A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria

[David Guyatt]

A really interesting and insightful article by Hersh, as usual.

What I don't quite get - or rather I get but don't fully understand the reasons why it is so - is why Turkey is so important to the US, that it can do something like this and get away with it, because, if the below is believed, it would upset Turkey. The corollary, Turkey manipulating the US into a war, doesn't seem to be considered or at all important? Why?

Barring a major change in policy by Obama, Turkey's meddling in the Syrian civil war is likely to go on. I asked my colleagues if there was any way to stop ErdoÄŸan's continued support for the rebels, especially now that it's going so wrong,' the former intelligence official told me. The answer was: "We're screwed." We could go public if it was somebody other than ErdoÄŸan, but Turkey is a special case. They're a Nato ally. The Turks don't trust the West. They can't live with us if we take any active role against Turkish interests. If we went public with what we know about ErdoÄŸan's role with the gas, it'd be disastrous. The Turks would say: "We hate you for telling us what we can and can't do."'

4 April

But in light of all this Erdogan skullduggery, I do now wonder who was responsible for releasing that Erdogan false flag Youtube tape? Payback perhaps?

[Peter Lemkin]

Sy Hersh Reveals Potential Turkish Role in Syria Chemical Strike That Almost Sparked U.S. Bombing

Was Turkey behind last year's Syrian chemical weapons attack? That is the question raised in a new exposé by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh on the intelligence debate over the deaths of hundreds of Syrians in Ghouta last year. The United States, and much of the international community, blamed forces loyal to the Assad government, almost leading to a U.S. attack on Syria. But Hersh reveals the U.S. intelligence community feared Turkey was supplying sarin gas to Syrian rebels in the months before the attack took place information never made public as President Obama made the case for launching a strike. Hersh joins us to discuss his findings.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: As Syria continues to remove its chemical weapons arsenal under the monitoring of the United Nations, a new article by the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh questions what happened last year in the Syrian city of Ghouta, when hundreds of Syrians died in a chemical weapons attack. The United States and much of the international community blamed forces loyal to the Assad government, and the incident almost led the U.S. to attack Syria. But according to Hersh, while President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry were making the case for U.S. strikes, analysts inside the U.S. military and intelligence community were privately questioning the administration's central claim about who was behind the chemical weapons attack.
According to Hersh, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency issued a highly classified five-page "talking points" briefing on June 19th which stated the Syrian rebel group al-Nusra maintained a sarin production cell. According to the DIA, it was, quote, "the most advanced sarin plot since al-Qaida's pre-9/11 effort." The DIA document went on to state, quote, "Turkey and Saudi-based chemical facilitators were attempting to obtain sarin precursors in bulk, tens of kilograms, likely for the anticipated large scale production effort in Syria." A month before the DIA briefing was written, more than ten members of al-Nusra were arrested in southern Turkey with what local police told the press were two kilograms of sarin.
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh now joins us from Washington, D.C. His latest piece is headlined "The Red Line and the Rat Line." It was just published in the London Review of Books.
Sy Hersh, welcome back to Democracy Now! Lay out what you have found.
SEYMOUR HERSH: Well, you just laid out part of it. I think the most important thing about the document is thatas you know, I was on this show, and the London Review did a piece that I wrote, months ago, questioning just the whole issue of "Whose Sarin?"was the title. It wasn't clear. This doesn't mean we know exactly what happened in eastern Ghouta. What we do knowI'm talking about the military, the Pentagon and the analystsis that the sarin that was recovered wasn't the kind of sarin that exists in the Syrian arsenal. It just raises a grave question about one of the basic elements of the president's argument for planning to go to war. The real point of the Shedd document, and the reason I wrote so much about it, is because when I did that piece months ago, the White House said they know of no such document, and there's nothey have no information about sarin being in the hands of al-Nusra or other radical groups or jihadist groups inside Syria.
Here's what's scary about it. What's scary about it is the military communityI know that the Southern Command, etc., were very worried about this possibility. The war is going badly for some of these jihadist groups. They obviouslymore than al-Nusra, other groups obviously have the capacity now to manufacture sarin, with the help of Turkey, and the fear is that as the war goes bad, some of this sarinyou can call it a strategic weapon, perhaps; when used right, it can kill an awful lot of people very quicklyis going to be shipped to their various units outside of Syria. In other words, they're going to farm out the chemicals they have, who knows wherenorthern Africa, the Middle East, other placesand then you have a different situation that we are confronting in terms of the war on terror. That's the reality.
Meanwhile, the White House's position, again, with this article, once again, even though wethis document they claim no longer existed, we ran a big chunk of it. Clearly, I have access to it. They are still insisting, "We know of no such document." This head-in-the-sand approach really has to do with something I write about in the article. I quote people as saying, once the president makes a decision, it's almost impossible to changeto get it changed. The president decided that the Syrians did it, and we're justified in thinking that and continuing to think that, no other option exists. And so, he's predicated a foreign policy which is a head-in-the-sand policy, because, meanwhile, we have a serious problem with these kind of weapons, particularly as Syria gets rid of the weapons. The only people inside Syria with those weapons are the wackos. And so, there we are.
AMY GOODMAN: What is the rat line?
SEYMOUR HERSH: The rat line is an informal designation of athe CIA isthere's a lot of very competent people in the CIA. I give it a hard time, but you've got to acknowledge a verya lot of very bright people still work there, and they know what they're doing. During the Iranian war, whenduring when Cheney and Bush were deeply involved in trying to find out whether there was a secret underground nuclear facility inside Iranthey absolutely believed itwe would send in Joint Special Operation Command teams undercover from Pakistan, from wherever, through routes that the CIA had known for smuggling and moving cash. They would use those rat lines to go in.
And the rat line in this case is, very early in 2012, when thisI don't know why, but maybe because of the hubris over whatthe victory we thought we had in Libya ousting Gaddafi, which is a mess of its own, we set up a covert, a very secret operation inside Libya to funnel arms through Turkey into the Syrian opposition, including all sidesthose who were secular, those who had legitimate grievances against the Assad government, and the other groups sponsored by the Saudis and Qataris, who are really trying to create a Wahhabi or Salafist government in Syria, take it over. And this was a very secret operation. It went for a long time. It only ended when the consulate in Benghazi was overrun. And it was done withoutas I write, without telling Congress. And the reason we even know about it, there was a recent Senate Intelligence Committee report on Benghazi that was published a few months back raising questions about security, etc., the same issues Republicans constantly talk about, but there was a secret annex to the report that described this process of funneling stuff. And it was done with money, actually, from the Turks, from the Saudis and the Qataris. We sort of used their money, and we funneledto use it to buy weapons and funnel it. The CIA was deeply involved in this.
In effect, you could almost say that, in his own way, Obamayou can call it shrewd or brilliant. He was almost channeling Saudi Arabia and Qatari and the Turks to get something done we wanted done, which was to have the opposition defeat Bashar al-Assad. And that's what it was. It was a long-running operation. It only endedand, by the way, when it ended with thewhen we shut it down after Benghazi was overrun, we suddenly saw all kinds of crazy weapons be showing up, including MANPADS, the shoulder-held anti-aircraft missiles. We showedthey were suddenly showing up insideinside Syria in the hands of various jihadist groups. So, clearly, the rat line we set up after we shut it down had a life of its own, which is often that happens in these kind of operations.
AMY GOODMAN: After the Syria talks concluded earlier this year, Secretary of State John Kerry renewed his backing of the departure of Bashar al-Assad and said the United States is prepared to increase support for the rebel opposition.

SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY: No one has done more to make Syria a magnet for terrorists than Bashar al-Assad. He is the single greatest magnet for terrorism that there is in the region. And he has long since, because of his choice of weapons, because of what he has done, lost any legitimacy. ... I will just say to you that lots of different avenues will be pursued, including continued support to the opposition and augmented support to the opposition.

AMY GOODMAN: That was Secretary of State John Kerry. Sy Hersh, your response?
SEYMOUR HERSH: Well, by this time, they knew from the Joint Chiefs of Staffthey knew that the British had come to us with sarin that had been analyzed at their laboratory and thatwe share a laboratory on chemical and biological warfare issues with Britain, place called Porton Down. It's their chemical warfare facility. And we, Americans, share that in terms of analyzing international problems when it comes to chemical and biological warfare. So it's a lot ofwe have a lot of confidence in the British competence. And so, the Brits came to us with samples of sarin, and they were very clear there was a real problem with these samples, because they did not reflect what the Brits know and we know, the Russians knew, everybody knew, is inside the Syrian arsenal. They haveprofessionals armies have additives to sarin that make it more persistent, easier to use. The amateur stuff, they call it kitchen sarin, sort of a cold phrase. You can make sarin very easily with a couple of inert chemicals, but the sarin you make isn't veryisn't as lethal as a professional military-grade sarin and doesn't have certain additives. So, you can actually calibrate what's in it. They came to us, very early, within six, eight days, 10 days, of the August 21, last year's terrible incident insidenear Damascus, when hundreds were killed. And it was overwhelming evidence.
And so, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led by its chairman, Martin Dempsey, an Army officer of many years of experiencehe was commander of the Central Command, covered the Middle Eastthey did go to the president, and they raised questions. They let him know the problems. And they also talked about the fact that the military was, I can say, unhappy. Military people tend to bewhen you give them an assignment, they'll do it, but often they see the risk more than civilian leaders. The firstthe president wanted a wave of bombing, and the military came up with a list of a number of targetsI think 21, 31, something like that, targetsrunways and other stuff. And they were told by the White HouseI don't know whothat they wanted something that would create more pain for Bashar. So then, the next thing you know, they're coming back with a massive bombing attack, two air wings of B-52 bombers dropping 2,000-pound bombs, hitting power nodes, electricity nodes, etc., the kind of attack that would cause an awful lot of damage to civilian infrastructure. And that was an awful lot for the Joint Chiefs, and they really raised that question with the president.
And as I write, I don't think there's any other issue that would have forced him to stop as he did. The notion of we're going to suddenly go back and sign a chemical disarmament treaty with the Syrians, that the Russians had been talking about, that had been raised a year earlier, and we didn't bite them. He clearly jumped on it then. And helook, you've got to give the president credit. As much as he wanted to and as much as he talked about it, when faced with reality, he backed down. He didn't say why. But, you know, we don't expectwe have learned not to expect very much credibility on foreign policy issues. Unfortunately, the fact that we don't get straight talk from the top means that the bureaucracy can't do straight talk. If you're inside the bureaucracy, you can't really tell the White House something they don't want to know.
AMY GOODMAN: Uh
SEYMOUR HERSH: That'syes, go ahead.
AMY GOODMAN: Sy, I want to talk Turkey for a minute.
SEYMOUR HERSH: Sure.
AMY GOODMAN: In your piece, you mention the leaked video of a discussion between the Turkish prime minister, Erdogan, and senior officials of a false flag operation that would justify Turkish military intervention in Syria. This is Erdogan's response to the leaked recording.

PRIME MINISTER RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN: [translated] Today they posted a video on YouTube. There was a meeting at the Turkish Foreign Ministry on Syria, on the tomb of Suleyman Shah. And they even leaked this on YouTube. This is villainous. This is dishonesty.

