New 2nd in Command at DOD Ashton Carter – CFR, Aspen Group, Goldman Sachs…Connects to 911

[Jan Klimkowski]

Though we were no fans of Mr Gates, (It was swell of him to stand up against the Libyan war) Panetta is a 1000 times worse.

Noone is a thousand times worse than Iran-Contra player and Bush Crime Family consigliere Robert Gates.

Gates' stance on Libya is purely part of elite squabble over tactics. It's got nothing to do with moral principle.

Here's former senior CIA analyst Ray McGovern's insider view on Gates, published in November 2006:

I have known Robert Gates, whom the president has picked to succeed Rumsfeld, for 36 years, starting when Gates was a journeyman analyst in CIA�s Soviet Foreign Policy branch which I headed.

(snip)

Character Counts; So Does Integrity

Those of us who had front-row seat to watch Gates� handling of substantive intelligence cannot overlook the manner in which he cooked it to the recipe of whomever he reported to. A prot�g� of William Casey, President Ronald Reagan�s CIA Director, Gates learned well from his mentor. In 1995, Gates told the Washington Post�s Walter Pincus that he watched Casey on �issue after issue sit in meetings and present intelligence framed in terms of the policy he wanted pursued.� Gates followed suit, cooking the analysis to justify policies favored by Casey and the White House.

The cooking was consequential. Among other things, it facilitated not only illegal capers like Iran-Contra but also budget-breaking military spending against an exaggerated Soviet threat that, in reality, had long since passed its peak.

I was amused to read in David Ignatius� Washington Post column this week that Gates �was the brightest Soviet analyst in the [CIA] shop, so Casey soon appointed him deputy director overseeing his fellow analysts.� He wasn�t; and Casey had something other than expertise in mind. Talk to anyone who was there at the time (except the sycophants Gates co-opted) and they will explain that Gates� meteoric career had mostly to do with his uncanny ability to see a Russian under every rock turned over by Casey. Those of Gates� subordinates willing to see two Russians became branch chiefs; three won you a division. I exaggerate only a little.

To Casey, the Communists could never change; and Gorbachev was simply cleverer than his predecessors. With his earlier training in our Soviet Foreign Policy branch (and a doctorate in Soviet affairs no less), Gates knew better. Yet he carried Casey�s water, and stifled all dissent. One consequence was that the CIA as an institution missed the implosion of the Soviet Union�no small matter. Another was a complete loss of confidence in CIA analysis on the part of then-Secretary of State George Shultz and others who smelled the cooking. In July 1987 in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair, Shultz told Congress: �I had come to have grave doubts about the objectivity and reliability of some of the intelligence I was getting.�

Iran-Contra

And well he might. In the fall of 1985, for example, there was an abrupt departure from CIA�s analytical line that Iran was supporting terrorism. On November 22, 1985 the agency reported that Iranian-sponsored terrorism had dropped off substantially in 1985, but no evidence was adduced to support that key judgment. Oddly, a few months later CIA�s analysis reverted back to the pre-November 1985 line, with no further mention of any drop-off in Iranian support for terrorism.

It could be more than coincidental that the US illegally shipped Hawk missiles to Iran in late November 1985. When questions were raised later about this zigzag in intelligence, Stephen Engelberg of the New York Times quoted senior CIA official Clair George saying this was �an example of a desperate attempt to try to sort of prove something was happening to make the policy [arms to Iran for hostages] look good, and it wasn�t.�

Also in 1985 Gates commissioned and warped a National Intelligence Estimate suggesting that Soviet influence in Iran could soon grow and pose a danger to US interests. This provided additional �justification� for the illegal arms-for-hostages deal with Iran.

More serious still was Gates� denial of awareness of Oliver North�s illegal activities in support of the Contra attacks in Nicaragua, despite the fact that senior CIA officials testified that they had informed Gates that North had diverted funds from the Iranian arms sales for the benefit of the Contras. The independent counsel for the Iran-Contra investigation (1986-93), Lawrence Walsh, later wrote in frustration that, despite Gates� highly touted memory, he �denied recollection of facts thirty-three times.�

In 1991, when President George H. W. Bush nominated Robert Gates for the post of Director of Central Intelligence, there was a virtual insurrection among CIA analysts who had suffered under his penchant for cooking intelligence. The stakes for integrity of analysis were so high that many still employed at the agency summoned the courage to testify against the nomination. But the fix was in, thanks to then-chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, David Boren and his staff director, George Tenet. The issue was considered so important and the damaging evidence so abundant, however, that thirty-one Senators voted against Gates when the committee forwarded his nomination. Never before or since has a CIA director nominee received nearly as many nays.

