[FONT=Courier New][size=12] Page 32727
1 Tuesday, 14 September 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.
6 MR. KAY: Thank you. Your Honour, before I call the first
7 witness, who is Mr. Roland Keith, there is another matter that I would
8 like to raise at the end of his testimony - the witness is here and
9 available and should be heard first - and that deals with the matter of
10 the accused's appeal on the issue of his right to represent himself.
11 As the Trial Chamber knows, we lodged before the Trial Chamber an
12 application for a certificate for leave to appeal that decision. Leave
13 was given last Friday, and we would be making an application after this
14 witness is finished testimony on the issue of the suspension of the
15 proceedings until the appeal is heard by the Appeals Chamber.
16 I gave notice to the Prosecution of this matter slightly earlier
17 this morning, and I --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. Let us hear the witness
19 first and then we'll deal with that matter afterwards.
20 MR. KAY: I was raising it to put the Trial Chamber on notice as
21 well.
22 If we could have Mr. Keith, please.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's not coming from Canada, is he?
24 MR. KAY: He had arrived. I don't know whether he -- ah, here he
25 is.
Page 32728
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
3 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
4 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
6 WITNESS: ROLAND KEITH
7 Examined by Mr. Kay:
8 Q. Your name is Roland Keith; is that right?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And you're a citizen of Canada?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. If we could just have a brief resume of your background,
13 Mr. Keith. You were an army officer in the Canadian army; is that right?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. For what period of time?
16 A. I was a military officer in the Canadian army for 32 years.
17 Q. And finishing your service when?
18 A. I finished my service -- it was broken service, actually. I
19 finished initially in the year 1982. I then took what I call a
20 sabbatical. I was back at grad school, studying history. I returned to
21 the army for a further four years in the year 1987 to 1991.
22 Q. And your rank at retirement was captain; is that right?
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. And you became a member of the Kosovo monitoring force in 1999?
25 A. Yes, I did.
Page 32729
1 Q. What we call the KVM?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. When were you first recruited to take part in that mission?
4 A. The background to my service with the Kosovo Verification Mission
5 was in the summer of 1998 when the first indication that it would be
6 constituted, and I subsequently applied to participate, and in the late
7 fall of 1998, my government and -- contacted me and said is that they --
8 they furthered -- they forwarded, rather, my resume and my application,
9 and I was notified in -- shortly after New Year's 1999 that I -- that they
10 would like me to serve with the OSCE, Kosovo Verification Mission.
11 Q. And did you arrive in Kosovo in the first week of February, 1999?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. And you undertook a period of training for some four days on about
14 the 9th of February?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. And did you go down to Pristina on the 12th of February for a
17 period of two days?
18 A. I believe that is correct, yes.
19 Q. And the purpose of that was for what?
20 A. The purpose of that was to assign me to a role within the Pristina
21 Regional Centre and the Pristina Coordination Centre of the Kosovo
22 Verification Mission, which was done in that short period of time.
23 Q. Before this period, had you ever spent any period of your service
24 in the Balkans?
25 A. No. This was my initial participation with the Balkans.
Page 32730
1 Q. Had your previous military experience had you undertaken observer
2 duties in other countries?
3 A. Yes, I had. In the mid-1970s I had served a double tour as a
4 United Nations military observer in the Sinai -- the Suez Canal, the
5 Sinai, throughout the United Nations truce supervisory organisation area,
6 including the state of Lebanon.
7 Q. And in your previous military history have you spent a previous
8 period in the Suez area, right at the start of your military career?
9 A. Yes. I was very, very proud as a young man to have served with
10 the Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron as one of the initial units
11 under General Burns in what was then the United Nations Emergency Force 1,
12 and a very interesting and challenging experience.
13 Q. Right. Now let's turn to Kosovo. When you arrived here in The
14 Hague, you brought with you some documents, and the first one I'd like to
15 put before the Court, which will serve as a familiarisation process, is a
16 general map of the Kosovo area centred upon Pristina.
17 MR. KAY: And if copies of that can be handed out and one put
18 before the witness.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question
20 and answer. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you have seen the notification? Pause
22 between question and answer. And I say the same to the witness, for the
23 benefit of the interpreters.
24 MR. KAY: Yes. Thank you.
25 Q. It's what I discussed with you yesterday. We must be careful
Page 32731
1 about not running our questions and answers together, and the mistake is
2 entirely mine in not doing that which I told you not to do.
3 If we could look at this map, then, and we see Pristina in the
4 middle of the map. We see an area, a town to the left, Kosovo Polje. We
5 see, slightly above that, Obilic. And we see to the left Glogovac. And
6 if you could confirm this: The testimony that you're to give largely
7 concerns that area to the west of Pristina; is that right?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. I'd like you now to take us through your tour of duty, which I
10 believe commenced after you had had your familiarisation process in
11 Pristina, with going to Glogovac; is that correct?
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. And if you could inform the Court what the circumstances were at
14 this time in the middle of February when you arrived in Glogovac. What
15 did you see?
16 A. My initial recollections of arriving in Glogovac in this time
17 frame, in the middle of February of 1999, this was a small Serbian --
18 sorry, a small Yugoslavian town inhabited by, I believe, some 6 to 7.000
19 inhabitants. It was predominantly Albanian, and to the best of my
20 knowledge, it was -- it was, I believe, entirely Albanian at this time.
21 The surrounding area consisted of a number of small villages. To my --
22 best of my knowledge, all of these were entirely Albanian.
23 The town had a -- a small MUP, paramilitary station in an old
24 industrial site or a former industrial site, and routine patrols and the
25 replacement of MUP personnel occurred on a daily basis, and there were
Page 32732
1 frequent patrols after the hours of darkness into and out of Glogovac to
2 visit this MUP site.
3 The general area both to the -- in the surrounding villages, to
4 the north-east, the east, and to the south, and to the south of Komorane.
5 If you see Komorane, it's a small community on the crossroads on the
6 Pristina to Pec road. And the surrounding -- the villages from Lopusnik
7 and all down the valley to the south there were all, as well, additional
8 Albanian inhabited small communities. In all of these communities there
9 was what I refer to as the home guard. They were local UCK members,
10 referred to as terrorists by the authorities, who had a presence in all of
11 these villages, and they maintained static armed checkpoints on the routes
12 in and out of their villages. There was no -- there was no harassment or
13 incursion of Serbian or Yugoslavian authorities or forces into any of
14 these villages at this time. To my knowledge, they stayed, as I've
15 previously stated, to the route in and out of Glogovac and patrolling the
16 main road which I've previously referred to as well, the Pristina-Pec
17 highway, and the road going down to Orahovac and down to the -- down to
18 the Prizren area from the north.
19 So this was my -- my general impression of the Glogovac area.
20 There were some incidents that had occurred as recently as the day before
21 I arrived when an individual was fatally murdered just south of Glogovac.
22 I did not participate in the investigation nor in the follow-up to that
23 particular incident, but to the best of my knowledge, it was a local
24 attack by one side or another or retribution.
25 Q. The period you spent at Glogovac was how long?
Page 32733
1 A. I don't have the precise dates in front of me at the moment,
2 Mr. Kay, but I -- I believe I was there for about one week.
3 Q. In your previous answer which I can see on the LiveNote
4 transcript, you said the MUP was in a paramilitary building. Is that what
5 you meant?
6 A. In Glogovac itself?
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. Yes. I believe I stated that the MUP team in Glogovac occupied a
9 military -- had a military presence in a former industrial building which
10 was fortified, of course.
11 Q. Yes. In terms of what you saw in that week of -- of Glogovac, did
12 you come across any abuses of power by the local MUP or the VJ or any
13 other body to be associated with the Serbian authorities?
14 A. No. During that -- that week that I was in Glogovac, as I've
15 previously stated, the -- the VJ had a very limited presence. There were
16 some armoured infantry fighting vehicle movement into and out of Glogovac,
17 small numbers of vehicles, platoon size. There -- but basically the VJ
18 were staying in their barracks, and other than some movement on the
19 principal roads, the MUP, again as previously stated, had routine patrols
20 on the roads into and out of their -- their patrol sites, and they manned
21 checkpoints along the major highway, again referring to the Pristina-Pec
22 highway, and these -- within the Glogovac area of responsibility, these
23 would number probably one or two a day along the main road or on the road
24 into Glogovac where they would set up temporary checkpoint, and they would
25 examine all personnel transiting that particular checkpoint.
Page 32734
1 I observed a number of these operations in progress. It was not
2 my observation that there was any abuse or -- or harm, physical harm, that
3 is, done to any of the inhabitants transiting those checkpoints. We did,
4 however, in conversing with the predominantly Albanian population of the
5 area, ask them if they were having any difficulty in moving through the
6 area, transiting the area, or being harassed. They stated in some cases
7 they thought they had in that -- in that their -- some of their documents,
8 they claimed, were taken from them. In some cases, they claimed that some
9 individuals were detained for a short period of time, perhaps maybe
10 overnight, but I did not see personally any maltreatment or physical or
11 harmful harassment to the inhabitants trying to participate in their
12 lawful -- lawful business.
13 Again, the -- the -- the local -- what I referred to as the local
14 home guard of the UCK, or the terrorists, did again stay within their
15 villages at this time in this area, to my knowledge.
16 Q. You've described there the UCK/KLA as having a home guard network
17 in the villages in the surrounding area. What level of strength are we
18 looking at in terms of KLA forces that you were able to observe at this
19 time in this area?
20 A. These were local forces, in my estimation. They would be in half
21 a dozen -- strength of half a dozen young men. Sometimes -- sometimes
22 there were more, but they appeared to me to be local inhabitants and not
23 part of any main force UCK offensive group.
24 Q. After that we -- did you then establish a field office in Kosovo
25 Polje?
Page 32735
1 A. That is correct. I was -- I had gone to -- I'd been assigned to
2 Glogovac with the understanding that I would take over the direction of
3 that field office. That did -- did not happen. And after the short
4 period of time, approximately one week, I was requested to assume
5 responsibility to form a field office under the direction of the Pristina
6 Coordination Centre and Regional Centre at Kosovo Polje. This was a new
7 team that did not exist until the time that I was appointed.
8 Q. You brought to the Tribunal with you some -- some notes from your
9 records at the time; is that correct?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. And these notes came from what source?
12 A. The notes were -- were put together by myself, and they are weekly
13 summaries, I believe the ones you're referring to, that were based on the
14 daily reports that were put together by myself and my team of verifiers
15 and submitted to the Pristina Coordination Centre on a daily basis. The
16 weekly reports were -- were put together by myself to -- to give a summary
17 of what those daily reports consisted of and to provide me personally with
18 a record of what my participation in the Kosovo Verification Mission was.
19 Q. Now, it would probably help to consider your evidence with those
20 notes before us.
21 MR. KAY: So, Your Honours, if the map we produced could be the
22 next exhibit, which would D246.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's admitted.
24 MR. KAY: And if the notes of the witness can now be produced and
25 put before the parties.
Page 32736
1 Q. Whilst that's going on, Mr. Keith, on your left-hand side is a
2 very detailed map which is your personal property again; is that right?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Which is a map of the general area and was your operations map at
5 the time; is that right?
6 A. That is correct, Mr. Kay.
7 Q. You're familiar with that map, and if you need to direct our
8 attention to anything on the map, please do so as it's on an ELMO and
9 we're able to look at it on the video screens if necessary. We've got the
10 general map and then we've got the more detailed map which may help your
11 testimony.
12 Just looking at the first note, then, which is headed 28th of
13 February, 1999, Weekly Summary Number 1, it states you established your
14 field office in Kosovo Polje on the 22nd of February, 1999; is that right?
15 A. That is correct.
16 JUDGE KWON: Before moving on, Mr. Kay, why don't we make sure the
17 ELMO is operating properly or not.
18 MR. KAY: We did a test earlier, Your Honour, and it was. Shall
19 we see?
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're not getting any signal.
21 JUDGE KWON: We can proceed.
22 MR. KAY: Are you getting something on your monitors now, Your
23 Honours?
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. But proceed, Mr. Kay.
25 MR. KAY: We just had a flash then and then it went.
Page 32737
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: There we are.
2 MR. KAY: We have the picture there. Thank you.
3 Q. Kosovo Polje, if you can tell us there what the situation was that
4 you found at that stage when you arrived on the 22nd of February.
5 Describe the type of place it was.
6 A. Kosovo Polje, of course, is a very historic site. The town -- I
7 can't recall the estimates of the population, but I would estimate 10 to
8 15.000; a major -- a major site.
9 It was -- in asking questions of the various authorities and
10 people who I had the opportunity to associate with, I understood the
11 ethnic distribution within Kosovo Polje, the town itself, to be
12 approximately 70 per cent Serbian and perhaps 20 per cent Albanian and 10
13 per cent of others, including Turks, Roma, and various other ethnic
14 minorities.
15 The -- now, would you like me to go on about the --
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. -- area of responsibility?
18 The area of responsibility that I was assigned ran from Pristina,
19 the western -- the western ends of Pristina going south, including the
20 Pristina airport, which was -- which was a military site and was -- we
21 were not allowed to go into the Pristina airport site itself without a VJ
22 escort.
23 The area again going down just to the west of the main south
24 highway down -- proceeding to the -- sorry, to the south and then to the
25 west and then up, including the principal town of Obilic and the very
Page 32738
1 large coal mining site of Belacevac - sorry if I do not pronounce the
2 names that well - and the area then actually exceeded right to the north,
3 up to the Mitrovica highway and a number of small villages. Is that
4 shown?
5 Q. If the map can be brought down the ELMO.
6 A. Thank you. And then as you see from my Chinagraph markings here,
7 going up through the wooded and the high grounds going from south to north
8 to the west of the Belacevac mine site and the Obilic power station and up
9 towards the Mitrovica highway, and actually beyond my Chinagraph markings
10 here to a number of small villages around Hamidija and to the north and to
11 the north of the Grabovac and Obilic road.
12 So this was the general area of my responsibility, then back to
13 the Pristina highway and north.
14 The -- to describe it, the -- the area south of the Pristina-Pec
15 highway, a number of agricultural villages, numerous villages, had been
16 there for many years, I assume. These villages were primarily occupied by
17 Serbs. I believe there were other smaller numbers of ethnic authorities
18 in some of them as well. However, in the -- in the Grabovac - and I'll
19 mention Donji Grabovac a little later - but at Grabovac area, again I
20 believe these villages had -- had been ethnically -- an ethnic mix prior
21 to the troubles of the summer of 1998. However, on my arrival in February
22 1999, I believe that these were, in my opinion, entirely occupied by
23 Serbian peoples. And the village of Donji Grabovac was totally deserted,
24 unoccupied.
25 And the small villages that I've referred to in the north and off
Page 32739
1 the major routes were -- had suffered damage in the troubles and the
2 fighting of the summer of 1998, and the peoples residing in these villages
3 to this -- at this time, to the best of my knowledge, were almost entirely
4 Albanian. And in all of these villages there was what I referred to
5 earlier as a home guard element of the UCK.
6 We were -- we were allowed in and out of all of these villages but
7 only after we showed our credentials. And each and every time the UCK
8 sentries made a point of writing down all our credential information and
9 communicating with some -- with superiors which I could not observe before
10 they would let us proceed. However, they did not obstruct us other than
11 going through this procedure.
12 The MUP, again, similar to the Glogovac area, the MUP patrolled
13 all the routes in and around Kosovo Polje, the main roads. Of course
14 there was a police station in Kosovo Polje, another police station in
15 Obilic. I went to these police stations and introduced myself to the
16 local police chiefs and worked with them throughout my stay in the Kosovo
17 Polje area up till the evacuation of the Kosovo Verification Mission.
18 They -- I was received hospitably, professionally, and at all times they
