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Paul Rigby
10-16-2008, 07:59 AM
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10573

How the Nobel Peace Prize was Won

By Gregory Elich

Global Research, October 15, 2008

Counterpunch

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari has been widely hailed in the West, where there has been an outpouring of praise for the man and his efforts. Generally seen as a tireless promoter of peace and reconciliation, Ahtisaari has another side that has not received sufficient attention.

Although his record is long, Ahtisaari’s role in the diplomatic end to NATO’s 1999 war against Yugoslavia is regarded as the key to his selection. In praising the man, Nobel committee secretary Geir Lundestad noted, “There is no alternative to an independent Kosovo.” This baldly political statement indicates why Ahtisaari’s selection is proving so popular among Western leaders, and it is Kosovo that shows just whose interests Ahtisaari has served.

During the 1999 war, NATO’s attacks were having little effect on Yugoslav forces. Through the use of extensive camouflage and decoys, Yugoslav troops had managed to emerge largely unscathed by the end NATO’s bombing campaign. U.S. General Wesley Clark led the NATO campaign, and he pressed military and diplomatic contacts from other NATO countries for agreement to widen the scope of bombing. Clark was a strong advocate of bombing civilian targets, and at one meeting he rose from his chair and banged the table with his fist, bellowing, “I’ve got to get the maximum violence out of this campaign – now!” (1) Under Clark’s direction, the air campaign rapidly took on the character of sustained terror bombing. I saw the effects myself when I was in Yugoslavia in 1999. Every town I visited had been bombed. Purely residential areas had been flattened. Cluster bombs struck civilian areas. Hospitals, schools, apartment buildings, factories, bridges, office buildings – there was no category of civilian targets that NATO had not seen fit to hit. It was impossible to avoid the conclusion that NATO’s strategy was to win its war through terror tactics.

Terror bombing paved the way for final negotiations. It was Yugoslavia’s misfortune that Boris Yeltsin was the president of Russia at the time. He selected former prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin to handle negotiations with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Always anxious to please the U.S., Yeltsin had Chernomyrdin essentially do little more than deliver NATO’s messages to Milosevic. This approach was not yielding fruit, so Chernomyrdin suggested to American officials that it would be helpful to have someone from a non-NATO Western nation join him when he next visited Belgrade. It was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who offered the name of Martti Ahtisaari. Getting the Russians on board with the American insistence on NATO leading the occupation of Kosovo was the main sticking point. In the end, Yeltsin, as was his habit, gave the U.S. everything it wanted. (2)

Ahtisaari recalls that before departing for Belgrade, through “a major effort we achieved a final communiqué, signed by both the Russians and by the Americans.” Russian acquiescence, he correctly felt, would push Milosevic “in a corner.” It was the task of Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin to deliver NATO’s final terms, and they visited President Milosevic on June 2. (3)

Ljubisa Ristic was president of the Yugoslav United Left (JUL), a party formed from 23 smaller communist and left parties. JUL was closely allied with the ruling Socialist Party and a member of the governing coalition. Ristic was also a personal friend of Milosevic’s. He explains what happened at the June 2 meeting. Ahtisaari opened the meeting by declaring, “We are not here to discuss or negotiate,” after which Chernomyrdin read aloud the text of the plan. (4) Ahtisaari says that Milosevic asked about the possibility of modifying the plan, to which he replied, “No. This is the best that Viktor and I have managed to do. You have to agree to it in every part.” (5) Ristic reports that as Milosevic listened to the reading of the text, he realized that the “Russians and the Europeans had put us in the hands of the British and the Americans.” Milosevic took the papers and asked, “What will happen if I do not sign?” In answer, “Ahtisaari made a gesture on the table,” and then moved aside the flower centerpiece. Then Ahtisaari said, “Belgrade will be like this table. We will immediately begin carpet-bombing Belgrade.” Repeating the gesture of sweeping the table, Ahtisaari threatened, “This is what we will do to Belgrade.” A moment of silence passed, and then he added, “There will be half a million dead within a week.” Chernomyrdin’s silence confirmed that the Russian government would do nothing to discourage carpet-bombing. (6)

The meaning was clear. To refuse the ultimatum would lead to the deaths of large numbers of civilians and total devastation. President Milosevic summoned the leaders of the parties in the governing coalition and explained the situation to them. “A few things are not logical, but the main thing is, we have no choice. I personally think we should accept…To reject the document means the destruction of our state and nation.” (7) For Ristic, acceptance meant one thing: “We had to save the people.” (8) Three weeks after Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin delivered NATO’s ultimatum, Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatovich explained to both chambers of the Assembly why the government had accepted terms. “Our country was faced with a threat of total annihilation. Through diplomatic mediators and through the media, the aggressors spoke of the future targets to be bombed, including civilian victims counted in the hundreds of thousands.” (9)

It did not take NATO long to violate the peace agreement that Ahtisaari had delivered to Milosevic. While NATO dawdled over entering Kosovo, the secessionist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) went on a rampage, looting and burning homes, murdering and expelling thousands of Serbs, Roma, Turks, Slavic Muslims, Gorans, Egyptians, Croats and pro-Yugoslav Albanians. Milosevic was livid, and shortly after midnight on June 17, he phoned Ahtisaari and complained that NATO’s delay in entering Kosovo had allowed the KLA to threaten the population. “This is not what we agreed,” he said. (10) It hardly mattered. Once NATO troops entered Kosovo, they did nothing to deter KLA attacks against the populace. The KLA had unimpeded freedom to carry out a pogrom. That summer in Yugoslavia, I heard many refugees tell how attacks had taken place in the presence of NATO troops, who invariably did nothing. On numerous occasions people were thrown out of their homes, threatened, their possessions looted and homes burned while NATO soldiers stood aside and watched.

Ahtisaari’s mission was a success. He “was sensational,” said a senior U.S. official. Chernomyrdin won praise for remaining silent while Ahtisaari threatened Milosevic. “Chernomyrdin did great,” an appreciative U.S. official noted. (11)

The final agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO was spelled out in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which was implemented in a one-sided way. NATO got everything it wanted, but those aspects of the resolution not to its liking were never implemented. The required demilitarization of the KLA was a sham, with its members handing in obsolete weapons while retaining their arsenal. The resolution also called for the return of some Yugoslav forces to maintain “a presence at Serb patrimonial sites” and at “key border crossings,” as well as to liaise with international forces. NATO never permitted that. Most importantly, the resolution affirmed that the political process of arriving at an agreement on the status of Kosovo would take full account of the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Yugoslavia. (12) Instead, Western officials did everything possible to undermine that stipulation.

So pleased were Western leaders with Ahtisaari’s performance in 1999, that they called upon the man once again when it came time to negotiate a solution for the province of Kosovo. They saw to it that Ahtisaari was appointed as special envoy to the UN Secretary General to develop a set of recommendations for the final status of Kosovo.

U.S. officials were repeatedly promising secessionist Albanian officials in Kosovo that if negotiations with Serbian officials were to fail, then the province would be granted independence. This ensured that the Albanian delegation was unwilling to compromise or engage in serious negotiations. The Albanians’ maximal demands would be met as long as they could avoid a negotiated settlement. Ahtisaari’s role was to develop the plan for Kosovo’s final status that would be implemented if lieu of an agreement. In the end, secessionist Albanian leaders unilaterally declared independence, which was quickly followed by U.S. and Western European recognition. Yet much of Ahtisaari’s plan provided the basis for the agreement that was implemented between the province and the U.S.

Not surprisingly, Ahtisaari’s plan called for independence. This was to be supervised by “the international community,” that term that seems always to mean Western leaders and their interests and excludes the vast majority of the world’s population. Interestingly, the Ahtisaari plan required that Kosovo “shall have an open market economy with free competition.” (13) Already by this point Western officials in Kosovo had overseen the privatization of much of Kosovo’s socially owned property. Ahtisaari’s inclusion of the phrase “free competition” appears meant to protect the interests of Western investors. U.S. officials are never reluctant to push their own agenda, whatever noble-sounding themes they may trumpet. It may be recalled that the pre-war Rambouillet plan, drawn up by U.S. officials in order to sabotage any possibility of a peaceful outcome, required that “the economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market principles” and allow for the free movement of international capital. (14)

Kosovo’s independence under Ahtisaari’s plan was be supervised and monitored by Western officials. Kosovo would be required to prepare its budget in consultation with the Western-appointed official responsible for managing the province. The plan called for NATO to maintain its military presence. There was to be “close cooperation” with the IMF, and in regard to the privatization of publicly owned entities Kosovo officials were called upon to “take appropriate measures to implement the relevant international principles of corporate governance and liberalization.” The governing Western official would be “the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation” of the plan, and positions would be filled through appointment by Western officials. (15) Under Ahtisaari-influenced plan as implemented by the Western powers, Kosovo has less control over its affairs then it would have had under the plan for full autonomy offered by the Yugoslav delegation at Rambouillet.

The selection of Martti Ahtisaari for the Nobel Peace Price was a reward for services rendered. This was a purely political statement, meant to underline an important principle in international affairs. The same Western nations that forcibly carved Kosovo from Serbia are vociferously complaining that independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia violates international law and the territorial integrity of Georgia. This year’s Nobel Peace Prize affirms the lofty principle that it is only the West that will draw and redraw borders in the manner of 19th-century imperial powers.

Gregory Elich is on the Board of Directors of the Jasenovac Research Institute and on the Advisory Board of the Korea Truth Commission. He is the author of the book Strange Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit.

NOTES

[1] Dana Priest, “The Battle Inside Headquarters: United NATO Front was Divided Within,” Washington Post, September 21, 1999.
[2] “Getting to the Table,” Newsweek, June 14, 1999.
[3] Interview with Martti Ahtisaari by Riccardo Chiaberge, “Ahtisaari: This is How I Bent Milosevic,” Corriere della Sera (Milan), July 21, 1999.
[4] Interview with Ljubisa Ristic by Renato Farina, “Why We Serbs Have Given In,” Il Giornale (Milan), June 7, 1999.
[5] Interview with Martti Ahtisaari by Riccardo Chiaberge, “Ahtisaari: This is How I Bent Milosevic,” Corriere della Sera (Milan), July 21, 1999.
[6] Interview with Ljubisa Ristic by Renato Farina, “Why We Serbs Have Given In,” Il Giornale (Milan), June 7, 1999.
[7] Michael Dobbs and Daniel Williams, “For Milosevic, Internal Battle Just Starting,” Washington Post, June 6, 1999.
[8] Interview with Ljubisa Ristic by Renato Farina, “Why We Serbs Have Given In,” Il Giornale (Milan), June 7, 1999.
[9] “Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic Address to Both Chambers of the Assembly of Yugoslavia,” Yugoslav Daily Survey (Belgrade), June 24, 1999. [10] Geert-Jan Bogaerts, “If Democracy Returns then Milosevic will be Gone,” De Volkskrant (Amsterdam), June 25, 2008.
[11] “Getting to the Table,” Newsweek, June 14, 1999.
[12] Resolution 1244 (1999), UN Security Council, June 10, 1999.
[13] “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” UN Security Council S/2007/168/Add.1, March 26, 2007. [14] “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,” February 23, 1999.
[15] “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” UN Security Council S/2007/168/Add.1, March 26, 2007.http://www.counterpunch.org/elich10142008.html

David Guyatt
10-16-2008, 09:00 AM
Paul, thanks for posting this. I had forgotten all about it. But duly prodded I now remember Ahtisaari returning from the former Yugoslavia to be welcomed like a conquering hero by the then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl ---- lots of back-slapping, hand shaking and grins.

He now joins such other Nobel peace loving (ahem) luminaries as Dr. Henry Kissinger and Elihu Root to mention a few.

Paul Rigby
10-16-2008, 07:11 PM
Paul, thanks for posting this. I had forgotten all about it. But duly prodded I now remember Ahtisaari returning from the former Yugoslavia to be welcomed like a conquering hero by the then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl ---- lots of back-slapping, hand shaking and grins.

He now joins such other Nobel peace loving (ahem) luminaries as Dr. Henry Kissinger and Elihu Root to mention a few.

For the benefit of those slightly younger than our estimable selves, I hasten to add the following extracts by way of explaining the pliant Finn's earlier service to the US:

Patrick Heseldine*, “Letters to the editor: Missing diplomat links and the Lockerbie tragedy,” The Guardian, 5 August 1991


“If Mrs Thatcher harbours any lingering hopes of succeeding Mr Perez de Cuellar as UN Secretary-General…In my view Mrs Thatcher has disqualified herself from taking the UN’s top job by her behaviour on at least two previous occasions:

a) her connivance with the South African government in 1984 over bail-jumping in the UN arms embargo case of the Coventry Four…

b) the improper pressure put she put on the UN special representative in Namibia, Mr Martti Ahtisaari, during her visit on April 1, 1989 for him to permit the South African Defence Force (SADF) to take action against SWAPO soldiers who were peacefully returning to Namibia to take part in the 1989 elections. As a result, as many as 308 SWAPO soldiers were killed…Whether Mrs Thatcher could have persuaded the UN Commissioner for Namibia, Mr Bernt Carlsson, to agree to such treachery we shall never know as Mr Carlsson was assassinated four months earlier, on December 21, 1988…

Patrick Heseldine, “Letters to the editor: Flight Path,” The Guardian, 22 December 1992


Now that the case against Libya has been undermined by Edwin Bollier’s revised evidence (Guardian, December 20), it is time to cut through the mess of theory on the culpability for Lockerbie. Applying the scientific principle of Occam’s Razor to the problem (look for the simplest solution), the first question to ask is: what was so special about PanAm flight 103 to make it the target of international terrorism?

The answer is that Bernt Carlsson, UN Commissioner for Namibia, was on that flight to New York to attend the signing ceremony at UN headquarters of Namibia’s Independence Agreement…

*Formerly of the Information Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

David Guyatt
10-16-2008, 09:27 PM
Paul, this is most intriguing stuff from Mr Heseldine of the FCO.

Did he indicate what impact the deaths of all those SWAPO soldiers might have had - as 308 votes doesn't seem sufficient to tip the balance in an election? Perhaps there was a deeper angle to this?

But really very interesting angle on PanAm 103...

Paul Rigby
10-17-2008, 08:41 AM
Paul, this is most intriguing stuff from Mr Heseldine of the FCO.

Did he indicate what impact the deaths of all those SWAPO soldiers might have had - as 308 votes doesn't seem sufficient to tip the balance in an election? Perhaps there was a deeper angle to this?

But really very interesting angle on PanAm 103...

Forgive the episodic nature of my explanation, but my back's "gone," and I'm having trouble sitting (standing, or anything else for that matter). First up, a little more on America's Finnish asset's performance in Namibia:

Editorial, “Hope lies bleeding,” The Guardian, 14 September 1989:


It has taken the murder of SWAPO’s leading white official in Namibia, hardly a day before the return of President Sam Nujoma, to focus attention on the gloomy prospects now unfolding there for free elections in November….The UN’s own officials in Namibia have also consistently failed to rise to the urgency of the situation. Mr Martti Ahtisaari remained in charge because he had been landed with the job ten years before. He and his colleagues have chosen a low-key role, opting for quiet diplomacy with Pretoria rather than publicly denouncing the pattern of violence inspired by pro-South African forces.

I'll return later when the pain-killer's have kicked in!

David Guyatt
10-17-2008, 09:23 AM
Looking forward to your next installment...

Paul Rigby
10-17-2008, 10:16 AM
Looking forward to your next installment...

This is a quick sketch of an answer, but it gets most of the key points in. Apologies, by the way, for the absence of pagination in the cited articles. I had the bad habit in those days of omitting the page number of the articles I clipped.

The context for Lockerbie and the assassination of Bernt Carlsson by plane bomb

Namibia was, and remains, awash with strategic, and very lucrative, minerals. Thus control of the country’s resources was, in and of itself, held vital to US/Western business and military interests. British and South African extractors had made hay in the years of control from Pretoria (1).

Namibian “independence” was also – and this is crucial to understanding the stakes underpinning the Lockerbie atrocity - but a prelude to the even bigger prize of South African. The introduction of Namibian self-governance could not, therefore, be allowed to set “unfortunate” precedents for, or create obstacles to, the planned full, smooth re-integration of South Africa, complete with new veneer of black enfranchisement and nominal political control, into the Western economic order.

The major threat to the continuation of business as usual in Namibia was the genuine commitment of the non-CIA controlled elements of SWAPO’s leadership to a programme of extensive nationalisation. The party’s 1989 independence election manifesto brimmed “with the language of Marx and class struggle” (2). That programme’s implementation depended on SWAPO clearing an obstacle erected by the US, Britain, and the former’s regional proxy-in-chief, South Africa – it had to obtain a “two-thirds majority necessary to write the new constitution on its own” (3). SWAPO’s success in obtaining that two-thirds majority hinged upon the extent to which it could mobilize support not merely in its heartland, Ovamboland, home to just over a third of the electorate, but beyond, among other tribes such as the Damaras and Namas.

Carlsson’s murder removed a potentially formidable obstacle to the panoply of dirty tricks deployed by Washington, London and Pretoria, to minimise SWAPO’s electoral victory. He was a protégé of Olaf Palme, and his career embodied Swedish social democracy’s commitment to the Third World democratization (4).


(1) David Pallister, “British and SA mining companies accused of plundering Namibia,” The Guardian, 29 September 1988.

(2) Scott Peterson, “Grizzled rebel Nujoma takes statesman’s role,” The Sunday Telegraph, 29 October 1989.

(3) Ibid. See David Beresford, “Namibia tinderbox awaits a spark,” The Guardian, 3 November 1989, for the Anglo-American insistence on preserving this requirement, even to the extent of threatening to use their Security Council veto, in the face of tentative UN calls for flexibility.

(4) Dan van der Vat, “Obituary: Bernt Carlsson: Key figure in Namibian peace process,” The Guardian, 23 December 1988.

Lumbar region permitting, I'll add a brief sketch of those dirty tricks measures later today or tomorrow.

Paul Rigby
10-17-2008, 10:35 AM
The context for Lockerbie and the assassination of Bernt Carlsson by plane bomb

Carlsson’s murder removed a potentially formidable obstacle to the panoply of dirty tricks deployed by Washington, London and Pretoria, to minimise SWAPO’s electoral victory. He was a protégé of Olaf Palme, and his career embodied Swedish social democracy’s commitment to the Third World democratization (4).

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE6DB1E3AF932A35754C0A9679582 60&n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Namibia

Christopher Wren, “Afrikaner Says Army Subverted Namibia Vote,” NYT, 1 July 1991

In the year that preceded Namibia's independence in March 1990, Nico Basson was known around Windhoek, the Namibian capital, as an unobtrusive public relations man who helped the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a multi-racial coalition of centrist political parties.

