![[Image: title.gif]](http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/image/title.gif)
[FONT=Courier New][size=12]
Page 32618
1 Thursday, 9 September 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay to continue with your
7 examination-in-chief.
8 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 WITNESS: JAMES JATRAS [Resumed]
10 Examined by Mr. Kay: [Continued]
11 Q. Yesterday we broke, Mr. Jatras, when we were looking at the
12 document produced in your first bunch of exhibits, the report of the
13 select subcommittee. Could that be put back in front of the witness,
14 please. It's the large document. In fact, put all the exhibits in front
15 of him, please.
16 We were looking at page 200, which is section 4 of the document,
17 dealing with the conclusions of the select subcommittee, committee on
18 international relations for the US House of Representatives report of
19 October 10th, 1996.
20 Are you at that page, Mr. Jatras, page 200?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. The conclusions here, as we know, are those conclusions which have
23 been subject to declassification. That's right, isn't it?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. But in paragraph 2, it stated: "The subcommittee feels the need
Page 32619
1 to share with the American people as best it can the results of the
2 investigation."
3 Is that right?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. And there was a hearing in which evidence was heard by the select
6 subcommittee; is that right?
7 A. That is my understanding.
8 Q. Documents produced and witnesses questioned by counsel?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And even those appearing in front of the select subcommittee would
11 have had their own counsel?
12 A. That would be -- generally under an American procedures, that
13 would be the choice of the person, whether to retain counsel.
14 Q. Yes. The third paragraph: "It is our hope that the
15 administration will relent in its efforts to conceal the history of this
16 foreign policy fiasco, so that they will see a reasonably complete version
17 of the full report."
18 And that's what we have here, isn't it?
19 A. That's correct. And of course, the blacked out portions are those
20 that the administration would have concealed or removed for release of the
21 unclassified report.
22 Q. Thank you. The heading of number 1 is: "The administration's
23 Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented foothold in Europe
24 and has recklessly endangered American lives and US strategic interests."
25 We dealt with the issues that were concerned there to remind
Page 32620
1 everyone, yesterday, which concerned American troops being involved in
2 IFOR and SFOR, as well as the strategic interests.
3 "The Clinton Administration, unable to convince the United Nations
4 to follow its lead in lifting the Bosnian arms embargo and unwilling to
5 abandon its foreign policy philosophy of assertive multilateralism, found
6 itself in 1994 without a vehicle it found acceptable to implement a change
7 in foreign policy it believed to be in the national interest, the lifting
8 of the Bosnian arms embargo. Accordingly, the administration was
9 receptive when its ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, a man noted by
10 his colleagues for his passionate pursuit of courses, free-wheeling style,
11 and an open attitude towards Iran, pressed policy makers to consider a
12 scheme whereby Iran would be allowed to act as the US surrogate in
13 providing military assistance to the Bosnians."
14 Looking at that there -- in fact, the CIA were not involved in
15 this;
16 is that right?
17 A. They were not informed at the time the decision was made, as I
18 understand it. That is to say, it was through White House channels,
19 through Mr. Lake, from Mr. Galbraith, the ambassador in Croatia at the
20 time, and ultimately a decision made by the president, and only after that
21 decision was made were the defence department and the CIA told. What
22 involvement they may have had after that fact, after the decision had been
23 made, I can't say.
24 Q. No. The policy developed through completely unofficial channels,
25 if you like, in which it was obscured from the eyes of those with interest
Page 32621
1 in the House of Representatives and elsewhere?
2 A. Yes, that is correct. I think one thing is worthy of note here,
3 which has bearing on my paper in January of 1997. You'll note in the
4 initial sentences of the paragraph just below conclusion 1 that the
5 committee appears to be criticising the Clinton Administration for not
6 securing an end to the arms embargo or finding some other way to provide
7 weapons to the Sarajevo regime. That is to say, they agreed in substance
8 that we should be helping the Muslims in the conflict in Bosnia. They
9 disagreed with the way it was done through the Iranians. And this is why
10 I believe it did not focus at all, this report, on the other aspects that
11 I saw to bring out in the January 1997 paper, that is to say, the other
12 network which we would now refer to as Al Qaeda and the Islamist
13 orientation of the Izetbegovic government.
14 Q. You had become aware from your research in that exhibit we
15 produced first yesterday that there was another dimension to this, that it
16 wasn't solely Iran which had caught the focus of this particular
17 committee?
18 A. That's correct. And as I said, because of particular American
19 sensitivities surrounding our relationship with Iran, that was the focus
20 of the committee.
21 Q. So outside Iran, and this was something I attempted to deal with
22 yesterday, but it didn't make itself clear when I was questioning you,
23 outside Iran, the other interests were what, that was -- that you were
24 able to see were at work within Bosnia in the supply of arms or financial
25 support?
Page 32622
1 A. Or also bringing in volunteers.
2 Q. People?
3 A. Mujahedin. It was the network through the so-called charities,
4 like Third World Relief Agency. It has since been documented after 9/11
5 in many congressional hearings that are also public record that many other
6 such organisations were involved in this, and at the time it seems there
7 was very little objection raised by anybody on the American side,
8 including, by the way, from the committee.
9 Q. Now when you say "charities," we probably have in mind here
10 various UN-sponsored charities to deal with health, humanitarian relief,
11 refugee agencies. Are those the sort of charities we're talking about or
12 another dimension in the world of charities?
13 A. As you know, and again, I don't want to exceed the scope of what I
14 can directly attest to, but those who are knowledgeable about the global
15 terror network are aware that the funding mechanisms are applied to
16 activities that may include activities of the sort that you describe, in
17 addition to those that are violent, that we would describe as terrorism.
18 This is classically true of an organisation like, say, Hamas, which will
19 support terrorist activity on the one hand, but also then does support
20 schools and the hospitals and things of this sort, so that the activities
21 are mixed up together, and it's sometimes hard to not only trace the
22 source of the funding but even where the funding ultimately is disposed.
23 But again, this is something that is a matter of constant inquiry and
24 public record, not something that I have particular direct evidence of.
