The Wheaton Lead: An Exploration by Larry Hancock and David Boylan

[Peter Lemkin]

Hecksher had previously served with the CIA in Berlin, Guatemala, Laos, and Tokyo as well as on the Cuba projects - including special missions to Mexico City in 1962. Hecksher's second in command was Carl Jenkins. Jenkins had prior service across SE Asia including Laos and Indonesia, as well as in training the initial Cuba project Cubans in Panama along with Glen "Rocky" Farnsworth, who was involved with running pre-invasion maritime missions into Cuba out of CIA bases in the Florida Keys. Although it is not possible to be specific on their assignments, at least one of those individuals appears likely to have been associated with a new element of the AMWORLD project, a renewed effort to assassinate Fidel Castro (AMTHUG).

9/3/64 JMWAVE Report on Activities of AMWORLD.

Given that the Artime project was to be exceptionally deniable and highly autonomous, associates of Artime and the Cuban exile project personnel became directly involved in field activities without direct CIA officer supervision or involvement - to an extent never seen in previous CIA projects. Working under the umbrella of Desmond Fitzgerald's new Special Affairs Staff, Hecksher and Jenkins and a very small CIA staff provided AMWORLD support including the provision of false identities and travel paperwork (required to covertly exfiltrate them outside the United States) as well as business and employment covers. At this point only two other CIA officers are known to have been involved in the early months of AMWORLD operations; they will be identified and discussed later in this research paper.

Among the first of the Cuban exiles to join the AMWORLD project were Segundo Borges - serving as Artime's primary recruiter - and Felix Rodriquez, personally recruited for AMWORLD by Artime and Borges. However, Artime quickly brought in a number of individuals with whom he had worked in the anti-Castro resistance inside Cuba. Those men had been among the very first to volunteer for the CIA's original anti-Castro effort and had participated in a number of Cuban infiltration missions.

It is significant that prior participation in independent and unsanctioned maritime missions against Cuba or in illegal activities involving violations of U.S. federal statutes did not prevent individuals from being taken into Artime's operation. In fact, several individuals being investigated by the FBI as of August, 1963 were taken into the AMWORLD project during the next three months. That represented a dramatic break with prior exile activities sponsored by the CIA, where all personnel were security screened prior to any assignments.

Carlos 'Batea' Hernandez Sanchez

One of the earliest 1963 AMWORLD recruits was Carlos "Batea" Hernandez Sanchez (Cuban Brigade trainee 2523). Carlos was personally close to Artime, having been a member of Artime's "Commandos Rurales" in Cuba, along with Nestor Izquierdo and Rafael Quintero. Hernandez was a black belt in judo and a sharpshooter. It was his expertise in judo and his friendship with Artime that had led Artime to request Hernandez as his personal bodyguard while traveling in Latin America early in 1960. Carlos had also been one of the first volunteers for the CIA's Cuba project - receiving training as part of a small number of exiles to be inserted into Cuba. Their mission would be to join on-island resistance groups, stimulating guerrilla activities and triggering a counter-revolution against the Castro regime.

Carlos Hernandez began his CIA paramilitary training under Carl Jenkins at the CIA's Panama camp (JMRYE). Training included infantry combat, guerrilla operations, and sabotage as well as radio communications. Following training in Panama, Hernandez was moved into an advanced group, ultimately receiving special training in the use of explosives and infiltration skills, at a CIA camp operated outside Belle Chasse, Louisiana (JMMOVE). [ xvi ] A number of the earliest Cuban exile volunteers went through Panama training and moved on to Belle Chase - that list includes Nestor Izquierdo, Carlos Hernandez, Victor Espinosa Hernandez, Jorge Giraud, and Frank Bernardino. Those individuals were then "sheep dipped" as malcontents and officially taken out of the program - instead they were actually moved into safe houses and then into Cuba infiltration missions (AMHINT, AMHAZE, etc.) managed out of the CIA's base in the Florida Keys (JMFIG). [ xvii ]

11/10/62 CIA Memo on termination of Victor Espinosa Hernandez.

4/2/61 CIA memo list of exile trainees from JMMOVE. Some will be raiders some infiltration.

3/20/61 Infiltration team isolated site at Ramrod Key. Carlos Hernandez, Jorge Giraud, Manuel Rodriguez Treto. Hand picked team by Jorge Sotus.

3/27/61 GOC planning to intercept Operation Marcos. Also special alert Operation Yeast area.

12/15/61 Operation Pepe with Rafael Quintero and John Koch.

While many of these maritime missions remain to be explored, we do know details of one involving an AMHAZE team, a team involving Carlos Hernandez and designated as Operation Yeast. That mission was to launch from Ramrod Key with the assistance of the MDC and connect with DRE resistance elements and stimulate an uprising in Cuba's Oriente Province. Another of its team members, Luis Sierra, would also join AMWORLD, becoming chief of its commandos. As with several of the missions associated with stimulating on-island resistance to Castro, Operation Yeast apparently aborted due to Castro military forces in the intended landing area. Other operations (PEPE, PATRICIO and GORDO) sent in teams including Carlos Hernandez and Jorge Giraud (AMHAZE-2524) to contact and coordinate with DRE resistance groups - all those missions aborted, reportedly compromised by Cuban counter intelligence.