As Mr. Basson now tells it, he was actually an army reserve major employed in an elaborate plot by the South African military to manipulate Namibia's transition to independence. Mr. Basson said his role in the conspiracy, which he contended had Cabinet authorization, was to devise a press campaign that camouflaged a murkier intelligence operation aimed at subverting the South-West Africa People's Organization, the black liberation movement popularly called Swapo.

Reducing Victory Margin

The strategy, he said, reduced Swapo's margin of victory to 57 percent of the vote in the United Nations-supervised elections in Namibia in November 1989. This fell well short of the two-thirds majority that Swapo needed to impose the socialist-oriented constitution it preferred. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which Mr. Basson served as a spokesman, emerged with 28 percent and sits as the official opposition in Parliament.

"I think they've been very successful," Mr. Basson said of the South African military. "They used Namibia as a dress rehearsal for what's happening in South Africa."

Interviewed in his luxurious house in an affluent northern suburb of Johannesburg, Mr. Basson contended that the South African Defense Force was using the same methods to influence the outcome of the power struggle now under way in this country, where the Inkatha Freedom Party, a black faction that is more willing to cooperate with the white Government, is challenging the country's leading anti-apartheid group, the African National Congress. The Congress has repeatedly accused the Government of aiding Inkatha in factional clashes that have killed 7,000 people in the last three years. 'A Strong, Credible Alternative'

"They say the only way to break the A.N.C. is to create a strong, credible alternative," Mr. Basson said.

In remarks in early June, Mr. Basson said the military bought AK-47 assault rifles for distribution to some Inkatha members and was helping them set up cells in areas where Inkatha has little influence.

AK-47's have been used in recent factional fighting between supporters of Inkatha and the African National Congress, but Mr. Basson offered no evidence to support his assertions of Government involvement. Inkatha and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance have both denied receiving any support from the South African military.

A spokesman for the South African Defense Force, Commandant Riaan Louw, dismissed Mr. Basson's allegations as "unsubstantiated" and "ridiculous." He confirmed that Mr. Basson served in the army from 1982 to 1986 but said "he has no intelligence background whatsoever." But at the same time, Commandant Louw said that Mr. Basson was being sued under the Protection of Information Act on charges that he disclosed details of his 1989 contract with the Defense Force, which precluded more detailed rebuttal.

Mr. Basson talked of how the military pumped money into the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. To fuel fears of Swapo, he said, the plotters exploited reports that the organization had imprisoned dissident members in Angola and disseminated disinformation through local radio broadcasts. Intelligence agents infiltrated Swapo's ranks, he said, and placed an informer in the office of Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations' special representative in Namibia. Plans for Sabotage

Mr. Basson asserted that a notorious army unit, the Civil Cooperation Bureau, had plans to bomb Swapo meetings, put cholera germs in the water at two camps for returning exiles, firebomb vehicles of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group and kill prominent Swapo sympathizers.

No cholera outbreak occurred, and only one attack on United Nations property was reported. But Anton Lubowski, a lawyer who was the only white in Swapo's leadership, was gunned down in front of his home on Sept. 11, 1989, and Mr. Basson said that though he had no evidence, he thought that agents of the Civil Cooperation Bureau could have been responsible.

Mr. Basson said he befriended Mr. Lubowski in Windhoek, and they agreed to compile a dossier on the military's clandestine activities.

"It never came out because he was assassinated," Mr. Basson said.

After the killing Defense Minister Magnus Malan announced that Mr. Lubowski had spied on Swapo for the military, an allegation that Mr. Basson said he could not confirm.

For his undercover services, Mr. Basson said, the military paid about $400,000 to his public relations company. Why, he was asked, would he betray the white Afrikaner establishment to which he belongs?

"I'm a concerned citizen," Mr. Basson replied. "My problem is, if you don't stop destabilization, you will never get peace in South Africa."

He said his assignment in Namibia in 1989 exposed him to a world beyond white South Africa, and that he was upset by the zeal with which the security forces, with tacit United Nations consent, hunted down Swapo guerrillas trying to infiltrate back from Angola.

"I think it's wrong to use state resources for partisan political ends," Mr. Basson said. He said that 8 percent of South Africa's military budget went for secret purposes.

Mr. Basson said he wrote President de Klerk in April, offering to share what he had discovered. He said Mr. de Klerk's office told him to put it in a memorandum or testify before a commission.

"I refused to do it because then they will know what I know," Mr. Basson said, referring to the military, and would use it to mount a cover-up. "It's a handful of people conspiring, but they are very clever, well structured, well funded."

Paul Rigby
10-17-2008, 10:59 AM
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE6DB1E3AF932A35754C0A9679582 60&n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Namibia

Christopher Wren, “Afrikaner Says Army Subverted Namibia Vote,” NYT, 1 July 1991

"I think they've been very successful," Mr. Basson said of the South African military. "They used Namibia as a dress rehearsal for what's happening in South Africa."

Basson's admissions in a broader (ie US) context:


http://www.namebase.org/diamond.html

From International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Summer 1995:

A Diamond Is Forever: Mandela Triumphs, Buthelezi and de Klerk Survive, and ANC on the U.S. Payroll

by Richard Cummings

Nelson Mandela is the president of South Africa, an event of monumental significance in world history. This great personal triumph is for him a vindication of his struggle. But now that the South African elections are long past, the record must be set straight about what really happened and why.

The press has concealed as much as it reported; ideologues of all stripes have rushed around to rationalize their hypocrisies, and American politicians have been spreading around largesse as if the money were their own. That the results were so perfect, historically so symmetrical, is rather remarkable.

But, those with power, or who are connected to it, do not want the facts about the funding of the election to be known because it would reveal a pattern of deception and control, both to influence the outcome and to moderate the African National Congress. And those on the radical left don't want it known that the ANC has compromised itself by joining the list of organizations taking money from the United States, because they think it will hurt the cause of revolution. Everyone involved, across the ideological spectrum, has therefore joined in a kind of game to cloud the minds of outside observers.

Most hypocritical perhaps was the attempt to make a devil out of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi by characterizing him as the tool of the oppressors and an obstructionist in the transition to democracy. His anomalous situation in post-apartheid South Africa led to suggestions that he was an enemy of democracy, and the cause of dissension that led to violence in an attempt to disrupt the electoral process that black South Africans struggled for decades to achieve. Chairman of the Inkatha Freedom Party and chief minister of KwaZulu, this prince and descendant of Shaka Zulu was then cast in the role of villain and reactionary. But it was not always so.

ANC and the CP

The triumph of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress in South Africa was, for many years, viewed in certain circles as an extremely undesirable result. During the Cold War, the power of the South African Communist Party in the ANC made the ANC unacceptable as a holder of power in a post-apartheid South Africa. Yet, because apartheid and the white supremacist Nationalist Party were anathema to the rest of Africa, and because white racism fueled the sentiments for communism among the black majority in South Africa, a reliable black alternative to the ANC became essential. As Harry Rositzke, the Central Intelligence Agency station chief in New Delhi from 1957 to 1962, and coordinator of operations against Communist parties abroad from 1962 until his retirement from the CIA in 1970, wrote in 1977: "In Africa, an area of primitive, unstable states, Soviet influence is substantial in Somalia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Angola. The support of black independence movements against the Rhodesian and South African governments may extend that influence. The training of five thousand African students each year in the Soviet and East European universities is a direct investment in the future leadership of a largely illiterate continent."1 Noting the "Chinese competition the Soviets face in ... the South Africa liberation movements," Rositzke argued candidly for covert action in the Third World: "Do we try to make a deal with the leftists -- covertly at least to start? Do we take any covert political action to ensure the continued supply of chrome from a black Rhodesia that threatens to boycott its sale to the United States if we do not withdraw our investments in South Africa? However unlikely these scenarios, we cannot forecast what will happen in the economic world to threaten our prosperity."2

These concerns led to a policy that did not distinguish between anti-communism and opposition to apartheid. Indeed, they became synonymous in South Africa as that policy came to a head in the Reagan administration. As Gregory Treverton has observed: "For the Reagan administration, the intended signal was anti-communism. For it, there was nothing incompatible about supporting anti-communism in Angola and anti-apartheid in South Africa."3

United States anti-apartheid policy was always primarily a tool of its anti-communist policy. And that anti-communist policy was directly related to the preservation of American "prosperity" and economic self-interest, as Rositzke explained. To this end, the CIA funneled money into Africa Bureau, a London-based anti-apartheid group headed by the Rev. Michael Scott, an Anglican priest dedicated to ameliorating the harsh apartheid policies of South Africa in South West Africa. Dan Schecter, Michael Ansara, and David Kolodney wrote in 1970, "The United States remains involved in channeling money to various factions within southern-African liberation movements, hoping, of course, to mold them in pro-Western directions."4

Long before the Reagan administration, white liberals in the United States and South Africa understood the threat of communism in South Africa and took action, in concert with the CIA, to undermine that threat, even if this delayed, by necessity, the end of apartheid. And ultimately, Buthelezi became a key figure in that effort.

The leading American liberal politician to first become actively involved in the anti-apartheid movement was then United States Senator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minnesota). In 1960, a press agency, International Features Service, was established, largely to disseminate the thoughts of Senator Humphrey to the people of the Third World, including Africa. International Features was quickly reorganized as a not-for-profit organization, Peace for Freedom, liberally supported with CIA funds through the International Development Foundation and the Price Fund.5 Another organization launched with CIA assistance was the United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP) when the African-American Institute, a CIA conduit, agreed to add USSALEP to its existing projects.6 A key functional area of USSALEP was, and is, "flexible independent exchanges, providing opportunities for leaders in any variety of fields to confer with colleagues."7 In 1983, Harris Wofford, later a U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, and then, as now, a member of the management committee of USSALEP, stated that Buthelezi deserved support because he had stayed in South Africa, unlike leaders of the ANC, and had not engaged in violence.8 Wofford made it very clear that he was speaking not only for himself, but for his organization. Wofford served as President Kennedy's special representative to Africa from 1962 to 1964 before he became associate director of the Peace Corps. The implication was clear: Buthelezi was with the West, but Mandela, who often espoused pro-South African Communist Party sentiments, was not. And a major non-governmental backer of USSALEP was AMAX, the American mining giant, on whose board have served former Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.

The Lowenstein Intervention

In 1959, Allard Lowenstein, then a foreign policy aide to Senator Humphrey, traveled to South Africa and South West Africa to gather data on the effects of apartheid in both territories. During the course of this trip, Lowenstein was approached by the CIA in South Africa and requested to smuggle out of South Africa a "Cape colored" student, Hans Beukes, a member of the anti-SWAPO Herero tribe from Rehoboth, South West Africa.9 Beukes would later be accused of subverting SWAPO when it expelled him in 1976.10 Lowenstein would later write Brutal Mandate, a book on his South African experience. A leading American liberal who had served as president of the National Students Association and civil rights activist, Lowenstein was recruited to the CIA in 1962 as an expert on southern Africa.11 From 1962 to 1967, Lowenstein traveled to that part of the continent and had contacts with various southern African personalities, both in Africa and the United States, providing the agency with his assessment of their political leanings, and their reliability.
The ANC had taken up armed struggle on 16 December 1961 with the founding by Nelson Mandela of Umkhonot We Sizwe, "Spear of the Nation," and with its Communist support, was becoming a threat. Mandela was a cult figure of the Left who had enormous appeal. Until his capture, his ability to elude the police had made him a folk hero. In the spring of 1962, Lowenstein was contacted by both the American Committee on Africa and the CIA-supported American Society for African Culture, which were joining forces for a demonstration and protest march on behalf of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and the seven others who had been arrested by the South African police when the ANC underground headquarters was discovered. While the United States did not want Mandela in power, neither did it want him martyred. The arrested leaders were on trial and faced the possibility of the death penalty, which in South Africa was administered by hanging. Because of the organized pressure, Mandela and Sisulu were not executed but sentenced to life in prison, with Mandela remaining on Robben Island as the preeminent figure in the African National Congress. After the day to day operations of the ANC passed to Mandela's far less charismatic law partner, Oliver Tambo, who had fled to Zambia, the ANC was seemingly neutralized without the United States to blame.

Other Choices

The CIA was looking for alternatives to the ANC. To the ANC's left, the CIA directed money to the ultra-black nationalist Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which had organized the demonstration, from which the ANC abstained, that led to the Sharpeville massacre in the spring of 1960.12 As early as 1961, Mandela had discounted the Pan Africanist Congress because, he asserted, "there is no doubt in my mind that they preached an extreme form of racialism."13 Mandela believed the abandonment of non-violence and the introduction of the use of force to be justified because, "[N]o leader is going out to say we want peaceful discussions because the government is making that kind of talk senseless. Instead of getting a favorable response, the government is more arrogant. The African reaction can only be a show of force." Notes of the secret interview given by Mandela to Patrick O'Donovan were provided to Allard Lowenstein in London by Mary Benson, an anti-apartheid activist.14

To rival Spear of the Nation, which had begun a campaign of sabotage against "the symbols of apartheid" by staging rocket attacks against police stations, the PAC launched Poqo, a mass movement modeled on the Mau Mau in Kenya. Claiming a membership of 150,000, it engaged in acts of terrorism. Although it never achieved the strength of the ANC, it did come back to haunt South African politics by initially refusing to take part in the first one-person, one-vote non-racial elections in the country's history. Having become the CIA's Frankenstein's monster, the Pan Africanist Congress ceased to be an acceptable alternative to Mandela and the ANC, but it continued to pose a sufficient threat to possibly disrupt the electoral process.
Throughout the 1960s, Lowenstein made considerable use of his expertise on revolutionary movements in southern Africa in ways that would have an important impact on U.S. policy. From his vantage point in the intelligence community, he argued for an anti-Communist alternative on the Left, becoming a key figure, in the parlance of the agency, of the "good wing" of the CIA. As a CIA operative once described this element in the agency to Harris Wofford, "If you only knew what we're really doing, the liberals and the leftists, the democratic leftists, what we're supporting around the world, you'd see that we represented the 'good wing' in the CIA."15 And in his pursuit of an anti-Communist left alternative in South Africa, while he acknowledged that the blacks had ample reason to resort to violence, Lowenstein faulted the ANC, as did the agency, on the grounds that it was engaging in armed struggle with support from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, not to mention its alliance with the South African Communist Party.16

In his 1966 swing through southern Africa, Lowenstein conferred with representatives of the ANC in Dar es Salaam, whose headquarters in which they met featured a large portrait of Mao Zedong. When Lowenstein asked them how he could be of help, the black South Africans told him that what they needed was money for arms. They were engaged in armed struggle and wanted weapons, not the limited support Lowenstein had provided in the past, and which China had eclipsed. At this point, Lowenstein concluded that the ANC was unreliable and uncontrollable and therefore totally unacceptable.17 But as the entire Cold War liberal structure began to come apart during the Vietnam war, Lowenstein turned his efforts to getting rid of President Lyndon Johnson and to replacing him with Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D., New York) and to his own political career, winning election to Congress as a Democrat from New York in 1968. He would not return to the South African scene until the late 1970s, when, following a stint as one of President Carter's ambassadors to the United Nations, he traveled extensively in southern Africa at the behest of the CIA and Harry Oppenheimer, scion of the South African DeBeers and Anglo-American gold mining and diamond empire. In the interim, the fruitless search for an alternative political group to the ANC continued as violence escalated in South Africa, and it become increasingly threatened by the possibility of a revolution led by the South African Communist Party and the ANC.

Zulu Rising

During this period the fortunes of Buthelezi began to rise. Although in the pay of the South African government as chief minister of the KwaZulu government, Buthelezi steadfastly refused to permit KwaZulu to be turned into a "homeland." To do so would have constituted an acceptance of the government's apartheid policies. This posture of at least nominal independence, as well as his identification with the mythic Zulu people led Buthelezi to be able to play both sides with consummate skill. He was never a sycophant to the National Party, which had formalized a system of total racial segregation, and which had controlled South Africa since 1948, when the old United Party of Jan Smuts had been defeated. Buthelezi appealed to those who never had any use for white liberals like Helen Suzman, whose Liberal party had been outlawed, and who maintained a life of luxury in the midst of a system she purported to detest. As the cast of "Wait A Minim," the South African musical comedy mocked, "the only thing the liberals hate more than apartheid is the blacks."

Buthelezi, highly intelligent and articulate, played the role of the radical conservative, to the increasing attention of the United States. Capable of appearing fiercely traditional in tribal dress one minute, and handsome and immaculate in a Saville Row suit the next, Buthelezi began to capture the imagination of the power brokers. He not only spoke all the languages of South Africa, he seemed to speak to the economic and political needs of the country, with its astonishing diversity, as well. There was a vacuum and he appeared to be the only player capable of filling it. With Buthelezi and his ideas for a federal republic of South Africa, investment would be safe, and whites and blacks could be placated. Even his appeal to royalty, his professed loyalty to the King of the Zulus, Goodwill Zwelethini (also his nephew), impressed whites who sought modest change in the context of stability, and blacks, for whom royalty had always held a certain attraction as a dimension of African pride. If a black African leader for South Africa could have been created by the Reagan administration, it would have been Buthelezi. With Ronald Reagan in the White House and William Casey at CIA, the "good wing" would be out and the hard line in. There was no such thing as a Left alternative to communism in this ideology, only a Right alternative that was indeed "right." Under Reagan, Buthelezi would fit the mold, as Jonas Savimbi did in Angola, where South Africa and the CIA together aided his efforts against the leftist government, with its pro-Soviet sympathies.
Indeed, conservatives worldwide began to support Buthelezi, with particular support coming, according to a former U.S. "Africa hand," from Germany through such conservative semi-political foundations as the Adenauer Schiftung and the Ebert Schiftung, much in the manner that DCI Casey was able to get other countries such as Saudi Arabia to aid the contras in Nicaragua.18 According to this source, Buthelezi had been promised a "Greater Natal" by hard-line apartheid Prime Minister P.W. Botha, who offered him the possibility of having white areas such as Durban in his power base. With such an increase in his domain, were an election to happen, he would be able to command at least the five percent that was ultimately established as a basis for a seat in the cabinet. Along with white representation in the cabinet, he would be a sufficient force to moderate the polices of a leftist government under Mandela, and block either nationalizations or confiscatory tax policies.19 But before this scenario began to take hold, the liberals gave it one more shot to find an alternative to Mandela and the ANC who would not be so conservative as to alienate the majority of blacks, who might still turn to the far left. At this point in the 1970s, Allard Lowenstein once again entered the scene, with Buthelezi playing to both liberal and conservative factions.

