US/UK state brainwashing/torture/murder

[Michael Barwell]

Couple of passages taken from books Cruel Britannia & New Spymasters, that form something of a narrative. Bit of uncouth but necessarily expressive language, might edit that out later, everything takes so long at 1hr/day and occaisionally I'm in a shitty & I find it healthy to say so.

The New Spymasters, Pt2, New Spies; 'Thunderbolt' (long-established refs: Cyprus; Andreus/ Andrew [Antonides]; ant; Stanley, 'Holloway' [Hollowday]; Liverpool; heroin)
....Snitch, snout, tout, informer, grass, sneak, stool pigeon, double-crosser, canary, nark, rat, squealer, turncoat, weasel: criminals use many words to describe those who betray them. The British police came to prefer civil service jargon. In their world, a spy was called a covert human intelligence source or CHIS. I've had some of those as refs, as often as not, with a pulse of pain to the right side of my head. I get alot of 'liar' too, usually by a neuralgic pain; what do they want? What are they on about? Why should they give the tiniest shit about referencing 'liar'? [neuralgic to centre-right side of my head there] Idk, >tuts<. They make it up as they go along. I've not assimilated their sexed-up bullshit, perhaps that's it. It's not like they need me to play ball to ref to me "7" a thousand times and more (I think this is the licence to kill).
Law enforcement - whether police or national agencies such as the customs or National Crime Agency - has always had its own sorts of spies. As the saying goes, there is no honour among thieves, and as criminal organizations struggle to control a larger share of territory and illicit earnings, tipping off the cops has always been part of the game. But those called informers by the police were usually a different breed of people from those defined as secret agents or spies by secret services. Some of the difference was in the language. Policemen and spymasters used different terms. In 'spy-speak' , an informer was often a mere tipster, someone who sold titbits of information, as opposed to an agent, whose activities were more closely directed. A former senior French counterintelligence officer put it like this: 'In our work an agent is at a much higher level than an informant. An informant gives you local information and points out targets. Then you can send in an agent and he'll make contacts and work his way up.' But in other secret services, the terms were not so tightly defined. One former head of CIA covert operations said that 'source', 'informer' and 'agent' were used interchangeably. Some were just more reliable and more under control than others.

A bigger difference was that while the police in most countries both needed and had the legal authorify to pay acrive criminals to be their sources, most secret services were barred or, as a matter of good practice, simply shunned contact with criminals. Working with criminals was seen as too risky because they were deemed unreliable and likely to reveal secrets. Such work could bring the agencies into disrepute or, when their agents got into trouble, draw them into revealing their hand in a courtroom.

As part of its covert attempts to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro, the CIA made contact with several members of the US Mafia. This revelation dogged the agency for years, illustrating the cost of such relationships. In all, then, police informers were usually a different breed from the people recruited by secret services as agents.

As the twenty-first century approached, however, some of these distinctions were challenged as the lines between policeman and intelligence officer started to be blurred. One impetus was the growing political power of gangsters. Several leaders of organized crime had reached such powerful and influential positions in their countries that it became of stategic value to infiltate their circles. One example is Russia, where in the 1990s barely disguised mobsters became billionaires and began to wield huge influence in the Kremlin.

But the biggest driver of this blurring of the lines came in domestic politics with a push to use intelligence tactics to reduce crime on the streets of America and Europe. It was a two-pronged assault: the secret services were redirected towards crime fighting, and law enforcement tried to emulate them.

The collapse of the Iron Curtain and international agreements to liberalize trade helped to free up the movement of people and goods across borders and, as a by-product, also let well-organized criminals like drug smugglers roam freely and establish allies or branches of their gangs in other countries. And drug addiction - fuelled by this illegal international drugs trade was commonly held to be behind most burglaries and robberies in the US and Britain. These patterns led influential people in law enforcement to argue that effective action against crime in local communities meant taking the battle to the ringleaders of the trade. Raymond Kendall, secretary-general of the international police agency Interpol, urged 'using intelligence to crack the criminal at source'. Hence blanket saturation surveillance, they've lost their way and want to be able to 'hit' anyone; the system employs psychopaths, and the systems gone rogue - they're brainwash-torture-murdering ordinary people, to justifiy their
existence, a total attack by a military organisation, on a no-one, on the basis of convenience and deliberate fabrications, to test their toys and techniques, because they can.