AMY GOODMAN: Turkey briefly imposed a ban on YouTube following the leaked recording. Sy Hersh, could you explain what the Erdogan administration's support for the rebels, the Turkish support for the rebels, has consisted of and where the U.S. now stands on this?
SEYMOUR HERSH: Well, where we stand on it now is that there's not much we can do about it, becausewell, let me just tell you what we know. What we do know, that Turkey isthat al-Nusra groups have been inside Turkey buying equipment. There's also reports that they've also received some training from the Turkish intelligence services, which is veryis headed by a man named Fidan, who is very known. There's reports, wonderful report in The Wall Street Journal recently about Fidan's closeness not only to Erdogan, the prime minister and the leader of Turkey, but also to the most radical units. And so is Erdogan. They're all supportingif they have a choice, they're supporting the more fundamental groups inside Syria. And so, we know they supply training. We know also there's athere's, I guess you could call it, another rat line. There's a flowif you're going to send the chemicals that, when mixed together, meddled together, make sarin, they flowthat flow comes from inside Turkey. A sort of a paramilitary unit known as the gendarmyGendarmerie and the MIT [Milli Istihbarat Teskilati] both are responsible for funneling these things into radical groups. There's actually a flow of trucks that brings the stuff in. And so, Turkish involvement is intense.
And I can tell you, and as I wrote in this article, the conclusion of many in the intelligence communityI can't say it's a report, because they didn't write a report about itthe conclusion was, based on intercepts we have, particularly after the event, was that there were elements of the Turkish government that took credit for what happened in eastern Ghouta, with the point being that this sarin attack crossed Obama's famous red line. If you know, Obama had said in the summer of 2012, there's a red line that, if they cross in terms of using chemicals or doing too much, the opposition, he will bomb to stop Bashar. And so, Turkey was dying, trying, repeatedly in the springthere's a lot of evidence there were some attacks in the spring. The U.N. knows this, although they don't say it. I write about that, too, in the article. And also, the American community knew. That's the reason why that secret report I wrote about, the talking paper, was written. We knew that the radicals werehad usedthe jihadist groups had access to nerve agent and had used it against Syrian soldiers in March and April. Those incidents that were always described by our government as being the responsibility of the rebels, with high confidence, it's just not so. And the report makes it clear. We have had a huge problem before the August attack innear Damascus. We knew about this potential for months before. We justit's the kind of information, for some reason, it doesn't fit with what the administration wanted to hear, so it just never got out. And that
AMY GOODMAN: On
SEYMOUR HERSH: Yes.
AMY GOODMAN: Sy, on Sunday, the website EA WorldView published a piece headlined "There is No Chemical Weapons ConspiracyDissecting Hersh's 'Exclusive' on Insurgents Once More." The author, Scott Lucas, questioned the claim that rebels could have been responsible for the chemical weapons attack last August, given the range and scale of the operation. He wrote, quote, "Reports on the day and subsequently indicated that 7-12 sites were attacked with chemical agents at the same time. In other words, whoever was responsible for the attacks launched multiple surface-to-surface rockets with chemical payloads against opposition-held towns in East Ghouta and one town in West Ghouta, near Damascus. [The chemical] attacks were ... followed by ... heavy conventional attacks." The author, Scott Lucas, says that you fail to ask questions about whether anyone, apart from the regime, would have the ability to carry out such an extensive operation. Sy?
SEYMOUR HERSH: [inaudible] first article onwe're past that. We now know. Actually, The New York Times even ran a retraction, of sorts. You had ait was like reading Pravda. But if you read the article carefully, The New York Times had run a series of articles after the event saying that the warheads in question that did the damage came from a Syrian army base, something like nine kilometers, six miles, away. And at that time, there were a number of analysts, a group from MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology], led by Ted Postol, who used to be a science adviser to the CNO, the chief of naval operations, clearly somebody with a great deal of background and no bias. He did a series of studies with his team that concluded that the warheads probably didn't go more than one or two, at most, kilometerstwo kilometers, 1.2 miles. And we now know from the U.N. reporta man named Ake Sellstrom, who ran the U.N. investigation, he's concluded the same thing: These missiles that were fired were fired no more than a mile.
They wereone looksjust from the footage one saw, they were homemade. They didn't fit any of the nomenclature of the known weapons. And don't think we don't have a very good picture of what the Syrians have in terms of warheads. They have a series of warheads that can deliver chemical weapons, and we know the dimensions of all of them. And none of these weapons fit that. And so, you have a U.N. report. You have this independent report saying they werewent no more than one or two kilometers. And so, I don't know why we're talking about multiple-launch rockets. These are homemade weapons. And it seems very clear to most observersas I say, even to the U.N. team that did the final reportthe U.N., because of whatever rules they have, wasn't able to say thatwho fired what. They could just saythey just could describe the weapons and never make a judgment. But I can tell you, I quote somebody from inside that investigation unit who was very clear that the weapons fired were homemade and were not Syrian army. This is asked and answered; these are arguments that go on. This isI assume it's a blog. I don't know theI don't know the blog.
AMY GOODMAN: And
SEYMOUR HERSH: But this has been goingyes?
AMY GOODMAN: And Turkey's interest, if it were the case, in pushing the red line and supporting an attack that would be attributed to Assadtheir interest in getting the U.S. to attack Syria?
SEYMOUR HERSH: Oh, my god, totally of great interest, because Erdogan has putthe prime minister of Turkey has put an enormous amount of effort and funds and others, including his intelligence service, in the disposable in thehe and Bashar are like, you know, at loggerheads. He wants to see him go. And he's been on the attack constantly, supporting the most radical factions there. And also, I must say he's also supporting the secular factions, the people who seriously want to overthrow Bashar and don't want to see a jihadist regime; they just want to see a government that's not controlled by one family, you know? But there's no question Turkey has a deep investment in this. And it's going badly. It's very clear now that the Syrian army has the upper hand and is essentiallythe war is essentially over. I know, I don't like toin terms of getting rid of Bashar, that's no longer a done deal. There's going to be some outpost, perhaps, in areas near Turkey where there will be various factions. They'll be under pressure from the Syrian army all the way. But, essentially, this is a losing card we have. We don't like to admit it, but that's it. Bashar has held on. And whatever that means

[Lauren Johnson]

Cui bono?