19 cooperated with me and all of my requests. I was not -- I was not
20 obstructed from carrying out any of my duties or responsibilities by them.
21 Q. If I can just --
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay. Mr. Kay, I remember the witness mentioned
23 the place which is called Grabovac, which is different from Glogovac.
24 MR. KAY: Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: If you could help me to find --
Page 32740
1 MR. KAY: In between Glogovac and Pristina would be Grabovac and
2 Donji Grabovac --
3 Q. Perhaps you could find it on the more detailed map which we
4 anticipated may be needed. And I wonder if the scale can come up a bit.
5 We've lost it totally.
6 MR. NICE: I don't know if Your Honours will be assisted by having
7 a look at Exhibit 83 if you've got it with you.
8 JUDGE KWON: But in that map Grabovac is near in Pec, which should
9 be different from the location.
10 MR. NICE: I think if you look at -- look --
11 MR. KAY: The witness is pointing to the part on the map where
12 Grabovac is.
13 THE WITNESS: This.
14 MR. KAY:
15 Q. And Donji Grabovac, which is of importance in a part of your
16 testimony, is just to the north-west.
17 A. That is -- that is correct.
18 Q. If you just keep your pointer on Grabovac, and if we can go back
19 now to have a smaller scale, we can see where it is in relation to
20 Pristina perhaps. If the technical booth can do that.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I found it in Exhibit 83.
22 MR. KAY:
23 Q. We can see Obilic on the right-hand side --
24 MR. NICE: I'm glad. If it can be found as Donji Grabovac --
25 JUDGE KWON: It appears --
Page 32741
1 MR. NICE: Grabovac itself is not marked.
2 JUDGE KWON: On page 6, yes.
3 MR. NICE: Yes. The map otherwise is quite helpful.
4 MR. KAY:
5 Q. And would I be right if you drew a line, say, between Glogovac and
6 Obilic it would cross-intersect over Grabovac and Donji Grabovac roughly?
7 A. That is correct. I believe it's off the map here, Glogovac, now,
8 but it would be just to the south of the Grabovac area, directly on an
9 east -- east-west line, that is correct.
10 MR. KAY: Yes. I hope that assists the Trial Chamber.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the distance from Pristina?
12 THE WITNESS: This map is a 1:50.000, so each of these squares is
13 one kilometre. We are looking at a distance of about -- in Donji Grabovac
14 we're looking at a distance of 9 or 10 kilometres from Pristina and of
15 course Glogovac would be something like 17 or 18 kilometres, as I recall.
16 MR. KAY: Yes.
17 Q. In relation to the KLA in that area, you've described the home
18 guard but it's the overall situation within the region that you're dealing
19 with. Are you able to give evidence about that?
20 A. Yes. Yes, I believe so. Am I being -- am I being heard?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. Thank you.
23 MR. KAY: If the other microphone could be switched on so the
24 witness can speak across to me. Thank you. Yes.
25 Q. So if you could tell us about the overall strength. You've
Page 32742
1 mentioned the home guard in the villages, but was there a force behind
2 them elsewhere?
3 A. Yes, there was. In the area just west of Donji Grabovac -- I'm
4 not sure is this ELMO still projected or --
5 Q. We're off at the moment. If we could go on again. Yes.
6 A. In the -- in the area just to the west of Grabovac and Donji
7 Grabovac, we see a wooded rolling series of hills. I believe this is the
8 south-western end of the Drenica valley. When we proceeded into the
9 wooded rolling hills here and directly west of Donji Grabovac, we
10 encountered a local force of the UCK, and I had a number of meetings, as
11 did my deputy, almost on a daily basis, with this force. In my
12 estimation, what I saw when I was visiting and discussing security matters
13 with the UCK local commander would be a force about platoon size. That
14 would be about 35 armed personnel. They would have assault rifles, light
15 machine-guns, rocket propelled grenades. And in all our discussions with
16 the local commander and his deputies, they were not -- they were unable to
17 give us any assurances on -- on what they could or could not do without
18 reference to superior command, and this was seldom forthcoming.
19 They also -- they also were unable or -- or unwilling to answer
20 any queries about individuals from the authorities' side or the government
21 side who had disappeared, been abducted, or killed or injured. So
22 basically they were friendly, hospitable, but generally did not cooperate
23 in a meaningful manner for -- to enable me to carry out my
24 responsibilities as a verifier of the agreement.
25 Q. We'll just summarise those responsibilities now. They were to
Page 32743
1 monitor the cease-fire between the parties and to record incidents that
2 took place. And did you have a role as well in attempting to pacify the
3 area?
4 A. Yes, I did. The -- again, as you previously mentioned, Mr. Kay,
5 upon my arrival and my introduction in consultation with the MUP police
6 chiefs and local police chiefs, they claimed that -- that the area within
7 both Kosovo Polje and the Obilic police area, that the major concern was
8 this Donji Grabovac area. Again, just for the -- for the -- perhaps the
9 enlightenment of the Court or the assistance of the Court, the Bjelovac
10 mine, which covers almost -- a great deal of the area between Kosovo Polje
11 and Obilic and its power station, this is a vast coal mine that produced
12 the coal that fuelled the Obilic power station which not only provided
13 power to most of Kosovo but also to other parts of Yugoslavia, and with
14 the troubles and with the agreement that we were trying to verify, of
15 course the authorities were trying to facilitate the movement of mine
16 workers into and out of the mine on a regular shift basis. I believe they
17 operated around the clock, 24 hours. And because of the importance of
18 Donji Grabovac to the authorities and hence to myself and my team was that
19 that was an area where there was daily movement in and out of workers.
20 Not only were the MUP trying to maintain security and protect the -- the
21 mine operation and facilitate the comings and goings of the mine workers,
22 but the -- there was also a mine police force. This was a paramilitary
23 police force that was organised and hired, I assume, by the mining company
24 or the power company, and they also had a hierarchy of police,
25 non-commissioned officers, and police chiefs. I also dealt with these
Page 32744
1 people.
2 It was these -- it was this force that was primarily challenged,
3 in my opinion, with providing security to the mine and hence the mine site
4 which was right near the village of Grabovac. And this was a problem to
5 the authorities because they were suffering -- from all reports and
6 physical evidence that I saw, they were suffering almost daily harassing
7 attacks, sniping attacks. Prior to my arrival, an engineer had been
8 abducted, presumably -- to my knowledge he was never seen again.
9 Presumably he was murdered or disappeared. And mine guards --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Attacks from whom?
11 THE WITNESS: Allegedly from the UCK.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was that the only presence of the UCK in that
13 area?
14 THE WITNESS: No, I think as I previously described, Your Honour,
15 the UCK were -- occupied all of the small villages outside of the beaten
16 track with their what I referred to as home guard forces, and in the
17 wooded area to the west of Donji Grabovac there appeared to be, to my
18 military estimate, a platoon or elements of a company size UCK force which
19 was perhaps local but perhaps it was more than the home guard element that
20 I described earlier.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm trying to arrive at a number for the size of
22 the UCK force in that area.
23 THE WITNESS: I mentioned -- I mentioned in my previous testimony,
24 Your Honour, that the force that I witnessed when I visited was
25 approximately platoon size. That would be about 35 personnel, armed
Page 32745
1 personnel, and more heavily armed than the -- what I referred to as the
2 local UCK home guard in the various villages that I -- I visited.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: You encountered one force of platoon size, but
4 there are others?
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. I would -- again I'm trying to portray what I
6 actually saw. If you see -- as a former soldier, if you see a platoon,
7 there's obviously a company; and if you see a company, there's obviously a
8 battalion. I say this because military forces do not operate in
9 isolation, they operate with mutual support. And it would be my estimate
10 that this was a small element of a larger element further to the west and
11 to the north.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: So you assume that the UCK had such a
13 sophisticated command structure?
14 THE WITNESS: They certainly had a command structure over and
15 above what I -- whom I met or what I witnessed, yes.
16 MR. KAY:
17 Q. I think you referred as well to decisions being unable to be taken
18 by the local commander and so that matters were referred elsewhere; is
19 that right?
20 A. That is correct, and that's another supporting element of my
21 assessment that this was a smaller element of a larger force. The local
22 commander was never able to answer any of my queries or any of my
23 questions without reference to higher authority.
24 Q. Where you indicated the KLA/UCK were regionally centred from what
25 you could -- you could see, was the VJ or MUP presence outside that area?
Page 32746
1 A. The -- no. As I've tried to state several times, the -- the VJ
2 stayed either within their barracks area or camp areas other than for --
3 for patrolling the major routes or moving to conduct small exercises. And
4 the MUP, as well, occupied various observation posts overlooking some of
5 the highways. And of course they -- as I've previously mentioned, they --
6 on a daily basis they established checkpoints on the major highway
7 primarily but also on some of the rural areas, the rural roads, to provide
8 security to personnel and inhabitants moving along those corridors.
9 Q. You mentioned sniping attacks that were taking place which
10 affected the mine workers. Are you able to give any idea of responses
11 that there were to those sniping attacks, how the local authorities
12 attempted to deal with it?
13 A. The local authorities, again primarily the mine police, complained
14 to me on a daily basis that -- that they were being harassed and -- and
15 sniped at. I was shown evidence of new bullet holes in some of the mine
16 security buildings personally, and these -- I can attest that these were
17 not there the day or so before when I had looked at that same building.
18 So the rounds had been fired from west or north of the site.
19 Again, if you -- refer you to my weekly summaries of my daily
20 reports, and I don't for a minute think that the harassment was coming
21 from -- entirely from one side. The -- in discussions with the UCK
22 commander in this area, he, of course, complained that the mine police
23 were sniping at his forces and he was -- would respond. In discussing
24 with the mine police, of course I received entirely the other story. They
25 said that their -- their movement of personnel workers and security
Page 32747
1 personnel were being harassed and sniped at, and they then would respond
2 to ensure their safety.
3 In some cases, in my -- excuse me. I believe -- I believe there
4 are several quotes in my documents that I wrote at that time where I give
5 greater credibility to one side or the other based on my personal
6 judgement, and I think in the Grabovac area, given the situation that I
7 have tried to describe in the mine police to maintain security to their
8 workers that probably - and this is my assessment - that they probably,
9 during the hours of darkness were -- were somewhat nervous and probably
10 initiated a number of the gunfire accounts which, of course, would
11 probably elicit a response from the UCK side.
12 So I think -- I think there was a two-way stream here given the
13 general insecurity and the importance of this site to maintain the
14 operation of the mine and the power plant.
15 Q. Yes. Also in this region, and we can see that on your first
16 weekly summary of 28th of February, is somewhere known as the chicken
17 farm, which was a site of local economic importance; is that right?
18 A. Excuse me. No. The chicken farm was an unoccupied former
19 agricultural site, and I can point it on the big man here, to the ELMO, I
20 guess, to find it. It is -- it is the area shown on this map around the
21 crossroads of Krivovo --
22 MR. KAY: We're not picking it up. If the map could be moved,
23 please. We're on screen with it but if you can put the part where Mr.
24 Keith has the wand.
25 A. You see the Pristina-Pec highway.
Page 32748
1 Q. Yes?
2 A. Again running west from Pristina through Kosovo Polje, and it goes
3 through a small -- a small -- on my map it's known as Krivovo. And this
4 is again on the road going to the crossroads for Glogovac, and there are a
5 number of agricultural buildings on my map. I am circling the area with
6 the pointer at this time. The highway is just to the north and you see a
7 series of buildings there. This was -- this was not in operation as an
8 agricultural site when I was there. It was occupied by a VJ company team,
9 varied. There would always be a platoon of tanks, perhaps a company of
10 tanks - a company of tanks would be ten tanks, a platoon three tanks - in
11 this area. Certainly a platoon or more of infantry fighting vehicles.
12 And -- but they generally stayed in that area other than, as I've stated
13 earlier, moving out for small exercises or to conduct route patrols along
14 the main routes, primarily from there towards the Pristina air field,
15 which was -- is right within about three to four kilometres from that
16 site.
17 Q. Right.
18 A. Which was a heavily militarised area.
19 Q. Was that part of the security for the air field?
20 A. Well, it would be -- it would be addition to -- in addition to the
21 security at the air field, but it was a crucially military important area
22 because of its location right on the highway. It could facilitate a rapid
23 response to any major emergency in that area.
24 Q. The chicken farm, as it was called, was that subject to any
25 hostilities?
Page 32749
1 A. The chicken farm per se I -- I know of no attacks on the chicken
2 farm. However, I was witness to an attack on a police patrol just -- just
3 approximately 1.000 or 1.500 metres to the -- no, less than that, I'm
4 sorry. Probably about 200 metres to the west of the -- of what we refer
5 to as the chicken farm. Again, the Pristina-Pec highway comes out of the
6 open agricultural area and goes into a re-entry to get into the higher
7 ground, and there, as you approach the -- what we referred to as the
8 chicken farm, is what in military terms I would know as a D file.
9 Consequently a dangerous area if your opponents controlled the ground to
10 either side.
11 Q. And what did you witness there?
12 A. I believe it was on the 27th of February, if I recall correctly.
13 It's in my notes, I believe. At that site one of my patrols was -- had
14 proceeded to the west and was returning. It was towards last light, this
15 being February; the days were short. He encountered a major military
16 operation with a large amount of fire, including tanks, although I don't
17 know -- the tanks were not firing their main armament but their
18 machine-guns, and infantry fighting vehicles that had responded to what
19 was clear to me an attack on the police patrol that took place a few
20 minutes before this. And what my patrol was witnessing was the response
21 and retaliation to this attack. And I myself was proceeding on -- on
22 other business, about to leave Kosovo Polje, when I received his call.
23 The sound of heavy gunfire was obvious because it was transmitted when his
24 radio was transmitting. I immediately proceeded to the area and was there
25 within three or four minutes.
Page 32750
1 The -- when I arrived, the firing was beginning to subside but
2 there was still -- it had -- it had been going on for some time, and the
3 MUP estimated platoon, again about 35 armed paramilitary police, had
4 assaulted across the road under the support of a platoon, three T55 tanks.
5 And when I asked the local police commander if he could tell me what had
6 occurred, he said yes. He was cooperative, and although there was a great
7 deal of tension as one of his police NCOs had been fatally injured,
8 another critically injured, and I -- I observed the fatal casualty, and I
9 was witness to the evacuation of the critically injured police
10 non-commissioned officer, and the -- it was clear to me that there had
11 been an attack from the north of the D-file, in my estimation with the use
12 of light machine-gun or similar weapon that had been used to make this
13 attack. It was clear to me that -- that the force that had attacked had
14 been opposed to the government, and I assumed that they were UCK.
15 Q. I think in your report you used the phrase: "It appears to be a
16 clear case the KLA provocation."
17 A. That is correct, Mr. Kay. It -- it was -- this was no accident
18 where the MUP or the VJ had moved out and -- and challenged any of the
19 outlying areas. This was a clear case that the -- the terrorists,
20 insurgents from outside were coming in to harass the authorities,
21 obviously, in my estimation, to provoke a response.
22 Q. Thank you. You referred slightly earlier in your testimony to the
23 cooperation that you received from the local MUP police chiefs, and you've
24 referred to their involvement --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay. Sorry. Can I ask the witness, what
Page 32751
1 indicated to you that it was a KLA provocation? By that, I gather you
2 mean that the KLA initiated the attack.
3 THE WITNESS: It was -- my assigned role as a verifier was to
4 verify the -- the situation in accordance with the agreement of October
5 1998 of which the authorities, meaning the MUP and the VJ, would withdraw
6 from confrontation but maintain security in their -- along their routes
7 and in their -- in their -- the main sites, and they would not -- they
8 would not move into the hinterland, if I may use that term, that was
9 occupied primarily by the Albanian Yugoslavs. And -- and again, as I've
10 tried to describe and I certainly witnessed during my -- my few months in
11 Kosovo, the -- they generally did.
12 Conversely, it also was part of the agreement to my understanding
13 that the KLA or UCK would stay in the hinterland and would not harass,
14 interfere, or conduct military operations where the government authorities
15 held sway. And it appeared to me in this occasion and on several others
16 that I witnessed or observed that the UCK were not abiding by the
17 agreement, and they were conducting military attacks. In my military
18 assessment, given their strengths and the strengths of the authorities,
19 they were trying to -- trying to provoke a response. And being a military
