Big business hacking: report suppressed

[Jan Klimkowski]

More evidence that Justice is far from Blind....

The other hacking scandal: Suppressed report reveals that law firms, telecoms giants and insurance companies routinely hire criminals to steal rivals' information

Suppressed official report accuses respected industries of hiring criminals to steal rivals' secrets. Yet an official report into their practices has been suppressed

Tom Harper Author Biography

Saturday 22 June 2013 The Independent



Some of Britain's most respected industries routinely employ criminals to hack, blag and steal personal information on business rivals and members of the public, according to a secret report leaked to The Independent.

The Serious Organised Crime Agency (Soca) knew six years ago that law firms, telecoms giants and insurance were hiring private investigators to break the law and further their commercial interests, the report reveals, yet the agency did next to nothing to disrupt the unlawful trade.

It is understood that one of the key hackers mentioned in the confidential Soca report admitted that 80 per cent of his client list was taken up by law firms, wealthy individuals and insurance companies. Only 20 per cent was attributed to the media, which was investigated by the Leveson Inquiry after widespread public revulsion following the phone-hacking scandal.

Soca, dubbed "Britain's FBI", knew six years ago that blue-chip institutions were hiring private investigators to obtain sensitive data yet did next to nothing to disrupt the unlawful trade. The report was privately supplied to the Leveson Inquiry into press ethics in 2012 yet the corruption in other identified industries, including the law, insurance and debt collectors, and among high-net worth individuals, was not mentioned during the public sessions or included in the final report.

Tom Watson, the campaigning Labour MP, said: "What is astonishing about this whole murky affair is that Soca had knowledge of massive illegal invasions of privacy in the newspaper industry but also in the supply chains of so-called blue-chip companies.

"I believe they are sitting on physical evidence that has still not been disclosed fully to forensic investigators at the Metropolitan Police. The law should also be rigorously applied to other sectors that have got away with it."

One of five police investigations reviewed by Soca found private detectives listening in to targets' phone calls in real-time. The report said a "telephone interception specialist manufactured several devices which were physically attached to the target's landline at the relevant signal box by a British Telecom-trained telecommunications engineer."

During another police inquiry, the Soca report said officers found a document entitled "The Blagger's Manual", which outlined methods of accessing personal information by calling companies, banks, HM Revenue and Customs, councils, utility providers and the NHS.

"It is probably a good idea to overcome any moral hang-ups you might have about snooping' or dishonesty'," it read. "The fact is that through learning acts of technical deception, you will be performing a task which is not only of value to us or our client, but to industry as a whole."

The Independent understands that one of the key hackers mentioned in the report has admitted that 80 per cent of his client list was taken up by law firms, wealthy individuals and insurance firms while only 20 per cent of clients were from the media.

A security source with knowledge of the report codenamed Project Riverside said clients who hired corrupt private investigators included:

* a major telecoms company;

* a celebrity who broadcasts to millions of people every week;

* a well-known media personality, who hired a private investigator to hack his employee's computer as he suspected she was selling confidential information to business rivals;

* a businessman who hired hackers to obtain intelligence on rivals involved in an ultimately unsuccessful £500m corporate takeover.

A company which was owed money by property developers also hired private detectives to track down the firm's family information, detailed transactions from four bank accounts, information from credit card statements and an itemised mobile phone bill. The company paid £14,000 for the information.

However, the most common industry employing criminal private detectives is understood to be law firms, including some of those involved in high-end matrimonial proceedings and litigators investigating fraud on behalf of private clients.

Illegal practices identified by Soca investigators went well beyond the relatively simple crime of voicemail hacking and included live phone interceptions, police corruption, computer hacking and perverting the course of justice.

Despite the widespread criminality uncovered by Project Riverside between 2006 and 2007, none of the suspects identified in the report was charged with criminal offences until after the phone-hacking scandal four years later.

Police were finally forced to act after the scandal that caused the closure of Britain's biggest-selling newspaper, the resignation of two Scotland Yard police chiefs and the establishment of the Leveson Inquiry.

The Labour MP Keith Vaz, chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, said: "I am deeply concerned about these revelations. I will be seeking an explanation from Soca as to why this was not told to the Committee when we took evidence from them about the issue of private investigators.

"It is important that we establish how widespread this practice was and why no action was taken to stop what amounted to criminal activity of the worst kind."

The former News of the World deputy editor Neil Wallis added: "Until The Independent told me about this, I had not the slightest clue of the scale of illegal information theft going on among our supposedly respectable professions. Did Lord Justice Leveson only conduct his inquiry into 20 per cent of the problem?"