The Cuban exiles involved with these teams and missions remained fervent anti-Castro activists, several participated in further JMWAVE maritime missions through 1962 and even following the Cuban missile crisis. However, with the public agreement between the Kennedy Administration and the Soviets, the number and aggressiveness of those maritime missions significantly decreased as the months went on in 1963. By the summer many of the early volunteers were separated from ongoing JMWAVE activity.

Some who were also DRE and AMHAZE members were placed on a retainer and held as an inactive DRE military reserve. DRE itself had been receiving CIA payments since prior to the Bay of Pigs although its primary role was supposed to be propaganda and political action. However, the DRE members were generally young, notoriously hard to control and eager to go into combat against Castro. After his release from post-Bay of Pigs JMWAVE maritime missions, Carlos Hernandez became a very active DRE member, part of its military leadership and a trainer for DRE infiltration teams. He was a participant in a dramatic and internationally publicized DRE boat raid on Havana in August, 1962.

Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) by Jeff Morley.

By the summer of 1963 DRE activists such as Carlos Hernandez and John Koch Gene (whose brother had died at the Bay of Pigs landings) had been out of JMWAVE maritime operations for months.

9/12/62 POA on John Kock Gene by William Harvey TFW.

Clearly frustrated by inaction, and part of an organization that was continually seeing its request for combat operations rejected by the CIA, several of the DRE members began to initiate their own projects - attempting to buy weapons, to set up an offshore base of their own and as private funding allowed, participating in plans for their own strikes against Cuba.

8/14/63 FBI Report Bombing Raid. Mclaney, Hernandez, Espinosa, Pedroso.



Coming Together in 1963



Sep. 1963 FBI airtel from New Orleans
regarding seizure of explosives

DRE (AMSPELL) affiliations and their common training and operational experiences brought several of these men back together in July and August of 1963, first in a plan to launch bombing attacks from Florida and then in a more ambitious plan to actually assemble a large quantity of bombs and stage a two-plane bombing raid on Cuba. Surplus bomb cases were purchased, dynamite was bought from a source in Illinois and it was all carried to a rural area outside New Orleans (LaCombe Louisiana) for assembly. When the bombs were ready, the B-26's were to fly in (reportedly from the Houston Texas area), stop only briefly for weapons loading, and be on their way.

The Cuban exiles participating in both these summer, 1963 projects were Student Directorate (DRE) members, and the financing for their efforts reportedly came from former Havana casino figures, primarily from Mike McClaney, via Sam Benton. The FBI conducted an extensive investigation of the bombing efforts (the FBI summary report runs to 112 pages) but in the end no charges or other legal actions were taken against any of those involved. The effort had been quite serious, involving a massive amount of material, some 48 cartons of dynamite alone plus other bomb making materials. Enough so that after the FBI raid confiscated them the materials had to be housed in a military storage depot for explosives.

9/27/63 FBI report on Lake Pontchartrain raid.

The dynamite intended for the bombs had been obtained from a long time explosives and weapons dealer in Illinois, (Richard Lauchli) with a history of selling to Cuban exile groups including the DRE.

Explosives and other materials for the abortive bombing project had been obtained in Illinois, where DRE members had been traveling in the summer and fall of 1963, seeking weapons for new military activities. By that point in time the Kennedy Admiration was opposing any of their military missions and supporting them only in public relations and propaganda activities.

Bay of Pigs pilot Antonio Soto

Several of the names in the LaCombe project are familiar from Cuban maritime operations and the special group requested by Manuel Artime for his Cuba Project commando operations. They include Carlos Hernandez, Victor Espinosa Hernandez and John Koch Gene (AMHINT-26) as well as Frank Bernardino and Antonio Soto. Both Soto and Herrera had flown Brigade 2506 aircraft in support of the Bay of Pigs landings. At the time of the project, Soto was on leave following a six-month tour of duty in the CIA-organized Makasi air group operating in the Congo. He would return for a second tour at the end of November, 1963.

John Koch Gene, Carlos Hernandez and Victor Espinosa Hernandez had met with Mike McClaney as part of the bombing project and McClaney was identified by the FBI as the source of funding for what was essentially a DRE rogue mission. Details of the LaCombe project and the FBI's investigation are included as Appendix C in this paper.

What the Miami and LaCombe plans illustrate is that several of the more activist, independent exiles had begun coming together as the CIA's JMWAVE missions slacked off in 1963 and as the Kennedy Administration began to push the FBI and even the CIA to begin interdicting any missions against Cuba from the continental United States. There was a growing sense of frustration and even hostility within much of the Cuban exile community. During April, 1963 the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council resigned, with harsh words for the Kennedy Administration, claiming that JFK had promised the exiles another invasion but had instead settled on a course of peaceful coexistence with Fidel Castro.

HSCA Report, Volume X, p.58.

Beginning in the spring of 1963, FBI activities in Miami, Chicago, New Orleans and Dallas escalated, with surveillance on exile groups and camps as well as stings intended to abort attempts at purchases of explosives and weapons. During the course of the year, efforts to form new independent exile movements inside the United States launched and then floundered by the end of the year. The DRE had received some level of funding and support from the CIA with its leaders and a small military group on retainer; it had even received some amount of weapons and ammunition and encouraged to perform military training. But following the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, DRE members had become harshly critical of the CIA, blaming the U.S. for deserting them and even offering threats against CIA personal.

