13-06-2013, 04:46 PM
Jim an attempted thought re whether or not "change" happened from "Cold Warrior" stance.
Isn't this ambivalence what the whole JFK Assassination is about?
I mean its one thing for for you and I or Noam&Bill O'Reilly to say What we would do "were we president". That said, I am noticing a distinct dearth of Campaign Contributions to the Draft Heidenheimer movement from either General Dynamics or Huffington's Reconsidered Post-Divorce Suitureself.
You have succinctly shown just how strongly JFK differed from nearly every other Pol in DC re the question of whether 3rd world nationalist movements should be viewed as part or as distinct from the Cold War. You supplement Douglass with more examples and make the point about JFK during the 1950's more clearly than does Douglass; but he does mention some examples of this divergence from the 1950's McCarthyist norm.
What accounts for the difference, I think, is that in discussing politicians x,y,and z, views on the Cold War, we often fail to blend in the variable of to what extent the President actually controlled the National Security State. FDR was famous for juggling inter-deparmental end-runners because he became increasingly aware of how many steroids WWII was feeding the military branches and also how much each branch's self-interest was becoming detrimental to wider goals.
By the time of the Kennedy Presidency, The MICC had grown even stronger, and its ability to end-run the president via media sinews was much greater. So in stating that JFK was definitely not a "Cold Warrior" by the standards of Washington during the 1950's, it might not be a contradiction to also state that ANYONE elected to the presidency in the year 1960 would, of necessity, have to be a Cold Warrior to some extent. I don't think that this maneuvering of perception need be deemed "opportunism" either.
Is it opportunism to try to arrive in a position whereby one could restore the power of elected officials to stop a downhill toboggan if that official believed it were headed toward thin and tragic ice? Not in my view. It was democracy operating in a unique historical moment, and not a mellow one.
The missile gap rhetoric of JFK and other Cold War boiler plate need not be skirted. It is part of the historical moment. That said, it has been pointed out how the "Pay any price" part of the Inaugural address is often quoted from out of context to give the speech a more bellicose tone than was actually in the original.
The turning Douglass describes may well have been a turning from the posture ANY man elected in the Cold War context of 1960 needed to take in order to gain nominal control of the National Security State. Early experiences in the White House, Most notably Congo and Bay of Pigs, confirmed JFK's real views which were remarkably unique re the Cold War. The older views of JFK were confirmed by these experiences and now began to shine from the Executive Branch. That was dangerous for ourruling elites in a way that one dissident Senator was not.
The ambivalence between the older, more essentially Kennedy views and SOME of the Cold War garb he wore upon entering the White House is the same difference between the real power of the President v. the power of the national security state. Then there was grey area between real power and paper, flow chart power. That grey area has cleared up with the assassination, but it was never publicly acknowledged. For to do so would delegitimate a nations entire vocabulary for political power, the checks and balances scheme our rulers drum into every skull from NY to California. It would represent the most profound legitimation crisis imaginable.
If we recognize that parallel it is bad news for today's bipartisan merchants of political deception. The worst news possible. That is why the biggest lies are peddled to those readers who are the most likely dissidents.
Isn't this ambivalence what the whole JFK Assassination is about?
I mean its one thing for for you and I or Noam&Bill O'Reilly to say What we would do "were we president". That said, I am noticing a distinct dearth of Campaign Contributions to the Draft Heidenheimer movement from either General Dynamics or Huffington's Reconsidered Post-Divorce Suitureself.
You have succinctly shown just how strongly JFK differed from nearly every other Pol in DC re the question of whether 3rd world nationalist movements should be viewed as part or as distinct from the Cold War. You supplement Douglass with more examples and make the point about JFK during the 1950's more clearly than does Douglass; but he does mention some examples of this divergence from the 1950's McCarthyist norm.
What accounts for the difference, I think, is that in discussing politicians x,y,and z, views on the Cold War, we often fail to blend in the variable of to what extent the President actually controlled the National Security State. FDR was famous for juggling inter-deparmental end-runners because he became increasingly aware of how many steroids WWII was feeding the military branches and also how much each branch's self-interest was becoming detrimental to wider goals.
By the time of the Kennedy Presidency, The MICC had grown even stronger, and its ability to end-run the president via media sinews was much greater. So in stating that JFK was definitely not a "Cold Warrior" by the standards of Washington during the 1950's, it might not be a contradiction to also state that ANYONE elected to the presidency in the year 1960 would, of necessity, have to be a Cold Warrior to some extent. I don't think that this maneuvering of perception need be deemed "opportunism" either.
Is it opportunism to try to arrive in a position whereby one could restore the power of elected officials to stop a downhill toboggan if that official believed it were headed toward thin and tragic ice? Not in my view. It was democracy operating in a unique historical moment, and not a mellow one.
The missile gap rhetoric of JFK and other Cold War boiler plate need not be skirted. It is part of the historical moment. That said, it has been pointed out how the "Pay any price" part of the Inaugural address is often quoted from out of context to give the speech a more bellicose tone than was actually in the original.
The turning Douglass describes may well have been a turning from the posture ANY man elected in the Cold War context of 1960 needed to take in order to gain nominal control of the National Security State. Early experiences in the White House, Most notably Congo and Bay of Pigs, confirmed JFK's real views which were remarkably unique re the Cold War. The older views of JFK were confirmed by these experiences and now began to shine from the Executive Branch. That was dangerous for ourruling elites in a way that one dissident Senator was not.
The ambivalence between the older, more essentially Kennedy views and SOME of the Cold War garb he wore upon entering the White House is the same difference between the real power of the President v. the power of the national security state. Then there was grey area between real power and paper, flow chart power. That grey area has cleared up with the assassination, but it was never publicly acknowledged. For to do so would delegitimate a nations entire vocabulary for political power, the checks and balances scheme our rulers drum into every skull from NY to California. It would represent the most profound legitimation crisis imaginable.
If we recognize that parallel it is bad news for today's bipartisan merchants of political deception. The worst news possible. That is why the biggest lies are peddled to those readers who are the most likely dissidents.