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A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - David Guyatt - 17-08-2016 Magda Hassan Wrote:Beijing and Damascus have agreed that the Chinese military will provide humanitarian aid to Syria, a high-ranking People's Liberation Army officer said, adding that the training of Syrian personnel by Chinese instructors has also been discussed. I wonder if this is in response to those Neocons who were lining up to tell Hillary to bomb Syrian targets with stand-off weapons when she becomes president? It will make it harder to do that if Chinese military trainers and aid suppliers are embedded in the country along with the Russians too. A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - Magda Hassan - 17-08-2016 David Guyatt Wrote:Magda Hassan Wrote:Beijing and Damascus have agreed that the Chinese military will provide humanitarian aid to Syria, a high-ranking People's Liberation Army officer said, adding that the training of Syrian personnel by Chinese instructors has also been discussed. It will certainly throw a spanner in their works. I was listening to the radio today and heard that the US is 'disappointed' that Russia is using the Iranian bases to launch their anti ISIS air raids. Now why would any one be 'disappointed' in that? A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - Tobias Zackrisson - 17-08-2016 Interesting Analysis made by Hate speech International [QUOTE] Jabhat Fateh al-Sham's income and resources [FONT=&]august 15, 2016 0[/FONT] ANALYSIS / OPEN-SOURCE INVESTIGATION The jihadist fighters of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in Syria get their money and arms from taxation, tariffs, spoils of war, ransom, donations, oil trading, looting, asset seizure, sieges and smuggling. By Christiaan Triebert and Rao Kumar Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Arabic: جبهة ÙØªØ Ø§Ù„Ø´Ø§Ù…; literally "The Front for the Conquest of the Levant", abbreviated as "JFS") is a Sunni Islamist militia fighting in Syria. Some believe the group could become more of a threat to the security of Syria than the so-called Islamic State (IS), since JFS "has established an expansive network of partnerships with local opposition groups that have grown either dependent on or fiercely loyal to the organization"1 and, most recently, its important role in breaking the siege of Aleppo.2 Formerly known as al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria Jabhat al-Nusra, the group renamed itself to JFS and claimed it cut international ties. However, the United States (US) continues to consider the group as a foreign terrorist organisation, and continues to be bombed by especially Syrian and Russian warplanes. [FONT=&]Overview of territorial control in Syria as of early August 2016. Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (blue) holds large parts of Idlib, as well as small parts in the Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Rural Damascus and Dara'a provinces.[/FONT]
Taxation, tariffs and fines JFS has control of most of the Idlib province, including the city of Idlib, though it works alongside other rebel groups in the region. The organization also holds territory in the western Aleppo province, and some places in the Hama, Homs, and Dara'a provinces. In the city of Aleppo, JFS has small-scale presence in the Bustan al-Qasr, al-Shaar, al-Mallah, Hreitan, and Handarat areas.4 [FONT=&]Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (blue) had control of most of the Idlib province as of early August 2016, including the capital Idlib, though the organization works alongside other rebel groups in the region[/FONT]
Like IS, JFS governs parts of the territory it controls and has a sophisticated administrative structure. It establishes Islamic courts and carries out public works and civil services. With territorial control also comes the ability to tax and fine locals. JFS imposes a number of taxes on the citizens that live under its rule, including income and business taxes, as well as utility and services taxes. An example is the JFS's taxation of water. Beneficiaries of a water dam close to the town of Darkush in the Idlib province have to pay 3,000 Syrian pounds per dunum (a unit of area) over the course of 2016, according to a specimen obtained by Jabhat Nusra Violations (JNV), a clandestine group documenting daily life in JFS-controlled territory. That amount is equivalent to about 12.50 euros per 1,000 square metres at the official exchange rate (the actual exchange rate might be different). The dam beneficiaries are most likely to be farmers that use the water to irrigate their lands. The tax is paid in two instalments: in 2016 the breakdown is 2,000 Syrian pounds per dunum starting from April and a second instalment of 1,000 Syrian pound per dunum due in July. Inquiries can be directed to (JFS's) irrigation office in Darkush. Pro-government sources claim that under the authority of the Syrian government water from the dam for irrigation could be used free of charge.5 [FONT=&]At left, a document announcing that beneficiaries of the dam need to pay a 3,000 Syrian pound tax. At right, a rental contract. Both images were published by JNV.[/FONT]
