24-11-2008, 08:05 PM
From Our Washington Correspondent, “Drawing the Teeth of the C.I.A.,” The Times, Wednesday, 20 December 1961, p.11
Quote:The Central Intelligence Agency has moved into its large and handsome new headquarters on the other side of the Potomac river, suitably signposted for the convenience of visiting spies and curious reporters, and apparently with its clandestine powers little diminished. Its mysterious Mr. Bender, who is often said to have organised the Cuban invasion, is still employed, and the replacement of the former director, Mr. Allen Dulles, by Mr. John McCone, a chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the last Administration, is the only obvious price the agency has paid for the adventure it conceived and directed so disastrously.
Soon after the fiasco there were many demands that the agency be broken up, or at least reorganized, and the Congress is yet to have its last word. It is unlikely to be persuasive; the Defence Department has meanwhile combined the Service intelligence organization in one agency on the grounds of efficiency and economy, and the Administration is obviously in a mood to consolidate rather than sanction the creation of a number of small and perhaps conflicting civilian agencies. If the report of General Maxwell Taylor’s committee is accepted, however, responsibility for para-military operations will pass from the C.I.A. to the Defence Department, which already has a group somewhere in the Pentagon known as the department of dirty tricks.
PAST OPERATIONS
This is not an unimportant recommendation, although a second Cuban invasion is not at present contemplated. It is unlikely that the much-publicized special service troops of the Army will now be dropped over jungles and paddyfields to polish off communist conspirators, save the beautiful princess from a fate worse than death, and establish a local branch of the National Association of Manufacturers – although readers of the American press must be forgiven if they entertain such an enchanting notion. But it should mean that any hard-pressed country such as South Vietnam will in future deal with the departments of State and Defence, and not with a faceless intelligence agent.
The fact remains that para-military operations is a term difficult to define, and other cover operations will continue to be directed by the C.I.A. The memory of past operations conducted by the agency agitates many people. For instance, it has claimed credit for the ousting of Dr. Moussadek, the former Prime Minister of Iran, and for the coup d’état in Guatemala that got rid of the President, Dr. Arbenz, and made the country safe for the United Fruit Company.
Logistic support was provided for Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma, although they were pillaging large areas of a friendly country, and the disastrous counter-revolution in Laos against Prince Souvanna Phouma was engineered. It will perhaps no longer be in a position to direct raids against the Chinese mainland, as it did from the offshore islands, but some agents may believe that they can meddle in the political life of western European countries.
It can be seen why critics in and out of Congress are rather dissatisfied with what is known of plans for the agency’s future. The reappointment of Dr. James Killian as chairman of the President’s Board of Foreign Intelligence Consultants has not reassured them, if only because he occupied the post under General Eisenhower when the agency was notably free of control. Senator Eugene McCarthy has revived an earlier proposal that a congressional joint committee supervise its operations. This will almost certainly prove unacceptable, but it underlines the widespread apprehension here.
FEAR AND SUSPICION
Is it still justified? Part of the answer is provided by the brief catalogue above of the agency’s battle honours, but generally speaking the fears can be divided under two headings. First, there is the belief that it is wrongly organized, that it should not be responsible for both the gathering and evaluation of intelligence, especially overt political intelligence. This, the critics claim with some reason, should be the responsibility of the State Department. It is further believed that the agency should not undertake covert operations upon intelligence it has gathered and evaluated, and for objectives that the agency itself chooses to regard as important.
Under the second heading can be listed objections that are subjective to the extent that they rest upon suspicion fostered by previous activities. On the whole, it is believed that the agency, perhaps because of the stringent security regulations for its staff, is oriented too far to the right. Some people seem to regard it as an official John Birch Society.
The result, it is believed, is that its intelligence reports are unbalanced, and its covert operations designed to support right-wing and often dictatorial regimes overseas without considering the long-term political consequences. A prime example quoted is the Cuban adventure, when liberal elements were firmly excluded , and some indeed detained in a hidden camp until the invasion failed, and Batista supporters were encouraged.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
In spited of these well-documented stupidities, this belief must be treated with reserve, but the criticism combines in a general charge that the C.I.A. is free to influence foreign policy to a degree that no other western government would tolerate, and to involve the country in adventures both unnecessary and dangerous.
If due allowance is made for over-colourful reports of the agency’s activities, which it helped to circulate, and for the ignorance and apprehension that must surely surround any secret organization, enough it left to disturb the most sophisticated. Yet President Kennedy, who is determined to exercise his authority without departmental usurpation, does not seem over-agitated. He is furthermore cautious, his approach to foreign affairs is enlightened, and his liberal intentions, at least by American standards, have long been evident.
The President is also interested in history, and this perhaps explains why he considers the charges no longer well-founded. Certainly the short history of the agency should be viewed against the political background of the time.
The Central Intelligence Agency was established as the successor to the war-time Office of Strategic Services and the short-lived Central Intelligence Group. Under the National Security Act it was given the three functions of coordinating the work of other intelligence units; performing such other functions relating to the national security as the National Security Council may direct; and acting, through its director, as chief advisor and consultant on intelligence matters to the President and the National Security Council.
The definitions were vague, and some of its first recruits came from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which in the war years had been much involved in the tracking down of communist as well as German agents. A few of these men later became the bully boys of right-wing organizations. Mr. Allen Dulles had experience of intelligence work, but more significant he was the brother of the messianic Secretary of State, the late Mr. John Foster Dulles. They worked as a close-knit team to the exclusion of the Department of State and other government bodies involved in the making of foreign and defence policy, and under a complaisant President.
PRESIDENT’S RULE
They also worked together in an emotional atmosphere made more tense by witch hunts and the charges of treachery at home and abroad. Communism was improperly understood; the idea that a revolutionary party may in certain circumstances win a popular following was violently rejected. It was not surprising, also given the widespread ignorance of foreign affairs and intelligence work, and the suspicion of permanent foreign service officers, that the C.I.A. developed as it did – the private army of the Dulles brothers.
Today in Washington the situation is very different. President Kennedy is not only determined to rule, but is committed to strengthening the State Department. Communism remains the personification of evil, but it is better understood. Aid is furnished to under-developed countries, but they are urged to carry out land reform, adopt centralized economic planning, and introduce the income tax. At the administrative level, the National Security Council has been down-graded, and the task form system ensures that no policy is initiated without the President’s knowledge and reference to appropriate departments.
The old ogre known as the Central Intelligence Agency was in fact killed the moment President Kennedy’s administration began to function as he wanted it to function. For many Mr. McCone may remain an undesirable choice, the agency not as efficient as others, and much of its staff unsuitable. Only time will show and make improvements possible, but in the unlikely possibility that crew-cut cloak-and-dagger men are once again let loose on an unsuspecting world President Kennedy will be really responsible.