20th Annaversary of the fairytale of Big Lies

[Peter Lemkin]

Why Was Wilshire So Concerned? The Case for GID Surveillance of the Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
When analyzing Tom Wilshire’s behavior, the cables he sent between July 5 and July 23 are rather curious. As noted, Wilshire had prevented FBI agent Doug Miller from passing to the FBI information about Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi’s travel to the U.S. in January 2000.
He then continued to sit on this information, not informing the FBI, even after he was reminded of it again on May 15, 2001, upon reading a March 5, 2000, cable from the Bangkok station detailing al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi’s travel to the U.S. Why then, in July 2001, did Wilshire send three cables to Blee and others within the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center explicitly naming al-Mihdhar as a threat to American national security?
Al Mihdhar photo ID card. [Source: defenseone.com]
As detailed above, Blee was certain of an upcoming al-Qaeda attack on American soil. Tenet told the 9/11 Commission that during the summer of 2001, “the system was blinking red” in anticipation.[88] Kevin Fenton has argued that Wilshire, aware of this threat, may have been attempting to alert Blee to the fact that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi—the soon-to-be alleged hijackers they had been protecting—were likely to be involved in this upcoming attack.[89]
If this is the case, then the curious coincidence of Wilshire’s cable on July 5 and al-Mihdhar’s re-entry into the United States on July 4 takes on new significance. If Wilshire was aware that al-Mihdhar had re-entered the U.S. on July 4, it may have prompted him to attempt to warn Blee of impending danger.
Wilshire and Blee had been protecting al-Mihdhar for 18 months at this point, and if he was involved in an upcoming attack, any investigation into what the CIA knew would, as it ultimately did, discover this fact. Wilshire may have been acting to protect himself and Blee, or just himself.
While nothing in the CIA’s publicly available records indicates that the agency was surveilling al-Mihdhar, strong circumstantial evidence suggests that elements within the Saudi Arabian government may have relayed this information to elements within the CIA.
In 2007, Prince Bandar, Saudi ambassador to the U.S., commented that “Saudi security had been actively following the movements of most of the terrorists with precision” in advance of the 9/11 attacks.[90]
George W. Bush with Prince Bandar at his Texas ranch in August 2002 [Source: newyorker.com].
Pat D’Amuro [Source: concordia.net]
Of course, the 2016 release of the long-classified “28 pages” of the Joint Congressional Inquiry provided indications that Bandar knew more than he let on. These classified pages drew in part from an FBI investigation led by manager Pat D’Amuro’s team in the weeks after 9/11.
The FBI’s investigation chiefly focused on two men, Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan. Though accounts differ as to how Bayoumi met al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, what is clear is that he quickly became close with the pair. [91]

• Omar al-Bayoumi [Source: sandiegoreader.com]
  
• Osama Basnan [Source: historycommons.org]
  

He secured them a San Diego apartment next to his, served as a guarantor on their lease, and even provided them with more than $1500 for two months of rent. More significantly, he helped arrange classes at flight school for the pair.[92]
Apartments where hijackers lived, which have since been converted into condominiums. [Source: sandiegoreader.com]
Bayoumi was employed at Dallah Avco,[93] a Saudi aviation services company ultimately owned by the now disgraced and presumably imprisoned[94] Saudi billionaire Saleh Abdullah Kamel.[95]
Saleh Abdullah Kamel [Source: arabnews.com]
When Bayoumi began his employment, he was paid a small stipend of under $500 a month. When al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in San Diego, his pay increased to $3,700 a month.[96] This, despite the fact that a source told the FBI that Bayoumi was a “ghost employee” of Dallah Avco who was “being paid for doing nothing.”[97]
Bayoumi was also receiving large sums of money, totaling in the tens of thousands of dollars, from none other than Haifa bint Faisal, Prince Bandar’s wife.[98] On one occasion, Bayoumi received a check from Prince Bandar’s account directly.[99]
Haifa bint Faisal [Source: alchetron.com]
Bayoumi left the U.S. in July 2001,[100] but not long after, his good friend Osama Basnan moved into his apartment building, which as noted also housed al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. The FBI felt this “could indicate [Basnan] succeeded Omar al Bayoumi and may be undertaking activities on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia.”[101]
Certainly Basnan seemed to sympathize with the alleged hijackers: After 9/11, Basnan reportedly “celebrated the heroes of September 11” and talked about “what a wonderful, glorious day it had been.”[102]
The FBI’s investigation revealed that Basnan had received more than $74,000 in cashier’s checks from Bandar’s wife between February 1999 and May 2002. On one occasion, Basnan received $15,000 directly from Prince Bandar.[103]
In April 2002, Basnan met with an unknown “high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters”[104] and who was part of a Saudi royal entourage which had arrived in Texas to conduct meetings with Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld. This prince provided Basnan with “a significant amount of cash.”[105] These connections strongly suggest that Basnan was an agent of Saudi intelligence.
