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Informers everywhere - Austin Kelley - 15-06-2010 http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/96233609.html Posted on Sun, Jun. 13, 2010 Informers everywhere Gathering information on people in Muslim communities has become part of daily life. After 9/11, all data is considered useful. Is that how America should be? By Stephan Salisbury Inquirer Staff Writer Not long after the FBI received a tip in 2006 that two North Jersey teenagers were watching terrorist videos and muttering angrily that "Americans are their enemies" and "they all must be killed," the pair traveled to Jordan and sought to join up with insurgents fighting in Iraq. That didn't go too well. Their help was rejected. When the two returned home after a few weeks, one allowed the FBI to search his computer, where agents found al-Qaeda propaganda and statements of Osama bin Laden. You'd think that would raise a cautionary flag for any would-be insurgent. You would be wrong. On June 5, Mohamed Mahmood Alessa, now 20, and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, now 24, were arrested as they sought to board separate flights to Egypt, the first leg in an odyssey they hoped would lead to Somalia and membership in al-Shabaab, designated by the United States as a terrorist group since 2008. This much is alleged in a criminal complaint filed by the FBI in a New Jersey federal court at the time of the arrests. The complaint constructs a familiar story: A covert police agent befriended Alessa and Almonte last year, gathered recordings of wild talk, chronicled development of a "plan" to travel to Somalia, and helped it along where he could. This Somalia trip, like the Iraq trip three years ago, was completely on spec, at least as described in the criminal complaint. The plotters had no contacts overseas. No specific plan on how to get from Egypt to Somalia. No weapons. No concept of what al-Shabaab might be doing - other than killing non-Muslims. Even that was wrong. For the most part, al-Shabaab sticks to killing other Muslims. What actually happened with Alessa and Almonte (other than a demonstration of incompetence) is difficult to say - there is little information yet available, although it is worth noting that court papers don't show much going on before the covert police agent appeared on the scene. Nevertheless, the criminal complaint underscores two critically important issues. First, law enforcement authorities received information directly from Almonte's family. This allowed police and federal investigators to focus their investigation on specific individuals without engulfing an entire community in a web of informants punctuated by scattershot interrogations and immigration detentions. Second, the case should make clear that more Americans have now sought to join al-Shabaab than any other terrorist organization in the world. Indeed, the first known American suicide bomber, Shirwa Ahmed, of Minneapolis, blew himself and 29 others to bits in 2008 on behalf of al-Shabaab, which was only a minor irritant until the U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia two years ago. In reporting the effect of the domestic war on terror for my book,Mohamed's Ghosts: An American Story of Love and Fear in the Homeland, I repeatedly encountered Middle Eastern and South Asian communities across the country that were so intimidated by law enforcement authorities that they feared any contact with them. This anxiety metastasized over the years as it became increasingly clear to residents that thousands of informers and covert police agents were keeping tabs on the doings of community centers, mosques, bookstores, coffeehouses, and whole neighborhoods. Informers have become so much a fact of daily life in Muslim areas that congregants joke that the FBI's informers keep bumping into the NYPD's informers leaving Friday prayer at al-Farooq mosque in Brooklyn. In Lodi, Calif., the joke is that each Muslim has his or her own personal informer. In one instance I came across, three separate informers and police agents who were scooping up tidbits at the Bay Ridge Islamic Society in Brooklyn on a single day. One of those undercover agents described himself as "a walking camera," capturing and passing along all the Kodak moments of daily life. What is wrong with this picture? Informers and covert agents gather names, and names go into databases. Information related to immigration goes to immigration authorities. It is passed on to revenue officials, local police, and the local Joint Terrorism Task Force. In the wake of 9/11, all information is considered useful, and it is not unusual for people to find themselves flagged in some way and, in turn, pressured to become informers. Sometimes people succumbed to the lure of steady pay for information. With payment comes the obligation to report something "useful." Informers are a necessary tool for law enforcement officials, without question, but they carry high risks, as any agent or police officer well knows. And when informers are turned loose on a community - not on a gang or group suspected of specific criminal activity - the dangers multiply. Rumors and gossip become fact; neighbors begin to fear neighbors; residents fear authorities; the foundations of community - and hence society itself - begin to weaken. Religious institutions become tainted. Families are broken. This is not rhetorical. The Pakistani community along South Seventh Street in Philadelphia no longer exists. Residents have scattered, fleeing like internal refugees in the face of law enforcement and immigration scrutiny. The same thing happened along Coney Island Avenue in Brooklyn. Many