10-02-2010, 08:20 PM
Following is an excerpt from:
http://www.doug-long.com/bohr.htm
[URL="http://www.doug-long.com/bohr.htm"]
[/URL]
that fleshes out more detail of Bohr's attempt to get official blessing for informing the Soviets about A-Bomb details.
...again, no mention that he actually followed through with it.
Let's take a moment to list some of Bohr's key points from 1944:
Bohr had already convinced some high level British officials that international control of nuclear weapons was essential for world security. Now they set up an appointment for him with the Brit whose opinion mattered most - Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
On May 16, 1944 Bohr met with Churchill and Lord Cherwell, Churchill's closest advisor. But when Bohr returned from the meeting he told a friend that Churchill had "scolded us like two schoolboys!" (R.V. Jones in French and Kennedy, pg. 284-285).
Churchill apparently felt the purpose of the meeting was to criticize how he had dealt with Roosevelt on nuclear matters, and he lit into Bohr and Cherwell before Bohr could explain his views. Churchill's tirade took up most of Bohr's allotted time, and it did not help matters that Bohr was a notoriously poor speaker. Plus, when it came to Russia, Churchill was interested in nuclear coercion, not nuclear cooperation.
After the meeting Churchill distrusted Bohr, fearing he might tell other nations of the Manhattan Project (Aage Bohr in Rozental, pg. 204; Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, pg. 107-108, 110).
Bohr returned to the U.S. in June and told Frankfurter of his failed meeting with Churchill. Frankfurter in turn spoke to FDR. Now the President asked to meet with Bohr.
Bohr's Aug. 26, 1944 meeting with Roosevelt was just the opposite of his meeting with Churchill. According to Bohr's son,
Bohr eventually surmised that nothing good had come of his meeting with Roosevelt. He made one final attempt, via letter, to influence FDR. But before the letter could be delivered, Roosevelt died. Bohr gave the letter to Vannevar Bush, who had been Roosevelt's main science advisor. In June 1945 Bohr left the United States (Aage Bohr in Rozental, pg. 209-210).
During World War II Bohr did not argue against using the atomic bomb, unlike fellow Manhattan Project physicist Leo Szilard. Instead, he stayed focused on his message of international control and scientific openness. But after the atomic bomb was used on Japan Bohr told friends, "The frightening thing was... that it was not necessary at all" (Niels Blaedel, Harmony and Unity: The Life of Niels Bohr, pg. 233). British nuclear historian Margaret Gowing wrote that Bohr's son Aage said his father "privately deplored the spirit in which the bomb had been used" (Gowing in French and Kennedy, pg. 275).
Bohr continued to work for international control of nuclear weapons until his death in 1962.
Bohr once summarized his approach to life, in his softspoken manner, when he said:
- Doug Long
http://www.doug-long.com/bohr.htm
[URL="http://www.doug-long.com/bohr.htm"]
[/URL]
that fleshes out more detail of Bohr's attempt to get official blessing for informing the Soviets about A-Bomb details.
...again, no mention that he actually followed through with it.
Let's take a moment to list some of Bohr's key points from 1944:
- Russia probably already knew about the Manhattan Project.
- Russia should be told soon that the west was working on the atomic bomb. The longer the west hid their a-bomb work from Russia, the more it would appear to Russia that the west intended to threaten them with the weapon.
- If Russia felt threatened by the atomic bomb, they would hurry to build their own. The result would be the "terrifying prospect" of a nuclear arms race.
- A nuclear arms race combined with fear and suspicion could lead to a disastrous nuclear war.
- But the nuclear threat could be turned into a blessing: the need to prevent nuclear war could provide the basis for nations to overcome their differences and work together in the post-WWII world.
- Discussions with Russia should begin by telling them of the atomic bomb project and of the need for international control of the weapon. Arrangements should be made to share scientific information. But no technical details about the a-bomb should be given until international control was guaranteed. (J. Robert Oppenheimer papers, Box 34, Felix Frankfurter/Niels Bohr folder, Library of Congress).
Bohr had already convinced some high level British officials that international control of nuclear weapons was essential for world security. Now they set up an appointment for him with the Brit whose opinion mattered most - Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
On May 16, 1944 Bohr met with Churchill and Lord Cherwell, Churchill's closest advisor. But when Bohr returned from the meeting he told a friend that Churchill had "scolded us like two schoolboys!" (R.V. Jones in French and Kennedy, pg. 284-285).
Churchill apparently felt the purpose of the meeting was to criticize how he had dealt with Roosevelt on nuclear matters, and he lit into Bohr and Cherwell before Bohr could explain his views. Churchill's tirade took up most of Bohr's allotted time, and it did not help matters that Bohr was a notoriously poor speaker. Plus, when it came to Russia, Churchill was interested in nuclear coercion, not nuclear cooperation.
After the meeting Churchill distrusted Bohr, fearing he might tell other nations of the Manhattan Project (Aage Bohr in Rozental, pg. 204; Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, pg. 107-108, 110).
Bohr returned to the U.S. in June and told Frankfurter of his failed meeting with Churchill. Frankfurter in turn spoke to FDR. Now the President asked to meet with Bohr.
Bohr's Aug. 26, 1944 meeting with Roosevelt was just the opposite of his meeting with Churchill. According to Bohr's son,
- "Roosevelt agreed that an approach to the Soviet Union of the kind suggested [by Bohr] must be tried... Roosevelt said [in regard to Churchill's disagreement with Bohr's ideas] ...he thought that Churchill would eventually come around to sharing his point of view in this matter. He would discuss the problems with Churchill at their forthcoming meeting and hoped to see my father soon afterwards" (Aage Bohr in Rozental, pg. 206-207).
Bohr eventually surmised that nothing good had come of his meeting with Roosevelt. He made one final attempt, via letter, to influence FDR. But before the letter could be delivered, Roosevelt died. Bohr gave the letter to Vannevar Bush, who had been Roosevelt's main science advisor. In June 1945 Bohr left the United States (Aage Bohr in Rozental, pg. 209-210).
During World War II Bohr did not argue against using the atomic bomb, unlike fellow Manhattan Project physicist Leo Szilard. Instead, he stayed focused on his message of international control and scientific openness. But after the atomic bomb was used on Japan Bohr told friends, "The frightening thing was... that it was not necessary at all" (Niels Blaedel, Harmony and Unity: The Life of Niels Bohr, pg. 233). British nuclear historian Margaret Gowing wrote that Bohr's son Aage said his father "privately deplored the spirit in which the bomb had been used" (Gowing in French and Kennedy, pg. 275).
Bohr continued to work for international control of nuclear weapons until his death in 1962.
Bohr once summarized his approach to life, in his softspoken manner, when he said:
- "Every valuable human being must be a radical and a rebel, for what he must aim at is to make things better than they are..." (quoted in Nielson, pg. 27).
- Doug Long
"If you're looking for something that isn't there, you're wasting your time and the taxpayers' money."
-Michael Neuman, U.S. Government bureaucrat, on why NIST didn't address explosives in its report on the WTC collapses
-Michael Neuman, U.S. Government bureaucrat, on why NIST didn't address explosives in its report on the WTC collapses