20 man, the responsibility to defend your forces, to defend your assigned
21 responsibilities, if you are attacked, you naturally, given the authority,
22 you respond.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: When you arrived at the scene, the attack was
24 already in -- taking place?
25 THE WITNESS: The -- the -- by the time I arrived there, I would
Page 32752
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Page 32753
1 assume it would be ten minutes after the attack had been initiated, and
2 the perpetrators of the attack had withdrawn because they -- there was no
3 -- there was no fire coming from - sorry - the attack position in that
4 ten minutes when I arrived there. The fire was all going from the MUP and
5 the VJ side into the -- the -- the high ground where the attack had been
6 committed from.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.
8 MR. KAY:
9 Q. And the significance of the attack is that it's 200 metres from
10 the military installation at the chicken farm?
11 A. I believe that is significant, but it's also significant that the
12 attack was on a routine police patrol on the main highway from Pristina to
13 Pec, a highway travelled not only by the local inhabitants but also by
14 NGOs. International Committee of the Red Cross and other NGOs used this
15 road frequently as did the Kosovo Verification Mission.
16 Q. It's the Pec to Pristina highway?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Carrying a great deal of traffic?
19 A. It's one of the major routes in Kosovo.
20 Q. And the chicken farm itself was -- was how far from the road?
21 A. The chicken farm, as you can see from the map, was just a matter
22 of metres, 50 metres to a hundred metres south of the road.
23 Q. You turned off the road into the chicken farm military
24 installation?
25 A. Who did? I'm sorry.
Page 32754
1 Q. No. If you were to drive along, you'd turn off the road and drive
2 into it.
3 A. Correct. You -- anybody transiting that road can observe the --
4 what we knew as the chicken farm, yes.
5 Q. You described the higher ground at this particular site. Was that
6 to the north of the road?
7 A. The -- there was high ground primarily to the north but also some
8 high ground to the south, and the attack allegedly had come from the
9 north. And by looking at the fatality and the injured, the damage -- and
10 one armoured jeep was destroyed in this attack, another one was damaged,
11 the -- it was quickly clear to me the attack had come from the north.
12 Q. Back on the other matter I wanted to deal with, which was the
13 cooperation you received from the local police commanders.
14 A. Could --
15 Q. You had dealings with several; is that right? Perhaps if you
16 could name those individuals and where they were based, if you're able to
17 remember this length of time.
18 A. I would be -- I would be really -- I'd be pleased to do that but
19 perhaps if I may just momentarily -- when we're talking about the security
20 of the Pristina to Pec highway, I had observed a previous UCK attack when
21 I had arrived in Glogovac at the Lopusnik observation point, which is on
22 this same highway just further to the west.
23 Q. Towards Komorane?
24 A. Beyond Komorane.
25 Q. Beyond Komorane towards Lopusnik?
Page 32755
1 A. Yes, and I believe five kilometres to the west of Komorane.
2 Q. Still in the Drenica region?
3 A. Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay, all those names appear on this map book so
5 if you can check during the adjournment, we will be more assisted by using
6 this.
7 MR. KAY: Yes.
8 THE WITNESS: I'm pointing to Lopusnik site now. Again, as the
9 highway moves west there is a high ground to the south of the highway,
10 approximately 800 metres south of the highway. The MUP had established a
11 section observation post - a section being approximately ten personnel -
12 and in early -- in early February while I was doing an introductory patrol
13 from Glogovac, the sound of heavy gunfire came from the Lopusnik area. We
14 immediately responded, as did a MUP reinforcement element of platoon size
15 - again two armoured Land Rovers, approximately 25 to 30 armed personnel
16 - when we -- they evacuated a wounded policeman from the observation site
17 maintained by the section with a corporal in charge. When we asked what
18 had happened, they explained that one of their personnel had gone from the
19 fortified observation post to a well to fetch water, which would be
20 approximately 20 to 30 metres distance from their site, and he was fired
21 upon from the east by a sniper and was wounded. Not critically, to my
22 knowledge, but was wounded. And they responded with a fusillade of
23 automatic fire in their defence and their responding reaction force also
24 swept the area looking for the sniper and no sniper was found. But again,
25 it was -- there was a clear police location that was fired on from the --
Page 32756
1 from the west -- sorry, from the east, which is indicative of the type of
2 incidents that took place periodically along this route.
3 Now, to respond to your query, Mr. Kay, on the cooperation with
4 the local police chiefs, again I mentioned they were cooperative to me
5 personally and to my verifiers. The police chief in Kosovo Polje was an
6 individual by the name of Dragan Miric. He and his police commanders and
7 deputy commanders -- developed a working relationship with him and his
8 staff, and they -- they cooperated with all the requests that I gave them,
9 to the best of my knowledge.
10 The other individual who I found cooperative and helpful to enable
11 me to carry out my task was Bozidar Spasic, who was the police chief in
12 Obilic and his area of responsibility, and he and his staff were
13 cooperative. The -- the mine police as well were cooperative, and I
14 mentioned that earlier. When we sought their information on what their
15 problems were and what their troubles were, they -- I'm not -- I'm not for
16 a minute saying that I was told the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
17 but they were cooperative and did reply to my queries, I thought,
18 relatively well.
19 MR. KAY:
20 Q. Thank you. Let's just look at the next page, then, in your weekly
21 summaries. You've given a lot of the general evidence that covers this
22 period now. The next one is the 7th of March, 1999, in which you describe
23 the area remaining generally calm, sniping Grabovac area, regular nightly
24 sniping at Glavotina, and you refer to the chicken farm and movement of
25 tanks and vehicles. You describe there the good contacts with the police
Page 32757
1 chiefs. "Humanitarian issues increased during the week with the
2 increasing incidents of attacks on the MUP and consequent retaliation
3 against KLA positions to our north. These resulted in the movement of an
4 estimated group of 100 plus IDPs" - internally displaced persons - "to our
5 northern area of responsibility from the north." And: One of our patrols
6 escorted 70 former villagers from Donji Grabovac from Pristina station.
7 We'll look at that issue separately, but what I've read out there
8 from the situation of the week ending the 7th of March is a summary of
9 that week. What did you mean by "humanitarian issues increased during the
10 week with the increasing attacks on the MUP?"
11 A. I -- my meaning in this report was that the -- the retaliation by
12 the MUP to the increasing incidents of sniping and other attacks resulted
13 in a -- the normal disruption of the movement of the -- the civil
14 population. As the tensions rose, the contact and the movement became
15 more difficult. And in visiting these series of villages, many of them of
16 which I've listed in this report, Mr. Kay, to the north, north of Obilic
17 but also north along the -- towards the Mitrovica highway, they were
18 individuals who required medical treatment or other treatment, and their
19 ability to attain foodstuffs and the normal paraphernalia of a civil
20 society was disrupted, hence they were in contact with them. During this
21 period, there were always concerns that somebody couldn't get there or
22 somebody couldn't be taken out to receive what they thought were necessary
23 treatments. And the NGOs, who they were reliant on for providing some
24 assistance, were -- were unable, with the growing instability, of
25 attending to these people. So they -- when we encountered them, they
Page 32758
1 always had concerns.
2 Q. You referred to the "consequent retaliation against KLA positions
3 to our north." If you are able then to describe what was going on between
4 the two parties here, being the MUP and the KLA, what was the pattern of
5 events?
6 A. I believe that the -- we've talked about several incidents, but to
7 the north there was -- as the month of March moved on, there were
8 increasing reports of -- of UCK attacks. Policemen were being abducted,
9 were being murdered. Other people were being abducted and murdered. And
10 the -- then out of Pristina and out of the various other military camps
11 the VJ moved to support the MUP in counter-terrorist operations. They
12 would move north, and this was further north than my area of
13 responsibility, I just saw the forces on the move and of course heard the
14 consequent radio reports of military and MUP activity.
15 These forces then moved in away from the major routes and the
16 highway in an attempt to cleanse the area and re-secure the area where the
17 UCK were conducting what I have referred to as a mid-level insurrection.
18 I -- I would -- I would describe the situation that I've tried to portray
19 here this morning as generally a low-level insurrection, but by the early
20 part of March, the middle of March, this had -- had grown to what I would
21 describe as a mid-level insurrection where there were -- major forces were
22 now attacking the authorities and the authorities were responding. The VJ
23 went into action in conjunction with the MUP in major military operations
24 up to the battle group level. By "battle group," I mean a force of six or
25 so hundred military personnel, including all arms, supported tanks,
Page 32759
1 mechanised infantry, the MUP in wheeled armoured vehicles, all of it
2 supported by artillery. And they were -- in my military assessment, they
3 were conducting counter-guerilla operations to secure their major routes
4 and their control of the area.
5 Q. This report for this week refers to Donji Grabovac. If you could
6 tell us briefly what your interest was in Donji Grabovac. What happened?
7 A. Well, Donji Grabovac, as I've -- as I wrote about after my
8 experience in -- in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo, had been a village that had
9 been evacuated in the summer of 1998 when the troubles of that time. And
10 again, as I've tried to stress in my testimony, the importance of this
11 particular site because of the mine and the operation of the mine
12 supporting the Obilic power plant, the villagers of Donji Grabovac,
13 predominantly Albanian, to my understanding had generally moved into
14 Pristina but they still retained a cohesiveness, and they were anxious to
15 return to their village and resume their normal life.
16 I had the opportunity to meet with them and their village leaders
17 on several occasions in Pristina, meetings that were arranged, and I told
18 them that I would try with the best of my ability to facilitate their
19 return to their village. These meetings had taken place over a number of
20 weeks commencing shortly after my arrival in Kosovo Polje up until, if I
21 recall correctly, a day or so before we were evacuated on the 20th of
22 March, 1999.
23 The cooperation with the authorities was good, in my estimation.
24 The police chiefs said they would -- they would help facilitate security.
25 They even offered to provide small arms to the villagers to enable them to
Page 32760
1 protect their homes if they were to re-inhabit them.
2 I helped facilitate a visit back to their homes by bus, or several
3 buses, of a number of them so they could see their homes and see what
4 damage or what existed of their homes, considering they had not been
5 occupied for some months. This visit was carried out. It generally went,
6 the visit itself, of the -- of a village delegation generally went well.
7 There were some -- there was some verbal harassment by the mine guards
8 allegedly of the personnel when they returned under escort from my
9 verifiers. They had the opportunity to spend some hours in the village,
10 and then, under escort of my verifiers, they returned to the -- the main
11 highway and returned back to Pristina.
12 The -- I was trying to facilitate this re-occupation of Donji
13 Grabovac, because I believed that if we could have achieved a small
14 accomplishment of restoring normality and putting people back in their
15 homes at such a -- in a critical area that had caused so much disruption
16 over the last number of months, we might have some hope of re-established
17 stability throughout the province of Kosovo. And of course the fact that
18 all my negotiations and whatever endeavours others made to help facilitate
19 this particular operation, it appeared to me after that that powers higher
20 than mine had no -- no real interest in rebuilding stability in Kosovo but
21 probably had other political agendas of which this would not play a role
22 whatsoever.
23 Q. And just -- did the resettlement of Donji Grabovac take place?
24 A. The resettlement did not take place. As I said, the meetings were
25 taking place, I believe, up 'til, I believe, the 18th of March. After
Page 32761
1 that, we had facilitated the return of the delegations to Donji Grabovac,
2 and of course with the -- the order to evacuate Kosovo in preparation for
3 the NATO war, there was -- that was the end of that particular programme.
4 Q. Evacuation of KVM 20th of March.
5 A. That is correct.
6 MR. KAY: If we take the morning --
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay, just before that. The villagers who wished
8 to return to Donji -- Kosovo Polje, were they of Serb ethnicity?
9 A. The majority of them were Albanian ethnics, to my understanding,
10 and I don't know if there were any Serbs amongst them or not.
11 JUDGE KWON: You said that they had been evacuated in the summer
12 of 1998.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was my understanding.
14 JUDGE KWON: Do you know why?
15 THE WITNESS: Well, because of the fighting that was taking place
16 at that time, which was the -- the precursor to what I've tried to
17 describe today in that this was such a critical site because of the mine
18 operation and the very close presence of UCK in the -- to the -- a few
19 thousand metres to the west.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. KAY: If we take the break now, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Time for the adjournment. Mr. Keith, we're going
23 to adjourn now for 20 minutes.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
Page 32762
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Kay.
2 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Q. I'm on the last session with you now, Mr. Keith. If we just turn
4 to the 14th of March, in your bundle of reports, weekly summary number 3.
5 And there again you cite what the activity was at that time; is that
6 right?
7 A. Which activity are you referring to, Mr. Kay?
8 Q. Just generally the situation report for the week.
9 A. Yes. That relates to the situation as I reported it at that time.
10 Q. You deal at the end of it with the -- with one of your verifiers
11 being sick on leave in Germany. So that we have an idea of your
12 resources, can you tell the Court how many people you had working under
13 you in your region of Kosovo Polje.
14 A. Yes, I can. My team consisted of myself and eight other
15 verifiers. These were from a variety of nations representing the OSCE. I
16 was the only Canadian in my team, and the rest of the team represented
17 verifiers from countries such as France, Norway, Germany, the United
18 States, and several others that don't pop into my mind momentarily.
19 We were supported by 13 interpreters. These interpreters were, to
20 my recollection were eight -- sorry, seven Albanian Yugoslavs. One
21 identified herself as a Turk, and four were Serbian. They provided the
22 translation and were always present when I or my patrols were attempting
23 to conduct our verification role.
24 And in addition to this, I -- the office and the location where I
25 resided in Kosovo Polje was the Herzegovina Motel. This was a building
Page 32763
1 that had been leased by the United States State Department to support the
2 United -- formerly support the United States diplomatic mission. They had
3 been evacuated from Kosovo early in February, during the Rambouillet
4 negotiations, and took up residence in Skopje in Macedonia, and hence the
5 building was available, and it was given to me to use as a site to reside
6 and to operate my responsibilities within the Kosovo Polje area of
7 responsibility.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. I should just add to that, Mr. Kay, that because of this I did not
10 have to hire security personnel. Most of the field stations hired local
11 personnel to provide 24-hour security to prevent theft or other
12 disruptions. The security personnel at the Herzegovina Motel were
13 employees of the United States State Department.
14 Q. Just moving on to the next page, 9th of March, which is an
15 incident report; is that right?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. There had been a murder during the night, and as a result of that
18 murder, an investigating judge appeared at the scene; is that right?
19 A. That is correct, Mr. Kay.
20 Q. If you could just briefly say what you found there, what the
21 situation was as you saw it.
22 A. This was one of a number of instances where fatalities occurred.
23 As I've said in my commentary, in articles, and in comments, in my
24 judgement many, if not the majority, of these murders were criminal in
25 nature and not necessarily political.
Page 32764
1 In this particular incident, as I've reported and have this one
2 document, in early hours of the morning a police commander - not the
3 police chief but one of their subordinate commanders - came to my office
4 in Kosovo Polje and stated, because I had asked them to keep me informed
5 of any -- any troubles or problems that would be of interest to the
6 Verification Mission and my field office, and said that there had been a
7 murder of a male and that the investigating judge would be there and if I
8 would like to go and have a look and observe the scene I would be welcome
9 to do so. I -- I did that.
10 I arrived at the scene about the same time as the investigating
11 judge. There were a number of MUP policemen who were in the area
12 conducting their police work, and I observed, as I have reported here, a
13 vehicle and who had been a male in the back seat who had been fatally
14 injured by a number of bullet wounds from automatic machine pistol, and
15 the casings of a number of rounds, allegedly 33 rounds from the machine
16 pistol were in the area. The individual had sustained gunshot wounds from
17 the groin to the head and was obviously very dead.
18 Q. And the -- from what you were able to see of the activities the
19 investigating judge?
20 ...