25 Q. Thank you. Let's look, then, at the next paragraph, and I'm going
Page 32623
1 to be concentrating on this particular conclusion and then quickly going
2 through the others. "The president's decision to give Iran a green light
3 in the Balkans allowed Iran to expand its economic and diplomatic
4 relations, as well as establish a military security and intelligence
5 presence so expansive it became the largest concentration of official
6 Iranians outside the Middle East. The consequences have been far-reaching
7 and pernicious. They persist to this day."
8 A. That is indeed what the committee found, yes.
9 Q. Are you able to say what was established there in terms when we
10 use -- the expression is used of "military security and intelligence
11 presence." Are you able to give us any idea of the extent or scope of
12 what was established, first of all, on the Iranian part of this issue?
13 A. Again, Mr. Kay, not beyond what the committee has documented here.
14 As I have said before, the significance of my reports not only here on
15 Bosnia, the January 1997 report, but I would say even more so the reports
16 I did on Kosovo, are the extent to which I have direct knowledge in the
17 sense that this was known or knowable to American officials. This report,
18 in some detail, shows what the committee had become concerned about
19 regarding the Clinton Administration's facilitation of Iranian influence,
20 which the committee found to be quite damaging to American issues, to
21 American interests in the way that you describe. The committee, for
22 reasons I can't explain, since I was not part of their deliberative
23 process, chose not to examine other presences, other assets in Bosnia
24 which I suspected or I believe as a policy analyst should be brought to
25 the attention of the Congress because they were at least as damaging to
Page 32624
1 American interests.
2 My testimony would be direct only insofar as my report is direct
3 contemporaneous, direct contemporaneous account of what was known on not
4 only the Iranian side, which is confirmed in this document, but also the
5 parallel, largely Saudi-supported network and also the character of the
6 Izetbegovic government. I would make the same assertion regarding the
7 papers on Kosovo, beginning with the one in August of 1998, indicating at
8 that time that the Clinton Administration had set itself on a course to
9 intervene militarily in Serbia.
10 Q. Looking at the next paragraph, and I mention it because Croatia is
11 referred to: "In Croatia, a government that had before the green light
12 been a consistent ally in the US's fight against Iranian-sponsored
13 terrorism was co-opted by the weapons it received in exchange for being a
14 staging point for the shipment of Iranian arms into Bosnia. As a result,
15 after the green light, there was a serious deterioration of cooperation
16 with the US, encountering very real and imminent Iranian-linked terrorist
17 threats. The US even now must cope with the consequences of Croatia's
18 developing what has been referred to as an all but out of control
19 relationship with Iran in the wake of the green light."
20 In summary, are you able to tell us what that is about?
21 A. Again, Mr. Kay, I cannot go beyond the substance of what is stated
22 in the report.
23 Q. It merely indicates that the Croatia had been used in this means
24 of avoiding detection in the supply of arms to Bosnia through Iranian
25 channels?
Page 32625
1 A. That is what is stated, yes.
2 Q. Yes. It says in the next paragraph, about the consequences being
3 much worse in Bosnia after the green light, Iran virtually overnight
4 became the unrivalled foreign benefactor of the Bosnian government: "As a
5 result, the Bosnian government became less secular and democratic and more
6 open in its embrace of a radical Islamic political agenda, acceptable to
7 Iran but inimicable to US national security interests and democratic
8 values."
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think, Mr. Jatras, you should just confirm what
10 is in the report, if you can. And if you have additional comments to
11 make, make them.
12 A. Yes. I will confirm the factual statements in the report as what
13 they purport to be. The committee examined this issue. They reached
14 certain conclusions. By and large, I would say those conclusions are
15 accurate insofar as this is my assessment as a policy analyst at the time,
16 not because I had direct knowledge of the matters under discussion. In
17 fact, I would quarrel with some of the conclusions, for example, the one
18 Mr. Kay just read, that the increasingly undemocratic Islamic orientation
19 of the Izetbegovic government was a result of this influence from Iran
20 because of the green light rather than an indication of what their
21 inclinations had been for some years, that that was in fact the
22 ideological orientation of the SDA from the beginning of the war. So, but
23 that, as I say, is a policy judgement rather than a matter on which I have
24 direct evidence, and if it please the Court, I would rather focus on the
25 reports which I issued about which I do have direct knowledge, which I
Page 32626
1 believe have direct bearing on the matter of this case, and accept that
2 the public reports which I have -- the committee reports which I have
3 acknowledged in the analyses which I have prepared for the policy
4 committee are, as I have cited them in the papers I prepared.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you'll no doubt take account of that.
6 MR. KAY: Yes. For reasons at this stage in relation to the
7 Defence, we take the view it's important to read these aspects into the
8 record, and I'm not going to read every word, but I'm going to -- I'm
9 moving through it in a particular way, and then we'll get on to the next
10 stage of this witness's evidence.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Kay.
12 MR. KAY:
13 Q. In the next paragraph, it was stated: "Somehow the administration
14 failed to see the short-term expediency of its Iranian green light was a
15 long-term curse on the Bosnian people."
16 That's concerned with the political issues in relation to what had
17 taken place; is that right?
18 A. That's correct, sir.
19 Q. And it's stated then in 1996: "Even now the administration is
20 having to cope with the fallout from its policy."
21 Further on in that paragraph: "Iranian influence in the highest
22 Bosnian ruling circles remains pervasive, and Iranian terrorist and
23 intelligence capabilities in Bosnia remain great cause for US concern.
24 The Iranians are biding their time and the radicalised Bosnian Muslim
25 political leadership may yet succeed in turning Bosnia into a radical and
Page 32627
1 authoritarian state."
2 It goes on in the report to criticise the president and those
3 working for him as poorly serving the administration; is that right?
4 A. That is what is stated, and again, I would note the careful focus
5 on the Iranians and avoiding mention of other radical assets that may be
6 present at the same time.
7 Q. Yes. And in terms of what happened, it's put this way, in
8 paragraph 4: "From the beginning, the administration realised the green
9 light policy was dynamite and so worked to implement it without
10 fingerprints."
11 And in relation to your role and your analysis, would you agree
12 with that comment that what had happened here was a cover-up that was not
13 meant to be generally known?