A reporter for the Step New Agency has told Hate Speech International (HSI) that JFS's most stable tax income is what it receives for electricity provided by generators. Some of the JFS tax and tariff income is given back to local communities, for example in the form of food distribution and electricity. These governing practices have fostered a sense of dependency on JFS. In addition, the security JFS provides to local communities has gained it a measure of respect from residents, as was demonstrated in citizen protests that followed the US designation of JFS as a terrorist organization in 2012.7 Such tributes notwithstanding, local residents regularly mount protests against JFS's governing practices, to which men allegedly affiliated with JFS have responded with heavy fire, causing several deaths and injured among the protesters.8 Import tariffs With the collapse of state services and institutions, commerce and trade in JFS-held territories has fallen under the management of a complex network of Sharia courts, businesses, smugglers and JFS itself. A key source of JFS's funding is import tariffs' on goods that enter JFS-held territory. While a traditional tariff would be paid in cash or cash equivalents, JFS often takes a percentage of the tariffed goods instead. Exactly how much JFS collects from such import tariffs is not available due to a lack of standardisation and documentation. Some data on the tariff JFS levies on arms and ammunition passing through JFS held territory is available, however. This "arms tariff" is particularly important as it provides JFS with a regular source of the arms and weaponry it needs to sustain operations. [TABLE="width: 830"] [TR] [TD="width: 830, colspan: 6"]JFS arms tariffs (Northern Syria)[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 130"]Location[/TD] [TD="width: 110"]Province[/TD] [TD="width: 159"]Month/Year[/TD] [TD="width: 81"]Tariff %[/TD] [TD="width: 146"]Tariffed Group[/TD] [TD="width: 204"]Tariff Reason[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 130"]Azaz9[/TD] [TD="width: 110"]Aleppo[/TD] [TD="width: 159"]9/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 81"]25%[/TD] [TD="width: 146"]Division 30 FSA[/TD] [TD="width: 204"]To secure safe passage into Syria for Div. 30[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 130"]Northern Syria[/TD] [TD="width: 110"]Idlib/Aleppo/ Latakia[/TD] [TD="width: 159"]3/2016[/TD] [TD="width: 81"]≤50%10[/TD] [TD="width: 146"]Unspecified FSA[/TD] [TD="width: 204"]Allow equipment/weapons to pass into Syria[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] As part of its arms tariff JFS appears to take up to half of the foreign-supplied weapons sent to the FSA in Northern Syria. Arms tariffs thus seem to be a significant source of supplies and funding for JFS. Furthermore, US and other foreign support for FSA can indirectly result in ammunition and materials for JFS. However, it is important to note that JFS's ability to enact arms tariffs is partially due to its strength in Idlib, Aleppo and Latakia governorates; in areas where JFS is weaker (such as Daraa, Homs, and Rif Dimashq governorate) the JFS "arms tariff" may not be as significant of a funding source. JFS's tariff system extends beyond arms and ammunition. The group places import tariffs on a variety of standard goods, including construction equipment, building materials, food and fuel. Key goods, such as gasoline and diesel fuel that are important to JFS operations, are likely tariffed at a higher rate. Specific figures on these tariffs are unavailable, but they are certainly a significant factor, as JFS appears to have a documentation system for its tariffs of standard goods. JFS has a special transit office which hands out passage permits for civilian vehicles. The office falls under the organization's general economic affairs, and is operated jointly with Ahrar al-Sham, a coalition of multiple Islamist and Salafist units which cooperate broadly with JFS. JNV has published a photo of an JFS/Ahrar al-Sham passage permit, which details the name of the specific good that is being transported, the number of units, and the weight. It also mentions the name of the driver, the car's colour and plate number, and suggests a careful search of the car. This specific permit says the vehicle should be handed off to another checkpoint, called "Um Harteen". [FONT=&]A permit for passage obtained by JNV allegedly showing import tariffs imposed by JFS and Ahrar al-Sham.11[/FONT]
[FONT=&]Specimen indicating the amounts, in Syrian pounds, to be paid for road and traffic violations. Via Aymenn al-[/FONT]