According to South Africa expert Professor William Foltz of Yale University, Buthelezi was being "courted by South African big business and some American corporations" during the 1970s.20 He mentioned AMAX, the mining giant with extensive South African holdings that was also a USSALEP backer through its AMAX Foundation, as one of these. The effort to approach Buthelezi, Foltz explains, was led not by American business interests, but by the liberal part of South African industry, particularly Harry Oppenheimer, whose Ernest Oppenheimer Memorial Trust, the charitable arm of Anglo-American, was also backing USSALEP; Helen Suzman; and Clive Menell, chair of Anglovaal Holdings, Ltd., a mining giant. Menell lives across the street from Oppenheimer in South Africa, and entertained Buthelezi in his home in the presence of Professor Foltz. Foltz explains that Buthelezi's refusal to let KwaZulu be a homeland made him attractive to the Oppenheimer crowd, as he could not be seen as a tool of apartheid. Although highly ambitious and sensitive to slights, real or apparent, Buthelezi was regarded by his advocates as a "reasonable and interesting alternative, at least a serious player." So Wofford was right. USSALEP, launched with the CIA's help and passed along to power South African and American corporate interests, could proclaim by 1980 that it "receives no funding, direct or indirect, from the United States, South Africa, or any other government," was now behind Buthelezi, seeing nowhere else to go.

Lowenstein Redux

By the mid 1970s, the exploitation of uranium in South West Africa had made South Africa's role there a major international issue. The large block of nonwhite Third World countries pressed for South West Africa's independence. In April 1975, Allard Lowenstein attended a key symposium on "The Outlook for Southern Africa," which was backed by the Johnson Foundation. Funded by USSALEP and the Johnson and Johnson pharmaceutical company, the meeting was held at the Johnson Wingspread conference facility in Wisconsin. The symposium explored ways to prevent the worst from happening from the point of view of the American, South Africa, and British companies that invested heavily there. South Africa was described as "the Saudi Arabia of minerals," and South West Africa had once again become vitally important to the West because of Britain's dependence upon it for uranium.21 Rio Tinto Zinc, a multinational mining company based in Britain, was exploiting the Rossing mine, the world's largest single source of uranium.

Lowenstein's presentation at the Wingspread symposium was a classic "good wing" analysis. Will we identify with the oppressed people, including those of South Africa? Because Africans were finding that the only way to produce change was through violence, this was playing "into the hands of the Soviet Union and China," who were providing money and training which were, in fact, producing results. Lowenstein asked the rhetorical question and tried to answer it: "Can we influence Africans to accommodate their demands in less violent ways? Only if we pressure for the necessary reforms at an acceptable pace. This means finding ways for South Africa to get out of Namibia and Rhodesia, to permit Black regimes to develop in both states. Instead of 'buffer states' there might emerge on the border of South Africa the appearance of privileged sanctuaries so that the pressure for change within South Africa would be stepped up. As the international dimensions proceed, they are the priority; the domestic ones should follow. Eventually, changes within South Africa will have to occur. If they do not come nonviolently and in a rapid, evolutionary way, they will be forced with sabotage, violence and warfare."22

At the United Nations, he clashed with U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young over U.S. policy in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. Lowenstein was strongly opposed to Robert Mugabe and wanted a role for white liberals. He also visited South Africa where he held lengthy meetings with young Afrikaner Nationalists. After his U.N. service, Lowenstein came back in from the cold. His involvement with the powerful white liberals of South Africa and his relationship with Frank Carlucci, appointed deputy director of the CIA by President Carter (and who had been stationed in South Africa when Lowenstein traveled there in 1959), enabled him to continue his work in southern Africa in the summer of 1979.

This vitally important trip was financed by Anglo-American, which paid Lowenstein $7,000 for his services, $1,000 to his aide, Mark Childress, and $1,000 to Lowenstein' s secretary. Provided for the summer's expedition were a comfortable house in Johannesburg, with recreational facilities and domestic servants, and full transportation, including return air fares on the Concorde for Lowenstein, Lowenstein's three children and Childress. All of this was arranged by Hank Slack, the American Director of Anglo-American and the former son-in-law of Harry Oppenheimer.23 Lowenstein was working closely with Deputy CIA Director Carlucci, who stated categorically that "Lowenstein would report to me."24 And there was much to report.
Lowenstein first consulted with Theo-Ben Gurirab of SWAPO, at SWAPO headquarters in New York City, then departed for South Africa. There he held meetings with Buthelezi, Harry Oppenheimer, Helen Suzman, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, and P.W. Botha, the South African Prime Minister. He also met with Mandela, still incarcerated on Robben Island.25 Richard Moose, Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, told Sam Adams, formerly of CIA, that Lowenstein was talking to "a lot of opposition groups."26 What Lowenstein was doing was laying the groundwork for a flexible American policy in South Africa, in alliance with the wealthy South African white liberals and the "verlicht" Afrikaner Nationalists, to dismantle the structure of apartheid without Marxist revolution. Lowenstein's role in this venture was cut short when he was shot to death in 1980 by Dennis Sweeney, a former recruit in the civil rights movement in Mississippi, but the legacy of his involvement remained a potent one. Carlucci, who admired Lowenstein and was greatly influenced by him, shared Lowenstein's assessment that the problems of South Africa could be "worked out."27 And Buthelezi had good reason to believe that he was, at the very least, part of the solution and not the problem.

U.S. Aid

With the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980, United States and South African intelligence (BOSS, the South African CIA) increased cooperation on behalf of Jonas Savimbi in Angola. The CIA authorized $15 million for Savimbi's UNITA.28 In South Africa, with German money coming to him, Buthelezi was fast becoming the darling of American conservatives, including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador to the United Nations, as a "sound anti-Communist alternative."29 The Washington Times and the Wall Street Journal took up his cause. But, according to Professor Foltz, there was a significant split in the Reagan administration. Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, was "opposed to Buthelezi" and "playing a much more complicated game."30 Foltz explains that Crocker thought it wise "not to see any single person as the answer."31 Foltz also credits the British Ambassador to South Africa at that time, Sir Robin Renwick, as being "highly skillful" in his efforts to prevent violence and bring about a peaceful solution in South Africa. (Renwick is generally acknowledged with having obtained Mandela's release from prison, a task made easier by the fact that his government had not imposed sanctions on South Africa, thereby giving it some leverage with the white regime in Pretoria.) But he argues that the "whole situation was sliding rapidly" and that the "logic" of the Reagan administration's policy was "coming apart."32

The support of American industrial interests for Buthelezi began to diminish when it appeared that he might not be able to deliver in the face of enormous public support for Mandela. The final push, Foltz explains, was the 1986 U.S. sanctions legislation, which altered the situation irrevocably. Now a legend among American blacks as a symbol of the triumph through struggle over apartheid, Nelson Mandela could no longer be shunted aside. The ANC had become the ultimate force in South Africa, and Buthelezi, with his base limited to the Zulus, was without a national organization capable of overcoming it. But, with financial support still coming to him from Germany, Buthelezi was, according to Foltz, able to retain the services of the powerful Washington public relations firm, Black, Manafort. Buthelezi and his people continued to use the rhetoric of the Cold War, "not about the ANC but the ANC and the Communists."33 But the mining companies were no longer interested and Buthelezi's support was limited to "the fast buck people in Natal."34 And while Buthelezi might, at one point, have been able to get the 5 percent needed for a cabinet position, the "old Africa hand" argued (incorrectly, it turned out) that Buthelezi would be "hard pressed" to carry the Zulu vote. Because the young Zulus are now more urban than rural, and identify increasingly with the ANC, he maintained, Buthelezi' s power base was substantially eroded, notwithstanding continued German support and support from private American conservative groups.35 Foltz puts it more forcefully: "He is playing a destructive and scandalous role now."36 But who was actually paying for that role and, in effect, funding the bloodbath that lasted until Inkatha reentered the elections?

Reenter the United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP), by now no longer stating that it does not receive funds from any government directly or indirectly, but indicating overtly that it is funded, in part, by the United States Agency for International Development (AID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). In its 1992 Program Update, in a short note entitled "Transition to Democracy Project," USSALEP proclaims:
The $8,000,000 cooperative agreement, under which subgrants of $4.8 million for the African National Congress (ANC) and $2.6 million for the Inkatha Freedom Party was to be disbursed by September 30, 1992, was extended for an additional 15 months in order to utilize the full amount obligated by USAID. The purpose of the project is to build administration capacity within the ANC and the IFP organizations to enable them to participate more effectively in the negotiations leading to a new constitution and democratic government. Due to the very stringent disbursement conditions (which, for example, eliminated the category of salaries as a permissible expenditure category under the original budgets), coupled with administrative/absorptive capacity limitations of the sub-grantees, only approximately 45 percent of the $7.4 million could be expended during the originally scheduled, 13-month project life.

The monies disbursed to date have been used to: (i) acquire or rent office space to house central and regional staff, (ii) purchase and install computer hardware and software and train personnel needed to establish effective management information systems, and (iii) pay for sundry travel, consulting and workshop expenses relating to the above and to the formulation of policy options and negotiation positions.

USAID and USSALEP are presently in discussion with the subgrantees to identify new areas of expenditure not previously included in their budget proposals. Among those being considered is the critical one encompassing peace initiatives.37

Hired as project manager of the Transition to Democracy Project was Stanley Kahn, a South African sociology professor on the faculty of both the universities of Witwatersrand and Cape Town. Kahn had served as executive director of the Funda Centre in Diepkloof, Soweto and was the recipient of a USSALEP Alan Pifer Fellowship to visit the United States to "survey the contribution of community colleges to adult education."38 Kahn was later promoted to Director of USSALEP South Africa.

Kahn may be a fine fellow, but it still sounds a lot like "walking around money." And if salaries were being paid to ANC and Inkatha, who was getting the money? Mandela? Buthelezi? And if these groups were getting the money, who decided that more than twice as much should go to the ANC as to Inkatha? Notably, Harris Wofford continued to serve on the Board and Council of USSALEP, which dispensed the funds from the AID budget that Wofford voted for as a senator. His past legal practice has involved major clients in Africa. Apart from this seeming conflict of interest, American taxpayers should be concerned that their money was being used to influence the outcome of an election in a foreign country, however overt this funding might now be. Most of the old players are still there: Harry Oppenheimer, who funds USSALEP through the Anglo-American & DeBeers Chairman's Fund; Clive Menell, chairman of Anglovaal Holdings, Ltd. (contributor and Board and Council member), and an old Buthelezi backer; and Hank Slack, now president and CEO of MINORCO in London (contributor and Board and Council member), as well as all the major industrial concerns, American, international and South African, that control the vast mining' interests of South Africa and the rest of its economy. The result of all of this funding of the competing parties? R.W. Johnson, a native of South Africa and a fellow in politics at Magdalen College, Oxford, on leave from Oxford to write about current South Africa and also to serve as national co-director of the Launching Democracy project, a public information service for all South African political parties, sponsored by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (one wonders about the source of its funding), observed:

Some of the killing is political: currently the largest set of victims are Inkatha officials killed by the ANC, though the most publicized recent killing was that of Chris Hani, the SACP (Communist) leader, by the white Right. The Azanian People's Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress, carries out anti-white atrocities from time to time, and, of course, Inkatha takes its vengeance on the ANC with fair regularity.39

As the whites were panicking, a state of emergency was declared in KwaZulu because of the inability of Mandela, Buthelezi, King Goodwill Zwelethini, and de Klerk to come to an agreement on how to resolve the impasse and get Inkatha back into the election process.40 Buthelezi denounced what he described as "a lengthy Machiavellian manipulation commenced, right at the start of our negotiations, with attempts to marginalize our Inkatha Freedom Party."41 If he was referring to the inequitable distribution of the U.S. AID money between the ANC and Inkatha, he certainly made up the difference from the Germans. And how effective giving money to the ANC will be in wooing it from its South African Communist Party ally remains to be seen. Mandela insists the ANC is not Communist, but that it remains loyal to its oldest ally and friend.42 Moreover, the relisting as a USSALEP sponsor of the African American Institute, a CIA conduit in the past that helped launch USSALEP, also means that CIA money still, in all probability, flows covertly to certain organizations in South Africa. The most likely candidate for U.S. assistance was the CIA's old client, the Pan Africanist Congress (whose overt support the ANC would never accept), to keep it in the electoral process and then accept the results. But the amount of money given to the Pan Africanist Congress has surely been miniscule, given its lack of a function at this point of history. The purpose was not to get it votes, but to keep it quiet.

Educating Voters

After the supposed failure of former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger (now an international business consultant) and former British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington (who has served on the board of Rio Tinto Zinc, which controls the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia) to bring Buthelezi into the elections, all seemed to be lost.43 But an amazing last minute reprieve was finally achieved, and the elections went forward in the midst of bombings by white extremists. Helping the Independent Election Commission to supervise them to make sure they were "fair" was the South African Fair Elections Fund (SAFE), funded largely by American interests and headed up by the liberal Kennedy loyalist, Theodore Sorensen, who had $7 million at his disposal for "voter education." According to Ian Williams of the New York Observer, "many of those involved in SAFE haven't concealed their hopes for an ANC landslide."44 And while Williams reported AID's funding of both the ANC and Inkatha, he neglected to mention USSALEP, the éminence grise of the whole sordid business. But even with AID funding much of the election, and SAFE providing additional assistance to assure the right kind of acceptable "left" victory, Ronald Brown, President Bill Clinton's man at the Department of Commerce, announced $140 million in aid to South Africa.
A good portion of this will find its way into the pockets of North Carolina academics and their institutions, Duke, Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State. They are participating in the $350 million South African research and manufacturing center to be built in Muizenberg, a suburb of Cape Town. The project has the backing of the ANC.45 This may help explain why conservative, anti-Communist Senator Jesse Helms (Rep., North Carolina) has failed to denounce the U.S. AID funding of the Communist-backed ANC -- he makes an unlikely pair with Harris Wofford. Actually, the only institution that should cry fraud is North Carolina's predominantly black university, Northern Carolina A&T, Jesse Jackson's alma mater, which has mysteriously been excluded from the AID boondoggle.

The ANC and Buthelezi both shouted "fraud" as the election came to a close. The one party that began to pick up surprising support in the election's final hours was the old bastion of white supremacy, the National Party. It appealed to the "colored" vote, those of mixed race who tend to be better educated and own property, and to conservative blacks. F.W. de Klerk, holding black babies, managed to remind South Africans of every color that "majority rule" on the African continent can be less than paradise. Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Zaire, and the Sudan are shattering reminders of the chaos so often associated with post-colonial "liberation." He managed to do the impossible: prevent the ANC from getting the two thirds seats in parliament it needed to ram through an economic agenda that is supported by the South African Communist Party. In four years, de Klerk's party will be in a position to form a coalition with Inkatha, not unlike the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia (formed with Allard Lowenstein's support and assistance), which also managed to prevent the prevailing revolutionary group, SWAPO, from getting the two thirds it needed to nationalize the mineral wealth.

Once again, white American liberals have failed to appreciate the innate conservatism of some black Africans, and their willingness to work with whites, even their former oppressors, out of fear that they might lose their property to a "revolutionary" regime, even one financed by the U.S. government and supported by Jesse Helms and Harris Wofford, the "Odd Couple" of American politics. If a post-Mandela ANC splits apart, as some South Africans have predicted, and with the South African Communist Party marginalized, a National/Inkatha Party could well become a real force in South Africa. There is a certain logic to this; the Boers and the Zulus have always had a common enemy: the British and their English-speaking South African allies in the mining industries. But the Boers and Zulus, both pro-business, pose no threat to the great companies and families that have controlled the South African economy since the Boer war.

Mandela's Democratic Moves

Meanwhile, Nelson Mandela has made all the right noises, from the point of view of his American supporters. He pledged not to confiscate the property of whites and not to tax in a way that will discourage foreign investment and profit. He also made it clear that he will not tolerate disorder; after the election he urged everyone to go back to work and back to school. Mandela did not spend all those years in prison to preside over a country in chaos and anarchy. Like Buthelezi, who is actually a close friend of his, Mandela is a descendant of African royalty. If the ANC and Inkatha have accepted U.S. dollars, as they have, from the Americans who caused the perpetuation of apartheid for Cold War reasons, there is more than enough irony in this to justify their actions. Mandela has started to resemble his predecessor in African liberation, Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta had been jailed for a very long time on charges of being a Mau Mau terrorist, and then was released in time to stop a violent revolution. Kenyatta suppressed his opposition and allowed the whites to keep control over the Kenyan economy. But Alec Erwin, a white Communist ANC candidate, declared that there "was nothing sacrosanct" about limiting the budget deficit to 6 percent of the GNP, as the IMF had required the ANC to pledge prior to granting a loan. If the ANC could stop mentioning this IMF requirement as part of the ANC's program, clearly more was necessary to make sure the worst did not happen.46

The Voters' Choice

The election results, which all the parties long ago accepted as "free and fair," produced some surprises, with the ANC polling 62.5 percent, less than the 67 percent required for control over the constitution, but more than enough to control patronage and 12 cabinet seats. De Klerk and the National Party (NP), which won control of the Western Cape, got over 20 percent, enough votes to allow de Klerk to be one of the two executive vice presidents and to gain four cabinet seats. The NP probably got a higher percentage of the black vote than did the Pan Africanist Congress, a relic of Cold War history, which received scant support in the election. Also disappearing into oblivion was the Democratic Party (DP), which was nothing more than the reconstituted old Liberal Party that Allard Lowenstein had backed. Once banned by the primitive white racist South African government, and later reinvented as the Progressive Party with the help of Harry Oppenheimer, the DP was basically the personal vehicle of Helen Suzman, who spent as much effort fighting the ANC as she did apartheid.
Mandela indicated that he would consider offering cabinet posts to representatives of parties which polled less than the required 5 percent, a carrot to the Pan Africanist Congress if they agreed to behave themselves. Inkatha received over 10 percent, enough to put Buthelezi in the cabinet and give Inkatha a total of four cabinet seats -- a result his critics said was impossible. His total was augmented, and de Klerk's reduced, by the fact that some white Afrikaners voted for Buthelezi on the national level and the NP on the provincial level to bolster black opposition to the ANC. The white separatist Freedom Front ended up with about 3 percent, indicating that the white racist call for a boycott of the elections was only marginally successful. Together, these three provided an opposition bloc of over one-third of the voters, not counting those who boycotted the election.47 Buthelezi, whose Inkatha also carried KwaZulu/Natal, which his critics claimed he would never be able to do, summed up: "I'm grateful that up to now, in spite of all the skullduggery and the cheating, so far it has not flared up into any conflict or violence."48

And it is not likely to. Buthelezi is now the Home Minister, which puts him in charge of internal affairs and makes him the boss of Sidney Mufamadi, the black chief of police who is also a member of the central committee of the South African Communist Party. The late Joe Slovo, South African Communist Party chairman, was head of Housing and Welfare before his death. Joe Modise, the black commander of Spear of the Nation, is Minister of Defense (albeit assisted by the existing chief of staff, General Georg Meyring, a white Afrikaner, who remained in his post); after the change in government Derek Keyes, de Klerk's white Afrikaner Minister of Finance continued to run the economy from the same position. Mandela's selection of the ANC's Thabo Mbeki as the other executive vice president left the able Cyril Ramaphosa out of the cabinet and the government entirely, although he remains as the chairman of the ANC, in which capacity he is in charge of drafting the new constitution. Mandela's incredible balancing act made it possible, overall, for there to be something for almost everyone, at which the CIA probably heaved a considerable sigh of relief.49 With the Cold War over, the view seems to be who cares if a couple of Communists clank around in the South African government as long as things are basically under control?