Kendall and others argued that the tried-and-tested methods of solving crimes were failing to catch the most serious offenders, particularly those who operated across borders, as well as gangsters at the top of large criminal empires who let their henchmen do their dirty work. The solution was to use more aggressive methods: proactively targeting criminals by tapping their telephones, bugging their cars and homes, putting them under surveillance, recruiting spies within their gangs and networks, and introducing undercover operatives to collect evidence and mount sting operations. They make it up as they go along, then paint their picture and throw a person at it, and it becomes the narrative, and it's a pile of shit; they know it, and I'm not supposed to know how they've done it - the grasping, lying, frauds, and so they constantly refer to 'law' & 'police' & 'justice', because they're superdooperheroesssss. Business must be slow, or the firm's strategically over-extended. I have to be far-right, fascist, racist,
mysoginistic, criminally-minded, "revolutionary". Except that I'm not, so I've
had 4yrs of them telling me that's what I am, because I'm supposed then, to
assimilate those things into my identity with the Pavlovian pain and torture-inducements to help-along the pro-cess. Knobheads. Just before this bullshit started, I'd 'phoned the cops about some lads nicking shit from a building site (leaving no name - I'm no hero-complexer), 'phoned an ambulance for a lass, collapsed, late at night (alcohol probably), 'phoned about a Turko-Kurd, threatening a lass, and another call about a verbally violent domestic and 'phoned the gas board about a chronic street gas smell - all in the last 10yrs. Things like this helps to make me a "criminal" - n'est fucking pas? 'cept I don't drop litter.

Law enforcement called these tactics 'intelligence-led policing' and both police and customs units created new departments devoted to intelligence collection and covert operations. But such theories were also sweet music to agencies like SIS, MI5 and the CIA: assisting the police or customs by taking on an anti-criminal caseload was a way of staying in business in the absence of the Soviet threat. When talking ro the press and lobbying politicians, intelligence officers floated the theory that spying on gangland might be at the heart of a new form of espionage. 'No enemy - no KGB'. There's no glory in torture-murdering a 'just this guy', so that's not what the picture they paint says; it's a picture of Super-/Spider-/Bat- man saving the universe. Frauds.