Efforts to lay the blame on Turkey as The Bad Guy should be seen as misdirection. IMO

[Peter Lemkin]

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Was Turkey Behind Syrian Sarin Attack?

By Robert Parry[/TD]
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[URL="http://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/obama-ungc-9-24-13.jpg"]
President Barack Obama speaking to the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 24, 2013.
(image by [/URL](UN photo))

Last August, the Obama administration lurched to the brink of invading Syria after blaming a Sarin gas attack outside Damascus on President Bashar al-Assad's government, but new evidence -- reported by investigative journalist Seymour M. Hersh -- implicates Turkish intelligence and extremist Syrian rebels instead.
The significance of Hersh's latest report is twofold: first, it shows how Official Washington's hawks and neocons almost stampeded the United States into another Mideast war under false pretenses, and second, the story's publication in the London Review of Books reveals how hostile the mainstream U.S. media remains toward information that doesn't comport with its neocon-dominated conventional wisdom.
In other words, it appears that Official Washington and its mainstream press have absorbed few lessons from the disastrous Iraq War, which was launched in 2003 under the false claim that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was planning to share hidden stockpiles of WMD with al-Qaeda, when there was no WMD nor any association between Hussein and al-Qaeda.


A decade later In August and September 2013, as a new war hysteria broke out over Assad allegedly crossing President Barack Obama's "red line" against using chemical weapons, it fell to a few Internet sites, including our own Consortiumnews.com, to raise questions about the administration's allegations that pinned the Aug. 21 attack on the Syrian government.
Not only did the U.S. government fail to provide a single piece of verifiable evidence to support its claims, a much-touted "vector analysis" by Human Rights Watch and the New York Times -- supposedly tracing the flight paths of two rockets back to a Syrian military base northwest of Damascus -- collapsed when it became clear that only one rocket carried Sarin and its range was less than one-third the distance between the army base and the point of impact. That meant the rocket carrying the Sarin appeared to have originated in rebel territory.
There were other reasons to doubt the Obama administration's casus belli, including the irrationality of Assad ordering a chemical weapons strike outside Damascus just as United Nations inspectors were unpacking at a local hotel with plans to investigate an earlier attack that the Syrian government blamed on the rebels.

Assad would have known that a chemical attack would have diverted the inspectors (as it did) and would force President Obama to declare that his "red line" had been crossed, possibly prompting a massive U.S. retaliatory strike (as it almost did).
Plans for War
Hersh's article describes how devastating the U.S. aerial bombardment was supposed to be, seeking to destroy Assad's military capability, which, in turn, could have cleared the way to victory for the Syrian rebels, whose fortunes had been declining.
Hersh wrote:

"Under White House pressure, the US attack plan evolved into 'a monster strike': two wings of B-52 bombers were shifted to airbases close to Syria, and navy submarines and ships equipped with Tomahawk missiles were deployed."'Every day the target list was getting longer,' the former intelligence official told me. 'The Pentagon planners said we can't use only Tomahawks to strike at Syria's missile sites because their warheads are buried too far below ground, so the two B-52 air wings with two-thousand pound bombs were assigned to the mission. Then we'll need standby search-and-rescue teams to recover downed pilots and drones for target selection. It became huge.'
"The new target list was meant to 'completely eradicate any military capabilities Assad had,' the former intelligence official said. The core targets included electric power grids, oil and gas depots, all known logistic and weapons depots, all known command and control facilities, and all known military and intelligence buildings."

According to Hersh, the administration's war plans were disrupted by U.S. and British intelligence analysts who uncovered evidence that the Sarin was likely not released by the Assad government and indications that Turkey's intelligence services may have collaborated with radical rebels to deploy the Sarin as a false-flag operation.
Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Erdogan sided with the Syrian opposition early in the civil conflict and provided a vital supply line to the al-Nusra Front, a violent group of Sunni extremists with ties to al-Qaeda and increasingly the dominant rebel fighting force. By 2012, however, internecine conflicts among rebel factions had contributed to Assad's forces gaining the upper hand in the conflict.
The role of Islamic radicals -- and the fear that advanced U.S. weapons might end up in the hands of al-Qaeda terrorists -- unnerved President Obama who pulled back on U.S. covert support for the rebels. That frustrated Erdogan who pressed Obama to expand U.S. involvement, according to Hersh's account.
Hersh wrote:

"By the end of 2012, it was believed throughout the American intelligence community that the rebels were losing the war. 'Erdogan was pissed,' the former intelligence official said, 'and felt he was left hanging on the vine. It was his money and the [U.S] cut-off was seen as a betrayal.'"

"Red Line" Worries
Recognizing Obama's political sensitivity over his "red line" pledge, the Turkish government and Syrian rebels saw chemical weapons as the way to force the President's hand, Hersh reported, writing:

"In spring 2013 US intelligence learned that the Turkish government -- through elements of the MIT, its national intelligence agency, and the Gendarmerie, a militarised law-enforcement organisation -- was working directly with al-Nusra and its allies to develop a chemical warfare capability."'The MIT was running the political liaison with the rebels, and the Gendarmerie handled military logistics, on-the-scene advice and training -- including training in chemical warfare,' the former intelligence official said. 'Stepping up Turkey's role in spring 2013 was seen as the key to its problems there. ErdoÄŸan knew that if he stopped his support of the jihadists it would be all over. The Saudis could not support the war because of logistics -- the distances involved and the difficulty of moving weapons and supplies. ErdoÄŸan's hope was to instigate an event that would force the US to cross the red line. But Obama didn't respond [to small chemical weapons attacks] in March and April.'"