A highly respected former CIA station chief, Tom Polgar, offered the following at the 1991 Gates nomination hearings:

�His proposed appointment as director also raises moral issues. What kind of signal does his re-nomination send to the troops? Live long enough, your sins will be forgotten? Serve faithfully the boss of the moment, never mind integrity? Feel free to mislead the Senate�Senators forget easily? Keep your mouth shut�if the Special Counsel does not get you, promotion will come your way?�

�Fixing� Intelligence Can Be Career Enhancing

Gates is the one most responsible for institutionalizing the politicization of intelligence analysis. He set the example and promoted malleable managers more interested in career advancement than the ethos of speaking truth to power. In 2002, it was those managers who then-CIA Director George Tenet ordered to prepare what has become known as the �Whore of Babylon��the October 1 National Intelligence Misestimate on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He instructed them to adhere to the guidelines set by Vice President Dick Cheney in his Aug. 26, 2002 preemptive speech and to complete it in three weeks (in order to force a congressional vote before the mid-term election). To their discredit, senior sycophants saluted and produced the most fraudulent�and consequential�NIE in the history of American intelligence.

Those commenting on the Gates nomination so far seem largely unaware of this history. The exception is Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ), who worked in the State Department�s intelligence bureau and now sits on the House Intelligence Committee. Pointing out Gates� reputation for putting pressure on analysts to shape their conclusions to fit administration policies, Holt called the nomination �deeply troubling� and stressed that the confirmation hearings �should be thorough and probing.� Too bad Holt is not in the Senate.

Confirming Gates Must Not Be a Slam Dunk

There are early indications that Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), ranking Democrat on the Armed Forces Committee, intends to acquiesce in the maneuvering of the White House�s cat�s paw chairman of that committee, Sen. John Warner (R, VA), to rush the nomination through the lame-duck Senate before a new Congress is in place. At times in the past Levin has shown considerable courage, but so many years in the minority seem to have dulled his edge, prompting him to acquiesce in compromises to which he would have been allergic in the past�the unsavory deal with Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC) on the rights of �detainees,� for example. Not to mention Levin�s sudden cave-in, in the aftermath of 9/11, on funding for the National Missile Defense program, which he earlier recognized as obscenely expensive, of unproven reliability, and of dubious utility given the changing nature of the threats to our security.

Whether Levin steps up to the plate on Gates will be an early indication of whether the election has implanted any spine into Democrats�whether they still have it in them to act like winners. Levin has had a running dispute with the Bush administration regarding what he calls a lack of candor (the correct word is �lies�) in sworn testimony on Iraq. If he allows the Gates nomination to sail through without a thorough investigation of Gates� record, he will be giving a nihil obstat to the practice of no-fault dissembling before Congress.

In 1991, Levin joined 30 other Senators in voting against Gates� confirmation as CIA director because Gates was a good deal less than candid about his role in Iran-Contra and unconvincing in his denials that he had politicized intelligence. But Levin said this week that he wanted to give Gates a �fair and fresh look; a lot of time has passed.�

Fair enough. If Levin wants to know what has happened in the interim, he can start with the fresh, documentary evidence adduced in award-winning investigative reporter Robert Parry�s recent article, �The Secret World of Robert Gates� [http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/110906.html]. Parry�s article contains unique and highly damaging information on Gates� role in the original �October Surprise��the successful Republican effort to prevent the release of the 52 American hostages imprisoned for 14 months in the US embassy in Tehran until Ronald Reagan had won the election in 1980�and on Gates� involvement in the illegal sale of weapons, including cluster bombs to Iraq in the early eighties.

Another excellent source of updated information on Gates� involvement in the secret arming of Saddam Hussein (yes, the same Saddam) and the Iran-Contra scandal is the transcript of an interview of Robert Parry and former CIA analyst Mel Goodman on Democracy Now, November 9th. [http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?s...09/1444242

Gates knew about many of Oliver North�s illegal activities, but under oath, he just couldn�t remember. And Gates has been able to escape close scrutiny of his own involvement in extralegal and illegal activities largely because there are far too few journalists with the enterprise and courage of Robert Parry. While all the above-mentioned escapades are significantly damaging, the corruption of intelligence should be placed front and center, given the huge role this played in 2002 in deceiving Congress in to voting for an unnecessary war.

Whether or not Levin is fully aware of it, Gates is the archetypal intelligence fixer, employing all the tricks of that dishonorable trade�including memory loss, when caught. I find myself wondering if Levin still has it in him to stand up and say, �Never Again.� Even before he formally becomes chair of Armed Services, Levin has the power to require a serious vetting of Gates� past behavior and to make �Never Again� stick.

At a hearing on his first (abortive) nomination to be CIA director in 1987, Gates denied that he had tailored intelligence to please his superiors, adding, �Sycophants can only rise to a certain level.� Whether that was an unintentionally prophetic observation or not now depends largely on Carl Levin and his newly empowered, but apparently not yet emboldened, fellow Democrats.

Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, the publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in Washington, DC. He was a CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990, and in 2003 co-founded Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).