The Soca report, which contains "sensitive material" that may be subject to "public-interest immunity" tests effectively banning it from ever being published even if it were disclosed during legal proceedings found private investigators to be experts at "developing and cultivating useful relationships" through "socialising with law enforcement personnel". One particular method identified was to become a member of the Freemasons, which has been repeatedly linked to corruption in the police and judiciary.

Victims of computer hacking identified by Soca who suffered eBlaster Trojan attacks which allowed private investigators to monitor their computer usage remotely include the former British Army intelligence officer Ian Hurst. He was hacked by private investigators working for News of the World journalists who wanted to locate Freddie Scappaticci, a member of the IRA who worked as a double-agent codenamed "Stakeknife".

Another victim was Derek Haslam, a former Metropolitan Police officer who was persuaded by Scotland Yard to go undercover and infiltrate Southern Investigations, a private detective firm, as a "covert human intelligence source".

A Soca spokesman said: "Soca produced a confidential report in 2008 on the issue of licensing the private investigation industry. This report remains confidential and Soca does not comment on leaked documents or specific criminal investigations. Information is shared with other partners as required." Scotland Yard declined to comment.

[David Guyatt]

I have never forgot being told that a well known City Merchant Bank used east end gangsters to collect debts from high end customers who refused to honour their contracts. This was 30 years ago.

[Jan Klimkowski]

The Guardian's take on this corporate espionage:

Soca alleged to have suppressed report of hacking by companies and law firms

Illegal activity by private investigators appears not to have been published to home affairs select committee


Conal Urquhart
guardian.co.uk, Saturday 22 June 2013 14.41 BST

The Serious and Organised Crime Agency is alleged to have taken no action having investigated illegal activity five years ago. Photograph: Richard Baker

The Serious and Organised Crime Agency (Soca) has withheld from MPs information about the criminal activity of large British firms, it has been alleged.

Soca uncovered illegal activity by insurance and telecoms companies, legal firms and wealthy individuals who paid private investigators to hack computers and steal information from rivals and private individuals.

According to a report leaked to the Independent, Soca compiled a report into private investigators but took no action into the illegal activity they discovered, effectively allowing it to continue.

The report finished five years ago was supplied to the Leveson Inquiry into press ethics in 2012 but it was not publicised. Members of Soca later did not mention their report when they appeared before the House of Commons home affairs select committee.

According to the Independent, one of the hackers cited in the report said that 80 per cent of his clients were non-media companies and 20 per cent media. Media use of private investigators has been subject to extensive investigation and prosecution by the Metropolitan Police as a result of the News of the World phone-hacking scandal.

Tom Watson, a Labour MP who sits on the home affairs committee, said that he will be writing to the committee chairman. "I shall be writing to the home affairs select committee as I think this is the subject area they would like to look at having recently produced a report examining the role of private investigators.

"Soca chose not to volunteer any information previously and I'm sure the committee will want to find out what they knew and did not know. I find it extraordinary that the head of Soca who would have had full knowledge of committee's inquiry felt he should not contribute information."

A spokesman for Soca said that they had produced a confidential report on the issue of licencing the private investigation industry. "This report remains confidential and Soca does not comment on leaked documents or specific criminal investigations. Information is shared with other partners as required."

[Magda Hassan]

None of this came up at the Levison Inquiry did it?

[Jan Klimkowski]

None of this came up at the Levison Inquiry did it?

The Leveson Inquiry appears to have chosen to ignore it.

The report was privately supplied to the Leveson Inquiry into press ethics in 2012 yet the corruption in other identified industries, including the law, insurance and debt collectors, and among high-net worth individuals, was not mentioned during the public sessions or included in the final report.

We can all read between the lines and discern the deep politics:

The Soca report, which contains "sensitive material" that may be subject to "public-interest immunity" tests effectively banning it from ever being published even if it were disclosed during legal proceedings found private investigators to be experts at "developing and cultivating useful relationships" through "socialising with law enforcement personnel". One particular method identified was to become a member of the Freemasons, which has been repeatedly linked to corruption in the police and judiciary.

Victims of computer hacking identified by Soca who suffered eBlaster Trojan attacks which allowed private investigators to monitor their computer usage remotely include the former British Army intelligence officer Ian Hurst. He was hacked by private investigators working for News of the World journalists who wanted to locate Freddie Scappaticci, a member of the IRA who worked as a double-agent codenamed "Stakeknife".

