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Thread: Scott Report Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment & Dual-Use Goods to Iraq

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    Default Scott Report Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment & Dual-Use Goods to Iraq

    The Scott Report (the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions) was a judicial inquiry commissioned in 1992 after reports of arms sales in the 1980s to Iraq by British companies surfaced. The report was conducted by Sir Richard Scott, then a Lord Justice of Appeal. It was published in 1996. Much of the report was secret.
    Background

    In the late 1980s, Matrix Churchill, a British (Coventry) aerospace quality machine tools manufacturer, that had been bought by the Iraqi government, and was exporting machines used in weapons manufacture to Iraq. According to the International Atomic Energy Authority, its products later found in Iraq, were among the highest quality of their kind in the world. They were 'dual use' machines that 'could' be used to manufacture weapons parts. Such exports are subject to government control, and Matrix Churchill had the appropriate government permissions, following a 1988 relaxation of export controls. Crucially, however, this relaxation had not been announced to parliament - indeed, when asked in parliament whether controls had been relaxed, the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry replied incorrectly that they had not.[citation needed]
    Matrix Churchill were contacted by HM Customs and Excise, under suspicion of exporting arms components to Iraq without permission. They had this permission but this was denied by the government, in line with the most recently announced policy on the matter. Matrix Churchill's directors were therefore prosecuted in 1991 by Customs and Excise for breaching export controls.
    The trial did not go well for the government - public interest immunity certificates obtained by the government to suppress some critical evidence (supposedly on grounds of national security) were quickly overturned by the trial judge, forcing the documents to be handed over to the defence. The trial eventually collapsed when former minister Alan Clark admitted he had been 'economical with the actualité' in answer to parliamentary questions over export licenses to Iraq.
    The Report

    The Scott Report represents possibly the most exhaustive study produced to that date of the individual responsibility of ministers to Parliament. Scott comments on the difficulty of extracting from departments the required documents (some 130,000 of them in all) and notes how Customs and Excise could not find out what Ministry of Defence export policy was, and how intelligence reports were not passed on to those who needed to know. The Economist commented that "Sir Richard exposed an excessively secretive government machine, riddled with incompetence, slippery with the truth and willing to mislead Parliament". The report characterised the nature of the government as:
    The main objectives of governments are the implementation of their policies and the discomfiture of opposition; they do not submit with enthusiasm to the restraints of accountability … governments are little disposed to volunteer information that may expose them to criticism … The enforcement of accountability depends largely on the ability of Parliament to prise information from governments which are inclined to be defensively secretive where they are most vulnerable to challenge.
    Scott identified three main areas of democratic concern. First, the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 was emergency legislation passed at the outbreak of the Second World War. It allowed the government to issue regulations which were not subject to resolutions in Parliament, for the duration of the emergency, which would make it a criminal offence to export particular goods to particular countries. While the Act should have been lapsed in 1945, it remained in force, and had been modified in 1990 so as to become part of the Import and Export Control Act 1990. [1]
    The second area was the failure of ministerial accountability; the principle that "for every action of a servant of the crown a minister is answerable to Parliament".
    The third area was that of Public Interest Immunity certificates, which had been issued during the Matrix Churchill trial. As a result of these certificates, innocent men were in danger of being sent to prison, because the government would not allow the defence counsel to see the documents that would exonerate their clients. While some of these contained potentially sensitive intelligence material, many were simply internal communications: the certificates were intended to protect the Ministers and civil servants who had written the communications, rather than the public interest. Scott states:
    The government is entirely frank in its desire to continue using "class" claims in order to protect communications between ministers and civil servants from disclosure in litigation. One argument put forward is that, unless these communications are protected, the necessary candour between ministers and civil servants will suffer. I have to say that I regard this "candour" argument … as unacceptable.
    Publication