HSCA Report, Volume X on DRE.

The CIA found itself increasingly unable to control DRE's independent military activities and by the end of 1962 DRE had become aware that the U. S. was pressuring the Dominican Republic to shut down the group's missions launched from that country. Internal CIA reports described the DRE as being the most bitter of all exile groups towards JFK and his policies, and in April the DRE officially advised the CIA that it "could no longer operate under the restrictions of U.S. policy". The DRE's own leaders had become quite public in proclaiming that the United States had deserted them and that they would need to fight own entirely at their own, harshly criticizing the betrayal of the Kennedy Administration.

FBI 105-82555 Oswald HQ File, Additional Releases, Part 3 of 3.

Such harsh words about JFK, perhaps more strongly expressed, were repeated in Dallas. A visiting DRE member from Dallas spoke so harshly about the Kennedys - remarking that "they" would take care of Kennedy one way or the other when came to Dallas - that when he realized he was being taped he literally threatened the individual (stating that he held a black belt) with the tape in order to retrieve it.

Harold Weisberg interview of Robert and Trudy Castorr.

Later, following the attack on President Kennedy in Dallas, his recollections of the climate and remarks being passed within the DRE led one CIA officer who had worked on the Cuba Project in Miami - and who was familiar with a number if the DRE members - to formally suggest that the DRE should be investigated in regard to the President's assassination.

3/8/67 FBI Report on possible DRE animus towards President Kennedy.

2/28/68 CIA Memo - Garrison Investigation of Kennedy Assassination.

By mid-1963 the DRE was increasingly involved in soliciting private funding from virtually anyone, in weapons purchasing efforts and in attempts to organize its only independent military activities. The organization would continue to request CIA support for its military operations, but by October it was receiving increasingly negative responses and ultimately it would be made very clear that DRE's military activities would not be tolerated.

12/4/63 JMWAVE Cable AMWORLD DRE/AMSPELL.



1967 CIA memo discussing DRE animus toward JFK
and DRE contact with Oswald

The lack of any ongoing DRE military operations, along with the dramatic cut in JMWAVE maritime operations against Cuba, left many of the most experienced Cuban covert operations personnel with literally no options to continue their struggle against the Castro regime. It was at this point in time we find DRE members such as Victor Espinosa Hernandez, Carlos Hernandez and John Koch Gene reaching out to their former maritime action associates to involve them in projects such as the LaCombe air mission.

However even before the FBI investigation of that effort had been completed, while several of the individuals involved were still under investigation, a brand new opportunity opened up for them and we find several of the other names with which we have now become familiar being recruited into a brand new CIA project - AMWORLD. The group that came together in AMWORLD, under Artime and Quintero, was first recruited inside the U.S. beginning in the summer of 1963. We know that it included DRE members involved in the LaCombe project including Carlos Hernandez, John Koch Gene (AMHINT-26), Antonio Soto and Gonzolo Herrera. Other recruits included Felix Rodriquez, Nestor Izquierdo, Jorge Giraud, Luis Sierra and Antonio Iglesias Pons. Quintero and Iglesias Pons would eventually become the individuals responsible for the AMWORLD camps.

FBI File on Antonio Iglesias Pons.

The exact locations and movements of the personnel recruited into AMWORLD in the fall of 1963 remain hazy; we do know there were funds made available for activities inside the United States such as lodging, travel and even the purchase of supplies and weapons. We also know that some training was conducted; as an example Felix Rodriquez reportedly trained 30 people on communications equipment and practices. Other documents suggest that some personnel may have undergone training at Camp Stanley, outside San Antonio Texas. Camp Stanley (referred to as the "Midwest Depot") served as a secret storage depot for CIA weapons, explosives and other equipment from the time of the Cuba project, through AMWORLD and into the 1970s, supplying material for CIA covert operations in Angola and later in support of the Contra-era activities in Nicaragua.

5/5/14 MySA article on Top Secret CIA Weapons Facility.

5/6/14 Daily Mail report on Camp Stanley.

During the Cuba Project Camp Stanley conducted some local training (apparently on communications equipment) and also supplied materials used to support the training which was conducted at Belle Chase - when that training concluded the materials were returned to the "Midwest Depot".

10/26/67 CIA Memo on Belle Chasse Training Camp.

There is documentation suggesting that AMWORLD may have sourced explosives from Camp Stanley. Given the indications of covert military training at the base, it is certainly possible that some of the personnel receiving advanced training for Cuban operations or for AMWORLD did spend time at Camp Stanley. That seems especially interesting given that one of the few details that Gene Wheaton related was that he had heard that some of the individuals involved in the Dallas attack had trained in Texas.

11/13/63 CIA Memo on availability of C-4 and C-3.

One of the AMWORLD project's most distinctive aspects was that unlike earlier CIA operations only a handful of CIA staff were involved. Two of the only officers involved at all in its field operations became so concerned by its management and security that they offered to be removed from the assignment. Key Cuban volunteer personnel were allowed to rotate from camps offshore back to Miami and gossip and rumors about AMWORLD were rife. In the end the general knowledge about AMWORLD within select portions of the Cuban community became comparable to that which had preceded the landing of the Cuban Expeditionary Force at the Bay of Pigs.