Meanwhile various shenanigans resulted in the suppression of information about a very senior Met Police Officer whose alleged criminal behaviour is subject to a "Public Immunity Interest" gagging order. See here.

The Met "gagged" the Leveson Inquiry from revealing intelligence that a very senior former police officer passed on sensitive information to the News of the World, the Standard reveals today.

The force claimed a "public interest immunity certificate" to ban the disclosure of a report that alleged the officer was obtaining highly confidential information on decisions taken by Lord Blair when he was Commissioner.
The classified document, which the Met withheld from the Leveson Inquiry until after it could have been usefully raised in the public hearings, suggested the officer who is not named for legal reasons passed the leak on to the tabloid for money.
When it was finally passed to the inquiry, Scotland Yard claimed "public interest immunity" which prevented Lord Justice Leveson from referring to it in public or considering it for the conclusions in his landmark report into inappropriate relationships between the press and police.
Tom Watson, the campaigning Labour MP, said: "These are remarkably serious events uncovered by the Evening Standard. As the Prime Minster has said, this inquiry was supposed to have left no stone unturned but it now appears to have been gagged by the very force it was set up to investigate.
"I'm sure the current Commissioner would wish to urgently review what happened and I will be writing to the Home Secretary Theresa May to ask that she satisfies herself that all seemingly vital documents from the Yard were not withheld from Lord Justice Leveson."
When the Evening Standard asked counsel to the inquiry Robert Jay QC why he did not raise these matters during the public hearings, he broke a 10-month silence and issued an extra-ordinary public statement.
The senior barrister, who was "gatekeeper" to the inquiry and had a huge influence over what evidence was made public, wanted to "make clear" that he and Lord Justice Leveson were "never shown" the intelligence report until "well after" it could have been used.
He added: "The Met is claiming public interest immunity in relation to any police intelligence report, the contents of which are neither confirmed nor denied.
"I also owe continuing obligations of confidence to the Met and others in relation to information I received during the course of the inquiry. These factors have at all stages limited what I am able to place in the public domain, and continue to do so."
A source close to Lord Justice Leveson told the Standard the intelligence report would have been used by the inquiry if the Met had passed it over before Lord Blair gave evidence.
Unable to refer to the intelligence of police corruption at a very senior level, Lord Justice Leveson was forced to publicly clear the Met and found the force conducted itself with "integrity" at all times.
News that the Met successfully gagged a public inquiry investigating its own conduct has raised serious questions that Lord Justice Leveson was unable to deliver the aims of David Cameron when he established the milestone judicial investigation in July 2011.

[David Guyatt]

The Guardian's take on this corporate espionage:

The Serious and Organised Crime Agency (Soca) has withheld from MPs information about the criminal activity of large British firms, it has been alleged.

What will Parliament do with your knowledge?

My guess ranges from a slapped wrist to nothing at all.

[Jan Klimkowski]

What will Parliament do with your knowledge?

My guess ranges from a slapped wrist to nothing at all.

My guess would be a D notice, or its twisted sister, the ludicrously named "Public Interest Immunity" certificate.

Here's an article about the history of the British government D-notice system for suppressing mateiral for "natioanl security" reasons, and Robin Cook's intriguing involvement up until his, ahem, accidential death.

There are several documents and videos attached to the article at the site here.

In mid-1980 the BBC informed the British government that they were putting together an episode of flagship documentary series Panorama that would focus on the Intelligence services. Over the following several months there was intense negotiation between the government and the BBC, resulting in a heavily-censored version of the documentary being broadcast in February 1981. The files of the Office of the Prime Minister describing this process have recently become available via the National Archives (reference PREM 19/587) and they shed light on how and why the censorship took place.

A letter marked Top Secret from Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher outlined the problem and possible responses. Included among its suggestions was the idea that the government intervene and actively veto the broadcast, preventing the BBC from airing the programme. This is a provision of the BBC's charter that has, to my knowledge, never actually been used. Though Armstrong explained that use of the veto would inevitably lead to a 'hoo ha' of criticism and increased interest in the very issue they were trying to keep quiet - the Intelligence Services - Thatcher wrote at the top of the letter that she was 'prepared to use the veto'.

Thatcher note 'I would be prepared to use the veto'

You can download the full letter here. So what were the government's concerns? For one thing, no BBC documentary had ever been made before about the Intelligence Services, though of course the James Bond film series (which portrays a fictional MI6 agent) had been going for two decades by this point. The film's reporters and researchers had gained access to a high grade of interviewees, people in a position to answer important questions. This was a watershed moment - official policy at that point was still to refuse to answer questions about MI5, MI6, GCHQ and Special Branch and to not even acknowledge the existence of the first three.