14 A. That is certainly what the committee is saying, and to that extent
15 I saw my role as an analyst at the policy committee, admittedly in
16 partisan circumstances, to be, so to speak, dusting the fingerprints that
17 the administration had sought to conceal.
18 Q. This had to be discovered rather than be declared by the
19 government?
20 A. It had to be discovered initially through press reports so that it
21 became a political issue which then was one that was focused on by the
22 relevant congressional committees.
23 Q. Yes. If we turn to page 204, because this might be of
24 importance: "At the time the administration was making high-minded
25 arguments about the need to respect both internationally agreed upon rules
Page 32628
1 and US allies, it was working assiduously behind the scenes to undermine
2 them."
3 And was that the issue here, that what was happening was in fact
4 not something that was official policy, nor policy that had been
5 recognised as a valid and appropriate policy through the allies of the US?
6 A. Well, certainly, and this relates to a characterisation you made
7 earlier that this somehow was not official policy. Clearly all those
8 engaged in the policy were themselves government officials and had the
9 power, if not the authority, to undertake what they did. At least in
10 American law, one of the questions would be was this technically a covert
11 operation? What laws and reporting requirements was it subject to? It
12 certainly was not one, though, that, as a policy matter and as a matter of
13 our alliance obligations was discussed with our allies or other partners
14 in the international community, except obviously the countries involved.
15 Q. And did the committee point out a number of public statements that
16 were made by administration officials which were in fact found to have
17 been not true; they were deceptions?
18 A. That's what the committee suggests, yes.
19 Q. And presumably you were aware of these public statements by
20 officials yourself whilst undergoing your analysis?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Secretary of State Warren Christopher: "The United States is not,
23 underline not, covertly supplying arms or supporting the supply of arms to
24 the Bosnian government."
25 National Security Council: "The US did not cooperate, coordinate,
Page 32629
1 or consult with any other government regarding the provision of arms to
2 the Bosnians. We have always made clear that we were abiding by the arms
3 embargo and that we expected other countries to do as well."
4 Again, department of state in response to questioning: "We are
5 certainly not contributing to it and we are certainly not turning a blind
6 eye," the blind eye being what was known and what was happening in Bosnia?
7 A. That's correct. And again, Mr. Kay, I would point out that the
8 committee is very selective in its choice of revelations on this matter,
9 that here, when it refers to Iranian influence, they're quite free in
10 exposing the fraudulent denials by administration officials, but, for
11 example, regarding the numerous reports received by -- numerous reports by
12 allied officers in Bosnia regarding flights landing at Tuzla for making
13 deliveries, this is addressed in both the House and Senate reports simply
14 by way of asking the relevant agencies if they knew anything about them,
15 receiving denials, and accepting those denials.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Flights from where?
17 THE WITNESS: We don't know. You all I can say is, again, not as
18 a matter of direct knowledge, but as an analyst following these reports,
19 some of these are described in the committee report and specifically in
20 the Senate report, which I guess has not been entered into the record, the
21 committees make note of these reports, describe who the officers were
22 making the reports and then show what action they took, which was to
23 inquire of the intelligence community and the Pentagon, receiving denials
24 and accepting those denials. So as I say, they're somewhat selective, it
25 seems to me, in deciding which administration assurances they consider to
Page 32630
1 be lies and which ones they consider to be the truth.
2 MR. KAY:
3 Q. Well, the issue of the denials and what happened went all the way
4 to the top, didn't it, because President Clinton, in response to a
5 question: If the US was involved in orchestrating the transfer of arms to
6 the Bosnian Muslims, said no?
7 A. I will not comment on Mr. Clinton's reputation for veracity.
8 Q. These sources are samples, aren't they, of the denials that you've
9 talked about and were all in various public documents and they're in fact
10 noted in this report?
11 A. That's correct. And you can see some of them are simply cited to
12 media reports.
13 Q. In section 7, the administration was criticised for deliberately
14 concealing the truth from Congress regarding the president's Iranian green
15 light decision, and it stated: "Despite protests to the contrary, in the
16 early months of this investigation, deputy Secretary of State, Strobe
17 Talbott, recently submitted to the subcommittee that the administration
18 had intentionally not told Congress of the green light it gave Iran in the
19 Balkans."
20 A. I'm sorry, Mr. Kay. Where are you looking at here?
21 Q. Section 7, page 205.
22 A. Okay. Yes. Yes. That is what the committee found.
23 Q. So this committee was also being misled. There was the misleading
24 beforehand and then there's the misleading to the Congress committee?
25 A. It was both public false denials and denials to the relevant
Page 32631
1 congressional committees.
2 Q. Section 8: "Several administration officials gave false testimony
3 to Congress on the development and implementation of the Iranian green
4 light policy."
5 A. Yes. And in fact, there was a cover letter to this report, one
6 that was submitted to the administration, asking for a justice department
7 investigation of several of these officials. It was responded to by a
8 letter from Attorney General Reno at the time, who found there was no
9 grounds for such investigation.
10 Q. The Congress committee required Ambassador Galbraith be
11 investigated?
12 A. They requested it.
13 Q. Yes. But Attorney General Reno did not proceed?
14 A. She did not.
15 Q. But the select subcommittee said it was truly disturbed that it
16 received testimony and statements from the National Security Advisor,
17 Anthony Lake, deputy National Security Advisor Samual Sandy Berger, deputy
18 Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Ambassador Walker, that directly
19 contradicts Ambassador Peter Galbraith's sworn testimony with respect to
20 material issues before the subcommittee and Congress."
21 A. That's what the committee found, yes.
22 Q. "The subcommittee is further dismayed that sworn testimony
23 provided Ambassadors Peter Galbraith and Charles Redman, both before the
24 House International Relations Committee and the select subcommittee is not
25 supported by evidence uncovered through this investigation."
Page 32632
1 Are you able to help what that is about?
2 A. Again, not beyond what is stated in the committee report.
3 Q. Right. In section 9, it says: "Evidence that Ambassador
4 Galbraith played a significant supervisory role with respect to at least
5 one Iranian weapons transhipment shipment through Croatia. Galbraith's
6 goal in facilitating this transhipment was to effect political and
7 military conditions in Bosnia. There is also evidence that he had input or
8 advanced knowledge of the planning and operation of the Iranian weapons
9 pipeline that Iran used to ship arms and gain influence in the embattled
10 Balkans."
11 A. Yes. And again, that's in the context of the conclusion there in
12 number 9 --
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. -- that this may have been a covert operation which has specific
15 consequences in American law.