A Carat a Day...

The Goldsmith Commission, which had investigated the role of the police in the violence prior to the elections, subsequently looked ahead to 1999, when the "real" elections will take place. There will be a need for new leaders who comprehend the serious economic problems of the country, as perceived by the International Monetary Fund. USSALEP no doubt stands ready to provide these leaders. The only question is whether the United States government will continue to finance their campaigns.

But while the pundits debate the first year of the Mandela era, DeBeers continues to control 80 percent of the world's diamond trade, "with 50 percent of these diamonds by value coming from the company's own mines in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia."50 Jonathan M.E. Oppenheimer, Harry Oppenheimer's grandson, the son of Nicholas F. Oppenheimer of Johannesburg, deputy chairman of the great mining giants, the Anglo-American Group and DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., the latter founded by Cecil Rhodes with the backing of the Rothschilds, represents the next generation of Oppenheimers as he continues his work as a management trainee at N.M. Rothschild & Sons in London.51 Politicians may come and go, but as the DeBeers ad claims on television, "a diamond is forever."

Funny Peculiar Postscript

Subsequently, reports came of widespread election fraud in KwaZulu Natal where Inkatha won its "victory." In some areas, more votes were counted than the census recorded people living there. Nevertheless, the ANC did not seriously challenge the results. Key ANC candidates who were not elected on the national or provincial levels were rewarded with big jobs in either Mandela's government in Pretoria or in the Inkatha-dominated government of KwaZulu/Natal. Reporting for Newsday from South Africa in May 1994, Dele Olojede wrote:

[T]he great South African political settlement is fait accompli. Mandela is in Pretoria, where Buthelezi will serve as his home affairs minister in charge of federal relations with provinces. In the Natal provincial capital of Pietermaritzburg Friday night, Inkatha Chairman Frank Mdlalose was duly sworn in as premier at the inaugural session of the provincial legislature. His candidacy was unopposed. The ANC accepted three of 10 positions in Mdlalose's cabinet. And when Zulu King Goodwill Zwelethini swept into the chambers, the ANC bench jumped up along with everyone else to shout, in salute, "Wena ndlovu!" ("You're the elephant.")
Or the donkey.

Richard Daley, the legendary major of Chicago, would have approved totally. That AID money wasn't wasted at all. King Goodwill expressed confidence that, now, peace would surely reign in "my kingdom."52


[B]References

1. Rositzke, Harry, The CIA's Secret Operations -- Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Action (New York, Readers Digest Press), 1977, p. 254.

2. Rositzke, supra, at 256, 266.

3. Treverton, Gregory F., Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York, Basic Books), 1987, p. 220.

4. Schecter, Dan., Ansara, Michael, and Kolodney, David, (African Research Group), "The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer," in Dirty Work 2, The CIA in Africa, Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Karl Van Meter, Louis Wolf., eds. (Secaucus, NJ, Lyle Stuart, 2nd printing, 1980), p. 51; first published in Ramparts in 1970 and referring to The Politics of Unity by I. Wallerstein.

5. Schecter, Ansara, and Kolodney, supra.

6. Schecter, Ansara, and Kolodney, supra.

7. "The USSALEP Story 1958-1980."

8. Interview with Harris Wofford, 18 May 1983.

9. My sources for this were: Tom Gervasi, who served as a counterintelligence officer assigned to the Army Security Agency and the author of Arsenal of Democracy I (New York, Grove, 1978), and Arsenal of Democracy II (New York, Grove, 1981), and who was writing a history of the CIA at the time of his death, allegedly from lead poisoning from handling toy soldiers he collected; Sam Adams, who served with the CIA in the Southern Africa Branch, DDI, at the time Allard Lowenstein worked for it, and then switched to the Southeast Asia Branch, and who was writing a history of the role of the CIA in Vietnam at the time of his untimely death from an alleged heart attack. Gervasi's book was never published, while Adams's unfinished manuscript was finally published in 1994, years after his death denied him the opportunity to both complete it and defend it against his critics. The book has so far attracted little attention, but it was reviewed in this journal by Richard R. Valcourt: see "Vietnam's Curious Numbers," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer, 1994, pp. 235-240. Adams was at my house in Bridgehampton for dinner not long before his death. He was in excellent health. See Sam Adams, War of Numbers (Steerforth Press, South Royalton, VT, 1994). See also William Chafe, Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American Liberalism (New York, Basic Books, 1993), note 13, p. 494: "It is noteworthy that the NSA's international vice-president, who was working for the CIA, once again asked Lowenstein to do some student government chores while in South Africa." Chafe does not elaborate further, but because Lowenstein attended the Congress of the National Union of South African Students while in South Africa during the trip and had kept up his ties to the CIA-backed U.S. National Student Association, the smuggling out of Beukes would constitute such a "chore."

10. Interview with then SWAPO Representative to the United Nations, Theo-Ben Gurirab, 5 May 1983. Curiously, Gurirab, whom I interviewed at SWAPO's headquarters in New York and a close advisor to Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO leader and currently Namibia's head of government, referred to William F. Buckley Jr. as one of his closest friends in New York. Buckley has acknowledged serving in the CIA.

11. Gervasi and Adams, note 9, supra, were my sources for this. This is confirmed by a document in Lowenstein's CIA file which I obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. Document No. 10, dated 19 February 1962, a memorandum addressed to the Chief of Personnel, Security Division, OS, from the Chief of the Contact Division, OO, states: "It is requested that priority security checks be procured on Subject as described in the attachment. Our deadline is 23 February 1962 for approval to contact Subject on an ad hoc basis. Subject reportedly has stated that he had done some work for CIA. If he were used in a [whited out] capacity, then this is an indiscretion regarding which our field representative would like to know something about the background before contact is made." Other portions of the document are whited out. This document has been confirmed to me by two former CIA station chiefs (Moscow and Saigon) as a "recruitment document." The "work" for the CIA to which Lowenstein was referring is clearly the smuggling of Hans Beukes out of South Africa. As the former Moscow station chief explained to me, Lowenstein was not a CIA "agent," which is a term of art referring usually to foreigners under contract with the agency for specific periods of time and for specific purposes, but rather a "consultant" to be used on an "ad hoc" basis. Such people, I was told by the former Moscow station chief, are generally older than the normal recruits to the agency. Lowenstein's situation at the time of his recruitment was that he was in his thirties, an academic who taught courses on the politics of southern Africa. Academics in such situations have been routinely recruited to the CIA. While such persons can be used as analysts, the former Moscow station chief explained, they can also perform "operations," as Lowenstein did, including the providing of funds to political organizations. Ironically, while the CIA was recruiting Lowenstein, the FBI, on 29 March 1962, concluded that Lowenstein had never been connected to the CIA, noting that as late as 9 January 1961, the CIA had advised the FBI that Lowenstein never had a relationship with the intelligence agency. Evidently, the FBI checked no further after that date, as Chafe indicates when he concludes, "None of this evidence is definitive." Chafe, supra. Further, in a letter dated 23 January 1985 to Bancroft Littlefield, a former Lowenstein aide who had married Lowenstein' s ex-wife after she had divorced Lowenstein, Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee said: "Based on representations made to me, I can say that Mr. Lowenstein was never an agent (italics added) of the CIA." Chafe, supra, note 20, p. 509. To Chafe, this is also not conclusive.
As explained, Lowenstein was not a CIA agent and was not recruited as one. He was recruited as an expert consultant. When I requested a copy of the letter from the CIA to Hamilton, Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director of the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, wrote on 5 August 1985: "Mr. Hamilton has asked that I respond to your letter of 30 July 1985 regarding certain correspondence to this committee from Mr. Briggs of the Central Intelligence Agency. The correspondence you referred to is classified and therefore cannot be released. I regret that we cannot be of assistance to you in this matter." They are clearly hiding something. Further, the exchange between the CIA and the FBI is an example of the ongoing war between those two agencies over turf and budget.

12. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), whose executive board was taken over by the AFL-CIO, gave the money for the establishment of The Federation of Free African Trade Unions (FOFA-TUSA) in 1959, which was intimately connected with the PAC. Barry Cohen, "The CIA and the African Trade Unions," AFRICA magazine, September 1976, Dirty Work 2, supra, p. 77. Jay Lovestone, who served as the Director of the Department of International Affairs for the AFL-CIO, "was one of the Central Intelligence Agency's most important men." Ioan Davies, African Trade Unions (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966), p. 201. A former member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., Lovestone, who was actually expelled from the Party, waged the Cold War from his vantage point in the American labor movement. In "Fight U.S. Subversion of Trade Union Movement in Africa!" B.S. Nyameko directly accused the CIA of creating the Pan Africanist Congress to undermine the Communist-backed African National Congress. He wrote: "Throughout Africa labour organizations are infiltrated by CIA agents posing as private individuals or under nonofficial cover, as employees in private companies or as U.S. Embassy staff in the Information Department and Labour Attaché men succeeded in establishing the PAC in 1959 to disrupt our ANC." The African Communist, No. 87, Fourth Quarter, 1981, pp. 56-57.

13. O'Donovan, Patrick, secret interview with Nelson Mandela, 30 May 1961. It is widely believed that the CIA fingered Mandela to the South African police, which would have been an inside job, almost certainly one of the white liberals pretending to be a supporter. Lowenstein was privy to the secret interview and may well have participated in the fingering of Mandela.

14. Cummings, Richard, The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and the Liberal Dream (New York, Grove, 1985), p. 136.

15. Interview with Harris Wofford, supra. Other CIA "good wingers" of that generation included the Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr. (See Coffin, Once To Every Man (New York, Atheneum, 1977); author and naturalist Peter Matthiessen, for whom the Paris Review was his cover and who, according to James Linville, the Managing Editor of The Paris Review, is "haunted by the CIA." Conversation with James Linville, Oxford, MS, April 1993, at the 40th anniversary celebration of The Paris Review (The New York Times first reported Matthiessen's CIA employment); Gloria Steinem, who worked for three years for the Independent Research Service, an organization totally supported by the CIA and whose purpose was to disrupt Communist youth festivals. This was first disclosed by Ramparts and later reported in The New York Times in 1967. See Press Release, 9 May 1975, Redstockings of the Women's Liberation Movement; letter from Jane Barry of Redstockings, 19 February 1987, and ultra liberal author/activist Robert Sam Anson (Interview with Robert Sam Anson, May 1985). The theoretical intellect behind "good wing" ideology in the CIA was Harry Rositzke, who argued that democracy and capitalism were not necessarily synonymous and that the United States should support progressive social democratic or democratic socialist approaches in critical countries. See Rositzke, supra, p. 268.

16. See Allard Lowenstein and John Marcum, "Force: Its Thrust and Prognosis," in South Africa in Transition, (New York, Praeger, 1966): "In the absence of internal collapse in Portugal and of external intervention in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the period of violent upheaval may be prolonged. Neither collapse nor intervention now appears likely, and the legacy of European settlement in southern Africa may consequently be hatred and destruction of catastrophic proportions. This prospect will not dissuade Africans from force. It will be recalled that Americans fought an extended War for Independence that was prompted by grievances that look paltry compared to those now present in southern Africa." Praeger, the publisher of the paper, which was given at a conference at Howard University in 1963 sponsored by the American Society of African Culture, a CIA front, was later revealed by Ramparts, to have had a CIA affiliation.

17. Interview with Hal Minus, Lowenstein aide on 1966 trip, March 1981.

18. Telephone interview, 5 April 1994.

19. Paul Taylor of The Washington Post has provided an excellent overview of the South African scene prior to the elections in "Outlook," Washington Post, 3 April 1994.

20. Telephone interview with Professor William Foltz, 4 April 1994.

21. "South Africa: Policy Alternatives for the United States," Report of a Wingspread Conference convened by the Johnson Foundation, April 1975, Racine, Wisconsin. Others in attendance were George Hauser of the American Committee on Africa; Africanist Gwendolen Carter; and Donald F. McHenry of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and later Andrew Young's deputy and then replacement at the United Nations in the Carter administration. See also Alun Robert, The Rossing File (London, Namibia Support Committee, CANUC, 1980).

22. Wingspread Report, supra.

23. Letter to Hank Slack from Ernest Wentzel, 12 June 1979; telephone interview with Ernest Wentzel, Johannesburg, 9 August 1983.

24. Interview with Frank Carlucci, 19 July 1983.

25. Memo by Mark Childress, undated.

26. Moose quoted by Adams, telephone conversation with Adams, 1982.

27. Interview with Carlucci.

28. See Treverton, Covert Action, supra, at pp. 220-221.

29. Interview with Professor William Foltz, supra.

30. Foltz, supra

31. Foltz, supra. See, generally, Chester Crocker's memoir, High Noon In Southern Africa (New York, W.W. Norton, 1992).

32. Foltz, supra

33. Foltz, supra.

34. Foltz, supra.

35. Interview, supra.

36. Foltz, supra.

37. USSALEP 1992 Program Update, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1993, p. 1.

38. USSALEP 1992 Program Update, supra, p. 7.

39. Johnson, R.W., "Beloved Country -- R.W. Johnson in South Africa," London Review of Books, Vol. 15, No. 13, 8 July 1993, p. 3.

40. See Bill Keller, "Zulu King, Rejecting Budget for Patronage, Refuses to Halt Election Boycott," The New York Times International, 9 April 1994, p. 6; Paul Taylor, "Zulu Leaders Still Opposed to Vote," The Washington Post, 9 April 1994, p. A18.

41. Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, "We Reject Unfair South African Election," Viewpoints, Newsday, 1 April 1994, p. A41.

42. See Steven Greenhouse, "Kissinger Will Help Mediate Dispute Over Zulu Homeland," The New York Times, 12 April 1994, p. 8.

43. Sparks, Allister, "South Africa: The Secret Revolution," The New Yorker, 4 April 1994, p.67.

44. Williams, Ian, "CEOs and Barbra Fund South African Dream," New York Observer, 2 May 1994, p. 18.

45. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 27 April 1994, A36.

46. See R.W. Johnson, "Here for the crunch -- R.W. Johnson in South Africa," London Review of Books April 1994, pp. 3, 5-6. Johnson points out that Ben Turok, "another white Communist, best known for his denunciation of the [World] Bank and the [International Monetary] Fund for 'attempting to install bourgeois democracy and so-called free markets in the Third World,' was installed as the top ANC official for economics. Johnson argues that the ANC will either have to borrow or print more money to finance its grandiose development plans, a policy that runs counter to the position of both the World Bank and the IMF and which could damage the economy in a country that is presently prudent and under-borrowed.

47. The New York Times, 2 May 1994, pp. A1, 10.

48. Clines, Fancis X., "Mandela and de Klerk Meet On Picking a New Cabinet," The New York Times, 4 May 1994, A8.

49. See Bill Keller, "Mandela Picks Old Comrades To Fill His New Government," The New York Times, 7 May 1994, pp. 1, 8. (Which old comrades?); Bill Keller, "Mandela Completes Cabinet Giving Buthelezi Post," The New York Times, 12 May 1994, A8.

50. Possehl, Suzanne, "Diamond Deal Stirs Regret in Russia," The New York Times, 14 May 1994, p. 37.

51. The New York Times, 26 December 1993. Style Section, p. 10 ("Miss Ward, Mr. Oppenheimer"). For a history of Cecil Rhodes and the Oppenheimers, see Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The Randlords (New York, Atheneum, 1986), and Anthony Hocking, Oppenheimer and Son (New York, McGraw Hill, 1973).

52. Olojede, Dele, "ANC Ignored Fraud; Inkatha 'victory' appears rigged," Newsday, 17 May 1994, pp. A4, 13.

Notes to the Notes

Finance Minister Derek Keys announced his intention to resign in the fall of 1994, citing "personal reasons." The New York Times, 6 July 1994, A. 4. He was replaced by Chris Liebenberg, who is also white and a prominent former bank chairman. As Keys is a member of the National Party and Liebenberg is technically an independent, de Klerk had the right to name another Nationalist to the cabinet to keep his total of six. In actuality, he had seven, as Liebenberg is very much part of the old establishment, a quick gain by de Klerk to increase his growing influence.

The Democratic Party, the personal vehicle for Helen Suzman of the old Liberal Party, while not part of the national government, since it failed to win enough votes to gain representation in the cabinet, did win control of the city council of Johannesburg. It became involved in crushing the squatter rebellion of poor blacks who sought to have the national government provide them with land, as the ANC had promised during the campaign.

Allard Lowenstein's connection with the CIA did not begin with his trip to South Africa and Namibia in 1959. It began in 1951, as a publicly released CIA document revealed. An interoffice CIA memo from Milton W. Buffington to CSP (Lewis S. Thompson) dated 17 February 1951 (CIA Cold War Records, The CIA under Harry Truman, Michael Warner, ed., History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 1994) discloses that at a CIA conference on the National Student Association held by Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, and Dr. William Y. Elliot, it was decided that the CIA should obtain a draft deferment for the staunchly anti-Communist Lowenstein, who was threatened with conscription at the time of the Korean war, in order to allow him to serve as president of the National Student Association, thereby enabling him to thwart the efforts by left-wing students, led by the International Vice President, Herbert Eisenberg, to gain control over the organization.

The memo makes clear that the CIA had accomplished the "penetration" of the National Students Association (NSA), and intended to "subsidize" specific NSA international projects. The CIA control of the NSA's international programs stems from this date, during which time Lowenstein was serving as the NSA's president. The NSA, through its international division, would develop close links with the South African National Union of Students and would afford Lowenstein with the opportunity of developing close contacts that would be of considerable importance to him and the CIA. For example, Ernest Wentzel, who was pivotal in planning Lowenstein's trip to South Africa in 1979, when Lowenstein was reporting to CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, was an old National Union of Students contact.

In Britain, an enigmatic Kenyan with the unlikely name of Washington Okumu, is now being credited with mediating the deal between Mandela and Buthelezi to bring Inkatha back into the elections. (See CAM, The University of Cambridge Alumni Magazine, Easter Term 1994, p. 36.) A graduate of Harvard with a Ph.D. from Cambridge, where he was at King's College, Okumu has homes in London and Nairobi and is executive director of the Jubilee Centre, a Cambridge, England based "Christian research group."
________________________

Richard Cummings has worked for the Agency for International Development (AID); and taught at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge; Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia; and the University of the West Indies, Barbados. Holder of a Ph.D. degree in Social and Political Sciences from Cambridge University, he writes on international affairs and world politics, and is the author of The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and The Liberal Dream (New York, Grove Press, 1985). This essay first appeared in the Summer, 1995 issue of International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and is posted by Public Information Research, Inc. with the kind permission of the author and the Journal.

