04-12-2012, 04:56 AM
Professor Scott returns to Acheson's exclusion of Taiwan from the U.S. defense perimeter:
On at least two occasions I believe Pawley's support for a minority right-wing clique led to significant and lasting changes to American foreign policy. The first was after Chiang Kai-shek's expulsion from mainland China to the island of Taiwan, when "Pawley became the point man for an end run around American policy toward
Taiwan."[3] It was the official policy of the U.S. State Department under Dean Acheson to plan for a containment policy in East Asia in which Taiwan would not be defended. But Pawley lobbied Acheson to allow for Chiang in Taiwan to be assisted by "a small group of American civilian, economic, industrial and [retired or ex-officers] military advisors."
This plan when implemented, apparently with assistance from at least one underworld figure along with Frank Wisner's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), became a significant factor in the survival of an independent Taiwan, and also in the growth of the post-war Asian drug traffic.[4]
Acheson had omited Korea in January 1950:
This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.
The defensive perimeter runs from Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements.
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from, the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.
Donald Gibson places Acheson at the inception of the Commission concept.
In the instance of Taiwan it seems Acheson provided Pawley an opening for a covert gambit.
In that of Korea, Acheson presents as April Glaspie greenlighting Saddam Hussein to initiate U.S. military intervention.
At the time of the Commission Acheson's was no mere jump ball: Dulles would be the most active in the project, making the Dulles Commission the most apt descriptive.
While his son in law William and brother McGeorge are positioned as counsel to the new king.
In urging recognition of "Red" China, Acheson might have countered, "Who lost China?" with "Someone had to be present at the creation of Eastasia."
The three superpowers contend in the "neutral" quadrilateral.
The anti-Castro Cubans have gone the way of Emanuel Goldstein, passing into disembodied legend.
Acheson's role in establishing the game board remains a fogbound coast.
On at least two occasions I believe Pawley's support for a minority right-wing clique led to significant and lasting changes to American foreign policy. The first was after Chiang Kai-shek's expulsion from mainland China to the island of Taiwan, when "Pawley became the point man for an end run around American policy toward
Taiwan."[3] It was the official policy of the U.S. State Department under Dean Acheson to plan for a containment policy in East Asia in which Taiwan would not be defended. But Pawley lobbied Acheson to allow for Chiang in Taiwan to be assisted by "a small group of American civilian, economic, industrial and [retired or ex-officers] military advisors."
This plan when implemented, apparently with assistance from at least one underworld figure along with Frank Wisner's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), became a significant factor in the survival of an independent Taiwan, and also in the growth of the post-war Asian drug traffic.[4]
Acheson had omited Korea in January 1950:
This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.
The defensive perimeter runs from Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements.
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from, the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.
Donald Gibson places Acheson at the inception of the Commission concept.
In the instance of Taiwan it seems Acheson provided Pawley an opening for a covert gambit.
In that of Korea, Acheson presents as April Glaspie greenlighting Saddam Hussein to initiate U.S. military intervention.
At the time of the Commission Acheson's was no mere jump ball: Dulles would be the most active in the project, making the Dulles Commission the most apt descriptive.
While his son in law William and brother McGeorge are positioned as counsel to the new king.
In urging recognition of "Red" China, Acheson might have countered, "Who lost China?" with "Someone had to be present at the creation of Eastasia."
The three superpowers contend in the "neutral" quadrilateral.
The anti-Castro Cubans have gone the way of Emanuel Goldstein, passing into disembodied legend.
Acheson's role in establishing the game board remains a fogbound coast.