Off the Grid

Recruits at Camp Guillot

We do know the names of a number of the AMWORLD recruits of August/September 1963, including several of those who would have been well known operationally to Jenkins, Quintero and Felix Rodriquez. Virtually all those individuals essentially went out of sight during the last quarter of the year.....including Rodriquez himself. The names - Carlos Hernandez, Nestor Izquierdo, John Koch Gene, Jorge Navarro - begin to reappear in the records only in January and February of 1964, in camps in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. It appears that recruits from the DRE were covertly exfiltrated "black" via an AKL ship called the Joanne and via a "chartered" DC-3. Most of them ended up in Costa Rica, either at Camp Guillot or at a camp near Puerto Viejo near the Panamanian border.

Documents from 1964 reveal several of the key leaders serving under Artime and Quintero. Sixto Mesa handled the group's finances while Quintero had overall charge of the camps as Deputy Chief. The number three man and the individual actually in the field, serving as the military leader running the camps, was Antonio Iglesias Pons. He had been a prisoner in Cuba, taken during the Bay of Pigs landings and was one of the first of the group to go outside the U.S., to Nicaragua in December, 1963. Later, friends would remark that Iglesias Pons had talked of knowing something about the conspiracy that killed JFK.

Segundo Borges, a veteran of the earliest CIA Castro assassination missions and lead recruiter for Artime in the AMWORLD project, became the operations commando team leader. Luis Sierra Lopez, who apparently received some form of early training in Texas, was also a commando team leader.

FBI Memo 8/4/75 on Antonio Iglesias Pons. He was associated with Artime in 1963-64.

8/10/63 CIA AMWORLD Memo Luis Sierra scheduled to go to Texas for language training.

Felix Rodriquez appears in the AMWORLD documents, but strangely (given his extensive covert operations experience) never in paramilitary activities - only in communications training and management. The first record of any actual AMWORLD operations appears to be the dispatch of a commando team - designated as Black Nine - to covertly depart the United States on a ship (the Joanne) which was being leased for equipment transport. The ship was sailing out of Baltimore and one hold had been converted to secretly house the team when the ship sailed. The team actually boarded the ship on November 27, remaining under cover on board. Due to apparent fitting and crew problems the ship did not actually sail until December 1, then had problems at sea. Apparently this activity was so sensitive that it was under overview by the CIA Director.

12/2/63 CIA Telecom. MV Joanne left Baltiomore 12/1/63 to Tortuguero to discharge the Black Nine Resistance team.

11/27/63 CIA Telecom. Two generators for Collins radios and silenced weapons will be delivered to MV Joanne.

2/2/63 CIA memo from Henry Hecksher. Artime (A-1) visited the Joanne crew and they are in good spirits.

In spite of the high priority for deniability and covert operations, during 1964 and 1965 the project maintained a relatively large office and staff in Miami, even allowing its field leaders like Iglesias to travel back and forth between its bases and Miami on a fairly routine basis. This led to a great number of leaks, compromised operational security and in the end totally frustrated CIA officers assigned to the project. More details in regard to the AMWORLD project are provided in Appendix B of this paper.

11/21/63 CIA memo regarding meeting at HQS. Lists AMWORLD personnel. Segundo Borges, chief of infiltration.

What seems missing in all the 1963/64 documentation on AMWORLD are the activities of what would seem to be its most experienced and operationally skilled members. While Carlos Hernandez, Nestor Izquierdo, John Koch Gene, and Jorge Navarro all appear to have gone to Nicaragua, they do not show up as military leaders in the project nor even in operations. It seems strange that individuals such as they, and Felix Rodriquez - selected for something as highly secret as a Castro assassination project, demonstrably skilled in both infiltration and exfiltration and trusted by the seasoned CIA paramilitary officers such as Rip Robertson - would go off the grid, and stay off the grid, out of any significant AMWORLD operations or activities.

One More Lead

Although it most definitely did not come from Gene Wheaton, there is one lead which appears to connect certain of the individuals associated with the AMWORLD project to inside knowledge of the Kennedy assassination. First uncovered by an English author/researcher decades ago, it has taken even more years to fully vet and potentially connect. Only now is it possible to speculate on that lead, which in itself might define the "circle" of individuals involved in the actual Dallas attack.

Wayne January operated an aircraft servicing and sales company at Red Bird airport in Dallas. [ xviii ] During 1963 he was involved with a small number of multi-engine transport aircraft which were being sold to a third party company associated with the Houston Air Center. January was responsible for servicing, checking and making any fixes required by the buyers who were accepting the aircraft. The last aircraft being sold was actually a WWII troop carrier which had been heavily modified, having all the seats removed and reconfigured as a cargo carrier.

Early in the week of November 22, 1963, two individuals arrived to take receipt of the last aircraft. One was an American, who left immediately and only returned that Friday. The second was Latino; he essentially accepted the aircraft, overseeing any corrective maintenance work which was required. The Cuban spent the week working alongside January.