    The publication of the report was seen by many as the nadir of the 1990s Conservative governments of the UK. Prior to the report's publication, those ministers who were criticised were given the opportunity to comment and request revisions. The 1,806 page report was published, along with a press pack which included a few relatively positive extracts from the report presented as if representative of the entire report, at 3:30pm. Given a then largely pro-government press, this proved effective at stalling an extensive analysis in the media.
    The report had to be debated in parliament. Ministers criticised in the report were given advanced access to the report and briefed extensively on how to defend themselves against the report's criticisms. In contrast, according to senior Labour MP Robin Cook, the opposition were given just two hours to read the million-plus words, during which scrutiny they were supervised and prevented from making copies of the report. Finally, the Prime Minister, John Major, stated that a vote against the Government would be in effect a vote of no confidence, ensuring that Conservative MPs would not vote against, while a vote for was a vote exonerating the Government of any wrongdoing. Robin Cook worked with a team of researchers to scrutinise the report, and delivered "what was regarded as a bravura performance". [2] Nonetheless, the Government won the vote 320-319.
    References


    "I think it would be a good idea." Mahatma Gandhi, when asked what he thought of Western civilization.

    The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
    Karl Marx.

    "Well, he would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies, 1963, replied Ms Rice Davies when the prosecuting counsel pointed out that Lord Astor denied an affair or having even met her.

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    CONTENTS

    Volume One
    PART 1

    SECTION A
    INTRODUCTION
    Chapter One
    Introduction Chapter Two The Institution of the Inquiry Chapter Three Terms of Reference
    SECTION B
    PROCEDURES
    Chapter One
    Chapter Two Chapter Three SECTION C THE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM Chapter One
    Government Powers under the Import, Export and Customs

    Powers (Defence) Act 1939
    Background - Pre 1939
    Cl.l
    The 1939 Act
    C1.20
    The Use of the 1939 Act after the Cessation of Hostilities
    C1.28
    The Import and Export Control Act 1990
    C1.66
    Export Control Orders
    C1.122
    Chapter Two
    Export Licensing Procedures
    The Department of Trade and Industry
    C2.3
    The Ministry of Defence

    C2.20
    The Foreign & Commonwealth Office

    C2.39
    Licences
    C2.50
    Open Individual Export Licences and Open General Export Licences
    C2.52
    Temporary Licences
    C2.58
    Interdepartmental Procedures
    C2.63 The Security Export Controls Working Party C2.66 The Restricted Enforcement Unit C2.67 The Working Group on Iraqi Procurement C2.73 Chapter Three The Role of Customs & Excise in Export Control General
    C3.1
    The Customs & Excise Management Act 1979 C3.11 Customs Exports Procedures C3.66
    PART 2
    SECTION D ARMS AND DEFENCE-RELATED EXPORTS TO IRAQ
    Chapter One
    The Howe Guidelines The Introduction of the Howe Guidelines D1.3 Sales to Iran D1.5 Sales to Iraq D1.10 The Discussions Leading up to the Howe Guidelines
    D1.17 The Procedures Instituted to Implement the Howe Guidelines
    D1.95 The MOD Working Group
    D1.103 The Interdepartmental Committee
    D1.116 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office
    D1.124 The Ministry of Defence
    D1.126 The Department of Trade and Industry
    D1.142 The Announcement of the Howe Guidelines
    D1.145 Chapter Two Applications of the Guidelines in the period December 1984 to August 1988 Introduction D2.1 The Visit to London of Tariq Aziz D2.3 The Ministerial Meeting on 19 June 1986
    D2.9 US Arms Shipments to Iran
    D2.19 The Ministerial Meeting on 3 March 1987
    D2.23 Availability of Supplies from Foreign Sources
    D2.24 The Policy of Impartiality and Even-handedness
    D2.27 Publicity
    D2.30 Licensing Procedures and Cryptographic Equipment D2.37 The Effect of Iranian Attacks on Shipping in the Gulf
    D2.40 Temporary Licences
    D2.46 Defence Attache Reports
    D2.52 ECGD Arrangements
    D2.65
    Specific Cases D2.122 D2.126 D2.140 D2.148 D2.168 D2.180 D2.185 D2.194 D2.200 D2.209 D2.211 D2.218 D2.229 D2.231 D2.232 D2.239 D2.260 D2.360 D2.362 D2.403 D2.411 Public Statements of Government Policy on Exports to Iraq D2.419 Summary D2.427
    Chapter Three
    Defence Sales Policy after the Cease-Fire
    The Effect of the Cease-fire on the Guidelines D3.1
    The Effect of the Salman Rushdie Affair
    D3.66
    Procedural Changes
    D3.126 Exchange of Ministers D3.132 Progress Towards a Review of the Guidelines D3.140 D3.152 Guidelines for the Export of Defence Equipment for Exhibitions D3.166 ECGD Policy after the Cease-fire D3.172 Guidelines for Military Training
    D3.186
    Chapter Four
    Government Statements on Defence Sales Policy After the