16 Q. 11, and this is the last passage I'll deal with in this
17 report: "The administration is holding its embarrassment behind the veil
18 of classification."
19 A. Well, you'll see there are a lot of blacked-out sections of the
20 report.
21 Q. Well, that's all we need deal with on that issue. And I'll move
22 on in your evidence now to --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, your lawyer has been
25 spending the last two hours wasting time, without allowing the witness in
Page 32633
1 actual fact to broach the main subjects that he has direct knowledge of
2 and that he worked and was involved in. And the witness himself said
3 yesterday when he mentioned Al Qaeda and the global network, in respect of
4 Kosovo and Bosnia and so on --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've stopped you because we have a procedure that
6 we will follow. You do not set the procedure here. The Chamber sets it.
7 And the procedure is that Mr. Kay is now examining. When he has finished,
8 I will invite you, as I have done before, to consider asking us to allow
9 you to put questions. That would be the appropriate time.
10 Mr. Kay, please continue.
11 MR. KAY: And on one matter, Your Honour, as it does need to be
12 addressed: I am here and ready to take instructions from the accused if
13 and when he chooses to do so. I have been put in this position as a
14 result of what has happened in this case, where he has been found unfit,
15 through medical reasons, to represent himself, and without his
16 instructions, I am attempting to put his case as we can see from his
17 opening, from his own cross-examination previously, on the issues in this
18 trial. And documents and exhibits that are produced from his witnesses,
19 which have been made available by his team and have been disclosed in this
20 case are the only materials that I have to go on. And in those
21 circumstances, I have to use my judgement on those materials as the best
22 way to deal with them. And some of the issues raised this morning, it
23 seemed to us, were relevant and pertinent to his defence, because his
24 cross-examination has been on the lines of the Iranian influence in
25 Bosnia, the Mujahedin, and this is a public document that this witness was
Page 32634
1 producing on his behalf as part of his Defence Exhibit material.
2 Now, the witness went on to deal with Al Qaeda and the other
3 terrorist organisations and has been at pains to point out that this is
4 all from his own research, and he wasn't there at the time, and this is as
5 far as it can go. There are other issues about the credibility of those
6 dealing with Mr. Milosevic, and this issue also goes to the US
7 administration at the time, about which we've heard a lot said, and about
8 their comments concerning Mr. Milosevic.
9 So for those reasons, I have embarked on this line of
10 cross-examination, doing my best, without instructions from him. But he's
11 willing to appoint his own lawyer as the order makes entirely clear, and
12 we would encourage that. We have not volunteered for the role that we
13 have been given, but in the circumstances, it seemed appropriate that we
14 were the team to have to pick it up.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. The Chamber finds no fault
16 with the way that you are examining the witness. The Chamber recognises
17 the difficulty. The situation would have been much better had the accused
18 given you instructions, and the accused will not be allowed to interrupt
19 the examination-in-chief. If he wishes, he can instruct you. And again,
20 if he wishes, he can, at the end, invite us to consider allowing him to
21 put questions. And that's the procedure which we will follow.
22 Please proceed.
23 MR. NICE: On an entirely separate point, Mr. Kay having indicated
24 that he's finished the questions he wants to ask about this document, the
25 Chamber will remember observations made yesterday by me challenging the
Page 32635
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Page 32636
1 admissibility of the document. I think the Court was very careful in the
2 way it invited the document to be dealt with, it not yet having formally
3 being admitted as an exhibit. Our objections to its admissibility stand.
4 In our submission, this is a document that cannot assist the Chamber at
5 all. It certainly can't support any factual findings of the matters
6 concluded by the committee, nor can it be relied upon, in our submission,
7 to undermine the evidence, for example, of Mr. Galbraith. I will say no
8 more by way of repetition of my objection. It's entirely a matter for the
9 Chamber. Our position is that this is not an exhibit which should be
10 admitted in this trial.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will deal with it at the end, but I just pause
12 to say that in my own view, it is very relevant to the case put forward by
13 the accused in cross-examination as to the help that the Muslims received
14 from Iran.
15 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will deal with it at the appropriate time.
17 MR. KAY: Much obliged.
18 Q. Looking at the other exhibits that you've produced, Mr. Jatras,
19 document number 2, we've considered already, and in it you told the Court
20 in evidence yesterday about how you were looking at the other side, the
21 extra support outside Iran that there had been to the Bosnian government
22 from other Islamic sources. Is that right?
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. And we also touched on that a moment ago in your evidence, and I
25 have no need to take that document any further. And we shall now move to
Page 32637
1 Kosovo.
2 I've got an order here, which is not my order, how they came to
3 me, and I won't deviate from it because I don't know if there is any great
4 significance. But it's not quite chronological. Document 3 that we look
5 at is dated March the 31st, 1999, and it's headed: "The Kosovo liberation
6 army: Does Clinton policy support group with terror, drug ties?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Is that a document written by you?
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. And again, that is in your function as advising the Republican
11 policy committee on international relations?
12 A. That is correct. If I could put that into context. This paper
13 dated March 31st, 1999, while the Kosovo war was under way, was the last
14 of four papers I issued on that topic. Two other ones, dated
15 February 22nd and March 23rd, are also in this group of exhibits here.
16 For some reason, the other paper that is also cited on page 1 of the
17 March 31st paper and in the other two as well was the first paper of the
18 series, dated August 12th, I believe, 1998. I will, of course, comment on
19 these other papers as well, starting with the one you have referred to,
20 but the August 1998 paper is the one I believe is most significant and
21 relevant to the case, in that it describes, in direct terms, the
22 preparedness of the Clinton Administration to attack Serbia in the very
23 near future. As it turned out, six months later. That description was
24 two months prior to the date given in the indictment relevant to Kosovo,
25 that there came into being, it is alleged, a joint criminal enterprise
Page 32638
1 regarding Kosovo.