D-Notice 11Indeed, discussion of these institutions and their practices was effectively forbidden by D-Notices. Copies of the two relevant notices are included in the National Archives file and can be downloaded here. The problem with D-Notices is that they are requests - firmly worded requests and with the implication that action will be taken against those who refuse the requests, but requests nonetheless. Furthermore, much of the information the BBC were intending to use was already in the public domain, just not consolidated together.

It is clear from the documents that the Tory government also suspected that the BBC documentary was part of a Lefty plot to discredit the Intelligence Services. At the time all this was going on, Labour MP Robin Cook was attempting to introduce a bill providing greater oversight, or rather at least some oversight, of the Services.

Cook had a conflicted relationship with the Western security establishment - as a young MP he tried to get the bill off the ground and failed miserably. When Labour won the 1997 election he was appointed Foreign Secretary to oversee Britain's all-new 'ethical' foreign policy. While in that position he presided over the Shaylergate affair, where MI6 were accused of sponsoring terrorists in an assassination attempt against Colonel Gaddafi. He then resigned from the cabinet on the eve of the Iraq war, in what appears to be a genuine moment of moral objection. As the 7/7 bombings happened he was writing an article published by the Guardian the day after the terrorist attacks which decried Al Qaeda as 'a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies.' He died weeks later.

Indeed, more so than the issue of the existence of British security services, more so than their covert spying methods, the question that seemed to bother the British government most was that of accountability. They saw any raising of the question - by Cook or the BBC - as an attack on the Services, a point made by Sir Robert Armstrong in a meeting with BBC director general Sir Ian Trethowan. Ultimately, pressure on Trethowan led to him showing a 100-minute version of the documentary to Bernard Sheldon, the legal adviser for MI6. Sheldon then recommended a large number of cuts, butchering the film before it was broadcast.

This is perhaps the moment at which the policy of Spook Publicity in the UK changed forever. As the BBC comment in their article on these documents:

The actual content now looks relatively tame compared to the kind of press coverage given to MI5, MI6 and GCHQ in the modern era but at the time the institutions were barely acknowledged to exist and shied away from anything about them being brought into the public domain.
- BBC

How things have changed. Only 30 years ago the British government went to the extent of directly pressuring the director general of the BBC to actively censor a documentary about the Intelligence Services. Today, we have this:

This is episode 1 of a 2004 BBC TV series called Spy. Unlike the James Bond films or companion BBC shows such as Spooks, Spy is a reality TV show, using real members of the public and having them trained by real former spies - one MI6, one CIA, and one unspecified former 'Intelligence Officer'. The members of the public are competing against one another in 'Spy School', where they are taught how to lie, cheat, manipulate and invade people's privacy.

From denial of existence to glorification on mainstream TV in less than 25 years, the Intelligence Services now occupy a major position in the propaganda. Spies have for a long time been shown to be sexy, cool and highly enviable characters, but this show goes further, as what we see is to a large extent what actually happened when they made the show. Perhaps most importantly, and beyond the superficial propaganda of 'look how great the spooks are' is the continually reinforced message that the spying 'game' is nowhere for people to have moral objections. Over and over the 'recruits' are told that they need to leave their feelings and their conscience at the door and just do 'whatever it takes' to achieve the objectives set for them each week.

This is significant because spying has, at least in Britain, been popularly considered to be an unjust, immoral and ungentlemanly way of carrying on. The notion of men in disguise sneaking into people's houses, eavesdropping on their conversations and general acting like state-sponsored criminal conspirators has, quite rightly, been seen as at best a necessary evil, if not a deliberate intrusion by the state on the privacy of ordinary and innocent citizens. As the policy has shifted from secrecy to open conspiracy and the apparatus of the spy state has begun to be laid bare for scrutiny, shows like Spy are crucial in convincing people that there is nothing morally wrong with what they are seeing.

That is my greatest cause for concern in analysing the 'Overt Ops' trend - that the amoral and often illegal attitudes and actions of the Intelligence Services are being popularised and normalised, to the extent that they do not cause the justifiable outrage that they should. So what can we do about this? We can try to outrun them, try to shed light on these manipulations at a faster rate than they are trying to normalise them. There are many techniques and pratices of the Intelligence Services that still have the capacity to shock people into action, and overt censorship is one of those. If we can accelerate the process by which these tactics and techniques are elucidated then we can stay ahead of the curve and maintain the pressure needed to force these institutions to either adapt, or be abolished.