The dispute between Erdogan and Obama came to a head at a White House meeting on May 16, 2013, when Erdogan unsuccessfully lobbied for a broader U.S. military commitment to the rebels, Hersh reported.
Three months later, in the early hours of Aug. 21, a mysterious missile delivered a lethal load of Sarin into a suburb east of Damascus. The Obama administration and the mainstream U.S. press corps immediately jumped to the conclusion that the Syrian government had launched the attack, which the U.S. government claimed killed at least "1,429" people although the number of victims cited by doctors and other witnesses on the scene was much lower.
Yet, with the media stampede underway, anyone who questioned the U.S. government's case was trampled under charges of being an "Assad apologist." But we few skeptics continued to point out the lack of evidence to support the rush to war. Obama also encountered political resistance in both the British Parliament and U.S. Congress, but hawks in the U.S. State Department were itching for a new war.

Secretary of State John Kerry delivered a bellicose speech on Aug. 30 amid expectations that the U.S. bombs would start flying within days. But Obama hesitated, first referring the war issue to Congress and later accepting a compromise brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin to have Assad surrender all of his chemical weapons even as Assad continued denying any role in the Aug. 21 attacks.
Obama took the deal but continued asserting publicly that Assad was guilty and disparaging anyone who thought otherwise. In a formal address to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 24, 2013, Obama declared, "It's an insult to human reason and to the legitimacy of this institution to suggest that anyone other than the regime carried out this attack."
Suspicions of Turkey
However, by autumn 2013, U.S. intelligence analysts were among those who had joined in the "insult to human reason" as their doubts about Assad's guilt grew. Hersh cited an ex-intelligence official saying:

"...the US intelligence analysts who kept working on the events of 21 August 'sensed that Syria had not done the gas attack. But the 500 pound gorilla was, how did it happen? The immediate suspect was the Turks, because they had all the pieces to make it happen.'"As intercepts and other data related to the 21 August attacks were gathered, the intelligence community saw evidence to support its suspicions. 'We now know it was a covert action planned by ErdoÄŸan's people to push Obama over the red line,' the former intelligence official said. 'They had to escalate to a gas attack in or near Damascus when the UN inspectors' -- who arrived in Damascus on 18 August to investigate the earlier use of gas -- 'were there. The deal was to do something spectacular.
"'Our senior military officers have been told by the DIA and other intelligence assets that the sarin was supplied through Turkey -- that it could only have gotten there with Turkish support. The Turks also provided the training in producing the sarin and handling it.'
"Much of the support for that assessment came from the Turks themselves, via intercepted conversations in the immediate aftermath of the attack. 'Principal evidence came from the Turkish post-attack joy and back-slapping in numerous intercepts. Operations are always so super-secret in the planning but that all flies out the window when it comes to crowing afterwards. There is no greater vulnerability than in the perpetrators claiming credit for success.'"

According to the thinking of Turkish intelligence, Hersh reported, "Erdogan's problems in Syria would soon be over: 'Off goes the gas and Obama will say red line and America is going to attack Syria, or at least that was the idea. But it did not work out that way.'"
Hersh added that the U.S. intelligence community has been reluctant to pass on to Obama the information contradicting the Assad-did-it scenario. Hersh wrote:

"The post-attack intelligence on Turkey did not make its way to the White House. 'Nobody wants to talk about all this,' the former intelligence official told me. 'There is great reluctance to contradict the president, although no all-source intelligence community analysis supported his leap to convict. There has not been one single piece of additional evidence of Syrian involvement in the sarin attack produced by the White House since the bombing raid was called off. My government can't say anything because we have acted so irresponsibly. And since we blamed Assad, we can't go back and blame Erdogan.'"

Like the bloody U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, last year's near U.S. air war against Syria is a cautionary tale for Americans regarding the dangers that result when the U.S. government and mainstream media dance off hand in hand, leaping to conclusions and laughing at doubters.

[David Guyatt]

Should we be remembering the now infamous American-Turkish Council that was brought to the world's attention by Sibel Edmonds?

Edmonds, during an interview in 2009, said this in connection to her story about congressmen selling classified material to foreign powers:

EDMONDS: Two sets of FBI files, but the AIPAC-related files and the Turkish files ended up converging in one. The FBI agents believed that they were looking at the same operation. It didn't start with AIPAC originally. It started with the Israeli Embassy. The original targets were intelligence officers under diplomatic cover in the Turkish Embassy and the Israeli Embassy. It was those contacts that led to the American Turkish Council and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations and then to AIPAC fronting for the Israelis. It moved forward from there.

And:

EDMONDS: Yes. Some of those individuals on the list were also working for the RAND Corporation. RAND ended up becoming one of the prime targets for these foreign agents.GIRALDI: RAND does highly classified research for the U.S. government. So they were setting up these people for recruitment as agents or as agents of influence?
EDMONDS: Yes, and the RAND sources would be paid peanuts compared to what the information was worth when it was sold if it was not immediately useful for Turkey or Israel. They also had sources who were working in some midwestern Air Force bases. The sources would provide the information on CD's and DVD's. In one case, for example, a Turkish military attaché got the disc and discovered that it was something really important, so he offered it to the Pakistani ISI person at the embassy, but the price was too high. Then a Turkish contact in Chicago said he knew two Saudi businessmen in Detroit who would be very interested in this information, and they would pay the price. So the Turkish military attaché flew to Detroit with his assistant to make the sale.
GIRALDI: We know Grossman was receiving money for services.
EDMONDS: Yes. Sometimes he would give money to the people who were working with him, identified in phone calls on a first-name basis, whether it's a John or a Joe. He also took care of some other people, including his contact at the New York Times. Grossman would brag, "We just fax to our people at the New York Times. They print it under their names."
GIRALDI: Did Feith and Perle receive any money that you know of?
EDMONDS: No.
GIRALDI: So they were doing favors for other reasons. Both Feith and Perle were lobbyists for Turkey and also were involved with Israel on defense contracts, including some for Northrop Grumman, which Feith represented in Israel.
EDMONDS: They had arrangements with various companies, some of them members of the American Turkish Council. They had arrangements with Kissinger's group, with Northrop Grumman, with former secretary of state James Baker's group, and also with former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.
The monitoring of the Turks picked up contacts with Feith, Wolfowitz, and Perle in the summer of 2001, four months before 9/11. They were discussing with the Turkish ambassador in Washington an arrangement whereby the U.S. would invade Iraq and divide the country. The UK would take the south, the rest would go to the U.S. They were negotiating what Turkey required in exchange for allowing an attack from Turkish soil. The Turks were very supportive, but wanted a three-part division of Iraq to include their own occupation of the Kurdish region. The three Defense Department officials said that would be more than they could agree to, but they continued daily communications to the ambassador and his defense attaché in an attempt to convince them to help.
Meanwhile Scowcroft, who was also the chairman of the American Turkish Council, Baker, Richard Armitage, and Grossman began negotiating separately for a possible Turkish protectorate. Nothing was decided, and then 9/11 took place.