2 Again, as I've stated with respect to my other papers, they are
3 significant not because they can be taken as direct evidence of the
4 matters described in the paper, but the papers themselves are direct
5 contemporaneous, official assessments about the course of American policy
6 at that time from someone in the American government.
7 Q. Let's start there, then, and I have not been given, and we were
8 not supplied with that earlier paper in 1998. But you can tell us now,
9 then, going back a year, what the issues were that you uncovered.
10 A. Well, the paper, which again you see the title of it here.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. On the paper you're referring to, the March 31st paper.
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. It's about three-quarters of the way down the page. It
15 says: "Bosnia II: The Clinton Administration sets course for NATO
16 intervention in Kosovo, August 12th, 1998." I do have copies of that
17 paper, for whatever use you may put them to.
18 Q. If I could have a copy of it now.
19 A. Certainly. And I have one for the Prosecution if they would like
20 one.
21 Q. The Judges would obviously need one as well. So --
22 A. Well, maybe someone should make some copies.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 A. Thank you.
25 MR. KAY: If you could make copies.
Page 32639
1 A. Again, I don't know how you want to proceed, Mr. Kay, whether we
2 should come back to that paper after copies --
3 MR. KAY:
4 Q. Let's start with it there. You're familiar with it and you can
5 tell us about it.
6 A. Yes. To summarise what is asserted in that paper at that time,
7 August of 1998, and the reason the paper is titled "Bosnia II" is that it
8 was clear to me as an analyst at that time, and it was clear to me, I
9 contend it should have been clear to others, that the administration had
10 made a decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo, either by creating
11 circumstances where Serbia would consent to an occupation of Kosovo or
12 through undertaking military action to bring about that result, and as I
13 then describe in the later papers, simply the implementation of that plan.
14 Even as of August of 1998, I was able to assert, and I think it turns out,
15 quite accurately, that that course had been decided upon, and the only
16 thing lacking in implementing that course was a suitable trigger, as I
17 refer to it in the paper, quoting an unnamed defence department official
18 mentioned in a Washington Post article I believe in June or July of 1998.
19 So I would say even that plan may have been decided upon by the
20 administration even earlier.
21 The reason I called it "Bosnia II" was that it seemed to me it had
22 all the hallmarks of what we had seen in Bosnia; that is to say, taking a
23 very, very complex, very messy conflict with lots of blame to go around
24 and boiling it down to a morality play, where we had good guys and bad
25 guys. With the evil Serbs and the saintly Albanians and naturally the
Page 32640
1 United States would be on the side of the angels. This entailed other
2 things which I also stated in the August 1998 report and mentioned in the
3 subsequent reports a -- I believe a whitewashing of the character of the
4 Kosovo liberation army, which had been called by American officials,
5 specifically by Robert Gelbard had been described as a terrorist
6 organisation, although it was never, as far as I know, officially listed
7 as one. But if you're going to embark on an invention of claimed
8 humanitarian grounds based on a very stacked presentation of the equities,
9 you have to overlook certain things on the -- with respect to your chosen
10 beneficiary.
11 As I say, I think the evidentiary value is this: You have an
12 official source saying: Six months before the attack came, that there
13 would be an attack, and two months before a joint criminal enterprise
14 supposedly came into existence, which I believe lends credibility to what
15 would -- what would be understood as the normal business of a government,
16 which is to protect its territory and people, not to formulate plans for
17 criminal activities.
18 Q. In relation to the Kosovo policy, did you write at all about the
19 extent, how wide the intervention was going to be?
20 A. I did not. I described the military planning that had taken place
21 up to that time and what appeared to be getting the political machinery in
22 place for proceeding with the intervention. And this was something that
23 primarily related to our NATO allies and what essentially appeared to be a
24 negotiation between our allies and Washington over their reluctance to
25 support air strikes and their insistence that Americans provide a major
Page 32641
1 part of the manpower to be part of the occupation force when the
2 occupation would begin.
3 Q. We know that in October of 1998 that there was a cease-fire that
4 was brokered between the KLA and the Serbian government.
5 A. Yes. The so-called Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement.
6 Q. Yes. You've dealt with so far the period before then. In terms
7 of the KLA and its influence, as you were able to see on the political
8 machinery in Washington --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- was there anything you were able to observe?
11 A. I'm not -- you're saying the influence of the KLA in Washington?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. I would say this: The Albanian cause in Kosovo, which I don't
14 dispute the validity of in the sense that every nation, every people has
15 its right to its own perspective on matters, clearly had strong support in
16 Washington, but I would say that also extended to a very dismissive
17 attitude toward serious and I would say credible reports of the character
18 of that specific organisation. These are the ones that I gave fullest
19 description to, you can see in numerous, numerous quotes from those
20 sources, in the March 31st paper, that the Kosovo liberation army was
21 substantially, in its leadership, a criminal organisation, let's say tied
22 to Albanian organised crime throughout Europe, really, and also that it
23 had links to terrorist influences, both Iranian and also Al Qaeda, the
24 same kind of people we saw getting their assets into Bosnia during the
25 Bosnian war.
Page 32642
1 Q. In the same way that we dealt with issues yesterday concerning
2 Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia and American perceptions of Serbia, in
3 relation to Kosovo at this time, was there an understanding of the
4 significance of Kosovo to the Serbian people, its historical, cultural,
5 and its root, if you like, with the Serbian people?
6 A. I would on occasion hear people ask questions about that. Again,
7 as an analyst at the policy committee, I would often receive inquiries
8 from Senate offices, generally from staff, but I was on occasion able to
9 brief senators on it who would ask me, you know, who are these people,
10 what is this place, what are the Serbs' interests here, what is the
11 Albanian interest, and so forth. In general, though, given the degree to
12 which Serb had become almost a synonym for some kind of a -- you know, it
13 was almost used like a word like Nazi or something. You couldn't describe
14 in many circles a Serb interest or a Serb perspective on a matter having
15 to do with potential violence in Yugoslavia without immediately
16 decrediting [sic] your argument. In fact, I should note that in preparing
17 my reports I did not use Serb sources for the simple reason that they
18 would be immediately considered discredited. I could possibly use Muslim
19 sources or Croatian sources, certainly European or American sources, but a
20 Serb source was automatically not admissible in that political context.
21 Q. We've all now got this document. I've just written an 8 on it to
22 indicate in the chain where it lies. And that might be a useful way of
23 having it. August 12th, 1998, was there any misrepresentation of the sort
24 of organisation the KLA was?