Paul Rigby
10-18-2008, 07:50 AM
For the benefit of those slightly younger than our estimable selves, I hasten to add the following extracts by way of explaining the pliant Finn's earlier service to the US:

Patrick Heseldine*, “Letters to the editor: Missing diplomat links and the Lockerbie tragedy,” The Guardian, 5 August 1991



Patrick Heseldine, “Letters to the editor: Flight Path,” The Guardian, 22 December 1992



*Formerly of the Information Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Patrick Heseldine, “Letters: ANC as fall-guys for Lockerbie bombing,” The Guardian, 22 April 1992:


That double standards were evident in the Rambo-style imposition of sanctions against Libya for its refusal to “hand over” the Lockerbie suspects – compared with an apparently limp response to the refusal three and a half years ago by Belgium and Ireland to “extradite” a suspected terrorist to stand trial in Britain – cannot reasonably be denied (Letters, April 18). The subversion of the UN Security Council as a pawn in the West’s game of geopolitics and the denial of a fair trial to the suspects (having already been convicted by a supine media) still amount to less than half of the emerging political thriller story of Lockerbie.

Readers of the letters page since December 1988 will know my view on where ultimate culpability for the crime of Lockerbie resides: South African state-sponsored terrorism targeted PanAm 103’s most prominent victim, Bernt Carlsson, UN Commissioner for Namibia. Based purely on a hunch and some circumstantial evidence, it is a view that few others share.

In the past week, however, David Beresford’s excellent reporting on the Winnie Mandela scandal in South Africa has prompted a dreadful thought and reminded me of what foreign minister, Pik Botha, said on Radio 4’s Today programme after the December 21, 1988 disaster. Like Carlsson, Mr Botha was flying to New York for the signing ceremony at the UN of the Namibia Independence Agreement. Mr Botha cancelled his booking on PanAm flight 103 and took the earlier PanAm 101. He told Radio 4 that he thought he himself had been the target and that the ANC were the perpetrators of Lockerbie.

According to David Beresford, the Winnie scandal began to unfold in the week after Lockerbie, on December 29, 1988. A key and mysterious player in the scandal was Mrs Xoliswa Falati, Winnie’s co-accused in the Stompie Moeketsi Seipei murder trial, whose legal costs were reportedly met by the Libyan government. If my theory that Winnie Mandela has been and continues to be framed is correct and the ANC are being groomed as the real Lockerbie culprits, the Western media are about to tell us that Libya trained ANC guerrillas and fixed on one of Nelson Mandela’s first overseas itineraries after his release from a 25-year incarceration. The inexorable conclusion is that the Libyans will be shown to have acted as the ANC’s agents by attempting to assassinate Mr Botha and blowing up PanAm 103 instead.

Now that the cat is prematurely out of this particular bag, the politicians concerned should consider their positions. Who will take the rap: Bush or De Klerk, Major or Mitterand?

Paul Rigby
10-19-2008, 12:27 PM
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10573

How the Nobel Peace Prize was Won

By Gregory Elich

Global Research, October 15, 2008

Counterpunch

Ahtisaari’s mission was a success. He “was sensational,” said a senior U.S. official.

America’s foreign policy establishment surely enjoyed broad support from its European “partners” when it came to the award? Unquestionably. Here’s a taste of Europe’s unqualified appreciation of the Finn’s disinterested labours:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/21/balkans.unitednations


The Americans have held back so far under demands from the EU. Despite formal EU support for the Ahtisaari plan, criticism of the Finnish envoy's mediation is growing among European diplomats and officials, and European support could shatter if tested. Moscow appears to be banking on that.

Ian Traynor, “Kosovo to declare independence despite Russian opposition,” The Guardian, 21 July 2007, p.25.

David Guyatt
10-20-2008, 02:41 PM
Paul, this has proved to be a fascinating and insightful look and I thank you for posting it.

It has left me wondering if my previous understanding of the deep political factors behind Lockerbie - namely, the deaths of the 5-man DIA team under command of Major Charles "Tiny" McKee on board PanAm 107 and the entire drug connection was not the motive... and possibly a red herring.

Paul Rigby
10-20-2008, 07:01 PM
Paul, this has proved to be a fascinating and insightful look and I thank you for posting it.

It has left me wondering if my previous understanding of the deep political factors behind Lockerbie - namely, the deaths of the 5-man DIA team under command of Major Charles "Tiny" McKee on board PanAm 107 and the entire drug connection was not the motive... and possibly a red herring.

Afraid so, DG, what we were offered was nothing less than the classic "double-bubble" - an easily penetrated outer-layer of deception (some Libyan geezers) within which lurked, for the benefit of the more intelligent and attentive, the inner deception (McKee and the DIA). Both designed to burst under the pressure of meaningful scrutiny.

I have long wondered what happened to Heseldine. I dimly recollect that he opened a cafe in a small town in Essex (Ongar? Chipping Ongar? Something like that.) If any does know his whereabouts, let me know; or draw his attention to the thread and ask him for his thoughts. I'd be fascinated to hear/read the full story.

Paul

Paul Rigby
10-22-2008, 06:07 PM
I have long wondered what happened to Heseldine. I dimly recollect that he opened a cafe in a small town in Essex (Ongar? Chipping Ongar? Something like that.) If any does know his whereabouts, let me know; or draw his attention to the thread and ask him for his thoughts. I'd be fascinated to hear/read the full story.

James Sanders. Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service (London: John Murray, 2006), p.467n48:


One of the more startling conspiracy theories involving apartheid South Africa concerns the Lockerbie bombing. The UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, died in the crash of PanAm 103 on 21 December 1988. If he had survived, Carlsson would have supervised the independence of Namibia. Incredibly, Pik Botha, Magnus Malan, the CSI of MID Admiral van Tonder and twenty other South African officials were also booked on PanAm 103. They were travelling to New York for the final signing ceremony of the agreements relating to the Angolan-Namibian peace process.

Botha and his team arrived early in London on an SAA flight which ‘inexplicably cut out the scheduled Frankfurt stopover’. Botha and five members of his team were hastily booked on the morning flight PanAm 101 flight; the remaining seventeen South African delegates did not use their tickets on PanAm 103 but returned to South Africa. (Patrick Heseldine, Lockerbie Trial: A Better Defence of Incrimination, 2005.)

The Swedish newspaper iDaG, 12 March 1990, reported that Carlsson had been due to return to New York on 20 December but was ‘persuaded’ to visit De Beers in London and therefore was forced to take PanAm 103 in order to be present at the signing ceremony.

A Reuters news report, 12 November 1994, confirmed that the South African party had been booked on PanAm 103, as did the South African Minister of Justice Dullah Omar when he was asked in the South African parliament on 12 June 1996 whether Pik Botha and his entourage had ‘had any plans to travel on [PanAm 103].’

The second parliamentary question: ‘Whether the South African intelligence service had any reason to be concerned about or was aware of concerns expressed by the intelligence services of the [USA] or the [UK] about a threat of a possible terrorist attack on PanAm 103?’ drew a ‘curiously equivocal’ response from the Minister: ‘As far as I could ascertain, the answer to both questions is no’ (Private Eye, 2 April 1999).

On Patrick Heseldine, the Foreign Office diplomat who was dismissed after writing a letter to the Guardian in which he criticised Mrs Thatcher for operating a ‘double standard’ on South African state terrorism, see the Guardian 7, 17 December 1988, 3 August 1989

Paul Rigby
10-22-2008, 06:36 PM
James Sanders. Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service (London: John Murray, 2006), p.467n48:

Apologies – it should be “Haseldine” with an “a” not with an “e.” That will teach me to work from blurry photocopies.

In addition, and to my genuine surprise, there is a Wikipedia entry on Haseldine, complete with scans of some of his Guardian letters; and a pamphlet from his 1993 bid to become a Labour county councillor in Essex.

Has anyone interview him on camera?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrick_Haseldine

David Guyatt
10-22-2008, 09:10 PM
There has always been considered arguments that the bomb was placed on the Pan Am107 flight during the stop over at London Heathrow, and that the trigger was height actuated -- thus exploding over Lockerbie as the aircraft increased altitude.

Indeed, there were any number of people prowling around this who were loosely associated with Mossad. I know because I met a couple of them and this view was expressed at that time.

Some years later this view was expanded upon by another gentleman who had rather unique insights into the matter. The Samsonite suitcase was switched on the tarmac at Heathrow using a well established colour coded routine to take off suitcases loaded with drugs and replace them with an identical Samsonite suitcase containing ordinary contents. There were, he said, PIRA connections. The implication was that PIRA was used as either cut-outs or as contractors. The PIRA were associated with a certain US arms manufacturer located in Manchester that was know to be close to the CIA (actually it was a CIA proprietary).

The Samsonite cases were purchased in a small town in northern England. Many years later the railway line running through the town in question
was disrupted by an alleged IRA bomb. The story of the bomb disappeared almost from the inside news pages almost as quickly as it arose and there is no evidence that it was actually true. I always wondered if this were some sort of subtle signal?

Paul Rigby
09-27-2009, 09:42 PM
Cui bono? Well, Israel wouldn't be quite top of my list on this one; and I can't help noticing how the sizeable CIA presence in the immediate aftermath has been entirely erased in favour of a single Mossad agent. Still, it is good on Abu Nidal's work for Israel, and other things besides, not least the link between Hollywood and the propaganda war against Muslims and Arabs which appears to owe much to Nazi efforts against Jews:


Deception over Lockerbie

by Maidhc Ó Cathail

http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15362

Global Research, September 27, 2009

“By way of deception, shalt thou wage war” - Motto of the Mossad, Israel’s Intelligence Service

The scenes of flag-waving Libyans welcoming home Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, the man known as the Lockerbie bomber, further discredited Muslims in the minds of many. For those whose knowledge of the story is derived mainly from TV news, it appeared to be a callous celebration of mass murder, lending credence to the belief that “Islam” and “terrorism” are virtually synonymous. A closer look at the facts surrounding the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, however, reveals a pattern of deception by those who have most to gain from making Muslims look bad.

While the news reports dutifully recorded the protestations of outrage by Barack Obama, Gordon Brown and others at what appeared to be an unseemly hero’s welcome for a convicted terrorist, they neglected to mention that Libyans were celebrating the release of a countryman whom they believe had been wrongfully imprisoned for eight years. Also omitted from the reports was any indication that informed observers of Megrahi’s case in Britain and elsewhere are likewise convinced of his innocence.

Robert Black, the University of Edinburgh law professor who was the architect of the trial at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, says that “no reasonable tribunal could have convicted Megrahi on the evidence led,” and calls his 2001 conviction “an absolute and utter outrage.” Prof. Black likens the Scottish trial judges to the White Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass who “believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” Hans Köchler, a UN-appointed observer at the trial, states that “there is not one single piece of material evidence linking the two accused to the crime,” and condemns the court’s verdict as a “spectacular miscarriage of justice.” And Dr. Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora was one of the 270 killed on December 21, 1988, dismisses the prosecution’s case against Megrahi and fellow Libyan Lamin Khalifa F’hima as “a cock and bull story.”

According to that “cock and bull story,” Megrahi, the head of security for Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), conspired with Lamin Khalifa F’hima, the station manager for LAA in Malta (who was acquitted), to put a suitcase bomb on a flight from Malta to Frankfurt. At Frankfurt, the lethal suitcase had to be transferred to another flight bound for London Heathrow. Then in Heathrow Airport, it would have to be transferred for a second time onto the ill-fated Flight 103 destined for New York.

But for that rather implausible scenario to be true, the Libyans would have to have had an inordinate faith in the reliability of baggage handlers in two of Europe’s busiest airports at one of the busiest times of the year. Less optimistic would-be bombers would surely have slipped the bomb-laden suitcase on board in London. Fueling suspicions that this is indeed what happened, investigating police were told by a security guard at Heathrow that the Pan Am baggage storage area had been broken into on the night of the bombing.

The reported break-in at Heathrow was part of 600 pages of new and deliberately suppressed evidence that Megrahi’s defense could present at an appeal, which in 2007 the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, after a three-year investigation, recommended he be granted.

But before that appeal could be heard, the compassionate release of Megrahi, suffering from terminal prostate cancer, conveniently spared the potential embarrassment of all those involved in his dubious conviction. More significantly, it also averted awkward questions being raised, in the likely event of the Libyan being acquitted, about who actually planted the bomb, and why.

Reel Bad Muslims

Many of those who doubt Libya’s responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, perhaps not surprisingly in the current climate, tend to suspect other Muslim countries of involvement. The most popular theory is that Iran hired the Syrian-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) led by Ahmed Gibril to avenge the “accidental” shooting down by the USS Vincennes on July 3, 1988 of Iran Air Flight 655, which killed all 288 civilians on board.

Others believe that Abu Nidal, the founder of the infamous Black September terrorist group, may have been involved. If they’re right, it raises disturbing questions about who was ultimately responsible for the Lockerbie atrocity. In his fine biography of Nidal, A Gun for Hire, British journalist Patrick Seale confirms long-held suspicions that many in the Middle East have had about the “Palestinian terrorist” who did more than anyone to discredit the Palestinian cause. “Abu Nidal was undoubtedly a Mossad agent,” Seale asserts. “Practically every job he did benefited Israel.”

Interestingly, one theory which has the PFLP-GC collaborating with Abu Nidal on behalf of Iran, has been espoused by a former Mossad staffer, Yuval Aviv, whose New York-based investigative agency, Interfor, prepared a report for Pan Am’s insurers on the Lockerbie bombing.

Writing under the pen name Sam Green, Aviv also authored Flight 103, a fictional account of the Lockerbie tragedy he claims is “based solidly on real-life facts,” in which the vengeful Iranians enlist a Palestinian terrorist, Ahmed ‘The Falcon’ Shabaan, to do their dirty work. Aviv, who inspired Steven Spielberg’s Munich, hopes his director friend will convert his Lockerbie tale into another Hollywood blockbuster.

Hardly any mainstream commentators, however, have questioned the trustworthiness of a former Mossad agent, who retains close ties with the intelligence service, fingering Palestinians and Iran for a terrorist attack which killed 189 Americans, thereby blackening the reputation of two of Israel’s greatest foes in the minds of those it wishes to convince that the U.S. and Israel face a common enemy.

Dirty Tricks

Not everyone in the media has been as naive about Israeli machinations though. Writing in the Guardian just before the trial of the two Libyans, veteran American journalist Russell Warren Howe, in an excellent article titled “What if they are innocent?” analyses whether the Iranian government, Palestinian terrorists or Israeli intelligence were more likely perpetrators. Howe concludes, “Even if Megrahi and F’hima are found guilty of the most serious charges, there would still be a need for a new investigation: to decide what was Israel’s possibly major role in mass murder and deception of its main benefactor, the US.” Howe is suggesting that even if the Libyans, or other Arabs, had actually planted the bomb, they may still have been duped into doing so by Israeli agents.

Intriguingly, Howe cites a reference in Gordon Thomas’ book on Mossad, Gideon’s Spies,to a Mossad officer stationed in London who showed up in Lockerbie the morning after the crash to arrange for the removal of a suitcase from the crime scene. The suitcase, said to belong to Captain Charles McKee, a DIA officer who was killed on the flight, was later returned “empty and undamaged.”

Moreover, the idea of Libyan responsibility, Howe notes, seems to have originated in Israel. Again, he quotes Thomas, who says that a source at LAP, Mossad’s psychological warfare unit, informed him that “within hours of the crash, staff at LAP were working the phones to their media contacts urging them to publicise that here was ‘incontrovertible proof’ that Libya, through its intelligence service, Jamahirya, was culpable.”

It may also have been Mossad disinformation, Howe suspects, that induced the U.S. government to believe the Libyans were guilty. The day after the Lockerbie bombing, U.S. intelligence intercepted a radio message from Tripoli to a Libyan government office in Berlin that effectively said, “mission accomplished.”

Two years earlier, a similar message intercept had induced Ronald Reagan to order air strikes against Libya, killing over a hundred people, including Qaddafi’s two-year-old adopted daughter. But the message had been faked by Israel, according to Victor Ostrovsky, a former Mossad case officer, who described the operation in The Other Side of Deception, the second of two exposés he wrote about the Mossad after leaving the service.

Operation Trojan began in February 1986 when the Mossad secretly installed a communications device known as a “Trojan” in an apartment in Tripoli. The Trojan received messages broadcast by Mossad’s LAP on one frequency and automatically transmitted them on a different frequency used by the Libyan government. “Using the Trojan,” Ostrovsky writes, “the Mossad tried to make it appear that a long series of terrorist orders were being transmitted to various Libyan embassies around the world.” U.S. intelligence, as anticipated by the Israelis, intercepted the bogus messages, and believed them to be authentic -- especially after receiving confirmation from the Mossad.

Within weeks of the Trojan being installed, two American soldiers were killed in an explosion at La Belle Discothčque, a nightclub in West Berlin frequented by U.S. servicemen. Assuming that Libya was responsible, nine days later the U.S. dropped 60 tons of bombs on Tripoli and Benghazi. Few suspected that the Americans had been tricked into the “retaliation” by Israel, whose subterfuge had punished Qaddafi for his support of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and further alienated the U.S from the Arab world.

Not all Americans are oblivious to Israeli wiles, however. Commenting on the Israeli intelligence service’s penchant for deception, Andrew Killgore, a former U.S. ambassador to Qatar, wrote in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, “Mossad’s specialty was dirty tricks...Its modus operandi had always been the same: pull off a dirty trick but make it appear somebody else had done it.”

As part of any new investigation to establish whether or not the Lockerbie bombing was another one of the Mossad’s “dirty tricks,” detectives might want to interview Issac Yeffet, the former chief of security for the Israeli airline, El Al, who in 1986 was commissioned by Pan Am to survey its security at a number of airports worldwide. As Killgore, in a separate article for the Washington Report, suggestively noted: “Yeffet may have been successful in maintaining perfect security for El Al at Ben-Gurion Airport. But his efforts at Heathrow Airport in London, one of the airports he surveyed for Pan Am, and to which he and his employees had full rein, failed to save Pan Am Flight 103.”

Still protesting his innocence, the dying Megrahi told reporters on his release, “The truth never dies.” That may be so. But as long as the Western media continue to believe that only Israel’s enemies would blow up a civilian airliner, the truth about Lockerbie is unlikely to ever reach a very wide audience.

Maidhc Ó Cathail is a freelance writer with a particular interest in the Middle East.