Magda - fantastic

Another thread that justifies the existence of the Deep Politics Forum.

There is official, sanctioned, history recycled by a braindead and supine MSM.

And there is suppressed history, which must be studied and probed, to test official, sanctioned, history.

The official history of the conflict in the Balkans is revealed as ANOTHER BIG LIE from start to finish.

Yep. Even the terrorist are surprised....

Quote:Bosnian leaders ignore testimonies on mujahidin crimes - ex-Al-Qa'idah officer BBC Monitoring Europe (Political) - September 18, 2006, Monday

Text of report by Dobrila Majstorovic headlined: "Eyes wide closed" by Bosnian Serb newspaper Glas Srpske on 11 September; boxes as published:

Al-Qa'idah still has its cells in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and it will never leave this country. This is a statement that Bahraini Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad [name as received], a former Al-Qa'idah officer, has been repeating for years. Ali Hamad has been serving his sentence in the Zenica Correctional Centre since 1997.

Ali Hamad was sentenced to 12 years for organizing a car-bomb attack in Splitska Street in Mostar in 1997, even thought, after nine years spent behind bars, he still claims that he did not do what he had been sentenced for.

In his confession to Glas Srpske several years ago, Ali Hamad spoke about his path of war, from Afghanistan to Bosnia-Hercegovina, where, as he said, he completed a course of training at an Al-Qa'idah military academy. As its officer, he became a commander in the notorious El-Mujahidin detachment. He talked openly about the traces of blood that the foreign mujahidins left behind all over Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, Ali Hamad noted that the relevant investigative and judicial bodies, which should have been concerned about his statements, did not find them interesting enough!

Ali Hamad joined Al-Qa'idah at the age of 18, when it rescued him and gave him a sanctuary after he spent four months loitering in the streets of Bahrain. Due to family problems, Ali Hamad left his home and was for four months left on his own, so, as he said, he was easy prey for Al-Qa'idah people.

From Bahrain, he went to Afghanistan and Al-Qa'idah's training camps, but he also participated in fighting against the Russians. As he was one of the best young fighters, he became a member of Al-Qa'idah, and he took an oath in Jalalabad in front of the terrorist organization leader Usamah Bin-Ladin.

Ali Hamad's fighting experience in Afghanistan in a way recommended him for a job in Bosnia-Hercegovina. He came to the Balkans in 1992, through Zagreb, where he was greeted by the people who said they worked for a humanitarian organization allegedly called an Agency for Help to the Third World. He left Zagreb and, via Split, arrived in Travnik, where, as he said, there was a strong mujahidin administration. The camp was founded by one of Bin Ladin's closest associates Sejh Mahmud Abu Abdul Aziz al-Muntesiba, known also as Barbaros or Red Beard. As Ali Hamad recalled, the mujahidin administration was led by Abu al-Haris Al-Libij from Libya, three Egyptians: Vajhudin al-Misrij, Abu Mina el-Misrij, and Al-Mutaz al-Misrij, and two Algerians: Abu es-Sidik and Abu al-Ma'ali. The seventh officer was Imad al-Misrij.

Upon his arrival in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Ali Hamad was tasked to command a unit that belonged to the El-Mujahidin detachment. His unit numbered 107 men, of which the majority were Arabs, but it also included 12 B-H citizens and 25 Turks. He recalled that the unit's headquarters was in the village of Bijelo Buce near Travnik, but they fought all over Bosnia-Hercegovina. He participated in the attack on Ilijas [near Sarajevo] at the end of 1992, when he was wounded. He witnessed several horrible war crimes that the mujihidins committed against the Serb and Croat civilians, which he also described more thoroughly in his book. He also wrote about it to the relevant bodies, but, he said, nobody took it seriously. True, the agents of the Bosniak secret service, that is, the Agency for Information and Documentation (AID), spoke to him on several occasions. He said that they were particularly interested in the war activities of the El Mujahidin detachment. He later read in a Federation newspaper that the AID agents participated in hiding the crimes committed by the mujahidins in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Meanwhile, the investigators of the Hague tribunal [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - ICTY] became interested in Ali Hamad's story, and they spoke to the former Al-Qa'idah officer several times.

Whether this will yield any results, nobody knows....

[Box] Book published by Glas Srpske

"I will never understand Bosnia and the people that lead this country. I openly tell them that I am a terrorist and that I committed many crimes, but they are convincing me that I have not and that I am innocent," Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad explains in disbelief.

He wrote about all this in his book, which will soon be published by Glas Srpske and will be available to the readers. In his book, the former Al-Qa'idah officer described in detail his journey from his family home in Bahrain, through the fights against the Russians and the communists in Afghanistan, and to the battles against the Serb and Croat forces in the mountains of Central Bosnia.

[Box] Withdrawal

Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad tried to withdraw from Al-Qa'idah during the B-H war, but unsuccessfully. However, the arrest and the trial for something that, as he claimed, he had not done, gave him the strength to persevere in his intention. He became even more determined after the bloody terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, after which he definitely decided to join an anti-terrorist coalition and assist in dismantling Al-Qa'idah in any possible way, because he believes that Al-Qa'idah harms Islam most!

---

Source: Glas Srpske, Banja Luka, in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian 11 Sep 06

http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/gs091106.htm

Here's an untouchable with friends in high places.

Quote:by Julia Gorin We are now up to TWO Albanians and one Bosnian being involved in the North Carolina cell disrupted last year.

Bajram Aslani (Tanjug)
For Immediate Release, June 17, 2010, U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs (202) 514-2007/TDD [IMG]chrome://skype_ff_extension/skin/numbers_button_skype_logo.png[/IMG](202) 514-1888
Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations

RALEIGH, NC Bajram Asllani, 29, a resident of Mitrovica, Kosovo, has been charged in a criminal complaint with providing material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; George E.B. Holding, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina; Owen D. Harris, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Charlotte Field Division; and Robin Pendergraft, Director of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, announced today.

Let's note that the terror suspect is from Mitrovica, the town whose northern half is the last Serbian holdout from a Muslim-Albanian Kosovo. This is whose control we want to bring all of Mitrovica under, as we try to submit Northern Mitrovica to what the rest of Kosovo has been submitted to: lawlessness and terror. Though I suspect this development could slow down our attack plans on northern Mitrovica not only because the terror connection is too conspicuous right now, but also because our military (if not our leaders) may finally and reluctantly take the long-existent hint that an official Serbian presence in Kosovo could help be our eyes and ears in that increasingly Islamic "country". (Well, they'll entertain this notion until our Albanian "partners" remind us that the deterioration of our security will accelerate if we don't support and secure all of Kosovo for them.)

Asllani, also known as "Bajram Aslani," or "Ebu Hatab," was arrested earlier today [Thursday] by authorities in Kosovo in connection with a U.S. provisional arrest warrant issued in the Eastern District of North Carolina. The United States intends to seek his extradition from Kosovo to stand trial in Raleigh. In accordance with the extradition agreement between the United States and Kosovo, Asllani faces a potential maximum of 40 years in prison if convicted.
Last July, eight defendants were indicted in the Eastern District of North of Carolina on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; conspiracy to murder, kidnap, maim and injure persons abroad; and other violations. Those charged were Daniel Patrick Boyd, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina; Hysen Sherifi, a native of Kosovo and a U.S. legal permanent resident in North Carolina; Anes Subasic, a naturalized [BOSNIAN] U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina….
A superseding indictment returned on Sept. 24, 2009, added new charges against Daniel Patrick Boyd, Hysen Sherifi and Zakariya Boyd, alleging, among other things, that Daniel Boyd and Sherifi conspired to murder U.S. military personnel as part of a plot to attack troops at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia. …
An April 19, 2010, criminal complaint unsealed today alleges that Asllani was a member of the conspiracy involving the defendants listed above. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Asllani has had repeated communications with the conspirators; solicited money from the conspirators to establish a base of operations in Kosovo for the purpose of waging violent jihad; tasked the conspirators with completing work to further these objectives and accepted funds from the conspirators to help him travel.
Among other things, the complaint alleges that Hysen Sherifi departed from Raleigh for Pristina, Kosovo, on July 30, 2008, to pursue violent jihad. While in Kosovo, Sherifi allegedly formed a relationship with Asllani. Sherifi often referred to Asllani as "the brother" in Kosovo who was advising him and who was "wanted." According to the complaint, Asllani had been arrested by Kosovar law enforcement in 2007 and been placed on house arrest for a period of time. He was later convicted in absentia by a Serbian court in September 2009 for planning terrorist-related offenses and was sentenced to eight years of confinement.
According to the complaint, Asllani provided Sherifi with videos related to violent jihad for the purposes of translating them so they could be used to recruit others for violent jihad or to motivate those currently involved in violent jihad. Sherifi, did in fact, translate videos provided him by Asllani, the complaint alleges.
The complaint further alleges that Asllani directed Sherifi to collect money for the purpose of later purchasing land and establishing a community in Kosovo, where they could store weapons and ammunition and which they could use as a base of operations for conducting violent jihad in Kosovo and other countries. Sherifi did, in fact, return to the United States on April 5, 2009, and collected money for this purpose, receiving a check for $15,000 in July 2009. Sherifi was arrested on July 27, 2009, before he could take the money back to Asllani in Kosovo.
In addition, the complaint alleges Asllani received money from Sherifi that was sent with the intention of being used by Asllani to obtain travel documents. And finally, the complaint alleges that Daniel Boyd stated his desire to assist Sherifi in his plan to raise money for the mujihadeen in Kosovo. Specifically, Boyd stated he wanted to send his sons, Zakariya Boyd and Dylan Boyd, and himself to Kosovo after Sherifi returned. Zakariya and Dylan Boyd spent time online with Sherifi chatting with Asllani in Kosovo.

Isn't that odd? What could the Boyd family's interest in Kosovo possibly be?

"The facts as alleged in this complaint underscore the connectivity between extremists at home and abroad and the global nature of the terrorist threat we face. At the same time, the arrest of Asllani demonstrates how effective cooperation among international partners serves to address such threats. I applaud the many agents, analysts and prosecutors who helped bring about this important case," said David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
…
"People who are plotting to harm America and Americans are no longer a world away from us. This case began in Raleigh, N.C., and now stretches across the globe, a circumstance no one would have thought possible less than 10 years ago," said Owen D. Harris, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI in North Carolina. […]

Uh, actually. Actually, uh, 11 years ago when we took the Muslim side in a war for land and resettled a few hundred thousand of those Muslims here and in Europe this possibility did, uh, sort of cross some of our minds. Two news reports on the initial arrest are here.
Meanwhile, we have an update: the suspect has been released. The reason is the Kosovo standard: "not enough evidence." Though one does find this surprising in a case where the U.S. also wants the guy. Perhaps the suspect has protection from someone in Pristina officialdom and so a "message" was sent to the EULEX judge. Still, thanks to U.S. security interests being at stake (rather than just expendable Serbian ones), there seems to be a twist to the usual arrest-and-release policy for Kosovo Albanians: he has to report to police twice a week.
EULEX releases terrorism suspect
19 June 2010 | 10:47 | Source: B92

BELGRADE An EULEX judge has freed Bajram Aslani from custody, who was suspected of planning terrorist attacks in America and Kosovo.
Aslani was arrested earlier under a warrant issued by the U.S. Attorneys' Offices.
He was freed after the prosecution confirmed that there was not enough evidence to keep him, though he is obligated to report to the police twice a week.
Aslani, an ethnic Albanian from the town of Kosovska Mitrovica, was arrested on Thursday and is the second suspect in Kosovo from a group of nine terror suspects.
The Associated Press stated that Aslani was arrested in 2007, and that we was convicted in absentia by the Serbian courts in 2009 for involvement in the planning of a terrorist attack. He was sentenced to eight years in prison.

