23-05-2013, 08:17 PM
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/opinio...nted=print
The New York Times
May 22, 2013
The C.I.A.'s Part in Benghazi
By THE EDITORIAL BOARD
Throughout months of Republican "investigation" into the tragedy in Benghazi, Libya, on Sept. 11 last year, the Central Intelligence Agency has escaped the scrutiny and partisan bashing aimed at the State Department and the White House. But we now know that the C.I.A., and not the State Department or the White House, originated the talking points that Republicans (wrongly) insisted were proof of a scandal. It was more central to the American presence in Benghazi than the State Department, and more responsible for security there.
The C.I.A.'s role needs to be examined to understand what happened and how to better protect Americans.
Republicans have mostly fixated on the talking points that were the basis of comments made by Susan Rice, the ambassador to the United Nations, on television the Sunday after Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed. She said the siege seemed to have been a spontaneous protest hijacked by extremists, not a planned terrorist attack. Within days, Republicans in Congress were calling for her head. They later claimed the C.I.A. wanted to tell the truth but Ms. Rice and the administration cared only about protecting President Obama.
Under pressure, the White House has since released e-mails describing the interagency machinations behind the talking points, which David Petraeus, then the C.I.A. director, initiated at the request of Representative C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. As Karen DeYoung and Scott Wilson reported in The Washington Post on Wednesday, the e-mails show that Mr. Petraeus was critical to producing talking points "favorable to his image and his agency."
It was the C.I.A. that wrote in the first and subsequent drafts that the attacks were "spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault" on the American mission in Benghazi and a separate annex, operated by the C.I.A.
Early drafts said Islamic extremists with ties to Al Qaeda participated and that the news media had suggested a link to the Libyan militant group Ansar al-Sharia. In an apparent attempt to avoid blame for not heeding warnings, the C.I.A. said it produced "numerous pieces on extremists linked to Al Qaeda in Benghazi and eastern Libya."
Other e-mails show that it was the F.B.I., which led the inquiry, and the C.I.A.'s general counsel and deputy director who wanted references to Ansar al-Sharia deleted to avoid compromising the investigation. Another intelligence official wrote that there was no "actionable intelligence" that foretold an attack of the kind that occurred.
Republicans faulted the State Department for objecting to the C.I.A.'s initial draft. But the department seemed concerned mostly that the C.I.A. would say more to lawmakers than what could be shared with reporters or that the C.I.A. was trying to suggest that warnings about the attack had been ignored.
To a degree, the wrangling occurred because the C.I.A. annex was a classified operation. In fact, the C.I.A. was the main American presence on the ground in Benghazi, had relationships with local groups and was supposed to have the best fix on what was going on. There are serious questions as to why the agency did not have a better handle on security and didn't do a better job of vetting the local militia that was hired for protection.
The State Department did a full a public review of its behavior and accepted the conclusion that "systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels" in two bureaus created "a security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place." Reforms are under way. Congress needs to look closely at the C.I.A.'s role and insist that the agency do the same.
Adele
The New York Times
May 22, 2013
The C.I.A.'s Part in Benghazi
By THE EDITORIAL BOARD
Throughout months of Republican "investigation" into the tragedy in Benghazi, Libya, on Sept. 11 last year, the Central Intelligence Agency has escaped the scrutiny and partisan bashing aimed at the State Department and the White House. But we now know that the C.I.A., and not the State Department or the White House, originated the talking points that Republicans (wrongly) insisted were proof of a scandal. It was more central to the American presence in Benghazi than the State Department, and more responsible for security there.
The C.I.A.'s role needs to be examined to understand what happened and how to better protect Americans.
Republicans have mostly fixated on the talking points that were the basis of comments made by Susan Rice, the ambassador to the United Nations, on television the Sunday after Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed. She said the siege seemed to have been a spontaneous protest hijacked by extremists, not a planned terrorist attack. Within days, Republicans in Congress were calling for her head. They later claimed the C.I.A. wanted to tell the truth but Ms. Rice and the administration cared only about protecting President Obama.
Under pressure, the White House has since released e-mails describing the interagency machinations behind the talking points, which David Petraeus, then the C.I.A. director, initiated at the request of Representative C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. As Karen DeYoung and Scott Wilson reported in The Washington Post on Wednesday, the e-mails show that Mr. Petraeus was critical to producing talking points "favorable to his image and his agency."
It was the C.I.A. that wrote in the first and subsequent drafts that the attacks were "spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault" on the American mission in Benghazi and a separate annex, operated by the C.I.A.
Early drafts said Islamic extremists with ties to Al Qaeda participated and that the news media had suggested a link to the Libyan militant group Ansar al-Sharia. In an apparent attempt to avoid blame for not heeding warnings, the C.I.A. said it produced "numerous pieces on extremists linked to Al Qaeda in Benghazi and eastern Libya."
Other e-mails show that it was the F.B.I., which led the inquiry, and the C.I.A.'s general counsel and deputy director who wanted references to Ansar al-Sharia deleted to avoid compromising the investigation. Another intelligence official wrote that there was no "actionable intelligence" that foretold an attack of the kind that occurred.
Republicans faulted the State Department for objecting to the C.I.A.'s initial draft. But the department seemed concerned mostly that the C.I.A. would say more to lawmakers than what could be shared with reporters or that the C.I.A. was trying to suggest that warnings about the attack had been ignored.
To a degree, the wrangling occurred because the C.I.A. annex was a classified operation. In fact, the C.I.A. was the main American presence on the ground in Benghazi, had relationships with local groups and was supposed to have the best fix on what was going on. There are serious questions as to why the agency did not have a better handle on security and didn't do a better job of vetting the local militia that was hired for protection.
The State Department did a full a public review of its behavior and accepted the conclusion that "systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels" in two bureaus created "a security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place." Reforms are under way. Congress needs to look closely at the C.I.A.'s role and insist that the agency do the same.
Adele