Another fine may be imposed for tapping into someone else's electricity line. As a punishment, the additional line will be removed and its owner fined "a minimum of [5,000] Syrian pounds in recompense for what he has committed".13 In all, taxation, tariffs, and fines provide a stable income for JFS, just as they do for IS. IS has benefitted as well from salaries still paid by the Iraqi and Syrian governments to civil servants working in IS-held areas.14 According to Step News Agency, the same applies to JFS in the territories it holds. "The salaries [are] still supported by [the] regime for those who were working as government employees before," one of the agency's reporters in the Idlib province told HSI, though some salaries have been cut to reduce government expenses. Hundreds of employees travel monthly or bimonthly to Hama, a city held by the regime, to pick up their salaries. But JFS and other rebel groups try to stop this, as they want to install their own administrative bodies. Spoils of war Spoils of war, or ghanima (Arabic: الْغَنيمَة), are a key source of supplies that allow JFS to conduct offensive operations. While JFS does seize ghanima from the largely Kurdish YPG as well as other rebel groups and IS, the amounts are small compared with the weapons, vehicles and equipment it seizes from the Syrian government. [FONT=&]Small arms captured by JFS near the Kurd Mountains. Photo published on an JFS Telegram channel on 15 April 2016.[/FONT]
Open-source estimation of ghanima JFS regularly releases video and photographs of major seizures of ghanima after battles. Using research by open-source analysts, an estimate can be made of the total amount of ghanima seized (and published) by rebels in certain battles and campaigns throughout mid-2015. JFS made up a plurality or majority of the rebel forces in these battles and campaigns. These numbers give a very rough estimate of the amount of ghanima seized by JFS. The actual amount of ghanima that JFS obtained in these battles is somewhat higher than the listed total, as not all ghanima is photographed or documented. [TABLE="width: 886"] [TR] [TD="width: 886, colspan: 8"]Selected rebel vehicle seizures (2015)15[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 119"]Location[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]Date[/TD] [TD="width: 73"]Tanks[/TD] [TD="width: 111"]IFVs/APCs[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]Self-propelled guns16[/TD] [TD="width: 119"]"Technicals"17[/TD] [TD="width: 109"]Bulldozers[/TD] [TD="width: 99"]Military Transport[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 119"]Abu al-Duhur Air Base18,19[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]9/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 73"]2[/TD] [TD="width: 111"]3[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]1[/TD] [TD="width: 119"]Unknown[/TD] [TD="width: 109"]Several[/TD] [TD="width: 99"]Dozens[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 119"]Frikka20[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]7/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 73"]0[/TD] [TD="width: 111"]1[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]0[/TD] [TD="width: 119"]3[/TD] [TD="width: 109"]2[/TD] [TD="width: 99"]0[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 119"]Buhsa21[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]8/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 73"]1[/TD] [TD="width: 111"]2[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]0[/TD] [TD="width: 119"]2[/TD] [TD="width: 109"]0[/TD] [TD="width: 99"]0[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 119"]Idlib Salient22[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]4/20156/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 73"]33[/TD] [TD="width: 111"]55+23[/TD] [TD="width: 129"]6[/TD] [TD="width: 119"]25+[/TD] [TD="width: 109"]Unknown[/TD] [TD="width: 99"]15+[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] JFS would not be able to function as effectively as it does without armoured vehicles. Tanks allow the group to shatter enemy frontlines. Infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) act as moving cover for rebels, allowing them to rapidly advance under fire. Civilian trucks and other vehicles, too, are extremely useful for JFS as they can be converted into vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) and used with great effect to shatter enemy morale and cause a rout. For instance, the 2016 South Aleppo offensive saw the effective use of multiple SVBIEDs, leading to rebel gains despite heavy Russian airstrikes. The second battle of Idlib in 2015 saw the use of multiple coordinated SVBIEDs to destroy large government defensive fortifications, leading to the fall of Idlib to the JFS-dominated Jaish al-Fatah rebel coalition. While further discussion of JFS tactics is not within the scope of this project, it is clear that vehicle ghanima (largely seized from the Syrian government and its allies) plays a major role in the group's combat operations. Arms and ammunition are two other major categories of ghanima that must be covered. [TABLE="width: 815"] [TR] [TD="width: 815, colspan: 6"]Selected rebel small arms/light weapons/artillery seizures (2015)[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 