 until December 1989 Revival of Interest in the Gun Project in Mid 1989 F3.1 Hadland Photonics LTD F3.7 Astra Holdings Plc F3.19 Mr Grecian F3.31 Mr Henderson F3.75 Action by Intelligence Agencies and by the Government F3.79 Sir Hal Miller (June and August 1989) F3.91 Forgemasters Engineering (1989) F3.93 Chapter Four Government Knowledge - January 1990 until April 1990 The Events Leading to the Seizure of the Forgings F4.2 The third Walter Somers contract (Sir Hal Miller) F4.22 The Statement to the House of Commons by Mr Ridley F4.26 Sir Patrick Mayhew and Sir Hal Miller F4.45 Sir Hal Miller and Mr Patrick Blackshaw of Customs F4.50 Mr Harding and Mr Primrose: Evidence to TISC F4.54 Government Answers to PQs about Supergun F4.67 What went wrong? F4.80
PART 3
SECTION G THE MATRIX CHURCHILL CASE Chapter One Introduction Chapter Two ...


Scott Report Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment & Dual-Use Goods to Iraq - Marius Titulescu - 10-10-2018

Are these regulations still in place?
I see the thread is rather old, but I couldn't find anything more recent.
__________________________________
Marius from C TPAT compliance training


Scott Report Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment & Dual-Use Goods to Iraq - David Guyatt - 12-10-2018

Marius Titulescu Wrote:Are these regulations still in place?
I see the thread is rather old, but I couldn't find anything more recent.
_________________________________
Marius from C TPAT compliance

I very much doubt it. This whole affair played out during the Thatcher government in the mid-1980's, over 30 years ago.