Paul Rigby
10-28-2009, 09:28 PM
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10573

How the Nobel Peace Prize was Won

By Gregory Elich

Global Research, October 15, 2008

Counterpunch

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari has been widely hailed in the West, where there has been an outpouring of praise for the man and his efforts. Generally seen as a tireless promoter of peace and reconciliation, Ahtisaari has another side that has not received sufficient attention.

Yes, MI6 has been thinking long and hard on the question of the European Council presidency and has plumped for - gosh, the CIA candidate. Now there's a surprise. Well done, chaps, as bright and principled as ever.

Carrying the torch for the creepy Finnish sot, none other than Timmy Garter-Sash, the bearded fellow-traveller, in the pages of the CIA's favourite British liberal daily, The Grauniad:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/28/president-of-europe-foreign-policy?commentpage=1

Now we see why the Guardian has hitherto been playing up the candidacy of British war criminal T. Bliar - out with the red herring, as it were, and in with the preferred puppet.

Paul Rigby
10-09-2010, 10:14 PM
http://orientalreview.org/2010/09/23/the-wests-plans-to-partition-kyrgyzstan-are-nearing-completion/


Martti Ahtisaari probably has a personal interest in Kosovo’s independence. The German media got hold of an intelligence report from the German intelligence service, BND, which said UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari, who proposed the plan for Kosovo independence, received about 40 million euros from Albanian billionaire politician Behgjet Pacolli. No one refuted the report, and the scandal was quickly hushed up.

And, yes, the CIA/State Department has deposited the fleck of Finnish vomit in Kyrgyzstan. Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey/Where Martti roams and the CIA makes hay.

Magda Hassan
10-10-2010, 12:54 AM
This is very bad news. Poor people of Kyrgyzstan.

Paul Rigby
01-08-2014, 07:57 PM
Looking forward to your next installment...

This is a quick sketch of an answer, but it gets most of the key points in. Apologies, by the way, for the absence of pagination in the cited articles. I had the bad habit in those days of omitting the page number of the articles I clipped.

The context for Lockerbie and the assassination of Bernt Carlsson by plane bomb

Namibia was, and remains, awash with strategic, and very lucrative, minerals. Thus control of the country�s resources was, in and of itself, held vital to US/Western business and military interests. British and South African extractors had made hay in the years of control from Pretoria (1).

Namibian �independence� was also � and this is crucial to understanding the stakes underpinning the Lockerbie atrocity - but a prelude to the even bigger prize of South African. The introduction of Namibian self-governance could not, therefore, be allowed to set �unfortunate� precedents for, or create obstacles to, the planned full, smooth re-integration of South Africa, complete with new veneer of black enfranchisement and nominal political control, into the Western economic order.

The major threat to the continuation of business as usual in Namibia was the genuine commitment of the non-CIA controlled elements of SWAPO�s leadership to a programme of extensive nationalisation. The party�s 1989 independence election manifesto brimmed �with the language of Marx and class struggle� (2). That programme�s implementation depended on SWAPO clearing an obstacle erected by the US, Britain, and the former�s regional proxy-in-chief, South Africa � it had to obtain a �two-thirds majority necessary to write the new constitution on its own� (3). SWAPO�s success in obtaining that two-thirds majority hinged upon the extent to which it could mobilize support not merely in its heartland, Ovamboland, home to just over a third of the electorate, but beyond, among other tribes such as the Damaras and Namas.

Carlsson�s murder removed a potentially formidable obstacle to the panoply of dirty tricks deployed by Washington, London and Pretoria, to minimise SWAPO�s electoral victory. He was a prot�g� of Olaf Palme, and his career embodied Swedish social democracy�s commitment to the Third World democratization (4).


(1) David Pallister, �British and SA mining companies accused of plundering Namibia,� The Guardian, 29 September 1988.

(2) Scott Peterson, �Grizzled rebel Nujoma takes statesman�s role,� The Sunday Telegraph, 29 October 1989.

(3) Ibid. See David Beresford, �Namibia tinderbox awaits a spark,� The Guardian, 3 November 1989, for the Anglo-American insistence on preserving this requirement, even to the extent of threatening to use their Security Council veto, in the face of tentative UN calls for flexibility.

(4) Dan van der Vat, �Obituary: Bernt Carlsson: Key figure in Namibian peace process,� The Guardian, 23 December 1988.

Lumbar region permitting, I'll add a brief sketch of those dirty tricks measures later today or tomorrow.

The Downing of Flight 103 over Lockerbie: It was the Uranium

Mystery continues to surround the 1988 downing of Panam Flight 103 at Lockerbie. Who did it, how, and why? UN Assistant Secretary-General and Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson Died in the Crash

By Patrick Haseldine

http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-downing-of-flight-103-over-lockerbie-it-was-the-uranium/5364222

Patrick Haseldine is a former British diplomat who was dismissed by the then foreign secretary, John Major, in August 1989. He is often referred to as the “Emeritus Professor of Lockerbie Studies”.

After 25 years study of the topic Patrick Haseldine reveals the shocking truth.

A little over two weeks ago, my wife and I were seated beside the flower bedecked pulpit in a packed Westminster Abbey.

There was an eerie hush as Big Ben’s muffled chimes tolled 7:00 pm – the exact moment 25 years earlier when Pan Am Flight 103 was sabotaged over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21st December 1988.

All 259 passengers and crew were killed, as were 11 people in the town. The names of the 270 Lockerbie bombing victims were listed alphabetically in the Order of Service, and five relatives took it in turns to read them out.

Thus it was Jane Swire, mother of victim Flora and wife of Dr Jim Swire, who read the name of the 43rd victim on the list: Bernt Wilmar Carlsson.

United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, was Lockerbie’s highest profile victim, yet the authorities and the media never mention him. Why?

As comedian Kenneth Williams used to say: “I think the answer lies in the soil.”

More specifically, I believe the answer lies in the processed uranium ore (Yellowcake) that was illegally extracted from Namibia in the period 1976 to 1989. A TV documentary film in March 1980 described succinctly what was going on:

“World In Action investigates the secret contract and operations arranged by British-based Rio Tinto Zinc Corp to import into Britain uranium (Yellowcake) from the Rössing Uranium Mine in Namibia, whose major shareholders are the governments of Iran and South Africa.

“This contract having received the blessing of the British government is now compromising the UK’s position in the United Nations negotiations to remove apartheid South Africa from Namibia, which it is illegally occupying.”

Thatcher “proud to be British”

Within four months of the Lockerbie disaster, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher decided to make a whistle-stop tour of southern Africa, and found time to visit Namibia’s Rössing Uranium Mine where she was accompanied by David Cameron, then a youthful Conservative Central Office researcher.

Mrs Thatcher was so impressed by the Rössing Uranium Mine that she declared it made her “proud to be British”.

While Mrs Thatcher was in Namibia, she put improper pressure on the UN’s man, Martti Ahtisaari, head of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, to permit the South African Defence Force (SADF) to take action against SWAPO soldiers who were peacefully returning to Namibia to vote in the November 1989 independence elections.

As a result, as many as 308 SWAPO soldiers were killed – “shot in the back” according to former SADF major Nico Basson.

Whether Mrs Thatcher could have persuaded UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, to agree to such treachery we shall never know since Mr Carlsson was assassinated fifteen weeks earlier, on 21st December 1988.

Illegal mining

In 1974, the UN Council for Namibia issued Decree No. 1 prohibited the extraction and distribution of any natural resource from Namibian territory without the explicit permission of the UNCN (United Nations Council for Namibia).

It also provided for the seizure of any illegally exported material, and warned that violators could be held liable for damages. Projected to be Namibia’s largest mining operation, Rössing became the primary target of Decree No. 1.

However, many Western governments (including the US and Britain) refused to accept Decree No. 1 as binding, with lawyers and government officials disputing whether the decree was juridically sound, whether and how it might apply, and which courts might enforce its application.

But the bottom line was that Rössing aimed to supply at least 10 percent of the global uranium market which translated into one-third of Britain’s needs, and probably more for Japan.

Decree No. 1 therefore sparked a lengthy international struggle over the legitimacy of Rössing uranium. The UNCN sent out numerous delegations to convince governments to suspend their dealings with Namibia.

Only one country pledged to respect Decree No. 1

They heard many expressions of support for the independence process, but prior to the mid-1980s only Sweden (among the large Western uranium consumers) pledged to boycott Rössing’s product.

Activists stepped up the pressure in a wide variety of forums. In the UK and the Netherlands, they joined forces with the anti-nuclear movement, resulting in organisations like the British CANUC (Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contract).

The UNCN held a week-long hearing in July 1980, during which experts and activists from Europe, Japan, and the United States gave presentations on Rössing’s operations and contracts, and the TV documentary Follow the Yellowcake Road was screened.

Testimony focused on the relationship between southern Africa and the Western nuclear industry, arguing that all purchases of Namibian uranium effectively supported the colonial occupation via the taxes paid by the Rössing mine.

In 1981, Namibia’s government-in-waiting (SWAPO) helped organise a seminar for West European trade unions as well as presentations on living and working conditions at Rössing and on the mine’s paramilitary security forces, which appealed to the loyalties of the International Socialist movement, where Bernt Carlsson was Secretary-General.

The seminar detailed the secret movements of Rössing uranium through European planes, ships, docks, and roads, noting that European transport workers had unknowingly handled barrels of radioactive substances.

A 1982 seminar organised by the American Committee on Africa on the role of transnational corporations in Namibia focused heavily on uranium, reprising many of the arguments mounted by European activists.

UNCN legal action

In May 1985, the United Nations Council for Namibia (UNCN) began legal action against URENCO – the joint Dutch/British/West German uranium enrichment company, with plants in Capenhurst (Cheshire, England), Almelo (Netherlands) and Gronau (West Germany).

Since URENCO had been importing uranium ore from the Rössing Uranium Mine in Namibia, the company was charged with breaching UNCN Decree No. 1.

The case was expected to be ready by the end of 1985 but was delayed because URENCO argued that – despite having enriched uranium of Namibian origin since 1980 – it was impossible to tell where specific consignments came from.

When the case finally reached court in July 1986, the Dutch government took URENCO’s line,claiming not to have known where the uranium had been mined.

Upon the adjournment of the URENCO proceedings, SWAPO’s UN representative, Helmut Angula, insisted that other companies, such as Shell, De Beers (Consolidated Diamond Mines), Newmont, and Rio Tinto were also likely to face prosecution for breaching the UNCN Decree.

Bernt Carlsson lays down the law

The man responsible for Namibia under international law, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, spoke about these prosecutions in a World In Action TV documentary “The Case of the Disappearing Diamonds” which was broadcast by Thames Television in September 1987:

“The United Nations this year in July started legal action against one such company – the Dutch company URENCO which imports uranium.”

When asked if he would be taking action against other companies such as De Beers, the diamond mining conglomerate, Bernt Carlsson replied:

“All the companies which are carrying out activities in Namibia which have not been authorised by the United Nations are being studied at present.

“As far as De Beers is concerned, the corporation has been trying to skim the cream which means they have gone for the large diamonds at the expense of the steady pace. In this way they have really shortened the lifespan of the mines.

“One would expect from a worldwide corporation like De Beers and Anglo-American that they would behave with an element of social and political responsibility. But their behaviour in the specific case of Namibia has been one of profit maximation regardless of its social, economic, political and even legal responsibility.”

Delay in closing the UF6 loophole

In 1988, US Congressional Democrats began working to close the UF6 loophole. The State Department’s Office of Non-proliferation and Export Policy did as well, declaring:

“It is not possible to avoid the provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act by swapping flags or obligations on natural uranium physically of South African origin before it enters the USA.”

Nevertheless, Rössing managed to delay the implementation of restrictions which could have put it out of business. And – in the end – that delay sufficed: apartheid South Africa and other negotiating parties signed an independence accord on 22nd December 1988.

It was on his way to the signing of the agreement at UN headquarters in New York, that UN Commissioner for Namibia Bernt Carlsson became the highest profile victim of the Pan Am Flight 103 crash at Lockerbie on 21st December 1988.

URENCO case dropped

Following Bernt Carlsson’s untimely death in the Lockerbie bombing, the case against URENCO was inexplicably dropped and no further prosecutions took place of the companies and countries that were in breach of the United Nations Council for Namibia Decree No. 1.

Despite this fairly obvious evidence that Bernt Carlsson was the prime target on Pan Am Flight 103, there has never been a murder investigation conducted by the CIA, FBI, Scottish Police or indeed by the United Nations.

Instead, fabricated evidence has been used to frame and wrongfully convict the Libyan Abdelbaset al-Megrahi for the crime of Lockerbie.

URENCO privatisation

On 22 April 2013, David Cameron’s coalition government announced plans to sell its share in URENCO – the uranium enrichment company owned by Britain, Germany and the Netherlands – unleashing a new wave of privatisations in an attempt to cut the public debt.

The UK government’s one-third share in URENCO could fetch up to £3bn, making it one of the biggest privatisations in the UK in years.

Headquartered in the semi-rural Buckinghamshire village of Stoke Poges – where, appropriately enough given its atomic plot the James Bond film “Goldfinger” was partly shot – URENCO has a 31% share of the world’s uranium enrichment market.

This provides the fuel for nuclear power utilities and URENCO has enrichment plants in the US and the three investor countries, including one in Capenhurst, Cheshire.

“It’s a ridiculous idea”, says the GMB union’s national secretary for energy Gary Smith, who earlier this week complained to The Independent of the prospect of the Chinese investing in the nuclear new-build programme. “We’re flogging off precious nuclear assets instead of developing a strategy around nuclear. It’s absolute madness.”

But there is a logic to the move: by privatising URENCO, the British government hopes to bring closure to the Lockerbie affair, and put a distance between itself and the Thatcher administration’s criminal behaviour in processing Namibian Yellowcake contrary to United Nations Council for Namibia Decree No. 1.

United Nations Inquiry

In November 2013, I created this e-petition calling upon HM Government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to:

“Support a United Nations Inquiry into the deaths of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and UN Assistant Secretary-General Bernt Carlsson”

Dag Hammarskjöld was Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1953 to 1961. On the night of 17-18 September 1961, in the course of a UN mission to try to bring peace to the former Belgian Congo, Hammarskjöld’s Swedish-owned and crewed plane crashed near Ndola airport in the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). All the passengers and crew died.

It now appears that his plane was shot down in order to protect western mining interests in Belgian Congo’s mineral rich Katanga province, to this day a major source of cobalt, copper, tin and diamonds – not to mention radium and uranium.

On 9 September 2013, the London-based Hammarskjöld Commission reported that there was“significant new evidence“ about the plane crash that killed United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and recommended that the adjourned 1962 UN Inquiry should now be reopened.

UN Assistant Secretary-General Bernt Carlsson was the highest profile victim on Pan Am Flight 103 which was sabotaged over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988.

Since Bernt Carlsson’s death has never been investigated, the British Government should propose extending the remit of the new UN Inquiry to cover the deaths of both senior diplomats: Dag Hammarskjöld and Bernt Carlsson.

His e-petition is open for signature by UK citizens and residents from 13 November 2013 to 13 May 2014, and can be signed here.
Copyright Patrick Haseldine, The Ecologist, 2014

Magda Hassan
01-09-2014, 10:46 AM
This is one of my favorite threads on the forum. Many dots connected here. I found it interesting, though there need not be too much read into it, that Bernt Carlsson's fiance at the time of his death was the daughter of well known Yugoslavs. Interesting in light of the Finn's next clean up job. Wonder what became of her?

Paul Rigby
11-08-2015, 10:35 PM
Open Letter to President Ahtisaari Re Jim Murphy

by Craig Murray on November 8, 2015 2:11 pm in Uncategorized

https://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2015/11/open-letter-to-president-ahtisaari-re-jim-murphy/#comment-560529


Dear President Ahtisaari,

I had the pleasure of meeting you on a number of occasions over the years, including when I was British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, and I recall your genuine concern for democracy and human rights in a region where they are sadly neglected.

Like a great many people in Scotland I was shocked that CMI is employing Jim Murphy. Of course, in a democracy there are always losers as well as winners in elections, and both are genuine and valid participants in public life. It is not the fact that CMI employs a politician who has been so recently, comprehensively and humiliatingly rejected by his national electorate that will do any damage to CMI. In a sense I think it does you credit.

What shocks many people here is that Mr Murphy is by any standards a dedicated warmonger. He was a major and important proponent of the invasion of Iraq, and is the strongest of supporters of the massive increase of Britain’s nuclear arsenal, in breach of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Mr Murphy is a member of the Henry Jackson Society, which as you know is a body which exists to promote United States neo-conservative foreign policy in its most aggressive sense, and openly and actively supports and condones extraordinary rendition and the use of torture by the CIA. It has supported every single military action by the USA since its formation, and defends United States exceptionalism in international law, including US non-membership of the International Criminal Court.

Mr Murphy’s belief set is therefore fundamentally at odds with the stated aims of CMI. Indeed, his employment by you can only lead to the suspicion that CMI’s stated objectives are not its real objectives, and that like Mr Murphy and the Henry Jackson Society your overriding goal in the regions where you operate is to promote the interests of the United States.

As you are funded by charitable donations and by governments, I think some explanation of your employment of Mr Murphy is in order, particularly when you have employed him as a conflict resolution expert in the Caucasus and Central Asia when he has no relevant experience of conflict resolution at all, virtually none of the Caucasus, and absolutely none of Central Asia.

I was the Head of the UK Delegation that negotiated the Sierra Leone Peace Treaty, and certainly under no circumstances would I let Jim Murphy anywhere near that kind of negotiation.

With All Best Wishes,

Amb (rtd.) Craig Murray

Surprising to find Craig Murray understands so little about the Finnish creep's real career.

Magda Hassan
11-09-2015, 02:49 AM
It's funny how some people are really good on some things and really shit on others. And we all have our blind spots of course. There is always the chance that Craig is being diplomatic and hoping for better results this way than starting his letter to Ahtisaari 'You fucking murderous conniving lying Finnish creep'. I know I wouldn't be able to stop myself which is why I do have a career in the diplomatic corps.

Paul Rigby
08-13-2016, 08:02 PM
For the benefit of those slightly younger than our estimable selves, I hasten to add the following extracts by way of explaining the pliant Finn's earlier service to the US:

Patrick Heseldine*, �Letters to the editor: Missing diplomat links and the Lockerbie tragedy,� The Guardian, 5 August 1991



Patrick Heseldine, �Letters to the editor: Flight Path,� The Guardian, 22 December 1992



*Formerly of the Information Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Patrick Heseldine, �Letters: ANC as fall-guys for Lockerbie bombing,� The Guardian, 22 April 1992:


That double standards were evident in the Rambo-style imposition of sanctions against Libya for its refusal to �hand over� the Lockerbie suspects � compared with an apparently limp response to the refusal three and a half years ago by Belgium and Ireland to �extradite� a suspected terrorist to stand trial in Britain � cannot reasonably be denied (Letters, April 18). The subversion of the UN Security Council as a pawn in the West�s game of geopolitics and the denial of a fair trial to the suspects (having already been convicted by a supine media) still amount to less than half of the emerging political thriller story of Lockerbie.

