10-03-2013, 05:50 AM
(This post was last modified: 10-03-2013, 03:30 PM by Charles Drago.)
During the 1997 JFK Lancer November in Dallas conference, George Michael Evica, researcher Chris Courtwright, attorney William Xanttopoulos, and I created a plan to, in the words of the official press release reproduced below, "[form] a task force to draft legislation establishing a legislative amnesty initiative. Its goal will be to encourage surviving material witnesses in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy to come forward."
Author John Kelin, who was present when initial plans for what has come to be known as the Amnesty Initiative were developing, reported fully and fairly on the proceedings in his appropriately named -- and celebrated -- Fair Play newsletter.
Kelin had attended our impromptu end-of-conference workshop on the Amnesty Initiative. The room was packed with researchers who were very taken with the idea. On stage and seated at a long table were GM, Xanttopoulos, and another well-known researcher who had had absolutely nothing to do with the formulation of our plans yet had been invited, without our knowledge or consent, to play a controlling role in what was to unfold.
At the height of the excitement about the idea, after the need for funds to launch the initiative had been detailed by GM, one or two audience members rose and asked how they should make out their checks. At least a dozen donations -- some quite considerable -- soon were collected. Checks were made out to GM (he was, appropriately, held in the highest regard and trusted). The plan was to set up a dedicated account ASAP. Until that happened, the checks would remain in GM's custody and not be cashed.
Very soon thereafter, GM called to tell me that the uninvited researcher, with the full blessing of JFK Lancer and no one else, was being positioned to gain control of the Amnesty Initiative. Those of us who had originated the project were being cut out of leadership roles.
GM mistrusted the researcher on many levels and would have nothing to do with him/her. Accordingly, GM informed JFK Lancer that he would tear up the checks and return them to the donors. He argued correctly that it was his good name that had prompted the flow of donations, and that since he was withdrawing from the project, he could not in good conscience entrust the money to others.
GM followed through.
In the hands of JFK Lancer and the puppet researcher, the Amnesty Initiative quickly died.
If that doesn't stink of an operation, I don't know what does. At the very least, it just plain stinks.
Here is John Kelin's report:
The Truth Commission
by John Kelin
The concluding afternoon of the November in Dallas conference brought what is, arguably, the most exciting development in the Kennedy case since the advent of the ARRB. Exciting, because of its great potential. A long shot? Probably. But there is so much promise there.
The development is exciting because it could lead to the break, or breaks, that actually solve the case --- a notion that, not so long ago, seemed far-fetched to many interested parties.
The general idea is probably best explained in a press release sent out by JFK Lancer a few days after their conference ended:
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 24, 1997
JFK RESEARCH GROUP TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE
DALLAS, TX: JFK LANCER, at its 1997 November In Dallas Conference, announced the formation of a task force to draft legislation establishing a legislative amnesty initiative. Its goal will be to encourage surviving material witnesses in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy to come forward.
The initiative is designed to be the logical successor legislation to the historic JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. It is modeled on the South Africa Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, and is intended, in the words of Conference Chair George Michael Evica, "...to make historical sense of the flood of new and important documents made available by the Assassination Records Review Board." Evica added, "We are offering what most likely will be the last opportunity for these witnesses to clear their conscience, serve their country, and tell the truth."
The task force, in consultation with its legal advisor Miami attorney and former federal prosecutor William Xanttopoulos, will draft the new legislation that will be acted upon in the next session of congress...
The idea of a Truth Commission, as it has thus far been referred to, was apparently first mentioned in The New York Times in July 1997. It was first broached at the Lancer conference by William Xanttopoulos, during his November in Dallas presentation, in which he discussed legal issues surrounding the case. The notion rapidly gained momentum.