have gone to less prominent suburban and rural areas; others are in Canada or back overseas. In a totalitarian society, like the old Soviet Union, such matters are immaterial to authorities. America is different, or should be. For law enforcement officials charged with preventing violent acts of terror before they become realities, it is absolutely essential to have community trust and the attendant flow of information. For democracy to have any meaning there must be an open and functioning public sphere. This is simple common sense, as a recent study from the Rand Corp., a federally subsidized think tank, makes clear. "On occasion, relatives and friends have intervened" in cases of radicalization, the report notes. "But will they trust the authorities enough to notify them when persuasion does not work?" In the case of Almonte, his family discussed their worries with agents, according to the criminal complaint. But Almonte, a naturalized U.S. citizen, is a Muslim convert born in the Dominican Republic. His immediate community has nothing to do with the ethnic Muslim communities from the Middle East and South Asia that have often felt besieged in the wake of 9/11. Alessa is a first-generation Palestinian American. How his family responded to police overtures, if there were any, remains unclear. Yet as hunkered down as Muslim communities might feel, their residents have demonstrated over and over again that they are as responsible and as engaged in the public welfare of this country as anyone else. In the case of the recent botched Times Square car bomb incident, for instance, it was a Muslim vendor who first sounded the alarm about a suspicious smoking SUV on 45th Street - even though, he said, authorities would view his religious beliefs with suspicion. In March of this year, Alessa told Almonte "that they should not include others they knew in New Jersey in their plan to travel to Somalia," according to the criminal complaint. Why? No one else they knew "was serious," Alessa said. In other words, they feared the response of other Muslim Americans. Yet federal counterterrorism officials described the investigation as ongoing, and one told the Newark Star-Ledger that authorities hoped for "a spiderweb of arrests" soon to come. Alioune Niass, the vendor who reported the Times Square bomb, may have said Islam is not terrorism, but in the United States these days, listening is not always a priority. Stephan Salisbury is an Inquirer staff writer and author of "Mohammed's Ghosts: An American Story of Love and Fear in the Homeland." E-mail him atssalisbury@phillynews.com. Informers everywhere - Austin Kelley - 15-06-2010 http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/authorities_followed_every_mov.html FBI followed every move of two N.J. terror suspects for years, culminating in airport arrests Published: Sunday, June 13, 2010 Carlos Eduardo Almonte, Mohamed Mahmood Alessa The airport was crowded last Saturday night. Carlos Eduardo Almonte and Mohamed Mahmood Alessa arrived from their respective homes in New Jersey for staggered flights to Egypt — one a 6:30 p.m. flight on Egyptair, the other a 9:55 p.m. flight on Delta Air Lines. What neither saw as he checked the departure board for his gate was that they were already surrounded. The terminals at John F. Kennedy International Airport were swarming with FBI agents and other members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, all dressed casually as travelers. "If one of them went to the bathroom, they were followed," said one official who was briefed on the take-down but was not authorized to speak publicly. "At no point were they not being watched. They could have been arrested at any point." U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman has said little of the investigation. "Their intentions were described pretty clearly," he told reporters last week after the two men were arraigned. "They were watching certain videos and interested in what certain people were saying and advocating." The FBI would not talk directly about the case. The New York Police Department declined comment. Mohamed Alessa, an alleged jihadist from North Bergen, tailed by authorities for years. But a week after the high-profile arrests — which raised new fears nationally of home-grown terror — interviews with more than a dozen people in law enforcement and investigative agencies reveal that the arrests of Alessa and Almonte were the result of a secret, tightly run operation of military precision that could end only at the airport. No one could be arrested until he first tried to try to board a flight for the Middle East and then make their way to Africa, clearly signaling he had intent to kill and maim as part of a holy war against America. The investigation, according to the sources, into the two alleged Jersey jihadists began nearly four years ago after the FBI received a tip on its website in October 2006: "Every time they access the internet, all they look for is all those terrorist videos about the Islam holly war and where they kill U.S. soldiers and other terrible things ... They keep saying that Americans are their enemies, that everybody other than Islamic followers are their enemies, and they all must be killed." At first, investigators were willing to dismiss Almonte and Alessa as a couple of angry young men well within their right of free speech to criticize America and adore the likes of Osama bin Laden. Alessa, 20, who holds dual U.S.