While the aircraft was being accepted, the pilot/aircraft mechanic conducting the acceptance identified himself as a Cuban (he spoke English with no particular accent) who had previously flown similar aircraft in Cuba. He had joined the Cuban Expeditionary Force as a pilot and had flown at the Bay of Pigs (both B-26 fighter bombers and parachute troop transports were involved in support of the landings). The Cuban told January that he was familiar with the type of aircraft which was being accepted and had flown similar planes as an officer in the Cuban Air Force. Later he mentioned that the American who had arrived with him to take possession of the aircraft was a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. The American had departed Red Bird immediately after arrival and did not appear again until around mid-day on November 22.

The Cuban became comfortable after talking with January over several days, and was outspoken in relating that his friends had died during the Bay of Pigs landings - because JFK had not delivered the promised air cover for them. Talk of the President coming to Dallas apparently agitated the Cuban and he stated to January that JFK would be killed in revenge for his comrades' deaths. January felt the man to be quite sincere but that he was simply exaggerating. No more was said about the subject until the afternoon of November 22. January talked to the Cuban for a few moments after the assassination of JFK and was told that things were happening just as he had been told. In the shock and excitement of the afternoon January did not talk to the American again nor did he actually observe the aircraft depart or observe who was in it.

Nothing about the pilot's remarks indicates he was directly involved in the Dallas attack; he had been there working on the aircraft's checking and acceptance since Nov. 18. It does suggest that he was associating with individuals - his "friends" - who were talking about JFK in terms of betrayal and revenge. His remarks reveal the same motives overheard by Wheaton and independently related by Martino, Otero and Vidal - that revenge was the motive and that to those involved, JFK's death was a matter of executing a traitor.

At this time virtually all the details of January's story have been researched and confirmed. The aircraft in question was real and it was sent off to a firm in Houston, remaining on its books for two years until it was ultimately turned over to a Mexican air transport company. [ xix ] As with the Wheaton incident, the question becomes whether the pilot's remarks can be associated with any particular group of individuals. With what we now know it appears highly likely the aircraft was destined for AMWORLD project.

2/9/64 CIA Memo by Carl Jenkins regarding AMWORLD meeting.

While speculative, it is also possible that the Cuban pilot was someone quite familiar to us by now. While AMWORLD was to be focused on deniable attack missions against Cuba from offshore locations - making it almost entirely a maritime effort - it did require limited air transport and a small number of pilots were brought into the project. A small number of pilots were recruited for AMWORLD; one of them was Antonio Soto, the individual involved in examining the bombs to be built for the Lacombe Louisiana bombing plan previously discussed. Documents reveal that Soto had previously been in the Cuban Air Force; he was recruited into the Brigade and had flown a B-26 in support of the Bay of Pigs landings. Beyond that, CIA documents reveal that he spoke very good English. And somewhat strangely, after flying at the Bay of Pigs, Soto was recruited into JMWAVE maritime operations in October 1962 - at the height of the missile crisis. He was then recruited from those missions into the new CIA Congo air operations (Makasi), beginning his first six-month tour there in November, 1962.

A Secret Legacy, Cuban Exiles, the CIA and the Congo Crisis.

10/29/62 CIA Memo request for POA for Antonio Soto. TFW signed by Guy Vitale for Cal Hicks.

AMWORLD pilot Jorge Navarro

Another AMWORLD pilot was Jorge Navarro. Although Navarro was a pilot and had been in training in the Cuban Air Force before going into exile, he did not fly for the Cuban Expeditionary Force but rather was assigned to paramilitary operations. His experience in unarmed combat and in sharpshooting appears to have qualified him for assignment to the special group of individuals inserted into Cuba prior to the Brigade 2506 landings. Navarro was part of a 15-man team that included Carlos Hernandez and the previously mentioned Luis Sierra. [ xx ] The record indicates that his insertion was operationally conducted by Rip Robertson.

Navarro was recruited into the Artime project in August, 1963 and served in it as a pilot until 1965, at which time he and many other members were recruited by the CIA for special operations in the Congo. Navarro stated that he was one of the pilots that flew C-47s in Nicaragua for the Artime project. Antonio Soto was also recruited for CIA air operations in the Congo. His stay in Nicaragua was very brief and he never actually flew for AMWORLD before transferring to the Congo. His second Congo tour was from the end of 1963 until May 1964.

Possible AMWORLD pilot Mario Ginebra

Another possible candidate for the AMWORLD mechanic/pilot/navigator is Mario Ginebra-Groero. Ginebra was known as "Chiqui" Ginebra during the Bay of Pigs operation. His first tour of the Congo was during the first part of 1963 where he partnered with Rene Garcia and flew with Antonio Soto. The exact date of his assignment to the AMWORLD project is not known, but he was the C-47 navigator as noted in an AMWORLD report of 11/29/63. His brother Francisco also applied to join the AMWORLD project but was given a six month cooling off period because he had just returned from a tour in the Congo.

11/29/63 CIA Memo AMWORLD. Mario Ginebra navigator for AMWORLD C-47.