One may wonder why, if his whereabouts are now finally known, he's not being delivered to the Serbian authorities who convicted him, but that conviction was only for his being a threat to the Balkans and terrorism in the Balkans doesn't qualify as terrorism. Plus, "guilty" in a Serbian court is all just "Serbian propaganda" until we're targeted too. (Besides, he only killed Serbs.)
Another report: Kosovo terror suspect wanted in U.S. released

PRISTINA (Reuters) …"He has to report to police twice a week," Kristiina Herodes, a spokeswoman from the EU police and justice mission (EULEX) said. "The prosecutor will have a close look at the written decision by the judge and then will decide to appeal against the decision or not."
…
Despite the decision from the EU judge, Herodes said that now it is up to the Kosovo government whether Asllani will be extradited to the United States or not.
…
"I personally have asked to be extradited to the United States because I am not afraid of U.S. justice, I believe in justice because I am innocent," Asllani told local media in his town in Mitrovica after he was released.
He said that Americans are good people and he has nothing against them. The United States is the biggest supporter of Kosovo's independence and has 1,480 troops on the ground. […]

Here Asllani is struggling with his identity crisis: his inner Albanian wants to love Americans for furthering those supremacist ambitions, but his inner Muslim knows that the love affair has to end.
Further update:
Interior Minister condemns Aslani release
19 June 2010 | 16:59 | Source: Tanjug

BELGRADE Interior Minister Ivica Dacic said that the decision of an EULEX judge to release terrorism suspect Bajram Aslani from custody is surprising and condemnable.
He is wanted in Serbia and America for involvement in the planning of terrorist attacks in America, Kosovo and other locations.
Dacic said that Serbia expects that the international presence in Kosovo will take into consideration the demands of the Serbian courts and that it will also respect the American demands for processing Aslani, as one of the leaders of an extremist radical Islamic group in the province.
He added that Aslani's release "can point to the fact that there are suspicions of some double standards for members of Albanian radical groups."
Aslani is also suspected of planning terrorist attacks in Jordan and the Gaza Strip.

Now what could an Albanian's interest in the Gaza Strip be? After all, Albanians feel they have so much more in common with Israelis than with Palestinians. So let us be reminded that four Albanians were among the "protesters" in the anti-Israel war convoy to Gaza. Let us also be reminded that the same month saw the arrest of five Wahhabis and seizure of a huge weapons cache in Kosovo, which involved three Bosnians and two Albanians.

Dacic said that operative information of the Serbian police shows that Aslani came into the possession of plastic explosives in Bosnia last year, which were taken to Kosovo, adding that the explosives were planned to be used in a terrorist attack in central Serbia.
"Operative information of our police also shows that Aslani is still a member of the Wahhabi movement and that he was in close relations and ties with known radical Islamists on the territory of Novi Pazar and Sjenica," Dacic said.
Dacic also said that there is information pointing to the fact that Aslani had organized a Wahhabi camp that was uncovered in a police action in March 2007.

So now we're beginning to see how beautifully, how symbiotically not-like-that Muslim Kosovo collaborates with not-like-that Muslim Bosnia. On that subject, here is the Aslani/Asllani news from last year, relating to his absentia trial in Serbia (again, we can see the timeless and historic Albanian/Bosnian sandwich):
Serbia: Four radical Muslims jailed for terror plot

Belgrade, 8 Sept. (AKI) - A special Serbian court has sentenced four radical Muslims from the volatile Sandzak region of the country to up to eight years in prison each for planning terrorist attacks on targets in the Balkans. The four men were sentenced on charges of terrorism, illegal possession of weapons and alleged links with unidentified foreign terrorist groups, following an eight-month trial.
Adis Muric and Bajram Aslani were sentenced to eight years each, Nedzad Bulic to seven and Enes Mujanovic was given a four year jail term. Bulic and Aslani's sentenced were delivered in absentia as they earlier escaped from police and are on the run.
The four men were arrested in police raids in 2007 in the Sandzak region, which borders Kosovo. They are from predominantly Muslim town of Novi Pazar and adhere to the fundamentalist Wahabi interpretation of Islam followed by Osama bin Laden and many Al-Qaida members.
The group formed a cell in 2007 that planned to carry out terrorist acts in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, judge Milan Ranic stated, explaining the court's verdict. The group's objective was to spread fear among citizens and to gain religious power.
The prosecution claimed the group planned to plant explosives at Novi Pazar football stadium and to kill policemen deployed there.
The group was in close contact with other Wahabis from Bosnia, Albania and Syria and had in their posession a large quantity of terrorism prosyletising materials, according to the court indictment.
The group was based in Novi Pazar and in Kosovska Mitrovica, where weapons and explosives were found.
Twelve Wahabis were sentenced in July to a total 60 years in jail for terrorism, conspiracy and planning terrorist attacks in Serbia, including a plot to assassinate local mufti Muamer Zukorlic, who the group considered to be an American spy and betrayer of Islam.
Most of those convicted were arrested in 2007 during a raid at a Wahabi training camp on Ninaj mountain in Sandzak, where police found a large weapons cache in a cave.
The group's leader Ismail Prentic was killed as security forces tried to arrest him in Donja Trnava village a month later.

The radical Islamist movement was brought to the Balkans by fighters from Muslim countries during the 1990s Bosnian war. Many have remained and are believed to operate camps and recruit young people in a bid to gain influence in Serbia, Bosnia and elsewhere in the region. […]

Quote:

Alleged jihadist wanted by FBI lives openly in Kosovo

Published on November 27, 2010, Reuters

Category: Islamic Terror in Kosovo
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(Reuters) - The United States considers lumberjack Bajram Asllani one of its most wanted men but, because of Kosovo's unusual international status, it is unable to extradite ands interrogate him.

Unlike others on the "most wanted" list, Asllani is not hiding out in a distant desert or rugged mountain range.

The 30-year-old lives openly with his family in Kosovo, a pro-American Balkan country where about 800 U.S. soldiers help preserve a fragile peace between majority ethnic Albanians and minority Serbs, formerly the territory's rulers.

A friendly local policeman even pointed the way to his street when a journalist recently tried to find Asllani's home in Mitrovica, one of the country's largest cities.

Asllani's case is caught up in the hybrid legal system of

Kosovo, whose own weak judicial system leaves European Union judges and prosecutors to handle major cases involving terrorism and war crimes.

Kosovo, whose independence nearly three years ago has been recognised by many countries, wants to join the European Union one day but remains an international protectorate more than a decade after its war for liberation from Serbia.

The FBI "Wanted" poster on the internet (here) has complicated life for Asllani, who lives on state unemployment benefits for his wife and three children of just 75 euros ($100) a month.

"I lost my job and there are times when I don't have enough to feed my children," he said after offering a guest a glass of strawberry juice in his ramshackle house.

"No one is hiring me. They tell me: you are a terrorist, you have attacked the Americans."

The FBI wanted poster reads: "Bajram Asllani is an alleged co-conspirator with a group of eight individuals in the United States who were allegedly co-conspiring to engage in violent jihad, or holy war, and to raise money for mujihadeen, or warriors engaged in violent jihad."

Asllani, a Kosovar Albanian, was arrested in June but released after EU judges rejected a U.S. request for his extradition.

The EU judges found that the United States had not provided sufficient grounds for believing that Asllani had committed the offences, and also cited the absence of an extradition accord between Washington and Pristina.

Asllani says he is innocent of the charges.

BASE FOR EXTREMIST ISLAM

The man the FBI considers highly dangerous lives next door to a United Nations building, and on a typical day prays in a local mosque and greets police officers when he goes shopping.

His appearance is the same as the long-haired, bearded image that appears on Interpol's website link.reuters.com/rur76q, which advises those with information about his whereabouts to contact police or Interpol.

"I am a victim of secret services," said Asllani, who is accused of providing material support to terrorism suspects and conspiring to kill and hurt people abroad.

He is accused of having ties and soliciting money from men in North Carolina arrested last year for an alleged plot to attack a U.S. Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, and alleged plans to hurt people overseas including in Kosovo, Jordan and the Gaza Strip.

The complaint alleges Asllani was preparing to buy land in Kosovo to build a base for extremist Islam, including the storage of weapons and training of fighters with the aim of committing terrorist acts overseas.

"We continue to seek his prosecution in the United States," said U.S. Justice Department spokesman Dean Boyd.

In September 2009, a Serbian court sentenced Asllani in absentia to eight years in prison for selling weapons to Islamic militants, a charge he denies. His house is a few hundred metres from the Ibar River, which divides the part of the city under Kosovo government control from an ethnic Serb community loyal to Belgrade.

Not only the United States and Serbia want to see Asllani behind bars -- the Kosovo government has approved a request from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to extradite him.

"The Americans know something about him and they will not just accuse someone who has not done something," a Kosovo government source close to the case told Reuters. "He should have gone to United States to face all accusations."

Asllani said all he had left was his family and his faith, which he said had helped him overcome the horrors he witnessed during Kosovo's 1998-99 war.

"I saw people with hearts cut out, without heads, and after the war I had a lot of trauma," he said. "Islam has saved me from these traumas. I thank God that has helped me.



"Everything has been black since I was accused," he said. "If I was armed and dangerous, I would not be here and I would have better living conditions."

Exclusive: Gaza Flotilla Official Was Foreign Fighter in Bosnia War

By Esad Hecimovic
SPECIAL TO INTELWIRE
A senior official with the Turkish activist group IHH who participated in the Gaza-bound flotilla boarded by the Israeli army last month served as a foreign fighter during the civil war in Bosnia.

Osman Atalay, a senior official with IHH, was on board the ship "Mavi Marmara," part of the controversial aid convoy to Gaza, which was boarded by Israeli commandos on May 31, according to published reports.

The initials IHH stand for the The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief in Turkish. The charity was created the mid-1990s, according to published reports, for the purpose of assisting Bosnian Muslims caught up in the three-way civil war between Muslims, Croats and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia. The war lasted from 1992 to 1995, leaving over 100,000 dead.

Several purported charities created to provide humanitarian assistance to Bosnian Muslims during the war were, in reality, funneling weapons and mujahideen fighters into the country, according to documents obtained during the making of the documentary "Sarajevo Ricochet", which debuts at the Kortfilmfestivalen (Short Film Festival) in Oslo, Norway, later this month.

Jihadist fighters frequently posed as employees of the charities in order to secure travel papers. Some mujahideen fighters were incorporated into the regular Bosnian army. A relatively small number of foreign volunteers bypassed the mujahideen and enlisted in the army directly.

Some IHH employees served as volunteer fighters with the Bosnian army, stationed in the town of Zenica, near the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, according to a Bosnian intelligence document obtained during research on the documentary.

The report by the Sarajevo Sector of the Bosnian National Security Service is dated November 19, 1995, and titled "Citizens, Organizations and Institutions from Afro-Asian Countries Who Reside and Operate in Our Area - A Sample of What We Have Learned and a Suggestion for Measures to be Taken."

Atalay was enlisted as a soldier of the Bosnian Army from 1992 to 1994, according to the document. After serving in the war, the document states, Atalay became head of the IHH office in Sarajevo.

A CIA report from the mid-1990s, obtained for the documentary, claims a director of IHH in Sarajevo was linked to Iranian government operatives, but does not name the person in question (read the document).

Efforts to reach Atalay for comment through IHH in Turkey were unsuccessful.

Another IHH employee, Hakan Bogoclu, was enlisted in the Bosnian army during the same period. According to the document, he served in the Seventh Muslim Brigade, a unit that included some mujahideen.

The document does not specify what unit Atalay served with, but it states both men served on the same dates, Sept. 1, 1992 through July 1, 1994.

In 1995, Bogoclu moved to IHH's Sarajevo office, where he was became deputy chief, according to the Bosnian intelligence document. Bogoclu still lives in Bosnia, where he is today an influential Sufi religious figure.

He declined to be interviewed at length, but denied any connections to terrorism and said he was an activist with IHH but not an employee.

A third IHH employee is named in the document as a director of IHH in Sarajevo but is not said to have been involved in the military.

A 2006 report written by terrorism expert Evan Kohlmann described a Turkish police raid on IHH headquarters in the late 1990s:

According to Kohlmann, IHH phone records also showed calls to the Islamic Cultural Institute, an Islamic center linked to Anwar Shaban in Milan. Another call was recorded between IHH and Abu Maali, the leader of the Bosnian mujahideen after Shaban's assassination in 1995. Both men are believed to be linked to Al Qaeda.

Some other figures named in the Bosnian intelligence document clearly illustrate the links between foreign fighters in Bosnia and terrorism.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the September 11 mastermind, lived and worked in Sarajevo in late 1995, according to the document, which says he was employed by a humanitarian organization called "Egipatska Pomoc" or "Egyptian Help," believed to be a reference to the Egyptian Humanitarian Relief Organization (EHRA).

Mohammed is described as a "Pakistani citizen, born on April 14, 1965, in Kuwait, temporarily residing at 11 Bjelave Street, engineer by profession, residing in Sarajevo since September 25, 1995."

Esad Hecimovic is a Bosnian investigative journalist. You can follow him on Twitter. INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger and "Sarajevo Ricochet" producer Ola Flyum contributed to this report. A version of this story was published in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet.
Labels: Anwar-Shaban, Bosnia, Esad-Hecimovic, Foreign-Fighters, Gaza-Flotilla, IHH, INTELWIRE-Exclusive, Mujahideen, Palestinian-Issues, [URL="http://news.intelwire.com/search/label/Sarajevo-Ricochet"]Sarajevo-Ricochet

http://news.intelwire.com/2010/06/gaza-f...reign.html[/URL]

Magda Hassan Wrote:Yep. Even the terrorist are surprised....

Quote:Bosnian leaders ignore testimonies on mujahidin crimes - ex-Al-Qa'idah officer BBC Monitoring Europe (Political) - September 18, 2006, Monday

Text of report by Dobrila Majstorovic headlined: "Eyes wide closed" by Bosnian Serb newspaper Glas Srpske on 11 September; boxes as published:

Al-Qa'idah still has its cells in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and it will never leave this country. This is a statement that Bahraini Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad [name as received], a former Al-Qa'idah officer, has been repeating for years. Ali Hamad has been serving his sentence in the Zenica Correctional Centre since 1997.