Dick Cheney meeting Saudi King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud. [Source: theatlantic.com]
Collectively, these links between Saudi (GID) intelligence agents, Prince Bandar, and the alleged 9/11 hijackers are strongly suggestive of a GID role in the handling of the hijackers, and they lend credence to Bandar’s claim that the GID was closely following the hijackers’ movements.
Given all this, it is worth uncovering any details about the information that Bandar or other Saudi intelligence officials may have provided Tenet. As James Risen has reported, Bandar and Tenet were close, with Tenet visiting Bandar’s McLean, Virginia, estate monthly. Tenet and Bandar would frequently exchange information, but Tenet would not reveal this information to other officials at the CIA—the broader agency only discovered what had been discussed through Saudi sources, typically long after the fact. [106]
Prince Bandar’s estate in McLean Virginia. [Source: virtualglobetrotting.com]
Tenet’s relationship with the Saudis was held so close to the vest that in the 1990s, Tenet appointed one of his top aides as station chief in Riyadh. This station chief would frequently communicate with Tenet directly, bypassing the chain of command and thereby “[driving] the barons of the [Near East Division] and [Counterterrorism Center] crazy because they were not in the loop.”
Indeed, according to Risen’s source, “top CIA managers were intent on making sure that the CIA did not produce politically inconvenient intelligence that could cause headaches at the White House.”[107] Tenet’s appointment of a top aide to a sensitive position in Riyadh mirrors Tenet’s appointment of Blee to a sensitive position at Alec Station.
This close relationship between Tenet and Saudi intelligence, which kept the Near East Division and Counterterrorism Center out of the loop, follows the long-standing and alarming post-Watergate pattern of bypassing the CIA bureaucracy to enable covert operations and avoid accountability in the face of “congressional interference.”
The Safari Club network, of which this Tenet/Saudi relationship seems a piece, was created specifically to link CIA leadership with the leaders of Saudi and other intelligence agencies for the purpose of avoiding accountability and keeping intelligence operations covert and unimpeded by congressional fetters.
Safari Club luxury resort in Mt. Kenya owned by Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi from which the CIA-led alliance got its name. [Source: wikipedia.org]
In this context, Tenet’s close relationship with Bandar and others in the Saudi intelligence community is concerning, as it indicates his desire for secrecy even from high CIA officials, not mention Congressional bodies tasked with providing intelligence oversight.
Another likely venue for GID-CIA collaboration was the 1997 Saudi-U.S. “joint intelligence committee” established by Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz and presumably his counterparts in U.S. defense and intelligence. This committee was established “to share information on terrorism in general and on bin Laden (and al-Qaeda) in particular.”[108]
Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz [Source: wikipedia.org]
Peter Dale Scott has written that this committee was part of a liaison agreement between the CIA and GID. The nature of these liaison arrangements, as Scott explains, means that it “would probably have required special access clearances for those privy to the arrangement and sharing the liaison information.”