While there is no way that we can determine the exact identity of the Cuban pilot who told Wayne January that his friends were planning to kill JFK in revenge for his treachery, it is true that Soto fully matches the description and remarks related by January. We even know that Soto's English skills were excellent, both reading and speaking. Later he would translate a diary belonging to Che Guevera during the CIA Cuban force's actions against Cuban military units led by Che in the Congo.

While equally speculative, it is quite possible that the American who arrived with the Cuban was a CIA officer whose duties and known travel exactly fit the time frame for an appearance to accept an aircraft in Dallas.

Lt. Col. Manny Chavez

U.S. Air Force Lt. Colonel Manny Chavez, pseudonym Russell Sambora and alias Manuel Gomez (Major Gomez) aka "the Mexican", was assigned from JMWAVE to support the AMWORLD effort in October 29, 1963. He had been at JMWAVE with David Morales on the Cuba project since 1960. He and Morales had previously served in Venezuela together before assignment to the JMMATE project. Chavez had trained as a pilot and flew during World War II with the Army Air Force. During the Korean conflict he was called back to active duty and received training at the U.S. Army Counterintelligence School. In early October 1963, he was a member of the USAF interrogation team.

Chavez's roles in the early months of AMWORLD were threefold. He assisted with the logistics of moving major pieces of equipment and shipments of weapons for the project, he appears to have done some contact work to set up the logistics for the project's air support and he was directly charged with monitoring and reporting on the operational security of the project. While details on his work are limited at present, we do know that Chavez traveled to help organize activities in the early days of the project, and that his travel included at least one trip to Mexico City where he was scheduled to arrive by November 25. On that trip he was to contact both David Phillips and officers from the Mexican Air Force. More details on his work and reports are contained in documents referenced in Appendix C.

Directions for Further Research

1950 newspaper article on
then-Marine Carl Jenkins, who
remains 'in the background' of
these stories.

It's unlikely that we will ever be able to definitively identify the individuals that Quintero, Jenkins and likely Felix Rodriquez mentioned in their war story sessions (or to know if they even named them or used true names). It also appears that Wheaton heard little in the way of details; if any "true" names were mentioned in the talk sessions he certainly was unwilling to share them - and they may have meant nothing to him at the time. It's a terrific challenge to explore the names connected to Jenkins and Quintero - even with the new resources we now have available. Thirty years ago it would have been virtually impossible for a single individual to connect the dots even in the speculative manner that we have done in this working paper. Yet there is more research that can be done.

1) Obviously one of the most important steps would be to identify the source for Quintero's sensational quote, as cited in his obituary. If that could be vetted and explored it would directly contradict any dismissive remarks which Carl Jenkins has offered over the years in regard to Gene Wheaton.

There is also a good deal more that could be done to flesh out the material in this research paper and possibly to corroborate certain portions. Certainly if Manny Chavez could be located and interviewed about his first months with AMWORLD, it could be a game changer. If he did travel to Dallas, and if he did remember the Cuban's name, that would be explosive.

2) Beyond that, further details on what the AMWORLD volunteers were doing in October and November is critical. If they were "off the grid" and just waiting, with time on their hands and the ability to travel to Dallas, it leaves open the possibility of a true rogue action on their parts. Felix Rodriquez bragged about how at times he fooled his own CIA case officers in order to take private jobs, even traveling overseas with them having no idea of his movements.

3) There remains an open question as to whether information shared among select Cuba Project mission cadre could have been related to the reported appearance of Cubans associating with Lee Oswald in Texas in the fall of 1963. As an example, in early 1961, Carlos Hernandez served on a handpicked infiltration team with Jorge Sotus. The two men, both early MRR members inside Cuba, spent considerable time together in advance of the mission. Sotus had been one of the founders of MRR inside Cuba along with Manual Artime. As a senior MRR military officer Sotus worked with an American (Robert McKeown) in smuggling arms into Cuba for the revolution against Batista. Sotus was among those charged with neutrality violations for the smuggling, when McKeown was arrested for his weapons dealings.

Commission Document 797 - FBI Letter from Director of 17 Apr 1964 re: Robert Ray McKeown.

When Sotus managed to escape from prison on the Isle of Pines, he made his way to Miami and he too joined the CIA project. Both men had a lengthy history with MRR and with Artime and when a plan to insert Artime into Cuba to stimulate on-island resistance was developed, Sotus specifically requested Hernandez to be part of a select three-man team to be inserted into Cuba in advance of Artime's return. The Sotus/Hernandez relationship is especially interesting in that MeKeown related that he had previously encountered the man who had accompanied Lee Oswald in a visit in which they attempted to buy weapons and a high caliber, scope-equipped rifle. He remembered that man as someone involved with his earlier weapons smuggling into Cuba, but could only recall a last name, "Hernandez".

4) What was Rip Robertson actually doing after TILT and before heading off to the Congo in 1964? Was he free enough to contact and organize an attack team for Dallas? We know our persons of interest would have trusted him operationally; did he take advantage of that? Where are the JMWAVE records on him for that fall?

5) The same goes for the JMWAVE maritime staff like Izquierdo; were there no missions to send him on? Ditto for Felix Rodriquez. Documents show that officially Rodriquez's only operational role was to conduct communications equipment training for 30 men - yet another document reveals that the 14 radio sets intended for AMWORLD never left Miami and after AMWORLD ended, Artime was trying to sell them. There remains a real question as to what any of the AMWORLD recruits were doing prior to leaving the U.S. in January/February, 1964.