Readers of the letters page since December 1988 will know my view on where ultimate culpability for the crime of Lockerbie resides: South African state-sponsored terrorism targeted PanAm 103�s most prominent victim, Bernt Carlsson, UN Commissioner for Namibia. Based purely on a hunch and some circumstantial evidence, it is a view that few others share.

In the past week, however, David Beresford�s excellent reporting on the Winnie Mandela scandal in South Africa has prompted a dreadful thought and reminded me of what foreign minister, Pik Botha, said on Radio 4�s Today programme after the December 21, 1988 disaster. Like Carlsson, Mr Botha was flying to New York for the signing ceremony at the UN of the Namibia Independence Agreement. Mr Botha cancelled his booking on PanAm flight 103 and took the earlier PanAm 101. He told Radio 4 that he thought he himself had been the target and that the ANC were the perpetrators of Lockerbie.

According to David Beresford, the Winnie scandal began to unfold in the week after Lockerbie, on December 29, 1988. A key and mysterious player in the scandal was Mrs Xoliswa Falati, Winnie�s co-accused in the Stompie Moeketsi Seipei murder trial, whose legal costs were reportedly met by the Libyan government. If my theory that Winnie Mandela has been and continues to be framed is correct and the ANC are being groomed as the real Lockerbie culprits, the Western media are about to tell us that Libya trained ANC guerrillas and fixed on one of Nelson Mandela�s first overseas itineraries after his release from a 25-year incarceration. The inexorable conclusion is that the Libyans will be shown to have acted as the ANC�s agents by attempting to assassinate Mr Botha and blowing up PanAm 103 instead.

Now that the cat is prematurely out of this particular bag, the politicians concerned should consider their positions. Who will take the rap: Bush or De Klerk, Major or Mitterand?

From Patrick Haseldine's Facebook pages, 12 August 2016

Always nice to see Private Eye doing it's stuff for MI6, from which august body at least two of its founders sprang:

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4039118090550&set=a.1393926922424.55648.1059719984&type=3&l=b196eb1f33

John Ashton's Lockerbie dictum: "Don't mention Bernt Carlsson!"

(https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Bernt_Carlsson)

"HERE ARE THE SWEDISH ARTICLES, AS PROMISED"

Early in 1994, I went to visit John Ashton at Hemar Enterprises in London when he was researching for the film "The Maltese Double Cross - Lockerbie" (https://wikispooks.com/…/The_Maltese_Double_Cross_-_Lockerb…). From the many letters I had written to 'The Guardian' between 1988 and 1993, John Ashton knew perfectly well that I strongly suspected apartheid South Africa of carrying out the Lockerbie bombing, and promised to let me have some newpaper articles which he thought might assist me in my Lockerbie investigations. The "Swedish articles" that Ashton mailed to me turned out to be a 10-page poorly translated version of some articles about Lockerbie's most prominent victim, Bernt Carlsson, which Sweden's 'iDAG' newspaper had published in March 1990.

It was not until the following year (1995) that I received the actual copies of those 'iDAG articles'. They were sent to me from Malmö, Sweden, by journalist Jan-Olof Bengtsson, on 23 November 1995:

"Dear Mr Haseldine,

Have just received your fax and you’ll have copies of my three
articles published in 'iDAG' in the mail at once. As you understand they are in Swedish so you have to translate them. The articles were published as follows: 1990-03-12, 1990-03-13 and 1990-03-14. I would very much like to have the articles/letters you’ve published in 'The Guardian' before and after the explosion. I don’t know the British regulations of how to use the articles and press materials in your court system as evidence. But if you find my articles and 'digging' helpful supporting your theories, you have my permission to use them in any way you want.

Yours sincerely,

Jan-Olof Bengtsson"

According to Wikipedia: Jan-Olof Bengtsson is the political editor of Kvällsposten newspaper in Malmö, Sweden, and a renowned investigative journalist. Mr Bengtsson's most important work - although perhaps the least publicised - is his series of three articles in Sweden's 'iDAG' newspaper on 12, 13 and 14 March 1990. Never published in the English language, the 'iDAG' articles featured Sweden's UN Commissioner for Namibia Bernt Carlsson who was the most prominent victim of Pan Am Flight 103 which was sabotaged over Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December 1988. Bengtsson alleged that Commissioner Carlsson's arm had been twisted by the diamond mining giant De Beers into making a stopover in London for a secret meeting and into joining the doomed flight, rather than taking as he had intended a Sabena flight direct from Brussels to New York (https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Jan-Olof_Bengtsson).

The 'iDAG' articles thus provided the evidential basis of my theory that it was apartheid South Africa - not Libya, Syria or Iran - that was responsible for the targeting of UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, on Pan Am Flight 103. Why is it then that John Ashton never even mentions Bernt Carlsson in the lengthy film that he co-produced with Allan Francovich ('The Maltese Double Cross' - financed by tycoon Tiny Rowland (https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Tiny_Rowland)?

Why no mention of Bernt Carlsson in any of Ashton's voluminous Lockerbie books or press articles: 'Paul Foot & John Ashton's 1995 investigation into Lockerbie' (http://leninology4.blogspot.co.uk/…/paul-foot-john-ashtons-…); 'Cover-up of Convenience' (http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2001/jun/17/politics); and, 'Megrahi: You are my Jury' (http://www.megrahiyouaremyjury.net/)?

EMAIL EXCHANGE ASHTON/HASELDINE: 15/17 AUGUST 2012

Re: John Ashton's Lockerbie dictum: "Don't mention Bernt Carlsson!"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick,

As you should well know, because I told you back then (but have perhaps chosen to forget) Allan Francovich and I always believed that BOSS knew that Pan Am Flight 103 would be targeted and were very happy to see BC fly to his death. Quite possibly they and others engineered his travel arrangements. However, your insistence that the flight was blown up by the South Africans is complete bollocks, based only on a hunch and your own lunatic obsession – the same obsession that has led you to brand some of the leading campaigners for Megrahi’s innocence as spooks.

I’ve no objection to Christof Lehman publishing the article on No Spin News, because no one of any intelligence who knows anything about Lockerbie takes you seriously. You’re in your own little club of one, consistently putting 2 and 2 together and making 22 – the headbangers’ headbanger. Maybe one day you’ll wake up and realise that those who disagree with you are not government agents, but simply have a better grip on reality.

But of course my MI6 controllers told me to say that, didn’t they?

Best,

John.

Dear John,

Thank you very much for making my point and not mentioning Bernt Carlsson ('BC' doesn't count as a mention)!

You say: "Allan Francovich and I always believed that BOSS knew that PA103 would be targeted and were happy to see BC fly to his death. Quite possibly they and others engineered his travel arrangements."

If that was your belief, why didn't you say so in the film The Maltese Double Cross? Or, did Tiny Rowland forbid you to mention Bernt Carlsson?

As I'm sure you know, Albert Einstein defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. By that definition, I must indeed have what you've termed a "lunatic obsession" by continually consulting the index of your books Cover-up of Convenience and Megrahi: You are my Jury and failing to find any reference to UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson.

Here is my latest alphabetical list of spooks (sorry, leading campaigners for Megrahi's innocence):

John Ashton
Professor Robert Black
Ian Ferguson
Robert Forrester
Professor Andrew Fulton
Dr Alan George
Dr Morag Kerr
Adam Larson
Gideon Levy
Steven Raeburn
George Thomson

Please let me know if there are any names missing from the list - "Don't mention Bernt Carlsson!"

Yours sincerely,

Patrick Haseldine
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4039118090550&l=b196eb1f33)

Patrick,

Rowland had no say over the documentary’s contents. We didn’t mention Carlsson because, as you well know, the film was primarily about the framing of Libya (Rowland’s primary interest) and the likely real story. As you also know, in regard to the latter, it mentioned that the South Africans were warned off the flight. Only in your bizarre world does that constitute following the apartheid regime’s agenda.

Around 7 billion people could be added to your list. The only person who can be definitively excluded from it is you.

Best,

John.

Dear John,

That's a good progression: from 'BC' to Carlsson. Can mentioning his full name (and position at the United Nations) be far behind?

You are perpetuating a myth that the South Africans were "warned off" Pan Am Flight 103. You must surely know that Pik Botha and his entourage had always been booked to travel on the earlier Pan Am Flight 101. Here's the chapter and verse:

WHY THE LOCKERBIE FLIGHT BOOKING SUBTERFUGE, MR BOTHA?
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1952368883124&l=30069eb4a1)

Six years after the crash, apartheid South Africa's foreign minister Pik Botha falsely claimed that he and a negotiating team had originally been booked on the evening Pan Am Flight 103 which crashed at Lockerbie on 21 December 1988, but had changed the booking at the last moment. In fact the South African booking had always been on the morning Pan Am Flight 101 that departed London Heathrow at 11:00am and arrived safely at New York's JFK airport in the afternoon.

Why the subterfuge, Mr Botha? Was it to divert attention from the highest profile victim on Pan Am Flight 103: Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson ('Gordon Brown says Bernt Carlsson was the Lockerbie target' (http://www.facebook.com/photo.php…)?

Upon signature of the Namibia Independence Agreement at UN headquarters on 22 December 1988, Pik Botha would have shaken hands with Mr Carlsson and acknowledged the UN's authority over Namibia. Because Bernt Carlsson was killed at Lockerbie, Mr Botha shook hands instead with the South African appointee Administrator-General of Namibia, Louis Pienaar (https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Louis_Pienaar).

On 12 November 1994, Pik Botha's spokesman Gerrit Pretorius told the Reuters news agency that Botha and 22 South African negotiators, including defence minister Magnus Malan and foreign affairs director Neil van Heerden, had been booked on Pan Am Flight 103. He said the flight from Johannesburg arrived early in London after a Frankfurt stopover was cut out and the embassy got us on to an earlier flight. "Had we been on Pan Am Flight 103 the impact on South Africa and the region would have been massive. It happened on the eve of the signing of the tripartite agreements," said Pretorius, referring to pacts signed at UN headquarters on 22 December 1988 which ended South African and Cuban involvement in Angola, and which led to Namibian independence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:REUTERS12NOV94.jpg).

Pik Botha's claim to have been booked on the Lockerbie flight was shown to be false by the now retired South African MP Colin Eglin of the Democratic Party. In a letter to a British Lockerbie victim’s family dated 18 July 1996, Mr Eglin wrote of questions he had put to South African Justice Minister Dullah Omar in the National Assembly. On 5 June 1996, Mr Eglin asked Mr Omar if Pik Botha and his entourage 'had any plans to travel on this flight (Pan Am Flight 103) or had reservations for this flight; if so, why were the plans changed?'

In reply in the National Assembly on 12 June 1996, Justice Minister Omar stated he had been informed by the former minister of foreign affairs (Pik Botha) that shortly before finalising their booking arrangements for travel from Heathrow to New York, they learned of an earlier flight from London to New York: namely, Pan Am Flight 101. They consequently were booked and travelled on this flight to New York.

Mr Eglin went on to write in his letter to the Lockerbie victim’s family:

"Since then I have done some more informal prodding. This has led me to the person who made the reservations on behalf of the South African foreign minister Pik Botha and his entourage. This person assures me that he and no-one else was responsible for the reservations, and the reservation made in South Africa for the South African group was originally made on PA 101, departing London at 11:00 on 21 December 1988. It was never made on PA 103 and consequently was never changed. He made the reservation on PA 101 because it was the most convenient flight connecting with South African Airways Flight SA 234 arriving at Heathrow at 07:20 on 21 December 1988."

Mr Eglin gave the victim’s family the assurance that he had 'every reason to trust the person referred to' since he had been given a copy of 'rough working notes and extracts from his personal diary of those days.' In his letter Mr Eglin wrote: 'In the circumstances, I have to accept that an assertion that the reservations of the South African group were either made or changed as a result of warnings that might have been received, is not correct' (http://lockerbiedivide.blogspot.com/…/south-africans-theory…).

The June 1996 reply by Justice Minister Dullah Omar directly contradicts the Reuters report of 12 November 1994, which stated: "Former South African foreign minister Pik Botha denied on Saturday he had been aware in advance of a bomb on board Pan Am Flight 103 which exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988 killing 270 people. The minister confirmed through his spokesman that he and his party had been booked on the ill-fated airliner but switched flights after arriving early in London from Johannesburg."

It also conflicts with statements made by Oswald LeWinter and Tiny Rowland in the 1994 film 'The Maltese Double Cross', which quotes Tiny Rowland as disclosing that Pik Botha told him that he and 22 South African delegates were going to New York for the Namibian Independence Ratification Ceremony and were all booked on the Pan Am Flight 103. They were given a warning from a source which could not be ignored and changed flights (http://lockerbiedivide.blogspot.com/…/south-africans-theory…).

As evidenced above, it's hard not to believe that you and Tiny Rowland were slavishly "following the apartheid regime's agenda".

Yours sincerely,

Patrick Haseldine
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=3415159851984&l=b32ddec019)

Dear John,
I have now incorporated our exchange of emails today [15 August 2012] into the Facebook article John Ashton's Lockerbie dictum: "Don't mention Bernt Carlsson!"
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4039118090550&l=b196eb1f33).

If you wish to clarify your position on the apartheid South African regime's targeting of UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, on Pan Am Flight 103 (http://www.facebook.com/groups/118951448146734/), please let me know.

Yours sincerely,

Patrick Haseldine
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1395853570589&l=9d9176b299)

Patrick,

It was originally planned that Pik Botha’s delegation would travel on PA103. It seems that some of them believed they were booked on that flight. So what? They’re not the ones who made the bookings. They privately admitted that they were warned off PA103, but denied it in public. In doing so they were unable to get their stories straight. So what?

Do you suppose that when I wrote this booklet, with the help of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, I was a BOSS/MI6 mole? (http://catalogue.bl.uk/primo_libra…/libweb/action/search.do…)

Christof Lehman has asked me to ask you not to copy him in on your emails to me.

John.

Patrick,

I see that you failed to include my last email. Why? Could it be because it states the obvious? The obvious being that there is a far simpler explanation for the events that you describe than your convoluted theory.

John.

Patrick,

I note that you’ve not answered my last two emails. Seems to me that you’re rather selective with what you put into the public domain, which, of course, is exactly what you accuse others of.

John.

Dear John,

The reason for the slight delay in answering your emails is that I have been busy writing a new article on Facebook entitled Craig Williamson: Apartheid 'Superspy' which you can read here: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4052416983014&l=3e25116588.

Please pay particular attention to this extract from the evidence given to Archbishop Tutu's 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' by Craig Williamson on 15 September 1997:

Finally Mr Chairman, the third aspect which I can speak about is that journalists, because of their access and because they have reasons to ask questions, are targets of recruitment by both Intelligence Agencies and Revolutionary Movements. These people can recruit journalists and use journalists so in our counter-intelligence function we did have a special section that monitored journalists, but this was often done in order to determine their involvements in ... (tape ends) ... They monitored The Guardian's David Beresford. At the time of the arrest, I think they called them the Armscor 4 [Coventry Four (https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Coventry_Four)]. The Armscor Officials who had been arrested in England for sanctions breaking, for sending some - not weapons, but military related equipment to South Africa, and it was believed at that time, that David Beresford had been tasked by an Intelligence Agency to find out certain information and we monitored him for that reason. I also included a source report that I wrote about a member of your panel, Mr Hugh Lewin. Where he was monitored while a journalist overseas. But again, he was being monitored not because of the journalistic activities, but because of his close relations with the African National Congress and other people. And finally, I was requested in my subpoena to give you whatever information I had about SANA, the Southern African News Agency. I have given certain budgets and letters and information which isn't really I don't think of very much use. Basically SANA was a genuine organisation. It was set up by certain South African journalists, during the period probably 1977 to 1980 roughly. It was of course to a large degree under my control. And while the people involved in it, were bona fide journalists, obviously they received instructions from me. I could ask them for certain information and obviously that information then got passed back to the Intelligence Agencies in Pretoria.

You've asked me the following question: Do you suppose that when I wrote this booklet [in 1988?], with the help of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, I was a BOSS/MI6 mole? (http://catalogue.bl.uk/primo_libra…/libweb/action/search.do…)

My answer, John, is that as a journalist in the 1980s you were recruited by the South African Intelligence Agency. At the time of the Lockerbie bombing in 1988, you were receiving instructions from and reporting to Craig Williamson. Your main counter-intelligence task then (which continues today) was to conceal apartheid South Africa's targeting of UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, on Pan Am Flight 103. Which rather neatly explains John Ashton's Lockerbie dictum: "Don't mention Bernt Carlsson!"

Yours sincerely,

Patrick Haseldine
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2806455434754&l=400a8947c4)

PS. At the TRC hearing, Craig Williamson talks about the 'Coventry Four'. Here is a relevant extract from Wikipedia:
In June 1984, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher controversially invited South Africa's president P.W. Botha and foreign minister Pik Botha to a meeting at Chequers in an effort to stave off growing international pressure for the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa, where both the U.S. and Britain had invested heavily. Although not officially on the meeting's agenda, the Coventry Four affair clouded both the proceedings at Chequers and Britain's bilateral diplomatic relations with South Africa. In August 1989, British diplomat Patrick Haseldine was dismissed for publicly criticising the UK government in the press of double standards over the release of the four suspects (https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Coventry_Four…).

TRANSLATION OF iDAG NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
----------------------------------------------------------
Pressad och nervös före dödskraschen - STRESSED AND NERVOUS BEFORE DEATH CRASH (12 March 1990)

Bernt Carlsson, UN Commissioner for Namibia, had less than seven hours to live when at 11.06am on 21 December 1988 he arrived in London on flight BA 391.

Strictly speaking he was meant to fly directly from Brussels to New York in time for the historic signing of the Namibia Independence Agreement the day after. But Bernt Carlsson could not make it. He had a meeting. An important meeting with a "pressuriser" from the South African diamond cartel, which was so secret that evidently not even Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary-General, knew anything about it. Here iDAG maps out the last 24 hours in the life of Bernt Carlsson.

BERNT CARLSSON IN A SECRET MEETING WITH "PRESSURISER" FROM THE DIAMOND CARTEL

The memorial service in the Folkets Hus in Stockholm on 11 January 1989 for Bernt Carlsson gathered most of our Heads of Government, representatives of the Namibia independence movement SWAPO and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the UN Secretary-General.