Ali Hamad was sentenced to 12 years for organizing a car-bomb attack in Splitska Street in Mostar in 1997, even thought, after nine years spent behind bars, he still claims that he did not do what he had been sentenced for.

In his confession to Glas Srpske several years ago, Ali Hamad spoke about his path of war, from Afghanistan to Bosnia-Hercegovina, where, as he said, he completed a course of training at an Al-Qa'idah military academy. As its officer, he became a commander in the notorious El-Mujahidin detachment. He talked openly about the traces of blood that the foreign mujahidins left behind all over Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, Ali Hamad noted that the relevant investigative and judicial bodies, which should have been concerned about his statements, did not find them interesting enough!

Not just the Bosnian leaders ignored him. But Paddy Ashdown was always a bad choice to write to.

Quote:

Saturday, October 22, 2005

Terrorist Claims World Leaders Ignored His Warnings

By Sherrie Gossett
CNSNews.com Staff Writer
October 10, 2005

(CNSNews.com) - An imprisoned al Qaeda leader claims his repeated warnings to international authorities regarding the terror network's planned operations, including bombings in Spain, Britain and Italy, have gone unheeded.

Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, who is currently serving a 12-year prison term in Zenica prison in Bosnia-Herzegovina for terrorism and robbery, states that for more than three years - from November 2001 to January 2005 -- he repeatedly offered in letters and "official interviews" to provide information on al Qaeda's operations in Bosnia and elsewhere.

Hamad adds that his efforts included two letters, sent on Jan. 12 and 19 of 2004, to Lord Paddy Ashdown, the international community's High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, according to Hamad, Ashdown ignored.

On Jan. 10 of this year, Hamad wrote a nine-page letter from prison, addressed to local news editors in Bosnia, complaining about being ignored. Cybercast News Service obtained a copy of the letter and confirmed its contents in a conference call with Hamad's newly-appointed attorney, Dusko Tomic, and an independent translator.(Click here to view copy of original letter. Click here to read English translation.)

"[Ashdown] has not shown the slightest interest" wrote Hamad, adding that "I offered him the opportunity to disable and destroy the major cells of al Qaeda."

Offering a "ten-point program" to help "cleanse" the region of the "remnants of terrorism," Hamad warned about "sleepers" who were waiting for the "green light ..."

The Washington D.C.-based International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), echoes the criticism of Ashdown, alleging that he has "consistently denied any terrorist activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has consistently and successfully dismissed any officials who brought to light links between [al Qaeda] and other terrorist supporting governments with the Bosnian Islamist leadership."

Ashdown became the international community's High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, on May 27, 2002. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created in 1995, immediately after the Dayton Peace Agreement, to ensure that Bosnia would become a "peaceful, viable state on course to European integration," according to the OHR website.

The OHR is funded by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), whose 55 member countries and agencies include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN).

The International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) has long warned about terrorists using the Balkans as a springboard for terrorist operations in Europe, and has published detailed reports linking the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S., the March 11, 2004, bombings in Madrid and the July 7, 2005, bombings in London to jihadist activity in the Balkans.

In August, Cybercast News Service posted an edited version of a video, which had been obtained from ISSA, showing a jihadist training camp in Bosnia.

The Cybercast News Service article accompanying the terrorist training camp video ended up on the front pages of news organizations in the Balkans, but Bosnian government officials and Gen. David Leakey of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) denied there were any terrorist camps in the region.

Bosnia's top Muslim weekly, Slobodna Bosna, confirmed the existence of the training camps and insisted the European Union general was "playing dumb."

One month later, al Qaeda activity in the area was confirmed by German intelligence sources as well, as reported by United Press International.

Hamad's letter also singles out Gen. Virgil Packett, the former commander of the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) for doubting that there were al Qaeda terrorists in the region, even while admitting that there could be "sleepers."

"[T]he terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks ... were peaceful sleepers before they received their order to attack," warned Hamad in his letter.

Other leaders and institutions that Hamad claims he warned include the prime minister of Bosnia, embassies of the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Canada; former Pope John Paul II, President Bush, the U.S. Department of Defense and the FBI.

A U.S. congressional staff member, who spoke on condition of anonymity, confirmed to Cybercast News Service that "our FBI official in Sarajevo has met with Ali Hamad and interrogated him."

Dusko Tomic also confirmed the FBI interrogations as well as meetings with Bosnian intelligence agents, who Hamad later accused of obtaining his information in order to protect terrorists.

Hamad states that he fled a broken home to live in the streets at 17 years old, was picked up by al Qaeda and "brainwashed" into hating those who were "alive and different," according to Bosnian public television.

"... I made a sworn pledge to al Qaeda, in the presence of Osama bin Laden and three of his high-ranking officers," Hamad further explained in the letter from prison.

The former al Qaeda officer claims to have details about al Qaeda's rules and operations, the individuals "deployed around the world" and their terrorist missions. He is also threatening to reveal the names of government officials "from various Islamic countries," who allegedly provided secret support to al Qaeda.

"My client has spoken out for two years about the threats of terrorist attacks against Spain, Britain and Italy and no one took him seriously until the Madrid and London bombings," Tomic told Cybercast News Service.

Regarding the evidence of jihadists operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tomic charged that "a lot of western intelligence, including MI6 (British intelligence service) not only have been aware of [mujahedeen] in the area, but helped them and therefore are now trying to cover up their existence so as to cover up their responsibility."

Tomic added, "It's my personal conviction that Ashdown is an agent of MI6, therefore that organization dictates his actions in the area."

In September, Sarajevo newspapers reported that Ashdown was an agent for MI6 in the 1970s. His office declined comment, but denounced the Internet publication of the names of alleged spies. Cybercast News Service attempted to contact Ashdown for this article, but a spokesman for the Office of the High Representative stated that "we do not comment on correspondence."

Ali Hamad, who claims he escaped an attempt on his life while in prison, has also written a book, which Tomic says will reveal how western intelligence helped mujahedeen infiltrate the Balkans during the Bosnian war and are now trying to conceal their existence.

Ali Hamad's Translated Letter

Ali Hamad, Penitentiary Zenica, Sarajevska 36
10 January 2005
To the "Glas Srpske" editors, Banja Luka
Ladies and Gentlemen in the "Glas Srpske," and particularly Dobrila Majstorovic, I accept full cooperation with you with great pleasure, but on one condition: that it be directed to anti-terrorist activity, in the name of justice, peace, love of all regardless of ethnic and religious background; and to be part of a joint struggle against injustice, violence, ethnic hatred and intolerance, as well as against terrorism in all its shapes and colors, especially against Osama bin Laden and his terrorist Al-Qaeda network, of which I used to be a member once, and against the foreign mujahideen who came to Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1992-95 war calling themselves "holy warriors" and "warriors of Allah." Spreading lies and propaganda that they came to this land to offer protection and aid to the assaulted Bosniak Muslims, they murdered and ruthlessly beheaded innocent citizens of B-H for no reason but that they weren't Muslims; their real goal is to spread their network to this region and fire up hatred between the ethnic groups here, using the war as a medium. They have continued their work after the war, perpetrating all sort of inhumane and dirty deeds.
So, if what I've indicated above can be our common purpose, then I support any form of cooperation with you that stays within the bounds of the law.
In this first contact (or second), and I hope it won't be the last, I wish to tell you the following:
From my childhood, and under the extremely difficult conditions in which I grew up in my homeland, I was forced to associate with members, collaborators and fans of the terrorist Al-Qaeda. I was friends with them for a year and a half, during which they spiritually and psychologically prepared me for terrorist actions, conducting everyday "lectures" (i.e. brainwashing). Once they were confident they had prepared me, programmed me robotically, to practice ethnic hatred and hatred of other; once they were convinced I hated the entire world, including myself; once they were certain I had become mercilessly violent and wanted blood and vengeance against just about everyone they sent me to the war in Afghanistan, giving me the opportunity to express my anger and hatred towards humanity, and exact vengeance on all human brings, innocent or not, only because they were alive and different.
After that, I made a sworn pledge to Al-Qaeda, in the presence of Osama bin Laden and three of his high-ranking officers. I took the pledge in the town of Gelalabad [sp? Jalalabad?], Afghanistan [sic]. Once my mission in Afghanistan was over, I was ordered back to my hometown, where I received orders to go to a new assignment, in B-H.
I arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina in September 1992, where I operated alongside the mujahideen within the former Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina [ARBiH]. As an experienced and trained soldier, I became a commander of a unit located in the village of Bijela Buca, near Travnik.
In 2001, as I was in this institution [prison tr.], I watched the horrors of the catastrophic terrorist attack on the US on September 11, which instantly killed 3000 innocent American citizens. I watched these painful scenes with sorrow in my heart and eyes, thinking, "I can assume who did this inhumanity. I feel horrible. How much longer will innocents be killed only because they aren't Muslims? How much longer will there be violence, nationalism, terrorism? How much longer will there be injustice, hatred, bloodshed and revenge? What have these people done to deserve death? Do they not have right to live, just because they aren't Muslims? No one could do such a thing but Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda. Remember, my former boss, you and your people will regret dearly that you'd trusted me and picked me for a member. One day I will be famous as your implacable enemy, who will strike mercilessly at the very heart of your Al-Qaeda. I am your pupil, and the pupil of your school, and you taught me that a promise is a debt…"

The attach on the US on September 11 changed the entire world, as well as my heart, which had been ill with the disease of terrorism. Because of it, and for several other reasons, I decided firmly and finally to not only quit Al-Qaeda, but to dedicate my entire being and everything at my disposal to a struggle against violence, ethnic hatred and intolerance, as well as evil people who use terrorism to spill the blood of innocents and destroy their homes. I specifically did this to fight against my former boss Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda, of which I was a member.
In the name of justice, peace and freedom-loving people whatever their ethnicity or religion, I have decided to offer maximum cooperation to the best of my abilities to all international antiterrorist institutions, and become an active member of the campaign against terrorism, especially against Al-Qaeda; in order to prevent the repetition of September 11 in the USA, to protect the lives of innocents, to ensure a better future and maximum protection for my children and all other children even at the cost of my own life.
From 6 November 2001, to the present day, I have initiated a widespread action, in which I informed many domestic and international institutions, in writing and in official interviews. Among them were the international stabilization forces in B-H, prime minister of B-H, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown, the embassies of the USA, Britain, Italy, Canada and others; Holy Father John Paul II, President of the United States George W. Bush, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the FBI, with which I am still in contact. Therefore, I consider myself obligated to offer maximum assistance, support and cooperation to all international institutions dealing with the problem of terrorism, so they could achieve positive results in suppressing and uncovering the work of Al-Qaeda and its clones.
I think that my assistance in this matter is necessary and that with that assistance they can achieve what they could not achieve without it, and without me and my knowledge of Al-Qaeda. My vast knowledge of Al-Qaeda comes from the fact that I was once one of its officers, I know its modus operandi from experience, I know its rules, its command structure, its active and passive members, its high-ranking operatives, who are spread throughout the world waiting for the green light from their boss to begin attacks and dirty, inhumane attacks. There are such people in this region, too.
Of all the institutions mentioned above I have asked for assistance, protection and maximum physical and political protection, so I could achieve what I promised to help disable and destroy the main cells of Al-Qaeda, to bring before the face of justice the leaders, members and associates of that terrorist network.
So far, thanks to me and no one else, two Al-Qaeda leaders were found and arrested in Qatar: one of the top brains of the organization, Khaled as-Shayk [sp?], currently at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and an Al-Qaeda financier Mohammed es-Siddiqi [sp?]
Had it not been for me and my maximum cooperation, no one could have found out these two were connected with Al-Qaeda, nor would they have been arrested, yet no one so much as thanked me.
It is interesting that the High Representative of the international community in B-H Paddy Ashdown, who has shown his teeth to the Serb Republic [RS] and often tells the media that he is not punishing the RS but the criminals and those who protect war criminals, that he has not shown the slightest interest or any teeth to the foreign mujahideen who came to this region during the 1992-1995 war, committed horrible war crimes against the Serb and Croat civilians, and imported from Asia and Africa the terrorism, Wahhabism, Selefism, ethnic hatred and intolerance towards non-Muslims; this is confirmed by something that was nonexistent prior to the war, which is the appearance of domestic mujahideen in all towns and villages of the B-H Federation.
I have written to him [Ashdown] twice, on 12 January 2004 and 19 January 2004; with full responsibility, I told him that Al-Qaeda has been present in B-H throughout the 1992-1995 war, and that it still has sympathizers in this region, who were given citizenships during the war, and whom I know personally. In these letters, I informed him of my case, and my readiness for maximum cooperation with international anti-terrorist institutions.