Getting involved in crime fighting meant, for example. MI5 sharing some of the technology they had developed against the Russians: helping to install covert bugs to listen in on a drug dealer's conversations, electronic surveillance to watch his every move or computer analysis to mapout his network of contacts. It meant SIS (which established an 'organized crime operations group') offering techniques of 'disruption', covert actions like emptying a criminal's foreign bank account or liaising with foreign agencies to raid drug factories. Always getting 'bank' this, an'
'bank' that. Tools - fat an' intoxicated. I'm pretty sure that the apex of technology is being used en masse & for effect here. Crazy, man. Fucking nutters.
The new role for SIS required a change in the law, which took place in 1994. Its role was now defined as being not only to protect national security and the economy but also to act 'in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime'. Within two years, other legislation was
amended to give MI5 the same tasks. There is no law. Last night 13July'15, No.18 ref'ed to "It's a sport anyone can get involved in" (ref source is rarely relevant, and I've forgotten); I wrote in my log "as in, if the SS co-ordinates the shite, then everyone can shit like a goose-stepping simian". Today(Mon13July), at a bookshop, a fella, chatting to
the owner about the SS (MI5 - MAE 'click' there), and the same fella chatting to a librarian I know when I get there. I'd've maybe liked a chat, but he legged-it.
Hint of a maniacal grin. I should probably give a shit, but they're so totally full of it, and they behave like... words fail me... absolute shits, & because it amuses them to do so, and they can get away with it. Think of 'Britain'; these people work at dragging everything you think you know thru' the mud, and more. Absolute scum.
There were some fundamental cultural clashes that took years to resolve. Intelligence officers, for instance, had little experience of the process of bringing their targets to justice in a courtoom. 'They couldn't really get their heads round it. I had to explain our world, working towards
evidence and court cases,' said one former customs officer. As for M15, 'They were terrified of courts. They didn't altogether understand why you had to finish up before a judge.' And then, along came the ability to manipulate peoples minds, and they became so intoxicated, that they lost their minds.
In the years ahead, MI5 surveillance officers became accustomed to appearing in court to give evidence. But a more delicate problem for the new crime fighters was how or if to deploy secret agents in the criminal underworld. While it was obvious that a spy inside an organized crime
group could be invaluable, recruiting or deploying such agents meant dealing with thorny questions that secret services had rarely had to think about before, such as how a court would react to the presence of a government-employed agent inside a gang. Would they have to disclose the presence of that agent to lawyers defending a criminal? Or would the agent be considered a provocateur that had instigated the crime? These questions were just as challenging for the police and customs, as they too began to make more use of human intelligence. The increased use of intelligence methods in law enforcement came at a time when, in Western
legal systems, judges in criminal cases were requiring prosecutors to disclose more details of any undercover work used during an investigation to lawyers for a criminal defendant. This would require careful handling.
In the past, secret services like SIS and the CIA had shied away from recruiting criminals. They were dangerous, unreliable and their mindset was just too different. As they pitched to get involved in crime fighting, intelligence officers tried to think laterally. They suggested hiring people
on the edge of gangs who might be more reliable and who could avoid participating in the crimes, such as the girlfriends of gangsters, or rheir accountants, or shopkeepers who sold them mobile phones. Another option for police and law enforcement was to expand their army of professional
undercover operatives -policemen or customs officers who lived under an assumed identity, organized sting operations and could then testify against criminals in court. Peripheral agents and undercover operatives were tried out, but, as when confronting any serious adversary, sometimes only a real insider, a trusted member of the gang who was privy to secrets, would really do as an agent. As both intelligence agencies and law enforcement sought to expand their ways of gathering human intelligence, they needed to ask whether it was possible to handle spies
among criminals when the danger was the operation could backfire, particularly in a courtroom. But while working with criminals might be unpalatable for most intelligence officers, they had to work with the intelligence targets they were given by governments. As non-state groups,
whether crime gangs or terrorists, began to be designated the new threat and the new main target, would men like Keravnos turn out to be the spies they needed?
To rely on such men was to enter a violent and chaotic world. Andrew Antoniades might be unknown in the wider world, but under his nickname Keravnos in his native Cyprus he is both legendary and unforgiven by many. The only thing that seems to divide some old comrades is
whether or not he had always planned to betray them. Some even wonder if, should he return, it is not too late to kill him in revenge. Antoniades was born in Foini (also spelled Phini), a village about fifteen miles north-west of Limassol, one of six children. His father died when he was five years old and he left school early to become an apprentice tailor. By all accounts, he was the classic tearaway, often in trouble with the police. His greatest love was motorbikes. One day he was arrested by police after climbing down the chimney to burgle a house. One of the police officers asked him to fix his bike, but after he had done so Antoniades jumped on it and roared off, crashing through the gate. The policeman said he sped away 'like black lightning' which is how he earned the name... Loads of refs to this fella; a mix of 'their' reading matter, but