    Cease-fire
    Letters from the FCO in 1989 D4.1 Letters from the MOD in 1989 D4.17 1990 Letters D4.22 Answers to PQs D4.25
    Volume Two
    SECTION D CONTINUED Chapter Five Iraqi Arms and Defence Equipment Procurement after the Cease-fire The November 1987 Report and its Consequences D5.2 Dr Habobi D5.5 Information about Iraqi Procurement after the Cease-fire D5.25 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook's Iraq Arms Manufacture Paper D5.64 Chapter Six Specific Export Licence Applications after the Cease-fire Hawk
    D6.1
    The Hawk Project and Mr David Hastie
    D6.29
    Machine Tools: D6.55 D6.73 D6.107 D6.194 D6.221 Computer Systems D6.269 Thermal Imagers and Night Vision Equipment D6.290 Consarc Engineering Limited: Vacuum Furnaces D6.312 Polibur Engineering LTD D6.337 Badger Catalytic Limited D6.343 Terrafix Limited D6.348 PD Technical Mouldings Limited D6.359 PMK Electronic Consultants LTD D6.370 Depleted Uranium - Amersham International Limited and Testrade Limited
    D6.388
    Marconi Command and Control Systems Limited and Marconi Company Limited D6.406 Plessey Radar Limited: Radar Jammer D6.428 Marconi and Ferranti Air Defence Training Simulators D6.437 Marconi Command and Control Systems ST800 Series Instrumentation Radar System D6.449 Marconi Secure Radio Systems: GR 083 ACT Mobile Digital Radio Communication System D6.455 Explosive Bolts D6.468 Postscript D6.485
    Chapter Seven
    Other Allegations of Illegal Arms Exports to Iraq Royal Ordnance I D7.1 D7.6 D7.10 D7.16 D7.20 Global Technical and Management Services International LTD D7.24 D7.24 D7.28 D7.35 Terex Equipment LTD D7.45 Astra Holdings plc/British Manufacture and Research Company Limited/Astra Pyrotechnics Limited D7.56 D7.60 D7.63 D7.69 D7.71 D7.75 D7.80 D7.83 D7.92 D7.93 D7.95 Chapter Eight Summary SECTION E DIVERSIONARY ROUTES Chapter One Introduction Chapter Two Jordan Chapter Three Egypt Chapter Four Kuwait Chapter Five The United Arab Emirates Chapter Six Saudi Arabia Chapter Seven Austria and Portugal Austria E7.1 Portugal E7.4 Chapter Eight Open Individual Export Licences Chapter Nine Marconi Underwater Systems Limited - Stonefish Mines Background E9.1 AWP Application of 13 June 1988 E9.6 AWP Application of 12 September 1988 E9.8 British Government Knowledge of the Connection between Cardoen and Iraq E9.10 E9.13 Revalidation of AWP Clearance dated 4 April 1990 E9.16 Telex of 23 August 1990 E9.18 Parliamentary Question: Defence Sales to Chile E9.26 Chapter Ten Ordnance Technologies Limited The Connection between Allivane, Aerotechnology and Ordtec E10.2 The Contract between Ordtec and SRC E10.3 The Licences E10.7 Allivane - Ordtec E10.12 The Exports E10.19 Information available to Government about Ordtec E10.24 Termination of Contact between Mr Grecian and the Intelligence Agencies E10.56 Volume Three
    SECTION F
    SUPERGUN Chapter One Limitations on the Scope of the Report Chapter Two Government Knowledge - November 1987 until December 1988 November 1987 to June 1988 F2.1 June - August 1988 F2.18 Sir Hal Miller and the 'Third Agency' F2.29 Forgemasters (July 1988) F2.73 The Resuscitation of the Walter Somers' Order in August 1988 F2.77 November 1988 F2.86 Mr I4 and the Customs F2.98 Propellant contract F2.100 Frank Machon F2.101 Chapter Three Government Knowledge - January 1989 until December 1989 Revival of Interest in the Gun Project in Mid 1989 F3.1 Hadland Photonics LTD F3.7 Astra Holdings Plc F3.19 Mr Grecian F3.31 Mr Henderson F3.75 Action by Intelligence Agencies and by the Government F3.79 Sir Hal Miller (June and August 1989) F3.91 Forgemasters Engineering (1989) F3.93 Chapter Four Government Knowledge - January 1990 until April 1990 The Events Leading to the Seizure of the Forgings F4.2 The third Walter Somers contract (Sir Hal Miller) F4.22 The Statement to the House of Commons by Mr Ridley F4.26 Sir Patrick Mayhew and Sir Hal Miller F4.45 Sir Hal Miller and Mr Patrick Blackshaw of Customs F4.50 Mr Harding and Mr Primrose: Evidence to TISC F4.54 Government Answers to PQs about Supergun F4.67 What went wrong? F4.80
    PART 3
    SECTION G THE MATRIX CHURCHILL CASE Chapter One Introduction Chapter Two The Commencement of the Customs investigation Chapter Three The Investigation prior to the Arrests Chapter Four The Arrests Chapter Five The Investigation from the time of (16 October 1990) Arrests to the Laying of Charges (19 February 1991) Chapter Six Events Leading up to the Committal Hearing Witness statements and interviews with witnesses G6.17 Chapter Seven The Committal Proceedings Chapter Eight The Sunday Telegraph Article Chapter Nine Disclosure of Documents to the Prosecution by Government Departments and Agencies The DTI G9.8 The FCO G9.9 The MOD G9.11 Chapter Ten Disclosure of documents to the Defence The General Principles G10.1 The Government's Approach to Disclosure of Documents to the Defence G10.13