When he died in the Pan Am bombing, Bernt Carlsson was less than 24 hours away from the fulfilment of his dreams - the signing of the Namibia agreement in New York which would finally pave the way to a free and independent Namibia. This was supposed to be the climax of his career with the UN, a career that began in December 1986 when he was appointed Commissioner for Namibia. Bernt Carlsson had great support from SWAPO but much less so from South Africa because of that country's substantial economic interests in Namibia: an interest in gold, uranium but above all in diamonds.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in his speech at the memorial ceremony on a cold day in January last year [1989] described the last 24 hours in the life of Bernt Carlsson:

"Bernt Carlsson was returning to New York following an official visit to Brussels where he had spoken to a Committee within the European Parliament about the Namibia agreement," Pérez de Cuéllar began. "He stopped briefly in London to honour a long-standing invitation by a non-governmental organisation with interests in Namibia."

Pérez de Cuéllar was wrong. True, Bernt Carlsson's trip to Brussels had been planned almost six months earlier. But his decision to return to New York via London was only made on 16 December 1988. The meeting in London was definitely not a long-standing invitation by Namibia sympathisers.

A DIAMOND GIANT

This was about a secret meeting with a "pressuriser" from De Beers, the giant diamond company. This company in turn owns Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM), the world's largest producer of diamonds which have been produced for more than 60 years in Namibia. It goes without saying that Bernt Carlsson in his capacity of Commissioner for Namibia had contacts with representatives of a great number of countries and political organisations as part of his job.

FORCED TO TRAVEL

But why a secret meeting with the diamond cartel in London? A meeting which to all intents and purposes he did not want to have but was forced to. On around 8 or 9 December, Carlsson receives a telephone call from the "pressuriser" at his United Nations office in New York. The telephone call is from London. We do not know what the telephone call was about. However, Bernt Carlsson is unsure. He does not know whether to act or not. As if going might put him in a compromising position. On the morning of 16 December, the day on which the travel arrangements are changed, Bernt Carlsson meets up with an old friend who has come to see him. He is Weine Karlsson, head of department at Stockholm University:

"In the early morning we sat talking in Bernt's office," he explains. "But after only a few minutes he became uneasy and asked me to go and wait in another room of the office. He had something urgent to deal with. It is possible that it had something to do with the trip. He said that 'important business needs to be done'. He was away for about half an hour."

POLISHED GANGSTERS

Weine Karlsson continues his story: "We all know that Bernt was very unobtrusive. Shy almost. Only, now and again he exploded. As when suddenly he said to me, 'You've got no idea what polished gangsters (South Africans) we are dealing with here'."

On 19 December, Bernt leaves New York for Brussels to make his speech in the European Parliament the next day. The visit was arranged by David Lowe, now with the Socialist International. Right up to this interview, he has felt 'guilt-ridden' and convinced that it was he who 'enticed' Carlsson to go to Europe and therefore is 'indirectly responsible for his death on the plane'. But when Lowe learns about the secret meeting in London, he is calm again.

"He made his speech on 20 December, before the Development Committee in Brussels," Lowe says. "After the meeting we went to a restaurant for lunch and discussions with some other friends. Our discussions continued until about 3pm." David Lowe continues: "It was at this point that Bernt suddenly said that he had to check out as he had to meet 'some friends' in London. I thought to myself, Good Lord, he has all this going on in New York. He will be even more tired than he is already. I remember thinking he was mad and why not go directly to New York for the signing of the agreement? I gathered he would catch a flight from Brussels to London at about 5pm that evening."

However, Bernt Carlsson had 'lied' to his friend David Lowe. He stayed in Brussels that afternoon and only arrived in London the day after - on 21 December.

MYSTERIOUS PRESSURISER

When we telephoned his old colleagues at the Namibia office, not one of them wished to talk about the meeting with the mysterious 'pressuriser' from the diamond cartel:

"All I know is that Bernt Carlsson was travelling to London to meet representatives of an NGO (in this case organisations friendly towards Namibia)," says Malthi Ranin who was his secretary at the time. iDAG has a copy of a private memorandum which says something completely different. This is a memorandum to Bernt Carlsson from his own office: "Mr Timothy says he will be waiting for you as soon as you get through the tunnel. Your meeting will finish in time for your next arrangement at 2pm. He will also provide a car to take you round."

'Mr Timothy'? His full name is Bankole Timothy. Not much known about him. Just another name working for the diamond cartel. But one who does know something about him is Randolph Vigne, secretary of the Namibia support committee: "Bankole Timothy worked for the PR department at De Beers for 15 to 20 years. I understand they pensioned him off but called him back when the independence of Namibia suddenly started accelerating. They probably felt they needed someone like him with contacts." Vigne continues: "I don't think he works for them any more. I believe he had a temporary assignment which is now completed." Was Bernt Carlsson that temporary assignment?

AGGRESSIVE DISCUSSIONS

iDAG managed to track down Bankole Timothy. But the telephone conversation was brief. And aggressive: "Could you tell me what you and Bernt Carlsson talked about when you met in London on 21 December 1988?" He replied: "I am sorry. I am very, very sorry but I have nothing to say about it." You do not want.....(we are interrupted). "Do not disturb me any more. I am going out. I don't know how you got my number. I'm going out and you start asking questions about....."

INTERRUPTED

You met Bernt Carlsson on the morning of 21 December and.....(we are interrupted)

"Don't disturb me anymore. What are you on about? (screams) I don't know who you are. And you want to interview me on the phone. I have no comments to make!"

At about 5.30pm on 21 December 1988 the telephone rings in the home of Pentti Väänäänen, then Secretary-General of the Socialist International, and an old friend of Bernt: "It was Bernt calling from the airport just before he boarded Pan Am 103," he says. "We exchanged Christmas greetings and talked a little about the Namibia agreement." Did he tell you who he had seen in London? "No". How would you describe his frame of mind? "If you want me to tell you in just a few words, he sounded nervous," he replied.

THE CLIMAX OF HIS LIFE

Nervous? Why? Bernt Carlsson was close to the climax of his life with the Namibia agreement the next day. He should have been happy and optimistic. But why nervous?

PICTURE CAPTIONS (page one of article): Not even Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary-General, knew about Bernt Carlsson's new travel arrangements. Today, not one of Carlsson's old colleagues wants to say anything about the mysterious meeting with the diamond cartel in London. (page two of the article-large picture): Bernt Carlsson should have travelled directly from Brussels to New York for the historic signing of the Namibia agreement. Instead, he altered his travel arrangements and became one of the passengers who died on the Pan Am flight. (Picture left-hand side): His friend, Pentti Väänäänen, thought that Bernt Carlsson seemed nervous before his trip to New York, despite approaching the climax of his life. (Right-hand picture): Bernt Carlsson had a secret meeting in London with the world's largest producer of diamonds. It would seem that he was coerced into it.

TOMORROW: When, in the days following the crash, Carlsson's belongings are checked in his sealed UN office in New York, people find to their amazement that his safe is empty. In the days before his death he warns a friend in New York not to open a parcel by sender unknown. The day after Bernt Carlsson's death, CDM, the diamond producer, publishes the discovery of a new diamond mine in Namibia.

BEWARE CHRISTMAS PARCEL BOMBS!
The second iDAG article about Bernt Carlsson was published on 13 March 1990:

KassaskĂĄpet var tomt - THE SAFE WAS EMPTY

WHO BROKE THE SEAL TO BERNT CARLSSON'S APARTMENT?

When Bernt Carlsson's safe was opened six days after the Pan Am explosion, those present had a minor shock: the safe was empty! Despite the fact that the office had been sealed already on 21 December 1988, and his private apartment the day after, by the UN's own security staff. The opening was witnessed by, among others, Bernt Carlsson's girl friend Sanya Popovic, his sister Inger Carlsson-Musser and Embassy Counsellor Stefan Noréen of the Swedish Delegation at the UN. In the days immediately before Bernt Carlsson made the trip to his secret meeting in London, which we wrote about yesterday, he was very uneasy.

According to Sanya Popovic:

"December was like clouded in a nightmare. He became increasingly nervous. He said that if I received a parcel I was not to open it under any circumstances. This was on 17 December. He said that people usually start getting parcels at this time, it being Christmas. But unless I knew who sent it, I was not to open it."

On 22 December - the day after the Pan Am bombing - Bernt Carlsson's apartment was sealed off. "The lock was changed," says Sanya Popovic. "I was given one key, and the UN security department had another. I was told that sealing off everything could take a long time pending the analysis. I therefore ensured that all windows were properly locked, all lights switched off, etc. A few days later, however, a friend and I passed by the apartment in a taxi. The apartment is easy to recognise from the outside: front view, third floor and five windows. My friend pointed out that the lights were on. So I got out and walked back. I found that some lights were switched on but there was no-one there." Sanya Popovic continues: "If there was anything of interest in the apartment, someone else got to it first."

On the evening of the disaster, the Swedish foreign minister, Sten Andersson, telephoned Bernt Carlsson's sister Inger Carlsson-Musser, who had lived in the US for almost 20 years, to give his commiserations. On 28 December 1988 Inger Carlsson-Musser travelled to New York to go through Bernt Carlsson's belongings in his UN office. This was the office which had been sealed off since the day of the accident. She asked Sanya Popovic and the Embassy Counsellor Stefan Noréen to help. We understand that his safe was empty. What can you say about that? "Yes, it was empty," says Sanya Popovic. "And this was very unlike Bernt who was very security-conscious and kept all his documents under lock and key. But above all the office was sealed off. No-one should have been able to get in."

REFUSAL TO COMMENT

Embassy Counsellor Stefan Noréen: "I was assisting Inger Carlsson-Musser in taking charge of her brother's personal belongings in the office. Nothing else happened there." Can you confirm that the safe was empty when it was opened? "I refuse to comment," Noréen replied. Is it true or not? "I refuse to comment. I was there. But I do not want to talk about what exactly happened. If anyone should comment surely they should be Bernt Carlsson's family."

iDAG tried to contact Inger Carlsson-Musser, but without success. We would have asked her about the empty safe. Also, to explain information from foreign investigative journalists who claimed that foreign minister, Sten Andersson, had asked her to keep an eye out for a specific document which was supposed to be held in the safe.

THE WANTED DOCUMENT

We have not obtained any comments from Sten Andersson either. We did, however, speak to his private secretary, Pierre Schori, who used to be a close friend of Bernt Carlsson. During a secret meeting in London, Bernt Carlsson met a person called Bankole Timothy. Do you know him? "No, I know of no-one of that name." He represents the diamond cartel. "The diamond cartel," queries Pierre Schori, almost laughing. "I know nothing about that." We know that Sten Andersson telephoned Bernt's sister Inger Carlsson-Musser in the USA. "Naturally." We are informed by foreign journalists that Sten Andersson was looking for some documents which Bernt's sister Inger was supposed to be able to help in finding, and which were kept in Bernt's safe. "This is nonsense, as far as I'm concerned. What's this all about?" We understand that the safe was empty when it was opened. "I know nothing about that. I don't understand a word. All I can say is that it is nonsense to claim that Sten Andersson should have done this or that." Sten Andersson is difficult to get hold of. Perhaps we should ask him? "I know this is all nonsense. I think you're on the wrong track," Schori replied.

NEW DIAMOND MINE

On 22 December 1988, the day after the Pan Am bombing, it was announced by Consolidated Diamond Mines, wholly-owned by De Beers, that $36m is being invested in new diamond production in Namibia. This will be done in Auchas, 45km from Oranjemund. It is estimated that the annual yield of diamonds over a ten-year period will amount to roughly the equivalent of 50 million Swedish Krona (SEK). The announcement is mentioned in a 'country report' about Namibia which was issued last year [1989] and published by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The report says, inter alia: "The company made their announcement on 22 December 1988, which was also the date that the Namibia agreement was signed. This is brushed aside as pure coincidence by De Beers representatives in London."

CRITICISM BY CARLSSON

Bernt Carlsson, as the intended UN Commissioner for Namibia, rarely spoke about the enormous diamond assets in the country and the multi-national companies exploiting the finds. There is, however, one exception. He was interviewed for a British TV documentary entitled 'The Case of the Disappearing Diamonds' by Granada which was broadcast early in December 1988 [see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHIDaGrIsmY]. In the programme, Bernt Carlsson speaks about the ruthless exploitation taking place in the diamond business: "The business has tried to pick the raisin from the cake. This means that they have been after the large diamonds instead of calm but constant development. The way they are doing it will endanger the survival of the mines."

HUNGRY FOR PROFIT

Carlsson continues: "One would expect from a worldwide organisation like De Beers to behave in a socially and financially responsible manner. However, as far as Namibia is concerned, they have only been interested in the maximum profit without regard to social, economic-political or even legal considerations."

On 16 March 1989 De Beers announced yet another diamond find in Namibia. This time it is a mine in Elizabeth Bay from which over the next ten years SEK300m-worth of diamonds are expected to be dug up. This particular find appears to delight the mysterious Bankole Timothy and, unusually, he himself issues the press release to the surprised public.

PICTURE CAPTIONS (page 1 of article - picture 1) Sanya Popovic was present when the safe was opened and discovered to be empty. Bernt was very security-conscious and kept all his documents under lock and key. (picture 2) This is Carlsson's home in New York. The apartment was sealed off after the death crash. Carlsson's girlfriend later determined that someone had entered the apartment. (page 2 - picture 1) iDAG could reveal yesterday that Carlsson met representatives of a diamond cartel with interests in Namibia during a secret meeting in London. (picture 2) Bernt Carlsson felt very uneasy. He warned his girlfriend about opening parcels from senders unknown.

TOMORROW: "I cannot say that I can explain why Bernt changed his travel arrangements. Bernt took the only explanation with him", says a very close friend for many years. This friend always walked close to Bernt Carlsson, and yet stayed away from the public eye.

CHANGE OF TRAVEL PLANS: this is the third and final part of Sweden's iDAG newspaper reportage by Jan-Olof Bengtsson on 14 March 1990.

Han tog Svaren pĂĄ FrĂĄgorna med Sig - HE TOOK THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS WITH HIM

"I cannot say that I can explain why Bernt changed his travel arrangements. Bernt took the only explanation with him." Her name is Meta Johansson, and she is a close friend of Bernt Carlsson for many years. A close friend who was always there but far from the limelight and all the scrutiny. iDAG spoke to her.

Bernt Carlsson in his many years as an international worker for solidarity experienced a great deal of misery, a lot of drama and many weird and wonderful cases. But he carried on regardless and worked for what he believed in. In a discreet, almost shy, manner. Always determinedly and in a very competent way.

WITNESS TO MURDER

On 10 April 1983, Bernt Carlsson who was Secretary-General of the Socialist International (SI) at the time, was an eye witness to the fatal shooting of the moderate Palestinian Issam Sartawi in the lobby of Hotel Montochero in Albufeira, Portugal. The terrorist, Abu Nidal, claimed responsibility for the killing. Because of his job as SI Secretary-General, his apartment in London at the time was subject to a number of break-ins while he was overseas.

These are some examples of the security measures taken by Bernt: When they opened Bernt's safe in his New York office, it was found to be empty.

"Yes, so I heard," replies Meta Johansson. Isn't that strange?

"Yes, clearly this is very strange. But I do not know the rules of the game in cases such as this."

NO THEORY

She continues:"I have helped his family go through all the papers and documents which we found in his apartment in the US. Neither the family nor I have found any papers linked to the accident." Do you have any theory as to why the safe was empty? "I have no theory. Nor do I know who had access to the safe. Bernt's sister Inger does not know either." Do you know anything about what Sten Andersson spoke to the sister, Inger Carlsson-Musser, about? "No, as I was not there, I cannot know what he asked her to do. And I was not present when the safe was opened. So I'm sure you will understand that I cannot comment on this."

SPECULATIONS

Meta Johansson continues: "If I may say so without being misunderstood, I have had so many speculations in my head that I doubt if there can be any more. Some more constructive than others." Bernt was very security-conscious, isn't that right? "Yes, very much so. But being security-conscious also meant that he carried important documents with him in his hand luggage. There were documents that he would want to take personal care of." But the safe was completely empty. Also of 'unimportant documents'? "That is true."

SECRET MEETING

What do you know about Bankole Timothy, the person Bernt Carlsson met in secret in London?

"I am very sorry, but I cannot help you with any information about that meeting." Why is the subject so sensitive? "I don't think it's sensitive. I just feel the people involved with the matter should speak."

We understand that Bernt was not particularly interested in meeting this person. That he was afraid he might be discredited as a neutral UN official?

"Obviously, with the kind of work Bernt was engaged in he would meet many people. And of course some people are more interesting to meet than others. But you are forced to. With Bernt, whatever he considered important to his work, he would go and do. Even if not every time he would jump with joy and shout hooray and think this was the best thing in the world. He was extremely dutiful."

Do you know anything about the position of Bankole Timothy?

"I know who he is and what he is doing."

How would you describe it? "No, I do not want to."

How would you explain why Bernt changed his travel arrangements at the 11th hour? His intermediate landing in London for this meeting before he returned to New York?

"I cannot say that I can explain the change in travel arrangements. Bernt took the only explanation with him. You can speak to a lot of people. But only a few are likely to know why Bernt changed his mind."

MANY QUESTIONS

iDAG does not wish to claim with these articles that Bernt Carlsson was the target of the bomb which blasted Pan Am 103 from the air and in which he was one of the 259 victims. We have no basis to make such a claim. We have only wanted to point out what seems to be a number of curious circumstances and that maybe no-one will ever have the full answers to the questions. What forced Bernt Carlsson to fly to the secret meeting in London and which was against his will? Why does Bankole Timothy refuse to say what the meeting was about, but gets aggressive when he is asked?

Why was Bernt Carlsson's safe in New York empty when it was opened on 28 December 1988? The questions are many, but the answers are few.

PICTURE CAPTIONS (top) iDAG has in a series of articles revealed a number of fascinating facts linked to Bernt Carlsson and the Lockerbie disaster. (in main text) The Swedish diplomat and UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, was killed on 21 December 1988 when a Pan Am flight on its way to New York crashed at Lockerbie in Scotland.
(https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Jan-Olof_Bengtsson…)

SEE ALSO:

1. Lockerbie Spotlight on John Ashton
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4025127820802&l=1e2cb3498a)
2. Blackout over Lockerbie
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=3870955126581&l=5950a6622d)
3. Blackout of Mandela Blueprint for Lockerbie Justice
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4009030178371&l=6662cb7fb9)
4. Tiny Rowland, Lonmin and Lockerbie
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4058824983210&l=0031ccc6ce)
5. The Assassination of Bernt Carlsson
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1395853570589&l=9d9176b299)
6. Lockerbie Cover-Upper Ian Ferguson
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4474406052477&l=1e52343dc9)

© Patrick Haseldine, Facebook, 15 August 2012.
(http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4039118090550&l=b196eb1f33