also, I'm pretty sure that 'the programme' when it hits, it'll take what it can get; the idea that I've been psychologically attacked and brainwashed for purpose of actually turning me into a double-agent, seems abso-fucking-lutley nuttso, but I think they'll take what they can get - if the victim/target can be moulded in such a way - they'll take it, for whatever purpose. This is the only reason I think for the "Insolent" message, as all these cases are apparently run by 'agent handlers', a piss-take in itself. I was perhaps not amenable to this fucking shit, perhaps hence the odd & paraphrased "Respect" - as in to me, so they went for the kill to keep it tidy - I knew from the off that it was science, and not their fucking "gods". How weak the powerful.
　
Cruel Britannia, Ch7, 'Standing Shoulder to Shoulder on the Dark Side', p.207-211
That night, Cofer Black locked himself away at his office at Langley and within five days had drawn up plans for the CIA's response. It would entail a vast expansion of the rendition
programme. Hundreds of al-Qaida suspects would be tracked down and abducted from their homes and hiding places in eighty different countries. The agency would decide who was
to be killed and who was to be kept alive in a network of secret prisons, outside the US, where they would be systematically tormented until every one of their secrets had been delivered
up. The United States had been blindsided by al-Qaida on 9/11 and that situation would not be permitted to occur a second time.
Black's plan was presented to the President and his war cabinet in a series of meetings during the days after the attacks. On Monday 17 September, Bush signed off the paperwork:with a stroke of his pen the CIA was granted the power of life and death over al-Qaida suspects and could arrange for men to be detained and tortured indefinitely. All this, Bush later said, was to remain invisible.
A few hours afterwards there was a brief glimpse of the manner in which the United States would disregard the restraints of international law when responding to the attacks. Speaking at a
press conference, Bush said: 'There's an old poster out West that says, "'Wanted: Dead or Alive."'The President then checked himself before saying that those responsible for the murderous attacks should be brought to justice.
Cofer Black's master plan had already been presented to the CIA's closest overseas allies. The evening before Bush signed off, Black and a handful of other senior CIA oflicers went to the
British embassy on Washington's Massachusetts Avenue, where they told senior British intelligence officers what was about to happen.
At the end of Black's three-hour presentation, his opposite number at MI6, Mark Allen, commented drily that it all sounded 'rather blood-curdling'.Allen also expressed concern that once
the Americans had 'hammered the mercury in Afghanistan', al-Qaida would simply scatter across South Asia and the Middle East, destabilising entire regions. Black was dressed in the same suit he had been wearing five days earlier and was clearly exhausted, but he appeared to relish the vicious retaliation he had planned. He told Allen that all the CIA cared about at that moment was killing terrorists. One of the CIA officers at the meeting, Tyler Drumheller, could see that while the British appeared laid-back, 'it was clear they were worried, and not without reason'. According to one account, even Black joked that one day they might all be prosecuted.8 (Mayer, The Dark Side, p41) But the CIA's closest ally had been put on notice: the British could never honestly
claim that they did not know what was about to unfold. Much like Himmlers speechifying to the generals at Sonthofen on May 24, 1944, where mutual responsibility was declared, for the Holocaust (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posen_speeches).
Shortly afterwards Allen departed for London, where Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw were waiting to be briefed on the Americans' plans.
At the end of September 2001, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1373, which required member states to do more to assist the US and each other in eliminating
international terrorism and called for a series of measures 'in conformiry with the relevant provisions of national and international law'.
The need to maintain a lawful response to the horrors of the al-Qaida attacks was stressed again and again throughout the resolution, but it was already too late. By then, Dick Cheney had said publicly that the United States was going to 'work through sort of the dark side' and that 'it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective'. And they've gone completely batshit, shifting military technology & techniques well into the area of domestic civil law, instigating programmes to drive people insane & torture-murdering people who've done nothing at all - completely rogue. As they say to me, "We're worse than ISIL". In the old days of the torture-murder campaign against me, they were quick to say that it wasn't 'personal'; now, they're adopting my observations & insults for them, and they're assuming the identities of the SS, Nazi's, murderers, much else besides and constantly threatening violence & injury - & now it's "personal".
On 2 October, members of NATO met at the organisation's headquarters at Brussels and agreed that they should invoke Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, under which an attack on one member is to be regarded as an attack on all.At a second meeting two days later, the US representatives presented a number of specific requests, all of which were granted in a series
of agreement documents that the US had itself drafted. Eight of those requests have since been made public. They included enhanced intelligence sharing, taking 'necessary measures to