121"]Location[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]Date[/TD] [TD="width: 143"]Artillery/mortars[/TD] [TD="width: 115"]Small arms[/TD] [TD="width: 164"]Anti-aircraft guns/HMGs[/TD] [TD="width: 138"]ATGMS[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 121"]Abu al-Duhur Air Base24,25[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]9/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 143"]4+[/TD] [TD="width: 115"]Unknown[/TD] [TD="width: 164"]4-5+[/TD] [TD="width: 138"]Unknown[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 121"]Frikka26[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]7/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 143"]0[/TD] [TD="width: 115"]4757+[/TD] [TD="width: 164"]0[/TD] [TD="width: 138"]2[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 121"]Idlib Salient27[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]4/20156/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 143"]30+[/TD] [TD="width: 115"]1,250+[/TD] [TD="width: 164"]125+[/TD] [TD="width: 138"]10[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] In the category of small arms, light weapons and artillery, we can see that ghanima remains a key source for JFS operations and funding. Accurate small-arms figures are hard to obtain as small arms are often taken from dead enemy fighters and not photographed. The number of captured small arms listed here is therefore drastically understated. The other figures tend to be more accurate; the counts for captured anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are considered a fairly accurate estimate. ATGMs are used by JFS to destroy tanks and other enemy vehicles. Ammunition is the final category of ghanima examined in this article. [TABLE="width: 845"] [TR] [TD="width: 845, colspan: 6"]Selected rebel ammunition seizures (2015)[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 125"]Location[/TD] [TD="width: 136"]Date[/TD] [TD="width: 113"]Small arms ammo28[/TD] [TD="width: 170"]Large-caliber ammo and rockets[/TD] [TD="width: 171"]Artillery, mortar and tank ammo[/TD] [TD="width: 130"]ATGM missiles[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 125"]Abu al-Duhur Air Base[/TD] [TD="width: 136"]9/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 113"]40,00050,000[/TD] [TD="width: 170"]Unknown[/TD] [TD="width: 171"]3+[/TD] [TD="width: 130"]12+[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 125"]Frikka[/TD] [TD="width: 136"]7/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 113"]15,00025,000[/TD] [TD="width: 170"]100150+[/TD] [TD="width: 171"]0[/TD] [TD="width: 130"]9[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 125"]Idlib Salient[/TD] [TD="width: 136"]4/2015-6/2015[/TD] [TD="width: 113"]8 million10 million[/TD] [TD="width: 170"]30,00040,000[/TD] [TD="width: 171"]10,00020,000[/TD] [TD="width: 130"]40+[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] These ammunition captures are very rough estimates, and the imprecision should be taken into account in analysis. JFS cannot sustain its offensives without capturing large amounts of ammunition, since it is not easy to buy millions of rounds of ammunition on the black market. While not listed in the total counts due to lack of data, captures of air-defence systems from the Syrian government have been a major factor in neutralizing the Syrian government's air force. Ghanima is the fuel on which JFS runs; without it JFS is nowhere nearly as effective. Ghanima and the black market While JFS uses ghanima first and foremost to carry out its operations, it is also a funding source. Throughout Syria there are large black markets where rebel groups can trade and sell unneeded ghanima for cash. Damaged equipment can also be sold to parties who are able to repair it or repurpose it into IEDs or other improvised weapons.29 [FONT=&]PG-7 RPG rounds for sale at $800 apiece in a Syrian black market in May 2016.30[/FONT]
[FONT=&]A 9M131 missile for the 9K115 Metis ATGM on sale in a Syrian black market in February 2016. Price: $4,300.33[/FONT]
[FONT=&]A Russian-made T-55 armed modular vehicle (AMV) for sale in the Syrian black market for $170,000 in April 2016.34[/FONT]
Kidnappings of civilians and, on some occasions, military personnel for ransom have been a significant source of income for JFS. The group has been involved in several high-profile hostage cases, especially between 2012 and 2015. [FONT=&]Screenshot from an JFS video of Fijian UN peacekeepers held hostage. A ransom of $20 million to $25 million was allegedly paid for their freedom, though the UN denies it.[/FONT]