"It's no secret," George Michael Evica said, "that a great many representatives, and certainly senators, are either former military intelligence or intelligence-associated people, or they are in close contact with intelligence people. In many ways, I think this [Truth Commission] would let them off the hook. They're going to say, 'Look, this is going to be a popular thing. It's the 35th anniversary [in November 1998] and people want to know. And it's not as if people are going to be indicted. It's amnesty --- it's immunity --- you come forward and tell the truth.' I think it could work."
"I think there are two other components that will make it work," Charles Drago said. "It's a fabulous, important, potentially earth-shattering idea that we've got to pursue.
"Two elements," Drago repeated. "One: financial. I think one of the jobs that we have to do as a community is to think about fund-raising, think about seed money to support this campaign [to] get this bill done, because --- this is the second part of the equation --- there has to be a high-profile, public opinion campaign, public relations campaign, to drive up the support of the rank-and-file, of the voters out there, which in turn will help to convince their elected representatives."
An audience member raised the prospect of another rash of mysterious deaths, should key figures suddenly express a willingness to talk. The same man also suggested a civil suit might be a better strategy than amnesty.
As to the former, William Xanttopoulos said the witness protection program should keep witnesses from harm. As to a civil suit, he didn't think it was a good idea. "You are cast in the position of the outsider, the dissenter, the people with the way-out case ... [also] you get a civil case going --- you get subpoena power, but the discovery in civil cases is very limited."
George Michael Evica suggested that surviving Secret Service agents were one potentially excellent source for the sort of material witnesses that were being discussed. Charles Drago said to bear in mind the distinction between individuals and institutions. "Our greatest opposition to any amnesty program might not come from hestitant individuals, but might come from the institutionalized powers, entities, that caused this thing to happen."
"I think that they [Kennedy-era Secret Service agents] would really respond to and respect the Federal authority of a Federal agency like the ARRB," said Vince Palamara, the Secret Service expert. "Even if privately they didn't like [having to come forward]..."
"I think the problem here is, we've got to decide whether we want justice or the truth," said Ian Griggs. "Under an amnesty we can't get both ... my personal view is, truth before justice. But then, if we got that, then afterwards we'd be saying, 'that guy should be shot!'"
This observation drew both laughter and applause, to which Ian replied with a slight laugh, "That's supposed to be a serious remark! But, you know, it's a real quandry, isn't it? We gotta have one or the other. But, let's have one or the other."
Charles Drago commented: "I would say that truth equals justice in this case only, if justice means doing right by him --- and making sure the system that he died for can be jump-started, preserved, and that that can't happen again."
At this point you have every right to ask why GM, Courtwright, Xanttopoulos, and I didn't move forward with the idea.
The answer: I cannot be certain, but to the best of my knowledge Bill Xanttopoulos was disenchanted by the hijacking of the Amnesty Initiative and faded away. My good friend Chris also seemed to lose interest, but as is the case with Bill, I don't feel comfortable speaking for him. GM and I clearly understood that, without Lancer's resources, we would be hard-pressed to move forward; and if we did so, we would be perceived to be in counter-productive competition with Lancer.
GM, as late as the very beginning of 1998 (a scant few months after the conference), wrote of the Amnesty Initiative in Lancer's Kennedy Assassination Chronicles. He accurately indicated that the "massive information drive" we had undertaken to inform the media of our work failed to generate any momentum whatsoever.
Clearly GM was holding out one last hope that, out of such failure, a re-formulated executive team would emerge to breathe new life into the Amnesty Initiative.
It was not to be.
I've lost touch with Chris and Bill. GM is in a better place. So if anyone within the sound of my cyber-voice would be so kind as to direct the formers' attention to this thread, I'm certain that all of us would benefit from their independent recollections.
And I know that John Kelin reads DPF, so I ask him to check in to fine-tune my memory.
One more thing: Under present circumstances, it would be extremely counter-productive for me to identify the researcher who, with assistance, attempted to take over the Amnesty Initiative. Suffice to say that his/hers is, within our community, a household name.