I guaranteed to him that with my assistance and cooperation many operatives and active leaders, members and sympathizers of Al-Qaeda throughout the world would be caught; I offered him the opportunity to disable and destroy the major cells of Al-Qaeda. Also, after stating that terrorist remnants still reside in B-H, I offered him a specific ten-point program, and guaranteed that its acceptance would cleanse B-H of the remnants of terrorism and evildoers who came here during the war, and now act as good citizens of FB-H, while they are in fact sleepers waiting for the green light from their boss to start committing inhumane deeds and atrocities. I guaranteed that I would give an explanation of every point in my program in official interviews with officials from his cabinet either in this institution [the penitentiary] or another adequate location.
The trouble is that I never received a real response. He never showed any interest for my program, or the problem of terrorism in this region, while at the same time he'd trained his political guns with great interest on the Serb Republic. With great and due respect to Mr. Ashdown, I hope he will show more interest and that he will take more serious steps to resolve this problem, while I herald my readiness for maximum cooperation in advance.
Also interesting is the case with the AID intelligence agency, and its former boss. I had three official interviews with AID officials inside this institution, on 9 August, 14 August and 13 September 2002, when I informed them in detail about the war crimes committed by the mujahideen during the war against the Serb and Croat civilians; names of the mujahideen who perpetrated these crimes; and locations where the crimes were committed.
Specifically, I talked about three atrocities: the first one was in the village of Bijela Buca near Travnik, where four foreign nationals (journalists, most likely British) were abducted and killed while performing their work. The perpetrators of this crime are six mujahideen Algerian E.M., Algerian A.B., Saudi E.M., Lybian E.H., Tunisian E.H., and Egyptian I.M.
I note that this case was closed and forgotten until I reopened it and reminded them of it in 2002.
The other atrocity, a barbarous murder, took place in 1993 in the Croat village of Guca Gora near Travnik. The mujahideen attacked the abovenamed village, and there was a brief firefight which involved even the members of international forces (UNPROFOR), who tried to protect the village and its inhabitants from the attack. But when UNPROFOR members saw the long beards of their attackers and realized they were being attacked by mujahideen, they boarded their troop carriers and ran, saving themselves and leaving the civilians in the village to the mercy of the mujahideen. Some 20 Croat civilians were captured; after psychological and physical mistreatment, they were taken somewhere just outside the village and brutally murdered with bullets, knives, and even a chainsaw. Before that bloody event, in the same village, a mujahid named E.M. used a big knife to slit the throat of a 16- or 14-year old Croat boy before his father's eyes. The father was forced to watch; then his life was taken in the same fashion.
The third atrocity happened the same year, and I witnessed it, in the mujahedeen camp in the village of Orasac near Travnik. The mujahedeen slit the throat and decapitated a Serb citizen of B-H with a rusty kitchen knife. This was witnessed by four Croat captives, who fortunately survived. The murderer was S.B., assisted by R.A., while E.M. severed the head from the body.
AID officials appeared interested for these crimes and my cooperation in bringing them to light and their perpetrators to justice. They told me we would be in regular contact and promised to take the appropriate measures. I waited for their next visit, but they never came again. Then I found out that the international institutions dealing with the problem of terrorism demanded of the former AID director, K.S., to give them a report on African and Asian persons who arrived in B-H over the last 10 years, and any information about their connections to any terrorist networks. I found out that the former AID director never gave the international institutions any information about these atrocities, nor of my existence as an

eyewitness, which means they were covering up important evidence that could have been helpful in anti-terrorist operations.
This illegal action was discovered, which is why the former head of AID was relieved. The problem is that the purpose of this cover-up was never revealed or investigated. This is why I have every reason to accuse the former head of AID that, for whatever purpose unknown to me, he and his associates who interviewed me abused the information and testimony I gave them and covered up the aforementioned atrocities, protecting the mujahideen who committed them.
This illegal action of theirs did not defraud me, since I am not a member of this community and have nothing to do with this country except wishing it to be safe, stable and prosperously on its way to Europea integration; they have however defrauded themselves and their own people by protecting criminals and their atrocities, giving them the opportunity to move about freely and endanger the safety of their own people and the state.
I want it to be known that I have no intention of further cooperating with officials who do not want to reveal the truth if it doesn't fit their political, national or religious positions. With all due respect, but also with a great deal of resentment, I appeal to the former head of AID and his men to return my material evidence. They do not need it, but I do.
Anyway, I claim with full responsibility that Al-Qaeda has been present in B-H throughout the 1992-95 war and that it still has members and sympathizers in this region.
In 2001, the SFOR command in B-H claimed it had evidence that Al-Qaeda had operated in B-H in that time period. Expert for international law and terrorism Darko Trifunovic claims that members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network are still in B-H territory.
Former SFOR commander General Virgil Packett hesitantly expressed doubt that there were live Al-Qaeda members in B-H, but could not state that categorically. So even though leading anti-terrorist institutions claimed that there were Al-Qaeda members in B-H, the general admitted that was a fact, though he only called them "sleepers" and not active members. Does this mean that, in his opinion, sleepers aren't dangerous? I tell the general, he is mistaken if he believes there is a difference between active members of Al-Qaeda and sleepers. The only difference between them is that active members have received the green light for action, while the sleepers are still waiting for it.
For example, the terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks in the USA, who instantly snuffed out the lives of 3000 innocents, were peaceful sleepers before they received their order to attack.
Preparation for terrorism and waiting for the appropriate time and order to strike are part of operational activities, and may well take years. So, the aforementioned general's opinion that Al-Qaeda's sleepers were inactive is wrong. If we were to accept it as true, we would have to say that the terrorists who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks were "not a danger" while they were preparing it in secrecy, waiting for the green light.
On 23 July 2004 I sent a letter to the general, openly challenging his wrong opinion and disputing his statements. He never responded, but I think he could not. American intelligence, the CIA, claims there are terrorists in B-H, that B-H is a way station for weapons, financial transactions and documents everything one needs for terrorist attacks. American lawyer and former political analyst for the U.S. Senate, James Jatras, has evidence based on which he claims that Al-Qaeda is operating in B-H.
Deputy Minister for security in the B-H Council of Ministers, Dragan Mektic, recently said that investigations have shown that there are seven Afro-Asian persons in B-H under surveillance for links to terrorist networks, who have obtained their citizenships fraudulently. This statement was carried by the media. However, certain high officials who are dealing with the problem of terrorism in this region loudly and strongly deny every report of persons connected with terrorist networks; they are disputing my

claims, and the claims of many world institutions, that since the beginning of the war in 1992, B-H has been fertile ground and a haven for international terrorism.
On this occasion I would like to ask several questions, asking those who every so often deny the existence of terrorism in this region to give me specific answers. For security reasons, every state has laws and rules demanding that foreigners who enter its territory must be registered, with their origin, purpose of visit, the length of stay and place of residence, etc. entered into evidence. So I ask the first question: did the foreign mujahideen who came to B-H during the 1992-1995 war, some of whom stayed in the region afterwards, pass through the proper and required procedure? In other words, does anyone in the government then or now know anything about these mujahideen: who they are, where they came from, their real identities, the purpose of their stay in B-H during the war?
If anyone in the authorities thinks he knows the answer to this question, I will be ready to face him and in the presence of foreign journalists and representatives of an international counter-terrorist institution give him the names of at least 50 mujahideen who I know, who operated in B-H during the war; he should then tell me what he knows about them, give me the real identities of at least two, and tell me where they came from.
If the officials decide to answer me and admit they have no information, or have just a little bit on foreign mujahideen who came to B-H during the war, they should have good answers to the following questions. How, then, and based on what can certain high-ranking officials in the B-H government claim there is no terrorism in this country, when they know little or nothing about the pile of foreign mujahideen that came into this country during the war, illegally and without any identity checks? Are these officials excluding the possibility that some of these mujahideen could have been terrorists linked to various terrorist networks? An additional problem is that many of those mujahideen received their citizenship under murky and illegal circumstances.
It is clear the mujahideen did not come to this country of which they did not know before, leaving their families and homes during the war in order to shoot marbles on the streets of Sarajevo or get laid? Don't the people who once ran the government in B-H and those who do so know think exactly what many B-H citizens think, that the foreign mujahideen came to B-H during the war to protect and defend the attacked Bosniak people?
Second question: How do the B-H officials interpret the appearance of domestic mujahideen, an occurrence unprecedented before the war? During and after the war, these domestic mujahideen adopted some very strange opinions, which influenced them so much they even changed their outward appearance adopting a garb previously unknown in this region, short trousers, long, unkempt beards, etc. and started aggressively practicing religion.
Under which circumstances did these foreign mujahideen arise, and who taught them these alien ways that made them into a separate sect, obviously distinct from the customs and mentality of the people of this region?
Third question: Who and what was Ahmed Zuhairi, known as "Handala," directly linked to Al-Qaeda from its foundation, and who fought with the mujahideen in B-H during the war, while at the same time working for the Croatian government with unknown authority, meeting with the Croatian president Franjo Tudjman several times?
I don't really know who used whom through Ahmed Zuhairi; was it Croatia that used Al-Qaeda, or the other way around? Or was something entirely different going on?
So, with all due respect, I demand the authorities in B-H do not raise dust about my sincerity, to answer my questions publicly, and prove with arguments their claims that terrorism does not exist in B-H. I will, however, use arguments to prove that Al-Qaeda has operated in B-H during the 1992-1995 war, and that it still has its members, associates and sympathizers in this country.

Within my struggle against injustice, nationalism, terrorism of any kind and especially Al-Qaeda, on 11 June 2004 I started writing a book under the working title "International terrorism and Al-Qaeda in B-H and the world," which I intend to make a road sign to the world in the fight against evil, and help people throughout the world, regardless of their nationality, religion or political affiliation. This book would be of special interest to the youth, giving them advice as to how to resist the seduction of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. It would protect them from falling into the dark abyss in which I was, and from which one can climb out of only with great risk and difficulty.
This book of mine will be like an earthquake to Al-Qaeda and its sympathizers, rocking them at their very foundations. The book will reveal many of Al-Qaeda's secrets, inhumane and dirty deeds, its high-ranking leaders, members and associates deployed around the world. For the very first time in history, the true face of Al-Qaeda will be revealed in public, from its 1987 foundation to the present.
What I intend to describe, what I've already almost finished describing (80%), will put the readers in my shoes. I will speak of the circumstances under which I was forced to associate with Bin Laden's people and where; about my membership in Al-Qaeda and how it came about; about the Al-Qaeda rules and ways of operation; about my first encounter with the Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and the topic of our conversation; about Bin Laden and his private life, which is filled with oddities and surprises; about his officers and people of importance; about the activities of Al-Qaeda and its military in Afghanistan, and where they were located; about the Taliban and their origins; about the end of my mandate in Afghanistan and departure to a new mission in B-H. In my book, I will speak about many of Bin Laden's men, deployed around the world, and reveal their missions. I will also speak of some officials from various Islamic countries, who hold positions of power and authority, and who secretly provided support, aid and special favors to members of Al-Qaeda, based on which Al-Qaeda prospered and developed its activities to the point where it threatens the world and all thanks to these officials. In the book, I will also speak of the foreign mujahideen who came to B-H during the 1992-1995 war, who and what they were, their links to Al-Qaeda, and how they were essentially Al-Qaeda's infiltration program in this region. I will speak in detail about the mujahideen, from the time they arrived in B-H at the start of the war, to 1997, as well as their organization and activities in B-H. I will especially address the domestic mujahideen and analyze their emergence, and discuss the links between former B-H authorities and foreign mujahideen during the war and afterwards. I will address some other matters, of which I won't talk about now.
I inform all those who constantly raise dust and doubt in my honesty and truthfulness that my book won't be entertaining fiction, but will include written evidence and arguments. The book will be read at the Hague Tribunal before publication maybe it is being read there right now. I will be ready to testify and argue before the Tribunal in The Hague about everything that I will cite in the book. This book will be a symbol of my struggle against violence, ethnic hatred and intolerance, a road sign in my sincere battle and sacrifice against evil, and in the name of justice, peace, understanding and love of all, regardless of their nationality, religion or political affiliation.
This book will be the fruit of my sincere repentance, and proof of my great love and friendship for all people, whom my painful tale will counsel to stay away from the fallen path that I walked, and from which I managed to return with much pain and effort. The book will be available to readers in B-H in the spring or summer of this year, and afterwards published in other countries and other languages.
Because of my opposition to Al-Qaeda and the foreign mujahideen who arrived in B-H during the war, because of my full cooperation with the international anti-terrorist institutions, and because of my book that strikes at the very heart of Al-Qaeda, I have become a target of vengeance by Al-Qaeda's members, who are all over the world. Therefore there is a danger I might be attacked while here in prison, and especially after I leave prison, and just by Al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, truth and justice threaten many, especially those in positions of power who fear my book. Danger to my life and safety also comes from many people who are Muslim, and who venerate Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, considering him a

defender of Muslims and Islam, whose struggle (terrorism) would (supposedly) restore the lost strength and pride of Islam.
These people consider me a traitor to Muslims worldwide, not aware that my struggle is directed against terrorism worldwide; to replace injustice with justice; to replace violence with kindness; to replace murder with salvation; to replace vengeance with forgiveness; and to have peace for all humanity, understanding, safety, and heavenly, limitless love.
My struggle is not aimed against Islam and Muslims. Quite the contrary. I am a Muslim and very proud of it. But I also love and respect other religions.
It is a fact that my struggle is aimed against evil, against terrorism and Al-Qaeda, its leader Osama bin Laden, and the mujahideen who came to B-H during the war, and continued to act after the war pretending to be loyal citizens.
Since many consider me an enemy of Islam and Muslims, I have experienced all the perils of my struggle against terrorism here in prison. I don't know what to say on this occasion, except that I am someone who is fighting with insufficient resources, sacrificing himself, in order to make life better for everyone. Member of my nation beat me up from all sides, but members of other nations understand me, respect me and thank me for my efforts and sacrifices.
When night falls in my dark prison cell and when I think of all the threats and dangers to my life, I smile and think, "Will the world allow that my struggle for the betterment of humanity makes my wife a widow, and that my two little girls become orphans? Can telling the truth cost me so much? But I will not give up, ever."
In case I am killed, however, let the humankind know and remember that I was a person who accepted the sacrifice of my life for the sake of justice, peace, and love for all regardless of their ethnicity or religion. If that ever happens, let everyone remember my name, and that I sacrificed myself for justice, peace and love for all; that my life was extinguished only because I fought to protect my children and everyone else's children from evils of terrorism; and that the freedom-loving world did not offer me the necessary physical protection, assistance and support.
I would like to use this opportunity to send a friendly message to my former teacher and master, Osama bin Laden, hoping that the message will reach him:
I am convinced that you are very unpleasantly surprised and that you could have never thought or dreamed that your quiet student could become the most bitter enemy of you and your Al-Qaeda, a nightmare that keeps your men awake and ruins the enjoyment of their wives.
This has happened. The devil has come to claim his own.
You and your men must accept that I no longer belong to you, but to the international anti-terrorist institutions, in which I could become an active fighter against you and your Al-Qaeda.
Your greatest enemy, America and Americans, are now my friends, and I am in constant contact with them. It is with great pleasure that I will offer them my maximum support and cooperation to destroy your Al-Qaeda. I do not regret in the least rebelling against you and your men; this had to happen, because there was nothing in common between us any more. You are still for injustice, and I am for justice. You are for destruction, I am for construction. You stand for hatred and intolerance, I am for great and sincere love for everyone. You are for war and murder of innocents, I am for salvation and peace. You are for revenge even against innocents, I forgive even those who are guilty.
You wish everyone ill, a discord upon the world. I wish everyone well, and understanding for everyone in the world, in every respect, that all become as members of one nation. You want to bury everyone but those who think like you, but I am already working on putting you all in prison, so the humanity would be safe and protected from your evil-doing.

I will use everything I learned in your schools against you and your men. Was I not a good student? I know you and your men are furious with me, and that you cannot wait for me to get out of prison so you could steal from me the rest of my short life, and that you will look for me wherever I go. But I hope the world will never allow your wish to be fulfilled.
So, when I get out of prison, send your hunters after me. But be aware, I will be hunting them as well. I promise you and a promise is sacred that if the world takes me seri0ously and gives me a chance, I shall strike at the heart of your Al-Qaeda and shake its foundations. My cooperation with the world will lead to capture of your lieutenants and fighters. Even though I am in prison still, I already helped capture two of your important men. If the world does not accept my offer, then I won't be able to fulfill my promise. Pray that this happens.
So, how do you like your fun now? Too painful, is it? But when I have fun with your men, it won't be like having a sweet blonde on a bed of roses. You know well that I am not an easy target like V.L., whom you killed in 1997 because he tried to resign from Al-Qaeda. So I tell your men, when I get out of prison, they should be as ready as I will be. Your hunters may become the prey, as I could catch them sooner than they could catch me. I do not intend to use weapons when I am released but if I meet any of your hounds, I will not shoot to wound. My bullets will not miss their heads and hearts; what I learned in your school will serve me well.
I must confess publicly, though I consider you evil, that since I know of myself, I have never met a person with so many virtues, indescribably polite and pleasant, as you were. This is why you managed to conquer the hearts and minds of so many around you, and why your followers love you unconditionally.
I want to tell you that my book will soon be in print. Buy it. Read it. It's not expensive, and you will like it.
Here, I've given you a chance to find out my opinion of you and your Al-Qaeda from my own pen. I hope you won't be loath to respond to your peaceful and quiet apprentice. Goodbye, forever.
I thank the editors, and especially Ms. Dobrila Majstorovic.

