Custer at Little Bighorn: A Deep Political Hypothesis

[Ed Jewett]

Interesting challenge, Charles, especially in light of the recent reference to Obama's handling of the Gulf oil spill as Custer-like in his inability to gage the scope of the thing, or to see all the Indians behind the hill. I've read some of those books, but I don't have time to go back and re-study them. [My waiting list for reading is 12 books deep already, including the just recently arrived gems by Albarelli and Seymour's "Last Circle", among others, whose publisher told me that the Evica offering is coming soon.] I'd suggest some consideration for the following in that investigation:

1) What, specifically, was the battlefield information or intelligence available to the US cavalry chain of command (and especially Custer) at the critical moments?

2) What factors -- aside from or in addition to the deep politics of US governance and military affairs -- were present in terms of the nature of the encounter... small, highly-mobile forces in a vast wilderness restrained by extremely slow communications? In addition, how did US cavalry mindset and tactics as evolved from the Civil War function in this type of encounter?

3) What factors play a role in terms of the Native-American deep familiarity with horseback warfare in the wilderness, their tactics and strategy, their own superiority in terms of battlefield intelligence, etc.?

4) What elements emerge from the telling of the tale by Native Americans and how might that have been compromised by our own inability to speak their language, understand their culture and mindset, or even to the extent that that history was 'cooked' by white genocidal imperialists? Are there modern-day people who represent the American Indian perspective whose viewpoints might be useful?

5) What about Custer's own temperament, Germanic roots, West Point mediocrity, proven military audacity, forensic psychological perspectives and ambitions?

From that most august of sources, WIkipedia:

""Custer's style of battle was often claimed to be reckless or foolhardy, but military planning was always the basis of every Custer "dash". As Marguerite Merrington explains in The Custer Story in Letters, "George Custer meticulously scouted every battlefield, gauged the enemies [sic?] weak points and strengths.... Custer established a reputation as an aggressive cavalry brigade commander willing to take personal risks...."

Being a student of the battle, as well as military history, strategy and tactics, and performance psychology, I always thought of Custer as the poster boy for the foolhardiness for arrogance in warfare.

Again, Wikipedia:

"One of Custer's finest hours in the Civil War occurred just east of Gettysburg on July 3, 1863.....Custer's brigade lost 257 men at Gettysburg, the highest loss of any Union cavalry brigade.[11] "I challenge the annals of warfare to produce a more brilliant or successful charge of cavalry", Custer wrote in his report.[12]"

"Custer led the 7th U.S. Cavalry in an attack on the Cheyenne encampment of Black Kettle — the Battle of Washita River on November 27, 1868. Custer reported killing 103 warriors; estimates by the Cheyenne of their casualties were substantially lower (11 warriors plus 19 women and children);[28] some women and children were also killed, and US troops took 53 women and children prisoner. Custer had his men shoot most of the 875 Indian ponies they had captured."

Was Custer merely an egotistical maniacal psychopath in search of glory and fame? He found it.

But Wikipedia also offers up this:

Grant, Belknap and Politics


Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, 7th U.S. Cavalry, ca. 1875


The expedition against the Sioux was originally scheduled to leave Fort Abraham Lincoln on April 6, 1876, but on March 15, Custer was summoned to Washington to testify at Congressional hearings regarding the scandal involving U.S. Secretary of War William W. Belknap and President Grant's brother Orville. After testifying on March 29 and April 4, Custer testified in support of the Democrats before the Banning Committee. After Belknap was indicted, Custer secured release and left Washington on April 20. Instead of immediately returning to Fort Lincoln, he visited the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia and traveled to New York to meet with his publishers. While there, he was summoned to the U.S. Senate, possibly a move instigated by President Grant.
Returning to Washington on April 21, Custer found he was the center of a campaign of vilification in the Republican media. He was accused of perjury and disparagement of brother officers. General Sherman asked the new Secretary of War, Alphonso Taft, to write a letter requesting Custer's release so Custer could take command of the Fort Lincoln expedition against the Lakota. President Grant prohibited sending the letter and ordered Taft to appoint another officer to take command. When Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry determined there were no available officers of rank to take command, Sherman ordered him to make an appointment. Stunned that he would not be in command, Custer approached the impeachment managers and secured his release. General Sherman advised Custer not to leave Washington before meeting personally with President Grant. Custer arranged for Colonel Rufus Ingalls to request a meeting, which Grant refused. On the evening of May 3, Custer took a train to Chicago.
The following morning General Sherman sent a telegram to General Sheridan ordering him to intercept Custer and hold him until further orders. Sheridan was also ordered to arrange for the expedition against the Lakota to depart with Major Reno's replacing Custer. Sherman, Sheridan, and Terry all wanted Custer in command but had to support Grant. Sherman wrote Terry: "Custer's political activity has compromised his best friends here, and almost deprived us of the ability to serve him".[citation needed]
Brig. Gen. Terry met Custer in Fort Snelling, Minnesota on May 6. He later recalled, "(Custer) with tears in his eyes, begged for my aid. How could I resist it?"[citation needed]. Terry wrote to Grant attesting to the advantages of Custer's leading the expedition. Sheridan endorsed his effort, accepting Custer's "guilt" and suggesting his restraint in future. Grant was already under pressure for his treatment of Custer and his administration worried about failure of the "Sioux campaign" without him. Grant would be blamed if perceived as ignoring the recommendations of senior Army officers. On May 8 Custer was informed at Fort Snelling that he was to lead the 7th Cavalry, but under Terry's direct supervision.
Before leaving Fort Snelling, Custer spoke to General Terry's chief engineer, Captain Ludlow, saying he would "cut loose" from Terry the first chance he got. Critics have used this statement to conclude that Custer was to blame for the resulting disaster by seeking to claim independent victory.[citation needed]


Indeed, it is a fascinating topic; I shall subscribe to the thread.


"When writing about Custer, neutral ground is elusive. What should Custer have done at any of the critical junctures that rapidly presented themselves, each now the subject of endless speculation and rumination? There will always be a variety of opinions based upon what Custer knew, what he did not know, and what he could not have known..." —from Touched by Fire: The Life, Death, and Mythic Afterlife of George Armstrong Custer by Louise Barnett.[62]