Such could help explain some serious anomalies.
First, there is the extensive protection provided to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar by Wilshire and others of the CIA’s Alec Station. Second, there is the evidence suggesting transmission of information between elements of the GID monitoring al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar’s movements and Wilshire.
Michael Scheuer, the head of the CIA’s Alec Station. [Source: globetrotter.berkeley.edu]
Third, there is the fact that certain other members of Alec Station, like Doug Miller, were deliberately kept out of the loop.[109]
A heretofore secret liaison arrangement which provided for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar’s safe passage into the United States would seem to be the most sensible explanation for all of this.
The pattern of facts presented here is circumstantial, but highly supportive of the conclusion that certain elements within the CIA, including Wilshire and Blee, were not only aware of al-Hazmi’s and al-Mihdhar’s movements, but were actively protecting operations of some kind under the terms of a joint CIA-GID liaison agreement.
Such an explanation takes into account a number of factors, namely: the GID’s role in handling al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, Prince Bandar’s personal role in financing their handlers Bayoumi and Basnan, Bandar’s close and secretive relationship with Tenet, and Tenet’s direct personal relationship with Blee. In this context, the timing of Wilshire’s July 5 cable expressing alarm at al-Mihdhar’s probable role in an upcoming terrorist attack and al-Mihdhar’s re-entry into the U.S. on July 4 should not be dismissed as mere coincidence.
Tenet’s Involvement in the Pre-Coverup
Ali Abdullah Saleh [Source: Britannica.com]
In recent months, Tenet has come under further scrutiny for his role in protecting key al Qaeda personnel. As detailed by Alex Rubinstein, leaked phone calls between Tenet and then-Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, published by the Houthi government of Yemen, indicate that Tenet was pressuring Saleh to release a prisoner who was being held by the Yemeni government in connection with the USS Cole bombing.[110]
At this time, the suspects of the Cole bombing were top priority for Alec Station. In fact, Tom Wilshire’s July 23, 2001, cable (discussed above) was a reply to a July 13 cable he had sent.
In this cable, Wilshire discussed Walid Mohammed bin Attash as a key player in the USS Cole bombing, and asked the CIA Counterterrorism Center leadership, Blee among them, if the FBI could be informed. To reiterate, permission for this was not forthcoming.[111]
Walid Mohammed bin Attash [Source: nytimes.com]
Khalid al-Mihdhar, who had been protected by Blee, Wilshire, and others in Alec Station on numerous occasions, was also a key suspect in the bombing. The Yemeni Prime Minister at the time, Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, declared that al-Mihdhar “was one of the Cole perpetrators, involved in preparations.”[112]
It seems that Tenet himself was committed to ensuring the FBI was not fully informed about al-Qaeda and the Cole bombings. When President Saleh informed Tenet that the FBI was on the ground in Yemen investigating the bombing, and asked if they could come to retrieve the prisoner in question, Tenet was insistent that “this is my person, this is my problem, this is my issue.”
Saleh and Tenet then discussed the details, whereby an officer from the CIA station in Yemen would come and retrieve the prisoner, instead of the FBI.[113]
Major General Abdul Qadir al-Shami, the deputy head of the Yemeni Security and Intelligence Service, told Houthi media that the identity of this prisoner was none other than Anwar al-Awlaki.
[Source: greatgameindia.com]
Al-Awlaki had already been under investigation by the FBI in 1999 and 2000 over his possible role as a procurement agent for Osama bin Laden.[114]
Anwar al-Awlaki [Source: thedailybeast.com]
His possible role as a CIA asset of some kind is particularly intriguing in light of his relationships with the alleged hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar—the men whose activities were being concealed by Blee and others at Alec Station.