increase security' and granting blanket over-flight clearances for the United States and other allies' aircraft for military flights engaged in counterterrorism operations. However, NATO has
since admitted that a number of other requests were granted; all of them remain secret.9 ('Alleged Secret Detentions & Unlawful Inter-state Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States', 2nd report of Senator Dick Marty). For what it's worth - not much as it's nigh-on the arse-end of the V-manner ladder giving the refs, but I've had absolutley masses of refs to the US & Obama in all forms.
By now, the US had a broad agreement from its key allies that it would conduct its 'war on terror' in line with Cofer Black's secret plan. What this would involve was spelled out in further
detail at a subsequent meeting of the heads of the intelligence agencies of the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. These men and women gather once every year to discuss signals
intelligence-sharing arrangements, and after 9/11 it was New Zealand's turn to play host.The venue was a house on the edge of the small South Island resort town of Queenstown.
The threat posed by al-Qaida, Tenet is said to have told the gathered spy chiefs,'is a challenge which redefines the way we work, the way we think, the way we act'.The CIA would accept
no restraints and would in future work with the intelligence agencies of any nation.'-Without them, and their help, we have no fucking global effort,' the head of the CIA is said to have
declared.'We'd be walking through the Arab world wide open and half blind.'As far as the CIA was concerned, he said, 'the shackles, my friends, have been taken off' [neuralgic when reading this - the slobbering apes]. And the CIA must not be alone in working closely with the intelligence agencies of the Arab world: ''We must work as one."
Cofer Black used similar terms during a subsequent Congressional inquiry into the 9/11 attacks when asked about the degree of freedom given to the CIA. 'All I want to say is that there was "before" 9/11 and "after" 9/11 he said-'After 9/11 the gloves come off.'
By November 2001, with the supercharged rendition programme about to go live, Bush issued a barely concealed threat to those allies who failed to offer anything less than full cooperation.At a press conference before a White House dinner with President Chirac of France, Bush said:'A coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy. A coalition partner must perform. It's going to be important for nations to know' they will be held accountable for inactivity. Either you're with us or you're against us in the fight against terror.' Chirac offered the view that it was Resolution 1373 that set out the obligations of member states. Bush, clearly unimpressed,
decided the press conference was over. 'The soups getting cold,' he said. If I had a penny for every ref to Gitmo and/or caves & holes in the ground, not to forget the recent cliff-edges...
New Spymasters, 'Faith in the Machine', p209-210
And all this scientific espionage was also bewitching. Cool gadgets and smart techniques inspired awe and a confidence that was comparable to religious zeal. lt defied good sense....
Obscure and remote as it was, the assassination of Zabet Amanullah in September 2010 caused a shock. This is the fella who was killed in the airstrike on the election campaign convoy.
He was widely known back in the Afghan capital, Kabul, including by some influential and well-connected people. It was their anger abour his killing that motivated their efforts to discover how he was targeted. Their investigation has provided a unique window into the twenty-first-century intelligence machine....
What [Michael] Semple noticed was just how often those in the secret services convinced themselves of false notions. And just such wrong-headed thinking had led to Amanullah's killing. Semple had known the man for years and would not accept that he had been a secret Taliban commander. Even years before, when the Taliban ruled the country, Semple remembered
that Amanullah had helped research the regime's human rights abuses. And then, after the US invaded and the Taliban was toppled, the pair stayed in touch. Semple remembered introducing him to a delegation of British Members of Parliament in Peshawar one week in 2003....
Senior US officials involved remained adamant. According to one:
We are very very confident that Mohamed Amin the individual who was targeted in that strike was an insurgent leader, a member of shadow government in Takhar, and actively involved in insurgent activities. We are very confident that the name Zabet Amanullah was an alias for the individual we know as Mohamed Amin. The individual we targeted used the alias Zabet Amanullah.
Petraeus responded, 'Well, we didn't think, in this case, with respect, we knew. We had days and days of what's called "The Unblinking Eye", confirmed by other forms of intelligence that informed us that there is no question about who this individual was.' But how was it that the man who was killed was living openly in Kabul and Afghan government officials said he was innocent? What had convinced him? 'Very precise intelligence that tells us exactly what he was doing when he was in Kabul, and exactly what he was doing up there. So again, there is not a question about this one, with respect.'
The truth, as all outsiders who investigated found, was different. It showed that US intelligence was not only questionable but - with respect - completely wrong. It revealed the Ant, Zabet Arnanullah, as the Taliban double agent who wasn't.
"I'd rather die than do this to an innocent person", so spewed a hound of shite to me, whilst patting hisself on the back for a crime well commited, as he accepted the plaudits and raised his glass to the legions of psychopaths who wouldn't give a shit either way, only a couple of months ago, around the time of my "Falsifying Precrime" blogpost. And they know it full well.