Please do not waste DPF bandwidth in efforts to convince me to name the name.
http://www.jfklancer.com/amnesty.html
http://spot.acorn.net/jfkplace/09/fp.bac...nesty.html
http://spot.acorn.net/JFKplace/09/fp.bac...dates.html
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archiv...elPageId=7
Author John Kelin, who was present when initial plans for what has come to be known as the Amnesty Initiative were developing, reported fully and fairly on the proceedings in his appropriately named -- and celebrated -- Fair Play newsletter.
Kelin had attended our impromptu end-of-conference workshop on the Amnesty Initiative. The room was packed with researchers who were very taken with the idea. On stage and seated at a long table were GM, Xanttopoulos, and another well-known researcher who had had absolutely nothing to do with the formulation of our plans yet had been invited, without our knowledge or consent, to play a controlling role in what was to unfold.
At the height of the excitement about the idea, after the need for funds to launch the initiative had been detailed by GM, one or two audience members rose and asked how they should make out their checks. At least a dozen donations -- some quite considerable -- soon were collected. Checks were made out to GM (he was, appropriately, held in the highest regard and trusted). The plan was to set up a dedicated account ASAP. Until that happened, the checks would remain in GM's custody and not be cashed.
Very soon thereafter, GM called to tell me that the uninvited researcher, with the full blessing of JFK Lancer and no one else, was being positioned to gain control of the Amnesty Initiative. Those of us who had originated the project were being cut out of leadership roles.
GM mistrusted the researcher on many levels and would have nothing to do with him/her. Accordingly, GM informed JFK Lancer that he would tear up the checks and return them to the donors. He argued correctly that it was his good name that had prompted the flow of donations, and that since he was withdrawing from the project, he could not in good conscience entrust the money to others.
GM followed through.
In the hands of JFK Lancer and the puppet researcher, the Amnesty Initiative quickly died.
If that doesn't stink of an operation, I don't know what does. At the very least, it just plain stinks.
Here is John Kelin's report:
The Truth Commission
by John Kelin
The concluding afternoon of the November in Dallas conference brought what is, arguably, the most exciting development in the Kennedy case since the advent of the ARRB. Exciting, because of its great potential. A long shot? Probably. But there is so much promise there.
The development is exciting because it could lead to the break, or breaks, that actually solve the case --- a notion that, not so long ago, seemed far-fetched to many interested parties.
The general idea is probably best explained in a press release sent out by JFK Lancer a few days after their conference ended:
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 24, 1997
JFK RESEARCH GROUP TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE
DALLAS, TX: JFK LANCER, at its 1997 November In Dallas Conference, announced the formation of a task force to draft legislation establishing a legislative amnesty initiative. Its goal will be to encourage surviving material witnesses in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy to come forward.
The initiative is designed to be the logical successor legislation to the historic JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. It is modeled on the South Africa Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, and is intended, in the words of Conference Chair George Michael Evica, "...to make historical sense of the flood of new and important documents made available by the Assassination Records Review Board." Evica added, "We are offering what most likely will be the last opportunity for these witnesses to clear their conscience, serve their country, and tell the truth."
The task force, in consultation with its legal advisor Miami attorney and former federal prosecutor William Xanttopoulos, will draft the new legislation that will be acted upon in the next session of congress...
The idea of a Truth Commission, as it has thus far been referred to, was apparently first mentioned in The New York Times in July 1997. It was first broached at the Lancer conference by William Xanttopoulos, during his November in Dallas presentation, in which he discussed legal issues surrounding the case. The notion rapidly gained momentum.
"It's no secret," George Michael Evica said, "that a great many representatives, and certainly senators, are either former military intelligence or intelligence-associated people, or they are in close contact with intelligence people. In many ways, I think this [Truth Commission] would let them off the hook. They're going to say, 'Look, this is going to be a popular thing. It's the 35th anniversary [in November 1998] and people want to know. And it's not as if people are going to be indicted. It's amnesty --- it's immunity --- you come forward and tell the truth.' I think it could work."