6) Just where did those AMWORLD recruits go in October/November, 1963? Was it to Texas and Camp Stanley? Or did they just stay at home in Miami? Interestingly enough, we know that Carlos Hernandez and others were used in DRE political activities; did they go to Dallas? Were they involved in any way with Lee Oswald?

And of course there is the mystery of the Black Nine team. Some 9 combat team members were sent to Philadelphia to exifiltrate via the boat outbound for Costa Rica - but documents also show that 9 Cuban exile crew from the boat resigned and somehow made their way back to Miami before the boat sailed. That appears not to have raised any concern or discussion - from an operational security view it certainly should have and Manny Chavez should have been up in arms about it. How did the crew get replaced so quickly? Or was something more sinister in play in this apparent personnel shuffle?

We would like to thank Bill Simpich for his advice, research and the work that he has done with crypt identification and the posting of his research at the Mary Ferrell website. Crypt identification has been critical to being able to read and understand the documents cited in our research.

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Appendix A: Backgrounds and Context



Carl Jenkins



Jenkins began his military service during WWII, following the war he was commissioned as a Second Lt. in a Reserve Rifle Company (1950) and became an instructor for the CIA in 1952, teaching courses in paramilitary operations, survival and Evasion and Escape during 1952 and 1953. During the 1950s he conducted training across SE Asia, including training Thai and Nationalist Chinese personnel and served in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. His specialties included maritime infiltration and guerrilla/resistance tactics.

In 1960 Jenkins (CIA pseudonym James D. Zaboth) was assigned to the CIA's Cuba project (JMATE) in 1960/61, placed in charge of training of Cuban exiles and expatriates. The initial training work was carried out at a CIA camp in Panama. From Panama, Jenkins was assigned to develop a much larger training facility in Guatemala, where he served as Chief of Base for the ground forces training there (JMTRAV). In February, Jenkins was reassigned, apparently to run a variety of highly covert infiltration missions into Cuba, missions related to preparing the way inside Cuba for the landing forces. He was associated with the abortive effort to move Artime and special teams into Cuba in March, and appears to have been involved with the covert efforts to send in personnel to carry out attacks against Fidel Castro in early April.

12/85 Carl Jenkins Summary of U.S. Government Experience.

11/18/61 CIA Memo from Alan Dulles recommending JMATE commendations. Includes Carl Jenkins, David Phillips.

Following the failed landings at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, Jenkins was sent to Vietnam, where he served as a special warfare advisor to I Corps in the northernmost region of South Vietnam, operating out of DaNang. In 1963 Jenkins was assigned to a new project, designated AMWORLD. That assignment most likely had to do with his earlier experience in covert Cuban operations as well as his prior service as a case officer for Rafael Quintero (AMJAVA-4), a participant in the very early covert maritime missions into Cuba.

2/15/61 CIA Telecom AMHAZE. Zaboth (Jenkins) agent 2515 to avoid contact with A-3 group.

AMWORLD continued as an active CIA project following the death of JFK, however Cuba did not remain a priority for President Johnson as all attention turned towards Vietnam. The Artime project struggled on, only to be quietly closed down by 1965. Following his AMWORLD assignment, Jenkins was assigned as a senior advisor to the Dominican National Police and following that as Senior Advisor on Security and Training to the national police of Nicaragua. In 1969 he moved to Laos, becoming Chief of Base for CIA military operations in southern Laos during 1971-73 (a position earlier held by David Morales, former Operations officer for the JMWAVE station in Miami). Jenkins retired at the end of the SE Asian conflict, although he was called back for special duties as late as 1979.

Carl Jenkins materials supplied to ARRB by Gene Wheaton



Rafael Quintero



Rafael Quintero was the second individual named by Gene Wheaton as having knowledge of the individuals involved on the attack on President Kennedy.

Quintero had been involved with infiltration missions into Cuba prior to the failed landing of the Cuban Expeditionary Force and had operated covertly on the island, as had Felix Rodriquez. He had managed to evade and escape capture during the landings and the following massive round up of suspected insurgents, as had Rodriquez. Following his return to the United States, he had drafted plans for a new covert operations initiative and presented them to Special Group leaders Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor, who in turn offered the plans to CIA Deputy Director Richard Helms.

Quintero was well respected, both within the CIA community and by senior members of the Kennedy Administration who thought highly of him. Helms was favorably impressed and forwarded Quintero's plans on to the president's military representatives. [ xxi ] As the Artime project evolved into AMWORLD, Quintero was appointed second in command of the new project and accompanied Artime to the most secret meetings - with Carl Jenkins continuing as his case officer, as he had been during the early 60/61 JMATE project.

Quintero was involved in AMWORLD military operations through 1965. It appears that given his experience with autonomous operations and deniable military logistics, he was then retained as a contract employee working with a variety of companies in Mexico and Central America that functioned as CIA fronts. He officially separated from the CIA in 1971, but still maintained contact with his former associates. In 1976 he was approached by former CIA officer Ed Wilson, and personally loaned Wilson ten thousand dollars to help set up a new freight forwarding company. Shortly afterwards Wilson approached Quintero to take part in an assassination; Quintero assumed it was CIA sanctioned and he and an experienced Cuban exile demolitions expert flew to London to be briefed on the mission.