25 A. I wouldn't say so much a misrepresentation of saying the KLA is
Page 32643
1 not a criminal organisation, the KLA does not have terrorist ties, but
2 rather a default assumption that the Albanian cause is a just one, they're
3 freedom fighters are freedom fighters and nothing more needs to be said
4 about it except that Mr. Milosevic and the Serbs are clearly the bad guys
5 and we must do something. And again, I think some of those quotes along
6 those lines are given in the paper itself from the Clinton officials. If
7 you look on page 3, for example, that there's a quote from Ambassador
8 Holbrooke, and I think there's another one on page 4 from Secretary
9 Albright. The thesis being that the Serbs - let's say Mr. Milosevic -
10 cannot do what they did in Bosnia, again giving their interpretation of
11 what was done in Bosnia, they cannot now do this in Kosovo, and we are now
12 going to do something about it. That doesn't entail a direct
13 representation or misrepresentation of the Kosovo liberation army. It
14 simply ignores the question.
15 Q. There's a paragraph headed "whitewashing the KLA."
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And in the second part, you refer to media reports of recent
18 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania may be connected to the deportation
19 from Albania of several members of the terrorist cell of Osama bin Laden.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Were the Al Qaeda links to the KLA something that had been
22 observed and pointed out? Were they noted?
23 A. Certainly in that article, and again I would refer you to the
24 March 31st paper, and I would not go beyond those reports, again to accept
25 the Prosecution's point, I have no direct knowledge of the accuracy of
Page 32644
1 those reports. On the other hand, I do have direct knowledge that those
2 reports from credible sources were available, certainly they were
3 available to the administration, and there's no evidence the
4 administration took them seriously. I would also note in retrospect, for
5 example, we have a gentleman down in Guantanamo, Mr. Hicks from Australia,
6 who fought in Kosovo before he was arrested fighting with the Taliban
7 against the Americans in Afghanistan. I suggest that a Taliban-oriented
8 Australian didn't end up in Kosovo fighting for the Albanian cause because
9 he was recruited by the Salvation Army.
10 Q. Let's go now to the next paper, which we had begun to look at,
11 paper 3, March 31st, 1999. Again, you're writing about the KLA and here
12 tying it in with drug dealing, terror organisations. Is this again
13 information that was being made available in Washington?
14 A. Well, it was being certainly made available in my report, and
15 given the dates of the sources cited in there, which are not classified or
16 secret sources, they were available to anybody who cared to compile the
17 information. I would note that this report was issued while the war was
18 under way and that the previous reports were issued before the war
19 actually started.
20 Q. And again it points out the Mujahedin and the other aspects, the
21 same aspects you've referred to in Bosnia as having been present in
22 Kosovo.
23 A. That's right. And if I can characterise what we saw from the
24 green light episode in Bosnia as a reckless disregard for the consequences
25 of such associations. I think the same thing could apply here, noting, by
Page 32645
1 the way, that the reports refer to KLA violence against Albanians as well
2 as against Serbs, and I would say given what happened in Kosovo as of June
3 1999, when the Serbian forces were withdrawn and the cleansing of Serbs
4 that occurred in Kosovo, I would say that the reports that I sought to
5 draw attention to were very much vindicated.
6 Q. Document 4, dated February the 22nd, "Clinton Kosovo intervention
7 appears imminent." This is a follow-on from the earlier article you had
8 written in 1998, when you indicated, on the 12th of August, what the
9 policy was going to be. And was this your characterisation of the issues
10 that were involved in terms of US foreign policy?
11 A. That is correct. And one thing I would note in there is that ten
12 days - excuse me - on -- this was issued on February 22nd.
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. If you look -- there is a report - excuse me - a hearing in the
15 House of Representatives on February 10th that I cited in there in which a
16 senior Defence department official, Walter Slocombe, was already referring
17 to KFOR by its acronym at that time. So even though supposedly we did not
18 have a Kosovo force until June of 1999, when Serbian forces were withdrawn
19 from Kosovo, at least by well over a month before the war began, the
20 military planning had gone so far as to even have the name of the force we
21 were going to insert into Kosovo once the occupation began.
22 Q. Document 5, March 23rd: "Senate to vote today on preventing
23 funding, military operations for Kosovo." A paper in this series dealing
24 mainly again with what these issues were, but looking at the so-called
25 trigger event of Racak; is that right?
Page 32646
1 A. Yes. And I would say this is one of the more significant matters
2 I would like to point out in these papers, which, as I again remind the
3 Court, are contemporaneous, official documents.
4 In August of 1998, I had said that this was essentially ready to
5 go, this was a course that the administration had decided upon and they
6 were lacking only a trigger, some event that would make the operation
7 politically saleable. And I even said in that August 1998 paper that they
8 would do so on the same, I would say, cavalier basis that they used in --
9 cavalier with regard to the facts, that they used in Bosnia regarding the
10 market-place and the breadline massacres. That is to say, there are
11 events that occur in war that are often at the time very difficult to know
12 precisely what happened. Even when investigation is given, it's hard to
13 know what is happening sometimes. You never know precisely what had
14 happened. That did not change the political utility of such events for
15 the Clinton Administration. As Secretary Albright commented with regard
16 to one of the market-place massacres, so-called Serb mortar massacres,
17 that we don't know exactly what the facts are; therefore, we must believe
18 the Serbs are responsible.
19 This violates not only all laws of logic; I believe it may violate
20 the laws of grammar in the English language, to say "we don't know,
21 therefore."
22 I think the same pattern as I predicted in August of 1998 was
23 followed with respect to Racak. As I discuss in some length in the
24 March 23rd paper, which was issued the day before the bombing began, it
25 was very unclear from the information available at that time what exactly
Page 32647
1 had happened at Racak and that the forensic team, headed by Dr. Ranta had
2 pointedly said: "We cannot say whether there was a massacre at Racak."