As the 9/11 Commission Report notes, al-Awlaki admitted to meeting al-Hazmi when he was an imam at the Rabat mosque in San Diego.[115] In fact, many FBI agents suspected that al-Awlaki may in fact have secured al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar housing when they moved to Alexandria, Virginia, a suspicion that the Commissioners shared.[116]
As documents obtained by Judicial Watch through a 2013 FOIA request revealed, by September 27, 2001, the FBI was aware that al-Awlaki had purchased plane tickets in July and August of 2001 for alleged hijackers Atta, Suqami, and al-Sheri.[117]
Al-Awlaki’s subsequent presence at a February 5, 2002, Pentagon dinner as an “up and coming” “moderate Muslim” seems incongruous with his assistance to the alleged 9/11 hijackers.[118] In fact, an FBI surveillance team followed al-Awlaki to the dinner, likely because just the day before they had identified him as a “terrorist organization member.”[119]
But while he may have been just a surveillance target for the FBI in February 2002, his repeated arrests and releases from U.S. custody, including in October 2002, November 2006, and July 2007, paint the picture of an FBI asset.[120]
An October 22, 2002, FBI memo, with the subject line “Anwar Nasser Aulaqi” and the heading “Synopsis: Asset Reporting,” seems to confirm this,[121] as does the fact that just 12 days before this memo was written, he was being held at JFK Airport under a warrant for passport fraud, but was released at the direction of an FBI agent.[122]
Al-Awlaki’s apparent status as an FBI asset following 9/11 is concerning given his relationship to Bayoumi, a handler of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in San Diego.
A 2011 Atlantic article described al-Awlaki as one of Bayoumi’s frequent “discussion partners.” In February 2000, soon after al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in San Diego, they used Bayoumi’s phone to call al-Awlaki on four occasions.[123]
Given that al-Awlaki served the same role in securing housing for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in Alexandria as Bayoumi did in San Diego, and that he had a close relationship with GID asset Bayoumi, it seems likely he was a subject of the GID-CIA liaison agreement that pertained to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, and was certainly under GID surveillance (via Bayoumi) at the very least.
In either case, elements of the CIA who were privy to the GID-CIA liaison agreement would have been aware of al-Awlaki and his actions, just as they were aware of al-Hazmi’s and al-Mihdhar’s movements.
Assuming Major General al-Shami was correct and that the prisoner Tenet freed was al-Awlaki, it is worth exploring the implications of this fact. As discussed earlier, Tenet’s relationship with Bandar and the GID-CIA liaison agreement means that he would likely have been aware of al-Awlaki’s relationship with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in San Diego, just as Wilshire at Alec Station was.
If Tenet had not secured al-Awlaki’s release, and FBI agents had been able to interview him, they would have found themselves in front of a man who had already been investigated by the Bureau in 1999 and 2000.[124]
Investigation of al-Awlaki’s activities in San Diego might have uncovered his connection to his frequent discussion partner and GID asset Bayoumi, certainly an inviting target for the Bureau within their counterintelligence responsibilities if nothing else.
While the outcomes of any counterfactual FBI investigation are speculative, had al-Awlaki been in federal custody it certainly would have meant that he would not have been in Alexandria to secure housing for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in advance of the 9/11 attacks.
That al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a drone strike on September 30, 2011, less than six months after Rep. Peter King (R-NY) opened a new investigation into his connections to the alleged hijackers, has potentially grave implications.[125]
Al-Awlaki was killed in a drone strike less than six months after Rep. Peter King, featured above, opened a new investigation into his connection to the alleged 9/11 hijackers. [Source: nytimes.com]
The FBI actively concealed al-Awlaki from the 9/11 Commission, “refus[ing] to set up interviews between the Commission and al-Aulaqi [sic].”
They continued to obstruct, even after an official at the FBI Academy received an October 23, 2003, email from al-Awlaki in which he said he was “around and available” for interview by the Commission, who were on the ground in Yemen searching for him at that time.
Ultimately, he was never interviewed by the Commission, and whatever he knew about Bayoumi, al-Hazmi, or al-Mihdhar was made finally inaccessible on his death.[126]