"I think there are two other components that will make it work," Charles Drago said. "It's a fabulous, important, potentially earth-shattering idea that we've got to pursue.
"Two elements," Drago repeated. "One: financial. I think one of the jobs that we have to do as a community is to think about fund-raising, think about seed money to support this campaign [to] get this bill done, because --- this is the second part of the equation --- there has to be a high-profile, public opinion campaign, public relations campaign, to drive up the support of the rank-and-file, of the voters out there, which in turn will help to convince their elected representatives."
An audience member raised the prospect of another rash of mysterious deaths, should key figures suddenly express a willingness to talk. The same man also suggested a civil suit might be a better strategy than amnesty.
As to the former, William Xanttopoulos said the witness protection program should keep witnesses from harm. As to a civil suit, he didn't think it was a good idea. "You are cast in the position of the outsider, the dissenter, the people with the way-out case ... [also] you get a civil case going --- you get subpoena power, but the discovery in civil cases is very limited."
George Michael Evica suggested that surviving Secret Service agents were one potentially excellent source for the sort of material witnesses that were being discussed. Charles Drago said to bear in mind the distinction between individuals and institutions. "Our greatest opposition to any amnesty program might not come from hestitant individuals, but might come from the institutionalized powers, entities, that caused this thing to happen."
"I think that they [Kennedy-era Secret Service agents] would really respond to and respect the Federal authority of a Federal agency like the ARRB," said Vince Palamara, the Secret Service expert. "Even if privately they didn't like [having to come forward]..."
"I think the problem here is, we've got to decide whether we want justice or the truth," said Ian Griggs. "Under an amnesty we can't get both ... my personal view is, truth before justice. But then, if we got that, then afterwards we'd be saying, 'that guy should be shot!'"
This observation drew both laughter and applause, to which Ian replied with a slight laugh, "That's supposed to be a serious remark! But, you know, it's a real quandry, isn't it? We gotta have one or the other. But, let's have one or the other."
Charles Drago commented: "I would say that truth equals justice in this case only, if justice means doing right by him --- and making sure the system that he died for can be jump-started, preserved, and that that can't happen again."
At this point you have every right to ask why GM, Courtwright, Xanttopoulos, and I didn't move forward with the idea.
The answer: I cannot be certain, but to the best of my knowledge Bill Xanttopoulos was disenchanted by the hijacking of the Amnesty Initiative and faded away. My good friend Chris also seemed to lose interest, but as is the case with Bill, I don't feel comfortable speaking for him. GM and I clearly understood that, without Lancer's resources, we would be hard-pressed to move forward; and if we did so, we would be perceived to be in counter-productive competition with Lancer.
GM, as late as the very beginning of 1998 (a scant few months after the conference), wrote of the Amnesty Initiative in Lancer's Kennedy Assassination Chronicles. He accurately indicated that the "massive information drive" we had undertaken to inform the media of our work failed to generate any momentum whatsoever.
Clearly GM was holding out one last hope that, out of such failure, a re-formulated executive team would emerge to breathe new life into the Amnesty Initiative.
It was not to be.
I've lost touch with Chris and Bill. GM is in a better place. So if anyone within the sound of my cyber-voice would be so kind as to direct the formers' attention to this thread, I'm certain that all of us would benefit from their independent recollections.
And I know that John Kelin reads DPF, so I ask him to check in to fine-tune my memory.
One more thing: Under present circumstances, it would be extremely counter-productive for me to identify the researcher who, with assistance, attempted to take over the Amnesty Initiative. Suffice to say that his/hers is, within our community, a household name.
Please do not waste DPF bandwidth in efforts to convince me to name the name.
http://www.jfklancer.com/amnesty.html
http://spot.acorn.net/jfkplace/09/fp.bac...nesty.html
http://spot.acorn.net/JFKplace/09/fp.bac...dates.html
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archiv...elPageId=7