In most cases, countries and organizations will deny that ransom has been paid in exchange of someone's freedom. Relatives of Peter Theo Curtis, an American journalist freed after almost two years in JFS captivity, were not briefed on the terms of his release. Qatar State Security, the intelligence agency that mediated Curtis's release, told journalists that no payment was made, although JFS had demanded over $24 million.36 [TABLE="width: 752"] [TR] [TD="width: 752, colspan: 5"]Reported ransom payments to JFS[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 151"]Who[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]Ransom (in million $)[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]Kidnap location[/TD] [TD="width: 165"]Date[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]Negotiated[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 151"]Peter Theo Curtis (journalist)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]32537[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]Northern Aleppo province[/TD] [TD="width: 165"]2012 (kidnapped); 08/2014 (freed)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]Qatar State Security[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 151"]13 Greek Orthodox nuns[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]438[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]Ma'loula[/TD] [TD="width: 165"]12/2013 (kidnapped);03/2014 (freed)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]Qatar, paid by Syria[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 151"]Vanessa Marzullo, Greta Ramelli (aid workers)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]11391240[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]Near Aleppo[/TD] [TD="width: 165"]08/2014 (kidnapped); 01/2015 (freed)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]X[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 151"]45 Fijian UN peacekeepers[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]20412542[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]Golan[/TD] [TD="width: 165"]08/2014 (kidnapped);09/2014 (freed)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]Qatar[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD="width: 151"]Jose Manuel Lopez, Angel Sastre, Antonio Pampliega (journalists)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]7438.844[/TD] [TD="width: 135"]Northern Aleppo province[/TD] [TD="width: 165"]07/2015 (kidnapped); 05/2016 (freed)[/TD] [TD="width: 151"]X[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [/TR] [/TABLE] Not all hostages have been lucky enough to be ransomed. In the course of 2014, JFS killed four Lebanese soldiers it had taken hostage after the Lebanese government did not respond to JFS's request to withdraw Hezbollah from Syria. Although ransom payments for hostages do not provide JFS with a stable income, opportunistic kidnappings do raise millions of dollars for the organization. It is a "big financial source", JNV told HSI. Open-source information confirms that hostages for ransom are an effective and lucrative business, accounting for millions of dollars a year to JFS. International donations Designated terrorist organizations often enjoy a stream of donations from supporters around the world, and JFS is no exception. Donations can take the form of small amounts from local communities or much larger sums. According to the Treasury of the UK, private donations "from the Gulf are a vital funding stream for [al-Qaeda] affiliated groups". An obstacle to open-source tracing of donations is the informal value transfer system known as hawala (Arabic: ØÙوالة‎‎). This system uses intermediaries and brokers to maintain plausible deniability. Once money is donated, it can be passed on to a network of facilitators who deliver the money to JFS without suspicion. This can be done through small money transfers for which no identification documents are needed, or by a person who brings the cash across the border. However, there have been instances of private businessmen from the Gulf raising funds for JFS publicly. Qatari connections to JFS have become clear in many hostage negotiations. Some Qatari negotiators have also been named by the US Treasury as major JFS fundraisers. Money is often raised through social media, where fundraisers abuse charity and humanitarian causes or organizations. In one such case, Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi of Qatar was designated a terrorism financier by the US in August 2015, and had previously played a role in facilitating a hostage ransom payment.45 [FONT=&]A digital flyer for Madid Ahl al-Sham, an online fundraising platform for al-Qaeda.[/FONT]
US officials believe that Qatar is increasing its efforts to shut down terrorist fundraising networks, though a closer examination by David A. Weinberg in The Long War Journal portrayed Qatar as rather negligent on terror finance: neither al-Kawari nor al-Ka'bi had been arrested near the end of 2015.47 Parts of the Turkish government have also been accused of financially and materially supporting JFS. In 2014, a convoy of three trucks directed by Turkey's MIT intelligence service, supposedly delivering humanitarian aid to Syria, were stopped by Turkish police. Inside the vehicles the police found 935 mortar shells, and confidential gendarmerie documents published on Twitter said that the shipment had been ordered by then-Prime Minister ErdoÄŸan, according to The Daily Beast.48Two similar incidents occurred in January 2015, when humanitarian convoys destined