-Jordanian citizenship, lived in North Bergen and had a troubled youth, going from school to school, according to one school official. Almonte, 24, of Elmwood Park was born in the Dominican Republic and grew up as a Catholic, converting several years ago to Islam against the wishes of his father. Carlos Almonte, accused of terroristic activity. Through 2006 and into 2007, there was a serious debate inside the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New Jersey, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security & Preparedness about the seriousness of the threat posed by the two young men, according to those interviewed for this story. Then investigators learned Alessa and Almonte had both traveled to Jordan in February 2007. "We were trying to figure out was it serious or was it just rhetoric. Some of us were saying they thought these guys were just talk. But they had already taken a trip," said one law enforcement source. "We heard about that after the fact. That was what really got the Bureau’s attention." It’s not known why the two men came back from Jordan. ‘TOUGH CALL’ A subsequent search of Almonte’s computer hard drive revealed documents authored by bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri, bin Laden’s chief deputy, the sources said. All of it was enough to mobilize a full national security investigation, as the Joint Terrorism Task Force decided the pair were not simply a couple of angry guys saying nasty things, according to the sources. It is an issue constantly being wrestled, especially when dealing with U.S. citizens, said Michael B. Ward, who heads the FBI’s Newark Division. He would not talk about the case, but he noted that even the heated rhetoric of hate remains protected as free speech until it moves from "aspirational" to actually doing something about it. "It’s a very tough call," Ward said. "We can’t monitor people ad infinitum." The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force is a unit that includes members of federal, state and local enforcement agencies, working cooperatively to counter terror threats. Inside the classified confines of the JTTF and Justice Department national security division, the case of Alessa and Almonte became a very active, well-known file known as Operation Arabian Knight. That name came from Alessa’s own computer records, in which, agents found, he had referred to himself and Almonte as "Arabian knights." According to those with inside knowledge of the case, there were increasing concerns that the two men’s behavior carried the potential for action that made them dangerous to Americans at home and abroad. Alessa and Almonte became the subjects of physical surveillance, approved by the secretive U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. They were tailed and photographed. Their phones were tapped and their computer activity was monitored. Their bank records were pulled and examined, sources say. Unlike typical wiretap orders that run on 90-day cycles, the secret, national-security search warrants and surveillance orders do not have predetermined time limits. But the warrants cannot be indefinite, so it is likely the U.S. Attorney’s Office went back to the secretive court to provide updates on the case and secure extensions. ENTER THE AGENT Ultimately, a decision was made to send in an undercover agent, the sources said. The JTTF has the resources of each of its member agencies. A rookie New York Police Department patrolman, who is of Egyptian descent and speaks Arabic, was enlisted for the job. He had been groomed as an undercover operative through a little-known NYPD counterterrorism program. Posing as a devout Muslim, the officer met the two men from New Jersey in 2009, winning their trust, authorities said. An incident in May 2009, not made public, reinforced the belief they were dangerous. Based on intelligence believed to have been gathered by the undercover operative, police with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey were alerted that the two were traveling in Almonte’s car through the Lincoln Tunnel to go into Manhattan to "disrupt" the annual Salute to Israel Day Parade. The pair were not armed but were dressed in "Muslim garb," said a source who recalled the incident. The Port Authority cops spotted the car and pulled it out of traffic. Almonte was apprehended for an outstanding warrant for assault in Elmwood Park. They missed the parade. Conversations, recorded by a surveillance wire, were stark as the two talked of jihad with their new friend. In November 2009, Alessa was heard talking to Almonte and the undercover officer. "A lot of people need to get killed, bro. Swear to God. I have to get an assault rifle and just kill anyone that even looks at me the wrong way, bro," he said, according to transcripts included in the criminal complaint. "My soul cannot rest until I shed blood. I wanna, like, be the world’s known terrorist. I swear to God." They would go to the undercover officer’s professed home in Jersey City and practice hand-to-hand combat. They joined a gym in North Bergen and lifted weights together. And in January, they talked about buying tickets to fly to Egypt. "Round-trip or one-way?" asked Alessa. "Round-trip," said Almonte. One-way trips to the Middle East were sure to attract unwanted attention. "Don’t risk it, bro." "That’s like 600 more," Alessa complained of the price. Doesn’t matter, Almonte said. "It’s enough of a risk trying to fly out of here." SUSPENDING THE RULES When they started planning and plotting for trips to Somalia, investigators immediately knew about it. According to surveillance recordings, Alessa and Almonte spoke about joining al Shabaab, a militant Islamic organization controlling much of southern Somalia. In one conversation included in the criminal complaint filed against the men, Almonte spoke of the various groups operating in Somalia, including al Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, another rebel group, and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama, a government-allied militia. "But Shabaab is the main one, yanni (you know). The main thing," he told the undercover officer. "It has to be them." Both men were on the restricted list at the State Department, meaning that if they tried applying for a passport, they would be red-flagged. And one of them had an expired passport. So the Joint Terrorism Task Force arranged behind the scenes for the restrictions to be suspended, to allow that suspect to obtain a new passport. Both were also on the no-fly list maintained by the Transportation Security Administration, which would have prevented either from buying a ticket or getting a boarding pass. Investigators said when the two men went to buy tickets to Egypt, the TSA took them off the no-fly list for one day only, to allow the transaction. On March 20, they bought two round-trip tickets on a credit card. The week before the arrests, authorities got ready to bring down the operation. There was a series of planning meetings, culminating in a lengthy all-hands-on session Friday, June 4, at the FBI in Newark, according to the sources. The prior day, the Port Authority had been brought into the mix. The FBI wanted full schematics, layouts, security camera locations for John F. Kennedy International Airport. A dozen takedown scenarios were discussed: arresting the men at the metal detectors; telling them they needed to go to a separate room for a "secondary" check; possibly pulling over the men as they walked from security to the gate. Planners wanted to make sure that potential onlookers wouldn’t see the arrests. They were very concerned that the sight of bearded. dark-skinned men being cuffed and rushed through the airport would cause a panic. It was decided the quietest, smallest place for each takedown would be at the end of the jetway, by the emergency door, according to the sources. Cars would be brought below the enclosed walkway to the plane to wait. Throughout the day of Saturday, June 5, the men were followed. At their homes, in transit to Queens, at the airport. All over the airport, agents dressed as travelers were eyeballing them. At the same time, dozens of agents readied themselves to raid the Alessa and Almonte homes as soon as the two men had been taken into custody. More than two hours before the arrests, the JTTF teams gathered near the two homes so they would be ready at a moment’s notice. The men had decided between themselves to take separate flights. It was strategic, said a source with knowledge of the case. They thought they would be less conspicuous. There was no evidence that they were being directed by any terror groups or that anybody else was involved. THE SCUFFLE The plane scheduled to depart first was Egyptair Flight 986, out of Terminal 4. Carrying a United Airlines code share, the Boeing 777 was due to leave the gate at 6:30. It was delayed more than an hour and a half because of weather. Then the passengers were called to begin the boarding. Agents watched as Alessa headed for the gate. He had already gone through the security checkpoint lines. As he walked along the passageway from the gate to the plane, the passengers behind him were briefly held up. Out of sight of those already on the plane and those waiting to board, he was confronted by burly federal agents, according to sources. He immediately put up a fight and was shoved into a wall of the jetway, leaving an angry red welt on his left temple and cuts on his face as he was finally cuffed and hustled down the stairs outside. Boarding continued as a line of security cars drove away unseen. Then came the wait for Almonte. His plane out of Terminal 3 at JFK, Delta Flight 84 to Egypt — a Boeing 767 also flying as KLM 9133 — was not due to leave until 9:55 p.m. It, too, had been delayed because of the weather, and it wasn’t until about an hour later that Almonte headed toward Gate 8. The same routine followed, as he walked down the jetway and found agents waiting for him. A team of law enforcement personnel was waiting in North Bergen, in the parking lot of a Home Depot. FBI agents, NYPD officers and others sat in their cars. A few, wearing their FBI windbreakers, walked across the street to the Dunkin’ Donuts for coffee. Within seconds of Almonte’s arrest, they got the signal from their command center. The convoy of cars at Home Depot roared into action, speeding toward the street where Alessa lived. The last car in line stopped at the foot of the street, dropped a couple of traffic cones to block off entrance, and then sped down the road. A similar scene took place in Elmwood Park. Teams of agents descended on the homes of both men, windows lighting up as they searched and took out boxes of evidence. ‘TEXTBOOK’ The dean of Rutgers Law School in Newark, John Farmer Jr., who was senior counsel to the 9/11 commission, said the takedown and investigation were "textbook. This is how you want it to be done." "The dilemma in all these cases is how far do you go with letting them plan. You can’t afford for the crime to happen or the event to happen because people can get killed, but you want to let them go far enough to show an intent. That’s what makes these investigations hard." Three days ago, both men were denied bail in a courtroom filled with FBI agents and others tied to the case. One of those not there was a detective with the state Homeland Security office. The officer, who was 31 when he died in July, had shepherded the case from the start. His handcuffs were used to apprehend Alessa. By Ted Sherman/The Star-Ledger and Josh Margolin/Statehouse Bureau Staff