    Chapter Eleven
    The Preparation of PII Certificates for use at the Committal Chapter Twelve Voluntary Disclosure and the Defence Requests for Discovery The Minutes of the Inter-Departmental Committee G12.14 Mr Henderson's Contacts G12.20 Minutes of meetings with MTTA and resulting communications G12.21 The "Martin Ford" Report G12.22 Who was responsible for the inaccurate Reply? G12.34 Chapter Thirteen The Preparation of the PII Certificates Mr Lilley G13.5 Mr Clarke's first PII Certificate G13.7 Mr Garel-Jones' PII Certificate G13.18 Mr Rifkind's PII Certificate G13.37 Mr Heseltine's PII Certificate G13.51 The 10 September 1992 meeting G13.76 Mr Heseltine's Second PII Certificate G13.81 Mr Needham and Baroness Denton G13.87 Mr Clarke's Second PII Certificate G13.88 Mr Leithead's Approach to the PII Certificates G13.90 The Attorney General's Approach to the PII Certificates G13.99 The PII Certificates: Summary G13.103 The Instructions to Mr Moses for the PII Hearing Before Judge Smedley G13.104 Chapter Fourteen The PII Hearing The DTI G14.21 The MOD G14.24 The FCO G14.27 Chapter Fifteen Further Discovery following the PII Rulings Chapter Sixteen The Defendant's Requests for Evidence from Ministers Chapter Seventeen The Trial Mr Moses' Opening G17.1 The Witnesses' Evidence G17.11 The Collapse of the Trial G17.30 Chapter Eighteen Matrix Churchill: A Post-Mortem The Investigation G18.2 The Legal Basis of the Prosecution G18.13 Disclosure of Documents to the Defence G18.36 The Public Interest Immunity Claims G18.43 Volume Four SECTION H THE OTHER MACHINE TOOL PROSECUTIONS Chapter One The BSA Tools Case Introduction H1.1 The Investigation H1.5 The Charges H1.21 The Preparation of the Case for Trial H1.25 The Withdrawal of the Prosecution H1.32 Summary and Post-mortem H1.44 Chapter Two The Wickman Bennett Case Introduction H2.1 The Investigation H2.4 Institution of Proceedings H2.21 The Compounding of the Proceedings H2.35 Chapter Three Contractors 600 LTD/600 Services LTD
    PART 4
    SECTION J
    OTHER PROSECUTIONS Chapter One The Prosecution of Mr Cowley and Mr Mitchell (TheSupergun Prosecutions) The Reasons why the Prosecutions were Discontinued J1.2 Treasury Counsel's First Written Opinion J1.17 The Attorney General and Sir Brian Unwin J1.35 Record of Grounds for a Search under Section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 J1.47 Customs' Briefing of the Minister of State at the Treasury and the Minister of State's letter to Sir Hal Miller dated 8 April 1991 J1.57 Chapter Two Contractors 600 Chapter Three The Microwave Modules Case The Investigation J3.1 Compounding of the Offence J3.7 Chapter Four The Euromac Case Chapter Five The Dunk Case Introduction J5.1 Background J5.5 First Contact with the Iraqi and Jordanian Embassies J5.10 Further Contact with the Iraqi and Jordanian Embassies J5.15 The Appeal J5.22 Chapter Six The Ordtec Prosecution and Appeal The Investigation: 1990 J6.1 Discovery and Disclosure of Documents to the Defence J6.19 Customs Knowledge of the Defence/s likely to be Employed J6.47 Adequacy of the Discovery Exercise J6.49 Public Interest Immunity Claims J6.59 Application for a Stay of the Indictment J6.70 The Changes of Plea and Sentencing J6.75 The Ordtec Appeal J6.77 Grounds for Appeal J6.78 Search for Relevant Documents for Purposes of the Appeal J6.79 Voluntary Disclosure of Documents to the Defence J6.81 PII Claims for the Purposes of the Appeal J6.84 Mr Hurd's Main Certificate J6.85 Mr Howard and Deputy Assistant Commissioner Howley's Certificates J6.87 Analysis of the PII Claims J6.91 The Appeal J6.93 Post-mortem J6.94 Chapter Seven Spark Gaps and Gyroscopes SECTION K RECOMMENDATIONS Chapter One Inquiry Procedures Chapter Two The Power of Government to Control Exports Chapter Three Export Licensing Procedures Chapter Four The Role of Customs and Excise in Export Control Customs as a Prosecuting Authority K4.6 The relationship between Customs ID and Customs Solicitor's Office K4.12 Chapter Five Prosecution Procedures Documents Held by Other Government Departments K5.1 Chapter Six Public Interest Immunity in Criminal Cases Chapter Seven Use of Intelligence by Government Departments Chapter Eight Ministerial Accountability Volume Five