3 Maybe there was. I don't know. I wasn't at Racak. I don't know if now,
4 years after the event, anybody is in a position to say with certainty
5 precisely what happened at Racak.
6 The point is that in terms of political intention to move forward
7 with a predetermined plan to attack Serbia, Racak was politically useful
8 and Racak became what the Clinton Administration said it was. If they
9 immediately want to say it was the massacre of an entire village at
10 point-blank range, forced to kneel, et cetera, et cetera, as I have quoted
11 Mr. Clinton and Senator Biden in my paper, that's what it was because it
12 was useful for pursuing a course of attack that they had previously
13 determined upon.
14 Q. Document number 6 is a text of a speech you gave on the Balkan
15 war, finding an honourable exit. I don't know actually seek to go through
16 this. I don't know whether you may be questioned on it or whatever, but
17 it doesn't have anything here further than your testimony has been
18 already; is that right?
19 A. I would take it as -- again, this is not an official document. It
20 is a speech given at a public policy institute, a think-tank in
21 Washington, in which I refer to the documents. I think it is possibly
22 useful as a summary of my description of the significance of the documents
23 plus some other material regarding Rambouillet and other aspects that I
24 think buttress my claim made six months prior to the war that the
25 administration had already determined upon this course and well before, it
Page 32648
1 appears, the allegation of a joint criminal enterprise took place. I
2 would say that there are other -- for example, the famous paragraph 8 of
3 annex B to the agreement that was discussed at Rambouillet where it
4 appears that we were demanding not only occupation of Kosovo but all of
5 Yugoslavia. And that, you know, there are other indications we can go
6 into as well, but perhaps not necessary at this time.
7 JUDGE KWON: CATO is an acronym of what institute?
8 THE WITNESS: CATO. It is a think-tank. It is -- it has its
9 name, the CATO institute. It is one of the libertarian political
10 orientation generally that supports a fairly non-interventionist
11 perspective on foreign policy.
12 JUDGE KWON: It is the abbreviation of what letters?
13 THE WITNESS: It evidently is not an abbreviation. It's just
14 CATO, yes. I've wondered about that myself.
15 MR. KAY:
16 Q. You mention Rambouillet and in this paper, I mean, I'll look at it
17 as you've mentioned it. I have it on good authority, and I'm looking here
18 at page 3 of the document, in the middle, "I have it on good authority
19 that one senior administration official told media at Rambouillet under
20 embargo, we intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply.
21 They need some bombing and that's what they're going to get."
22 A. Yes. And when I --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question
24 and answer. Thank you.
25 A.
Page 32649
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I will pause between question and answer.
2 As I stated there, "I have it on good authority," that is to say,
3 from confidential sources, not confidential in the sense of classified,
4 but confidential in the sense of people I know who were in a position to
5 know and rather would not identify themselves, that this had been said by
6 a senior official, and I think it's -- whether it was said or not, it
7 certainly describes the situation that I think must be universally
8 acknowledged to have existed, where a country is presented with a demand
9 for occupation of its entire territory or to be attacked militarily. I
10 don't know how one could describe that as not setting the bar too high,
11 unless a country didn't consider occupation to be out of bounds.
12 Q. Let's look at the last document, number 7. It hadn't been one I
13 was going to rely on with any particular detail. We don't have the date
14 because the photocopy cut it off. It's the Navy Times, August 21st
15 nineteen-ninety something or other.
16 A. Yes. Well, 1995. 1995.
17 Q. Is it 1995?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Right. It was faxed on the 25th of August, 2004?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Is there any significance in this newspaper extract from Navy
22 Times that you wish to draw to the Court's attention?
23 A. Only this, and again, I would agree with you, Mr. Kay, that it
24 should not be given great weight because I'm not able to say in great
25 detail what its significance is, and my direct observations on it would
Page 32650
1 be -- direct knowledge about it would be fairly limited. But let me
2 describe it as follows: If you look at the Kosovo war, as was initiated
3 by the Clinton Administration, the legal grounds for it is extremely
4 limited, slim to none, I would say. We did not get -- we, the Clinton
5 Administration, did not get a Security Council resolution authorising it.
6 It did not even get an authorisation from our own Congress. In fact, a
7 resolution of authorisation was affirmatively voted down in the House of
8 Representatives. We did secure an agreement of the North Atlantic
9 Council, again on what basis it's hard to say, in that the North Atlantic
10 Treaty refers only to the defence of the territory of member states and
11 the right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of
12 the UN charter, none of which were at issue in Kosovo.
13 The only thing that could possibly be said for the Kosovo
14 operation - and again, the legal authority for this, I'm still not sure
15 of - would be that it was necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe,
16 that human rights were so violated on such a massive scale, or potentially
17 would be, that some action was necessary.
18 Again, laying aside whether the humanitarian catastrophe ensued
19 after the initiation or when the initiation of hostilities was imminent
20 and was itself among the proximate causes of that humanitarian
21 catastrophe --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down. Thank you.
23 A. -- was among the causes of that humanitarian catastrophe, my
24 purpose in mentioning that report or alluding to it in my CATO remarks was
25 that with respect to Krajina, the Clinton Administration was seemingly
Page 32651
1 less fastidious about the massive humanitarian hardship when, even in
2 cases where it may have had some direct connection to the infliction of
3 that hardship.
4 This report in the Navy Times, which is a non-official publication
5 but one that is widely read in military circles and in government, refers
6 to air strikes that were directed against Serbian positions in Krajina
7 during Operation Storm. The article refers to strikes against radars. It
8 suggests that carrier-based planes were asked to come to the scene because
9 Pakistani peacekeepers were receiving artillery fire from the Croatian
10 forces, although that's not stated, and that when they came to the scene,
11 Serbian radar locked on to them and they struck at those radar sites.
12 The reason that struck me as significant is it was known from the
13 Serbian side that there were false broadcasts, what we would describe as
14 Si ops, to sow panic among their forces and population and to encourage
15 them to leave flee the scene and flee Krajina. Striking transmitters
16 would have been greatly -- a facilitation of such broadcasts. Inquiry was
17 made, not official inquiry but rather on the part of a retired officer
18 with experience in Vietnam and knowing something from a professional
19 standpoint about the use of air power, that official happened to be my
20 father, as it happens, who called the Congress, talked to people at the
21 Pentagon and ultimately to people at Air South in Naples asking about this
22 report and trying to get a little more information. The response he
23 received was essentially that it was a mistake. There were no such
24 planes, no such operation, nothing happened. It was a mistake.