for Syria were stopped. In one case, ammunition was found, while in the other the police were prevented from searching the vehicle.49 A UN document confirmed that arm supplies to JFS had indeed crossed the Turkish border, but it did not state any Turkish government involvement.50 Oil Oil used to be an important source of income for JFS, as the group occupied oil fields around the Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor. But in mid-2014, ideological and tactical differences increased between JFS and IS, with the latter driving JFS and a number of allied groups out of its key strongholds in the oil-rich Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria.51 IS thus gained control over the various oil fields and JFS lost an important source of income. Nevertheless, JFS and its allies retain control over several mobile oil refineries and oil markets in Idlib province, near Jisr ash-Shugur and Saraqeb.52 The organization is thus able to generate income from oil. According to research by the Financial Times, two types of fuel are sold in the areas JFS controls: "pricier fuel refined in [IS] areas, and cheaper locally refined fuel". Locals often buy a mix of both, using the better quality for their vehicles and the cheaper variety for generators. Oil-related facilities and smuggling routes linked to JFS have been struck by the Russian Air Force. These strikes began intensifying on 20 May 2016, according to a news briefing from the Russian Armed Forces. Prices of oil and diesel in rebel-held areas have doubled since the air strikes began, according to Financial Times. One effect of higher transport costs has been a rise in food prices. Looting and asset seizure [FONT=&]Screenshot from a recent video released by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, showing fighting in Ramouseh, Aleppo.[/FONT]
It is important to make a distinction between looting and asset seizure for the purpose of this article. "Looting" will refer to cases in which JFS fighters take assets from civilians and other non-combatants without official authorization from JFS leadership. "Asset seizure" refers to when JFS takes assets from civilians with official authorisation from JFS leadership. Looting by JFS fighters has been documented on several occasions. For instance, when the Nasib border crossing in Daraa province fell to rebel hands in April 2015, JFS fighters and other rebels were spotted carrying off goods seized from civilian-driven trucks.53 It is unclear if the goods looted were used by the organization or by JFS fighters. Both asset seizure and looting often have a sectarian aspect, with JFS targeting minority religious groups. In Idlib, for example, an JFS commander attempted to seize a house from a Druze civilian,54 resulting in the massacre of Druze civilians and the seizure of goods from the house in question. While JFS later condemned the attack, it had had the approval of a commander within the organization at the time.55 While other funding sources may be more important to JFS than looting and asset seizure, the looting across JFS-held territory appears systemic. Even if such activities are not fully approved, repetitive incidents suggest that the group's leadership tolerates them when it targets minority religious groups. Sieges and smuggling The war in Syria differs from other recent conflicts in part because of the many sieges that have occurred. One reason besieged urban areas have been able to hold out against foes is the poor quality of forces that operate in Syria. Corruption is rampant on all sides, and sieges are rarely airtight.56 The smuggling of food, ammunition and goods into besieged areas is often both a necessity for the groups and civilians under siege and a way for corrupt besieging units to make extra cash. When under siege in areas with a significant civilian population, JFS is able to smuggle in basic necessities and sell them to the civilian population. For instance, the group dug tunnels from the besieged East Ghouta area to the Barzeh and Qaboun areas of Damascus.57 This allowed it to sell basic necessities to civilians in the area, providing some funding for the group. Even when tunnels are not built, JFS is able to employ smugglers who bring food and other goods that can be sold to local civilians. This type of "siege smuggling" is only possible in areas where JFS is under siege. The majority of these areas are in Rif Dimashq governorate or in Damascus governorate (i.e. E. Ghouta or the Yarmouk Camp). The rebels in northern Syria are much stronger than those in southern Syria. Thus in northern Syria, JFS fighters can raise funds by selling goods in government-held pockets under siege. In Idlib governorate the government-held towns of Fu'ah and Kafriya have been under rebel siege since the Second Battle of Idlib in 2015. While a recent truce between the Syrian government and the rebels has allowed the entry of aid to the besieged pocket, corrupt JFS fighters are able to profit by selling goods there.58 This funding source is not significant compared to the money JFS makes from smuggling into pockets besieged by the Syrian government, but that is mostly because there are more besieged rebel pockets across Syria. [FONT=&]Historical artefacts have also been "claimed" by spraying graffiti on them, declaring JFS to be the "heroes of Muslims", according to JNV.[/FONT]