[Magda Hassan]

Colleville-sur-Mer (France) (AFP) 7/6/2014 1:49:30 am Mahmud Abdel Rahman/AFP/File
A Syrian rebel aim at pro-regime fighters during clashes in the northern city of Aleppo, on March 3, 2014


President Barack Obama's top foreign policy advisor Susan Rice on Friday said Washington was providing "lethal and non-lethal" support to select members of the Syrian opposition, offering more detail than usual on US assistance.
Top Obama administration officials typically decline to say exactly what equipment, arms or ammunition the United States is providing to moderate Syrian opposition forces.
But President Barack Obama said in a major foreign policy speech last week that the United States would "ramp up" support for rebels fighting President Bashar al-Assad.
National Security Advisor Susan Rice said in an interview with CNN while she was traveling with Obama to D-Day 70th anniversary celebrations in Normandy that she was heartbroken about the carnage in Syria's civil war.
"That's why the United States has ramped up its support for the moderate vetted opposition, providing lethal and non-lethal support where we can to support both the civilian opposition and the military opposition."
Officials normally publicly refuse to comment on exactly what they are doing to train opposition groups.
National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden declined to say whether Rice was announcing a new US policy by apparently being more open on US assistance.
"We're not in a position to detail all of our assistance, but as we've made clear, we provide both military and non-military assistance to the opposition," Hayden said.
Signs of a deepening commitment to Syrian rebels come three weeks after Obama met the head of the opposition National Coalition, Ahmad Jarba in Washington last month.
Officially, US support for rebel fighters in Syria has been limited to non-lethal aid amounting to $287 million, though the CIA reportedly participates in a secret programme to train moderate rebels in Jordan.
Opposition leaders are particularly dismayed that the United States has balked at providing anti-aircraft missiles to rebels, fearing they could fall into the wrong hands.
The Wall Street Journal has reported that Obama is ready to sign off on training missions for selected rebel groups, to counter the rising power of Al-Qaeda-linked extremists.

Colleville-sur-Mer (France) (AFP) 7/6/2014 1:49:30 am

[David Guyatt]

Syria conflict: Britain 'planned to train 100,000-strong rebel army to take on Assad'



The recruits were to spend a year training abroad, before returning to the region in a 'shock and awe' campaign

IAN JOHNSTON


Thursday 03 July 2014

A secret plan to train a 100,000-strong rebel army to wage war on Syria's President Bashar Assad was drawn up by a leading British general, according to a report.

The idea - developed two years ago by Lord Richards, who was then Chief of the Defence Staff - was considered by David Cameron and the National Security Council but they ultimately decided against carrying it out.
The plan, revealed on the BBC's Newsnight programme, called for Syrian rebels to be removed from their home country, put through a vetting process, given training and equipment by an international coalition and then sent back after a year.
They would have invaded Syria with air cover provided by the West and allies in the region in a "shock and awe" campaign modelled on the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The Government did not respond to Newsnight when it was asked to comment.
Tens of thousands of people have been killed and millions have become refugees during the three-year civil war, which has seen chemical weapons used by the Assad regime, according to the rebels and others.
VIDEO: THE WAR IN SYRIA

Monzer Akbik, spokesman for the Syrian National Coalition, an opposition alliance, said: "The international community did not intervene to prevent those crimes and at the same time did not actively support the moderate elements on the ground.
"A huge opportunity was missed and that opportunity could have saved tens of thousands of lives actually and could have saved also a huge humanitarian catastrophe."
Professor Michael Clarke, of the Royal United Services Institute think tank, said the chance had been missed to train "an anti-Assad force that would have real influence in Syria when he is removed, as he will be".
"I think there was an opportunity two or three years ago to have become involved in a reasonably positive way, but it was dangerous and swimming against the broader tide of history … and the costs and the uncertainties were very high."
He added there was little that could now be done. "There are no good options over Syria. It is a slow-motion road accident," he said.
Extreme Islamist militants have gained strength within the rebel force, partly because they are well equipped using funds sent from like-minded people and groups in the Middle East. Isis recently moved into Iraq, taking significant territory.

.

[Magda Hassan]

Any day now the people of Syria will rise up and overthrow their government...

[David Guyatt]

Is this what they call a "limited hangout?"

Syria conflict: British firms 'supplied chemicals used to manufacture sarin gas'




INDEPENDENT STAFF


Wednesday 09 July 2014


Britain oversaw the sale of chemicals to Syria that were eventually used in the manufacture of the deadly nerve agent sarin, it has been reported.