During the briefing it became clear that Wilson was involved with a strictly private project and that Russians were involved. The project was actually one of the Gadhafi/Libyan deals that Wilson and other Americans had become involved with, and Quintero immediately returned to the U.S. and reported it to his longtime friend, Carl Jenkins. Jenkins advised him to have nothing to do with Wilson.

By 1985 Quintero was in a new position, as field logistics coordinator for the Reagan Administration Contra initiative against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. He traveled across Central America, arranging shipping and weapons clearances with multiple governments - working directly for Richard Secord (under Oliver North). With no official US government clearances or standing, Quintero established senior level government arrangements with foreign governments and military agencies. Quintero supported Secord in establishing airfields and setting up a covert air operation in support of the Contra effort - all after Congress had passed legislation officially removing the CIA from Contra military activities.

At the same time, another long time CIA asset - Felix Rodriquez - had also been brought into the North era Contra operation.



Felix Rodriquez

Rodriquez (possible crypt AMJOKE-1) was deeply involved in the pre-invasion maritime missions into Cuba, as well as in plans for an abortive sniper attack on Castro. On key missions he traveled via the Tejana III, operated by Alberto Fernandez (AMDENIM-1)

3/15/62 CIA memo on AMDENIM-1. AMJOKE-1 (Rodriguez) used his boat the Tejana III.

He became one of the earliest recruits for the AMWORLD project, personally approached by both Artime and Quintero while in U.S. Army training at Fort Benning in the early fall of 1963.

10/16/64 CIA Memo Project AMWORLD. Henry Hecksher replaced by Nestor Sanchez.



Rodriquez was among the Artime recruits "black exfiltrated" out of the U.S. at the end of 1963. His role in the project, other than in radio communications coordination, is undocumented. Following the end of AMWORLD, Felix Rodriquez was retained by the CIA as a totally deniable field agent. In his own biography he describes being paid as a principal agent, but only under a verbal agreement with no contract and no paperwork. Following a short assignment to Venezuela, Felix Rodriquez, along with two other Cuban exiles, was moved into a project in Bolivia - a project specifically targeting Che Guevara. Operating under commercial cover, Rodriquez became a key figure in the operation which ultimately led to Guevara's death.

Afterwards Rodriquez continued activities across Latin America, conducting counter insurgency training under the cover of being an American military officer. Following that service, he was moved to SE Asia, where he supported Project Phoenix field operations out of Saigon; after Vietnam he was redirected back to Latin America, to a post in Argentina in 1972.

While working as an "off the books" CIA employee, Rodriquez had also pursued other work - serving as a security consultant in Lebanon and then joining Ed Wilson (as Quintero did) for work supplying weapons to militias in that country. He writes of "hoaxing" his CIA case officer to go overseas for that work. His activities across Latin America introduced him to a host of senior military officers in the region. He officially separated from the CIA in 1976 and received a virtually unique approval to publicly talk and write about his CIA employment. By 1981/82 he became involved in a number of private initiatives against the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua, implementing what he called his own "tactical task force" of experienced anti-Castro Cuban exile fighters.

Ultimately Rodriquez, like Quintero, became deeply involved with the North/Secord Contra operations, organizing and managing transportation and supply logistics for the effort. It was during this involvement that Quintero became reacquainted with Carl Jenkins and in which Jenkins went to work for Gene Wheaton, seeking air transportation contracts to support the North/Secord Contra effort.



Nestor "Tony" Izquierdo



Izquierdo was one of the early volunteers for the Cuba Project, having been among the first to join in the movement against the Castro regime inside Cuba, along with Artime, Quintero and Tony Varona. Along with Quintero and Felix Rodriquez he took initial training in Panama under Carl Jenkins, reportedly parachuting into Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs landings. Following the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, Izquierdo managed to make his way out of Cuba and joined CIA JMWAVE maritime missions against Cuba, missions often personally led by Rip Robertson.

Izuierdo became one of Artime's early recruits for the AMWORLD project. Both Robertsion and Artime clearly had a good deal of respect for Izquierdo's operational skills. Robertson recruited him out of AMWORLD for a special hostage rescue mission into the Congo in the fall of 1964.

Ultimately Izquierdo ended up being one of the last AMWORLD recruits to leave Nicaragua as that project was being closed down. He and Silvano Pozo Carriles helped secure the cache of AMWORLD armaments at Monkey Point in Nicaragua. In June 1965 Carl Jenkins managed to obtain work for both men in Panama, in jobs under George Cabot Lodge, son of Henry Cabot Lodge.

Upon his return to the United States, Izquierdo became involved with some of the most activist Cuban exile groups, joining CORU along with Rolando Otero, Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles. Izquierdo was also one of the first Cuban exile volunteers to train Contra rebels to fight against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. He was killed in 1979 during an air mission into Nicaragua.

4/20/77 CIA Memo Information only. No identifiable information on Nestor Izquierdo.

4/5/77 San Antonio Express. Cuba CIA Agent Arrested. Nestor Izquierdo arrested. Hal Feeney supports his bail.