25 Given the names in the article, the names of the ship, the names
Page 32652
1 of the flight leader, the specifics of the aircraft, it is hard to believe
2 that the entire report is simply a mistake, it didn't happen. I just
3 throw that out there, mention that in the CATO or alluded to it in the
4 CATO remarks, for what it is worth, as an indication given the kind of
5 falsity the Clinton Administration was capable of pedalling on the other
6 matters we've discussed in Kosovo and Bosnia, that their humanitarian
7 claims should also be taken with a great deal of scepticism.
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that the speaker
9 slow down.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you are asked to slow down.
11 THE WITNESS: I think I'm asked to slow down.
12 MR. KAY: I have no further questions to ask you, but wait there,
13 please.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do you wish to invite us to
15 consider allowing you to put questions to this witness? Yes or no. Did
16 you hear the question, Mr. Milosevic?
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that Mr. Milosevic is
18 waiting for the end of the translation.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Okay.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As I was saying, that was the end of
21 the interpretation.
22 Mr. Robinson, there's no sense to this. Mr. Kay himself explained
23 that he was not able to examine --
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've cut you off. I asked you for a yes or a no
25 answer.
Page 32653
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Page 32654
1 Mr. Nice.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My answer is this: I want you to
3 return my right to self-defence back to me.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
5 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:
6 Q. Mr. Jatras, just a few preliminary questions to make sure I
7 understand where we are.
8 Did you go to the former Yugoslavia at all in the course of the
9 period with which we are concerned?
10 A. On one occasion during the Kosovo war, I accompanied a
11 congressional delegation to Macedonia to visit the refugees there, also to
12 Albania.
13 Q. That was the only occasion, was it?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Do you speak the language?
16 A. I do not.
17 Q. The visit to Macedonia, I suppose, may lie behind an observation
18 you've made about refugees stating that they had fled either because of
19 the activity of the Serbs in Kosovo or because of the NATO bombing;
20 correct?
21 A. Actually, no. I was -- again, let me pause. It's contrary to my
22 nature. Actually, no. I was citing -- I was taking those from press
23 reports.
24 Q. Very well. So I'm just trying to clear the decks a little bit.
25 It appears you have, therefore, nothing by way of actual, direct evidence
Page 32655
1 coming from the territory that you can help us with?
2 A. I have nothing, actual, direct evidence coming from the territory.
3 My direct evidence is solely that within the government and the thinking
4 in the government in Washington.
5 Q. You have expressed and indeed been allowed to express conclusions,
6 including general observations on the integrity of the Clinton
7 Administration and indeed the honesty of its president. But this material
8 comes to you simply from public-source material?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. Insofar as you have had some access in your job to confidential
11 material, you've cut it out from consideration, so that all you're telling
12 us is conclusions that anybody else could have reached having access to
13 the same public material?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. You're currently a lawyer for the first time -- first time
16 practicing as a lawyer. How long is that?
17 A. Just over two years.
18 Q. But you've made some references to legal issues here. You bring
19 no legal expertise at all to the evidence you've given?
20 A. I would say to the extent to which I had a legal education, my
21 service with the State Department and with the Senate was informed by that
22 background and education, but no, that is not a specifically legal
23 perspective on the issues.
24 Q. You realise there are different provisions for expert witnesses
25 that prepare reports?
Page 32656
1 A. Absolutely. And I'm not here as an expert witness.
2 Q. And you're not here as an expert witness as a lawyer, you're also
3 not here as an expert witness in any other capacity because you don't
4 pretend to any special expertise on the matters about which you've been
5 giving evidence?
6 A. I would not accept that exactly. I would claim expertise on the
7 formulation and implementation of American policy as I have practiced it
8 during certainly my 17 and a half years at the Senate, as well as my
9 experience with the foreign service. However, I am not testifying as an
10 expert based on that experience. I...
![[Image: edit.png]](http://www.historycommons.org/pics/icons/edit.png){kind=icon}
![[Image: a184_abu_abdel_aziz_barbaros_2050081722-17119.jpg]](http://cdn.historycommons.org/images/events/a184_abu_abdel_aziz_barbaros_2050081722-17119.jpg)
Abu Abdel Aziz Barbaros in Bosnia in September 1992. His beard is dyed with henna. [Source: Pascal le Segretain / Corbis]Jamal al-Fadl, an al-Qaeda financial agent, is sent from bin Laden's headquarters in Sudan to Zagreb, Croatia, to gather information about the Bosnian war and the prospects of buying businesses in Croatia for al-Qaeda. In Croatia, he meets with Enaam Arnaout (who will soon become the head of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) in the US), and al-Qaeda operatives Abu Abdel Aziz Barbaros (a.k.a. Abdel Rahman al Dosari), and Abu Zubair al Madani, one of bin Laden's cousins (he will later be killed fighting in Bosnia). Barbaros tells al-Fadl that al-Qaeda is seeking to create training camps in Bosnia, develop relationships with Bosnian charities, and establish businesses to help finance al-Qaeda activities. He says that BIF is providing money for al-Qaeda to buy weapons to use in Bosnia and that they have already obtained some weapons from Germany with the help of BIF and Mohammed Loay Bayazid (who also works for BIF in the US). According to a later Justice Department indictment, Barbaros also says that "al-Qaeda's goal in Bosnia [is] to establish a base for operations in Europe against al-Qaeda's true enemy, the United States." Around this time, BIF begins providing food, clothing, money and communications equipment to fighters in Bosnia, including the elite Black Swans unit. [USA v. Enaam M. Arnaout, 10/6/2003, pp. 24-25 ![[Image: pdfbw.png]](http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/pics/icons/pdfbw.png){kind=icon}
; Kohlmann, 2004, pp. 16-17] In 1996, al-Fadl will defect from al-Qaeda and tell all he knows to US investigators (see June 1996-April 1997).