Respectfully,

Ali Hamad

Some one didn't like his letter wring campaign or penpals...

Quote:Attempt on Life of al-Qaida Informant in Bosnian Prison
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis - February 21, 2005 Monday

Exclusive. From GIS Station Sarajevo. GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs sources reported that Bahraini Islamist Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, currently imprisoned at Zenica prison in Bosnia-Herzegovina, escaped injury when a murder attempt against him failed during the third week of February 2005. The attempt highlighted the extent to which radical, pro-al-Qaida Islamists within the security apparatus have been able to pursue known commitments by former Bosnian Government members to kill Ali Hamad because of his decision to leave al-Qaida and support anti-terrorist efforts.

The assassination attempt follows the release of a statement by Ali Hamad outlining links between al-Qaida and Bosnian officials, and his public criticism of the European Union-appointed High Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, for not acting on detailed information provided to him about the ongoing terrorist presence in Bosnia. Ashdown has consistently denied any terrorist activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has consistently and successfully dismissed any officials who brought to light links between al-Qaida and other terrorist supporting governments with the Bosnian Islamist leadership.

Ali Hamad had also earlier been threatened by former Bosnia-Herzegovina Interior Minister Alija Delimutstafic, who is now also in prison in Sarajevo.

The Bosnian newspaper Dani reported that threat on August 13, 2004, and also noted:

Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, a Bahraini citizen who has confessed to being an al-Qaida infantry counterattack officer and has offered to cooperate with the US authorities, has fallen into disfavor with inmates of Zenica prison, where he is serving 12 years and nine months for terrorism and robbery. Earlier this week, he sent, through his attorney, a long letter to SFOR (NATO Stabilization Force) Commander Gen. Virgil Packett. The letter said that he "does not feel secure in Zenica prison ever since he decided to cooperate with anti-terrorist institutions, left al-Qaida and opposed his former boss Osama Bin Laden and his organization".

The threats against Ali Hamad by Delimutstafic and others were apparently galvanized into an attack in February 2005, but were unsuccessful. The nature of the attack is not yet known, although it is understood that Ali Hamad has been concerned about the fact that, despite substantial cooperation with US and other authorities, he was still in the same prison with other convicted Islamist terrorists.

One GIS source in Sarajevo noted: "It's not just Delimutstafic and others from the SDA (the Muslim Party of Democratic Action; the late Alija Izetbegovic's party, which has been linked to bin Laden) who want to see Ali Hamad dead; it's clear that Ashdown is becoming embarrassed by the constant revelations that the al-Qaida terrorists in Bosnia have been working all along with the Bosnian Islamist leaders. If anything happens to Ali Hamad, it will be because Ashdown has deliberately ignored the warnings and left Ali Hamad to his fate."

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, February 14, 2005: Key al-Qaida Informant Details Additional Information, Criticizes Ashdown's Refusal to Act in Bosnia-Herzegovina .

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, August 23, 2004: Document: "Alija Delimustafic Threatens Former al-Qaida Officer Ali Hamad?"

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Copyright 2005 Defense & Foreign Affairs/International Strategic Studies Association
Posted for Fair Use only.

Mid-October 2002: British Administrator Fires Bosnian Official Vigorously Investigating Terrorism and Corruption

Munir Alibabic. [Source: Dani]By 2002, the Muslim Bosnian government is controlled by the Social Democrats, now that Alija Izetbegovic has retired and his SDA party is out of power. To deal with the issues of corruption and terrorism, in July 2002 the new government brings Munir Alibabic out of retirement to run Bosnia's intelligence agency. Alibabic had been fired in 1994 as head of the secret police in Sarajevo for opposing government corruption and the support of the mujaheddin, and he is widely respected for his integrity. He vows to stop the cover-up of Bosnian Muslim ties to terrorism, stating, "A crime is a crime, regardless which side commits it." He works aggressively with other intelligence agencies to uncover the al-Qaeda network in Bosnia. He soon completes a report detailing ties between the SDA party and organized crime. The report names Elfatih Hassanein, Hasan Cengic, Irfan Ljevakovic, Bakir Alispahic, and Alija Delimustafic as key co-consiprators. The first three were central figures in the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a bin Laden-linked charity front active in the early 1990s (see Mid-1991-1996). But in October 2002 elections, the SDA returns to power. Paddy Ashdown, a British politician serving as the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, publicly supported the SDA over secularists and reformers in the election and shortly after they win he fires Alibabic. Author John Schindler will later write that "By the end of 2002, it was evident that the post-9/11 drive to run al-Qaeda out of Bosnia and force its local supporters to heel had run out of steam." [SCHINDLER, 2007, PP. 289-291]The Telegraph will later report that Ashdown fired Alibabic on the advice of the British intelligence agency MI6, but it isn't clear why. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/27/2004]
Entity Tags: Hasan Cengic, Alija Delimustafic, Elfatih Hassanein, UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Paddy Ashdown, Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Munir Alibabic, Irfan Ljevakovic, Bakir Alispahic, Third World Relief Agency
[B]Timeline Tags: [URL="http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline"]Complete 911 Timeline

[/URL][/B]http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp..._ashdown_1

18 August 2004. Thanks to A.
Anthony Monckton was named in 1999 as MI6 officer:
http://cryptome.org/mi6-list.htm
Monckton's non-secret e-mail: anthony.monckton@fco.gov.uk
Source: www-aus11.cricket.org/link_to_database/ NATIONAL/ICC/ECC/MEMBERS/YUG/about.html

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Anthony Monckton at right.
Source
__________________________________________
http://news.suc.org/bydate/2004/August_16/27.html
The Sunday Times, August 16, 2004

Vengeful Serbs betray top MI6 man

Tom Walker and Milorad Ivanovic in Belgrade
A BELGRADE newspaper has blown the cover of Britain's most important secret agent in the Balkans, shortly after he left the Serbian capital.
Anthony Monckton, an MI6 officer who was credited with helping to arrange the flight of Slobodan Milosevic, the former Yugoslav president, to the Hague to face trial for war crimes, had his photograph published last week, along with his business card with telephone and e-mail details.
Diplomats close to Monckton said he had been betrayed by Serbian interior ministry officials close to the paper, the Nedeljni Telegraf. They are said to have been angered by his involvement in inquiries into the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, the prime minister, in March 2003.
One friend described Monckton, who is understood to have overhauled Britain's Balkan intelligence operation, as "the classic gentleman spy".
Monckton, whose brother Christopher was once a policy adviser to Margaret Thatcher, is also credited with providing vital intelligence to Lord Ashdown in Bosnia, where the former Liberal Democrat leader is the international community's high representative.
Serbian secret police have expressed a less favourable view. They have questioned Monckton's analysis of warnings of an Albanian uprising in Kosovo in March, and the quality of information on Milosevic that was given to prosecutors at the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
He was also said to have been a source of damaging intelligence about Milo Djukanovic, the prime minister of Montenegro, who two years ago was feared to be leading the republic towards independence.
Nedeljni Telegraf quoted secret police officials as alleging that Monckton had failed to establish the precise nature of a growing network of Al-Qaeda followers in Kosovo. "He missed a lot. He left a lot to be desired," said one adviser to the Serbian government.
According to Nedeljni Telegraf, Monckton was shocked when his name and photograph were first published in February in a book written by Zoran Mijatovic, the former deputy chief of the Serbian intelligence service, the DB.
The paper claimed Monckton believed he might be targeted by Milosevic supporters and grew a beard to change his appearance. The book had only a limited circulation, but the newspaper coverage has left him with little hope of anonymity in Serbia.
Last month David Gowan, the British ambassador in Belgrade, organised a discreet farewell dinner party for Monckton, who was also known among the expatriate community for running the city's cricket club. The elite of the Serbian interior ministry and intelligence community were invited -with the exception of Mijatovic.
After working in Bosnia during the civil war in the early 1990s, Monckton joined the British embassy in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, in 1996. He made frequent trips to Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb territory where Radovan Karadzic, the most wanted war crimes suspect still at large, was hiding. He moved to Belgrade in 2000, just before Milosevic fell from power.
Sources close to Monckton say the failure to arrest Karadzic and his general, Ratko Mladic, nearly a decade after the Bosnian war, is among his greatest regrets.
His one slip-up in the complicated transfer of Milosevic to the Hague in June 2001, Nedeljni Telegraf claimed, was his inability to bring an RAF jet into Belgrade airport in time. Instead, Milosevic was taken by military helicopter to a US base in Tuzla, Bosnia, where the RAF jet was waiting.
Monckton returned to Belgrade and celebrated the successful mission at Deltino, a local restaurant, with Dusan Mihajlovic, then interior minister.
According to the newspaper, a team from MI6 visited Belgrade recently to assess his predicament and decided it would be best for him to leave the city.
Friends in the diplomatic community insisted he had moved on as part of a normal rotation. However, they said he had paid for his professionalism in helping the Serbian authorities investigate the murky circumstances -and possible police and underworld involvement -surrounding the death of Djindjic.
"He was going into stuff that people really care about and he was hurting people who felt themselves to be above the law," said one European official. "They wouldn't be so stupid as to harm him, but they were more than happy to brief against him."

List of alleged MI6 agents who have spent time in various places in Yugoslavia and the years they were stationed there. Some duplicates. Different colours refer to different list they were sourced from.



George Benedict Joseph P Busby: 89 Bonn, 92 Belgrade; dob 1960; OBE.
George Benedict Joseph Pascal Busby: dob 1960; 89 Bonn, 92 Belgrade, 00 Vienna, 04 London.

Gareth Geoffrey Lungley: dob 1971; 97 Tehran, 02 Zagreb (1 Sec).

Anthony Leopold Colyer Monckton: 90 Geneva, 96 Zagreb; dob 1960.
Anthony Leopold Colyer Monckton: dob 1960; 90 Geneva, 96 Zagreb, 98 Banja Luka, 01 Belgrade, 04 London.

Richard William Potter: 85 Riyadh, 88 Nicosia; dob 1960.
Richard William Potter: dob 1960; 85 Riyadh, 90 Nicosia, 95 Sarajevo, 99 Skopje, 04 Amman (Cllr).*

Simon Jules Wilson: 91 Athens, 93 Zagreb; dob 1966; OBE.
Simon Jules Wilson: dob 1966; 91 Athens, 93 Zagreb, 99 New York, 02 Budapest (1 Sec).*

Jeremy John Durham Ashdown (Paddy Ashdown): dob 1941; 74 Geneva (1 Sec).

Timothy Gavin Bradley: dob 1959; 86 Kuwait, 96 Belgrade, 99 London.
Julian Nicholas Braithwaite: dob 1968; 95 Zagreb, 96 Belgrade, 02 Sarajevo, 04 Washington (Cllr).*

George Benedict Joseph P Busby: 89 Bonn, 92 Belgrade; dob 1960; OBE.
George Benedict Joseph Pascal Busby: dob 1960; 89 Bonn, 92 Belgrade, 00 Vienna, 04 London.

Charles Graham Crawford: dob 1954; 81 Belgrade, 87 Cape Town, 93 Moscow, 96 Sarajevo, 01 Belgrade, 03 Warsaw. (* Warsaw, 05)

Keith William Green: dob 1964; 92 Buenos Aires, 98 Sarajevo, 03 Santiago, 04 Baghdad (Cllr).*

James William David Hall: dob 1965; 89 Lusaka, 91 New Delhi, 99 Vienna, 02 Pristina, 03 London.

Graham Stewart Hand: dob 1948; 82 Dakar, 87 Helsinki, 94 Lagos, 98 Sarajevo, 02 Algiers.

William Lester Jackson-Houlston: dob 1952; 80 Brussels, 82 Buenos Aires, 90 Belgrade, 99 Hague, 03 Berne (Cllr).*

Richard Hugh Francis Jones: dob 1962; 86 Abu Dhabi, 94 Brussels, 03 Tirana.*

Gareth Geoffrey Lungley: dob 1971; 97 Tehran, 02 Zagreb (1 Sec).

Hugh Roger Mortimer: dob 1949; 75 Rome, 78 Singapore, 83 New York, 91 Berlin, 97 Ankara, 01 Ljubljana. (* DHM, Berlin, 05)
Colin Andrew Munro: dob 1946; 71 Bonn, 73 Kuala Lumpur, 81 Bucharest, 87 East Berlin,90 Frankfurt, 97 Zagreb, 01 Mostar, 03 Vienna (OSCE, Head of UK Delegation).*

Clive Dare Newell: 79 Tehran, 82 Kabul, 86 Addis, 90 Bosnia, 94 Ankara; dob 1953.

John Matthew O'Callaghan: dob 1966; 92 Santiago, 98 Moscow, 03 Stockholm,04 Belgrade (Cllr).*

Richard William Potter: dob 1960; 85 Riyadh, 90 Nicosia, 95 Sarajevo, 99 Skopje, 04 Amman (Cllr).*

John Charles Josslyn Ramsden: dob 1950; 76 Dakar, 79 Vienna, 80 Hanoi, 90 Berlin, 96 Geneva, 04 Zagreb.*

Janet Elizabeth Rogan: 91 Peking, 98 Sarajevo; dob 1962.

Anthony Jonathan Terry: 70 Nairobi, 73 Havana, 79 Belgrade, 86 Santiago, 97 Geneva; dob 1946.

Harcourt Andrew Pretorius Tesoriere: dob 1950; 76 Kabul, 79 Nairobi, 81 Abidjan, 87 Damascus, 96 Tirana, 98 Kabul, 02 Riga, 05 Algiers.*[Ambassador to Latvia]

Simon Jules Wilson: 91 Athens, 93 Zagreb; dob 1966; OBE.
Simon Jules Wilson: dob 1966; 91 Athens, 93 Zagreb, 99 New York, 02 Budapest (1 Sec).*

http://cryptome.org/mi6-list-276.htm

The Moncton's are an interesting family. SMOM and KstJ all the way. The sister of Christopher is Rosa (wife of Dominick Lawson), a one time close friend of the late Princess Di.