Documents from the Foreign Office suggest chemicals and components were supplied to Syria in the mid-1980s, the BBC said.
Ministers are reportedly set to confirm that a number of UK firms provided the materials and that Syria has admitted they played a role in its chemical weapons programme.
They will also suggest there were no proper regulations at the time, but that tighter rules and controls exist now, the BBC said.
A report by UN chemical weapons inspectors found "clear and convincing evidence" that rockets containing sarin were fired at suburbs near the capital Damascus last August in an attack that killed hundreds of people.

[Lauren Johnson]

from Wikileaks, diplomatic cable dated February, 24, 2010 account of the visit of the Syrian General Intelligence Director Mamlouk requesting that Syria be "allowed" to participate in the GWOT.

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In a surprise appearance, Syrian General Intelligence Director (GID) General Ali Mamlouk attended a February 18 meeting between Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad and a U.S. delegation led by S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin. Miqdad explained Mamlouk had joined the meeting at the request of President Bashar al-Asad as a gesture following a positive meeting between U/S William Burns and the Syrian president the previous day. Stressing the meeting did not signal the commencement of security and intelligence cooperation between Syria and the United States, the Syrian side said the discussion could be a starting point for a blueprint regarding possible cooperation in the future. Calling Coordinator Benjamin's description of terrorist groups operating in the region "valid," Mamlouk emphasized the linkage between progress on political issues in U.S.-Syrian relations and possible security and intelligence cooperation. He identified Syrian-Iraqi border security as an area where Syria could cooperate with the U.S., but only after Iraqi legislative elections in March. Mamlouk added cooperation on Syrian-Iraqi border security could lead to security cooperation in other areas.

2. (S/NF) Mamlouk, Miqdad, and Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha were attentive during Benjamin's presentation on al-Qaeda, foreign fighters, and other common threats, and reacted positively to his warnings that these issues presented challenges to both the U.S. and Syria. Mamlouk and Miqdad emphasized three points regarding possible security and intelligence cooperation with the U.S.: (1) Syria must be able to take the lead in any regional actions; (2) politics are an integral part of combating terrorism, and a "political umbrella" of improved U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations should facilitate cooperation against terrorism; and (3) in order to convince the Syrian people that cooperation with the U.S. was benefiting them, progress must be made on issues related to economic sanctions against Syria including spare parts for airplanes and a plane for President Asad. "In summary, President Asad wants cooperation, we should take the lead on that cooperation, and don't put us on your lists," Miqdad declared. END SUMMARY. SURPRISE GUEST AT MIQDAD MEETING

3. (S/NF) GID Director General Ali Mamlouk was the surprise guest at a February 18 meeting at the MFA hosted by Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad with S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin, DHS A/S David Heyman, and NEA DAS Maura Connelly. Miqdad said Mamlouk's participation in the meeting had come at the direction of President Asad following what Miqdad termed a positive meeting between Asad and U/S Burns on February 17. Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha, who translated for Mamlouk during the meeting, stated that Mamlouk's attendance at meetings with foreign delegations was extraordinary and did not occur "even with friendly countries like Britain and France." Mustapha explained President Asad instructed Mamlouk to attend the meeting as a personal gesture.

4. (S/NF) Benjamin, stressing that cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts was an essential part of the roadmap for improved bilateral relations, noted that there were issues on which we had clear differences, such as Syrian support for Hamas and Hizballah. The U.S., he continued, still viewed these groups as undermining stability and the prospects for peace in the region. Nonetheless, the two countries should still work to cooperate on immediate threats facing both the U.S. and Syria, including the proliferation of takfiri groups in the region, such as al-Qaeda, and stopping the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. The Coordinator provided Mamlouk an overview of the threats posed by terrorist groups operating in the region from North Africa to Iraq to Yemen. Benjamin noted the challenge that these groups posed to Syria as well, illustrated by the September 2008 attack on a Syrian intelligence building. He explained the U.S. is concerned about the long-term implications of arms smuggling to Lebanon and Iraq through Syria, and observed that the disarray among the Palestinians could ultimately create an opening for groups with an al-Qaeda orientation, citing the case of Junjalat, a radical faction in Gaza.

5. (S/NF) Mamlouk pointed to Syria's 30 years of experience in battling radical groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood as evidence of Syria's commitment to the fight against terrorism. Mamlouk termed Benjamin's description of the challenges posed by terrorist groups in the region as "valid, despite the reasons that gave rise to them." Mamlouk repeatedly stressed his attendance at the meeting did not signal the commencement of security and intelligence cooperation between Syria and the U.S., but could be a starting point for "a blueprint for that which is not yet started." Echoing Miqdad, Mamlouk said progress on political issues in the Syrian-U.S. bilateral relationship was "closely connected" to progress on possible cooperation on security and intelligence. MAMLOUK DESCRIBES GID'S METHODS

6. (S/NF) The GID Director said Syria had been more successful than the U.S. and other countries in the region in fighting terrorist groups because "we are practical and not theoretical." He stated Syria's success is due to its penetration of terrorist groups. "In principle, we don't attack or kill them immediately. Instead, we embed ourselves in them and only at the opportune moment do we move." Describing the process of planting embeds in terrorist organizations as "complex," Mamlouk said the result had yielded been the detention of scores of terrorists, stamping out terror cells, and stopping hundreds of terrorists from entering Iraq. Mamlouk acknowledged some terrorists were still slipping into Iraq from Syria. "By all means we will continue to do all this, but if we start cooperation with you it will lead to better results and we can better protect our interests," he concluded.