Conclusion Among the litany of rebel groups in Syria, JFS stands out for its size, effectiveness and degree of organization. Its ability to finance its operations is a major factor in allowing the group to dominate the field in rebel-held territories in northern Syria. Funding also allows JFS to govern and provide services to civilians, enhancing the group's legitimacy among the population, although many locals have protested fiercely. While much of the organization's income and resources initially came from foreign donors, JFS increasingly relies on funding sources more typical of a government. Taxes, tariffs and fines are typically levied by governments, but are key in JFS's overall funding structure. Unlike most governments, JFS also relies heavily on spoils of war, hostage ransoms and smuggling to fund itself. Looting and asset seizure are also significant funding sources, though both are more typical of a militia than of a group seeking to replace the Syrian government. JFS's diverse funding sources highlight the complex and contradictory nature of JFS itself. It is an armed Islamist group seeking to form an Islamic proto-state or "emirate" in Syria. JFS provides state-like services to the population, but like a typical militia it relies on capturing supplies in battle to fund its operations. JFS is essentially a non-state actor and proto-state that aspires to statehood. The group's complex funding network shows just one facet of the slow and complicated rise of an JFS proto-state in northern Syria. While this growing proto-state may not enjoy the glamour of the IS "caliphate", it is a clearly a rising threat to international security. Indeed, JFS will remain a major player in the Syrian civil war and in the global war on terror for the foreseeable future. Footnotes:
A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - David Guyatt - 17-08-2016 Jabhat Fateh al-Sham is Al-Nusra rebranded. It used to be Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda in Syria, and also al-Qaeda in the Levant (HERE). The US has designated it a terrorist outfit. But hey, don;t let little things lime that stop them becoming a moderate opposition group as far as the US is concerned (HERE). Al-Qaeda has always been an American tool, as admitted (most unusually) by former British foreign secretary Robin Cook on the day after 7/7, the UK's worst terrorist event. Cook, who soon after (less than a month, in fact) suffered a heart attack on a Scottish mountain whilst walking ------- and came over all dead (see HERE and HERE). Anyone who believes that relationship ended after the Russians left Afghanistan (which is the accepted limited hangout) need only conduct some Google research on the role played by al-Qaeda with the drug-smuggling Kosovo Liberation Army that was backed by the US and CIA during the designer break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Especially the way the US flew in al-Qaeda soldiers from Afghanistan to Kosovo to aid in the fighting there. Or read HERE. Different name but the same old US war beast.... A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - David Guyatt - 17-08-2016 Magda Hassan Wrote:David Guyatt Wrote:Magda Hassan Wrote:Beijing and Damascus have agreed that the Chinese military will provide humanitarian aid to Syria, a high-ranking People's Liberation Army officer said, adding that the training of Syrian personnel by Chinese instructors has also been discussed. It just occurred to me that when Hillary gets herself settled in Pennsylvania Avenue she'll be sitting at husband Bill's favourite blowjob and relaxation desk... ::hush:: A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - David Guyatt - 02-09-2016 Quote:Source A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - David Guyatt - 06-09-2016 Quote: September 05, 2016Source A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - David Guyatt - 06-09-2016 Quote:Source A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - Drew Phipps - 06-09-2016 So, the short version of those two posts is that Jordan is arming the "green" Syrian rebels nearest its borders; and, Putin's "masterstroke" means that Turkey is now able to rearm and equip its Daesh buddies without prying eyes... I am also supposing that means that Erdogan and his family will once again be able to profit from oil trades from Daesh- controlled territory. But I don't really understand how allowing Turkey and Daesh to do business away from "prying eyes" helps Russia's ally, the embattled government of Syria? A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria - Drew Phipps - 10-09-2016 U.S., Russia clinch Syria deal, aim for truce from Monday http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kerry-idUSKCN11F0HC |