    Appendix A
    Part A
    Schedule of Export Licence Applications 1984 - 1990 submitted by the Department of Trade and Industry to the Inquiry on 6 December 1995. Part B Closing Statements made by Permanent Secretaries on behalf of Government Departments.
    Part C
    ASTRA HOLDINGS PLC/BMARC C1 Correspondence between the Inquiry and the Ministry of Defence concerning the non-submission to the Inquiry of Astra Holdings Plc/BMARC documents seized by the Ministry of Defence Police (31 March 1995 - 4 May 1995). C2 Correspondence between the Inquiry and the Ministry of Defence concerning the discovery and inspection of further documents seized by the Ministry of Defence Police (16 June 1995 - 2 August 1995). C3 The inspection of Astra Holdings Plc/BMARC documents. Part D PROCEDURES D1 Inquiry's Notes on Procedures D2 Correspondence between the Inquiry and Lord Howe.



    "I think it would be a good idea." Mahatma Gandhi, when asked what he thought of Western civilization.

    The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
    Karl Marx.

    "Well, he would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies, 1963, replied Ms Rice Davies when the prosecuting counsel pointed out that Lord Astor denied an affair or having even met her.

  3. Default

    Are these regulations still in place?
    I see the thread is rather old, but I couldn't find anything more recent.
    _________________________________
    Marius from C TPAT compliance

  4. #4

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Marius Titulescu View Post
    Are these regulations still in place?
    I see the thread is rather old, but I couldn't find anything more recent.
    _________________________________
    Marius from C TPAT compliance
    I very much doubt it. This whole affair played out during the Thatcher government in the mid-1980's, over 30 years ago.
    The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge.
    Carl Jung - Aion (1951). CW 9, Part II: P.14

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