7. (S/NF) According to Mamlouk, Syria's previous experience in cooperating with the U.S. on intelligence "was not a happy one." He stated Syria hoped any future cooperation would be "on an equal basis." Mamlouk specified this meant Syria should be allowed to "take the lead" on anti-terrorism efforts. Alluding to the "wealth of information" Syria has obtained while penetrating terrorist groups, Mamlouk declared "we have a lot of experience and know these groups. This is our area, and we know it. We are on the ground, and so we should take the lead." POSSIBLE COOPERATION ON IRAQ

8. (S/NF) Mamlouk identified Iraqi border security as an area where Syria and the U.S. could cooperate. He described Syria as ready to move forward on tripartite border security talks, but added "we are at a freezing point until after the Iraqi elections" scheduled for March. Mamlouk added that cooperation on Iraqi border security could lead to cooperation in other areas.

9. (S/NF) Benjamin, noting the importance of achieving a secure and stable Iraq, stated an important measure of progress on this subject is further success on reducing the flow of foreign fighters and cracking down on their facilitators. Mamlouk said the foreign fighters come from a large number of Arab and Muslim countries and that the Syrians detain "large numbers plus their local facilitators." As an example, Mamlouk said he handed over 23 Saudis detained in Syria to Saudi Prince Muqrin last year. Benjamin commended Mamlouk on reducing the flow of foreign fighters, while encouraging further progress. Miqdad interjected that the issue of foreign fighters using Syrian soil is a matter of national security for Syria. "We have zero tolerance," he said. Miqdad said Syria needs the cooperation of other countries, namely those from which the terrorists are coming. "If we can close this circle - with us, you, and other countries - we will succeed," he concluded.

10. (S/NF) Miqdad added that Syrian/Lebanese border security is also a subject on which the SARG is making progress. Stating "the past is behind us," Miqdad said Syria is attempting to assist the Lebanese on security at ports and at the border without interfering in internal Lebanese affairs. UPDATE ON TERRORIST NAMES PROVIDED BY USG

11. (S/NF) Alluding to previous USG requests for assistance on tracking down terrorists thought to be in Syria, the Syrian side stressed that intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Syria should not be solely based on receiving names of terrorist suspects from the USG and checking up on those individuals. However, Mamlouk confirmed that Syria could verify the specific whereabouts of several individuals who had been discussed in previous meetings with SARG officials. MIQDAD WANTS POLITICAL UMBRELLA TO GUIDE SECURITY COOPERATION

12. (S/NF) Following Mamlouk's statements regarding possible security and intelligence cooperation, Miqdad stated he wanted to emphasize three points. First, Miqdad said that because of Syria's "wealth of information" on following 30 years of facing security threats from takfiri groups, Syria must be able to take the lead in any joint efforts. Second, the Vice Foreign Minister said politics are an integral part of combating terrorism and warned that listing Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and including Syria on the list of 14 countries for enhanced screening by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) created a "contradiction" when the U.S. subsequently requested cooperation with Syria against terrorism. Miqdad stressed a "political umbrella" of improved U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations should facilitate counterterrorism cooperation.

13. (S/NF) Third, Miqdad stated convincing the Syrian people to support cooperation with the U.S. would hinge on progress on economic sanctions against Syria, including spare parts for airplanes and a plane for President Asad. The Vice Foreign Minister said the Syrians wanted these efforts "accelerated." Miqdad specifically requested the USG reach out to Lufthansa Technik and "assure them of no negative consequences" if they cooperate with Syrian requests to have the purchase of spare aircraft parts approved. In response, Benjamin said the Obama administration viewed counterterrorism as a vital concern but, unlike its predecessor, it did not see counterterrorism as something that was separate from the rest of U.S. foreign policy or the sole driver of U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it was part of the fabric of policy, and the administration recognized that progress in bilateral relations would involve coordinated moves in a number of areas. Benjamin added the U.S. expected that the Syrian people would see the benefits of closer relations.

14. (S/NF) Miqdad also encouraged the U.S. to reconsider including Syria on the TSA's list for enhanced screening, and praised U/S Burns for informing the SARG that the U.S. was prepared to lift its block on Syrian accession to the World Trade Organization. "In summary, President Asad wants cooperation, we should take the lead on that cooperation, and don't put us on your lists," Miqdad declared. DHS BRIEFING

15. (S/NF) Benjamin and Heyman underscored that the TSA's enhanced screening requirements protected travelers of all nationalities, and that the TSA does not target Syrians but applies to all travelers, including American citizens, coming to the U.S. from or through the listed countries.

16. (S/NF) A/S Heyman provided the Syrians with a brief overview of DHS's mission and activities, focusing in particular on its expertise in the management of ports, airports, and land borders. He noted DHS could explore with the SARG ways to meet international security standards at ports. This, in turn, could lead to enhanced trade and travel between the two countries, and reduce obstacles to shipping between the U.S. and Syria. Heyman said the Coast Guard was prepared to send a team to Syria to work on port security with their Syrian counterparts. This type of activity could lead to measures that reduced costs and lowered barriers to shipping. General Mamlouk said the SARG would study the proposed Coast Guard visit. UPCOMING VISITS

17. (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of continued U.S.-Syrian dialogue on bilateral issues, Benjamin proposed a mid-March visit to Damascus by NEA A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Daniel Shapiro. Benjamin invited Miqdad to a subsequent visit to Washington in April. Miqdad spoke at length about his fondness for A/S Feltman, and thanked Benjamin for the invitation to visit Washington. Benjamin added he was ready to return to Damascus at the appropriate time. Mamlouk asked Benjamin what the agenda of his next visit would be, and Benjamin explained that it would depend on the outcome of the upcoming visits.

18. © U.S. participants: S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin CDA Charles Hunter DHS A/S David Heyman NEA DAS Maura Connelly NSC Director for Lebanon and Syria Meaghen McDermott S/CT Staff Patrick Worman POL/ECON Jay Munir, notetaker

19. © Syrian participants: Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad GID Director General Ali Mamlouk Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha MFA Americas' Director Muhammad Khafif Miqdad Chief of Staff Husam Al'aa 20. (U) S/CT Benjamin cleared this message. HUNTER