Silencing The Critics of the Warren Commission - CIA Talking Points [Resurface]

[Peter Lemkin]

CounteringCriticism of the Warren Report Richard Helms, Director CIA
1April 1967
JFK01, p.1
CIAChiefs, Certain Stations and Bases
CIA Document Number1035-960
SECRET
SUBJECT:Countering Criticism of the Warren Report
ForOswald file! 2 copies
This was pulled together by ... in closeconjunction with.... We furnished most of the source material,proposed many of the themes, and provided general "expertise"on the case. The Spectator article was written 23 Jan 1967
PSYCH
1.Our Concern. From the day of President Kennedy's assassination on,there has been speculation about the responsibility for his murder.Although this was stemmed for a time by the Warren Commission report(which appeared at the end of September 1964), various writers havenow had time to scan the Commission's published report and documentsfor new pretexts for questioning, and there has been a new wave ofbooks and articles criticizing the Commission's findings. In mostcases the critics have speculated as to the existence of some kind ofconspiracy, and often they have implied that the Commission itselfwas involved. Presumably as a result of the increasing challenge tothe Warren Commission's Report, a public opinion poll recentlyindicated that 46% of the American public did not think that Oswaldacted alone, while more than half of those polled thought that theCommission had left some questions unresolved. Doubtless polls abroadwould show similar, or possibly more adverse, results.
2.This trend of opinion is a matter of concern to the U.S. government,including our organization. The members of the Warren Commission werenaturally chosen for their integrity, experience, and prominence.They represented both major parties, and they and their staff weredeliberately drawn from all sections of the country. Just because ofthe standing of the Commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitudeand wisdom tend to cast doubt on the whole leadership of Americansociety. Moreover, there seems to be an increasing tendency to hintthat President Johnson himself, as the one person who might be saidto have benefited, was in some way responsible for the assassination.Innuendo of such seriousness affects not only the individualconcerned, but also the whole reputation of the American government.Our organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, wecontributed information to the investigation. Conspiracy theorieshave frequently thrown suspicion on our organization, for example byfalsely alleging that Lee Harvey Oswald worked for us. The aim ofthis dispatch is to provide material for countering and discreditingthe claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit thecirculation of such claims in other countries. Background informationis supplied in a classified section and in a number of unclassifiedattachments.
3.Action. We do not recommend that discussion of the assassinationquestion be initiated where it is not already taking place. Wherediscussion is active, however, addressees are requested:
CSCOPY
9 attachments h/w
DATE 4/1/67
1- Satts

DESTROYWHEN NO LONGER NEEDED
JFK01, p.2
a.To discuss the publicity problem with liaison and friendly elitecontacts (especially politicians and editors), pointing out that theWarren Commission made as thorough an investigation as humanlypossible, that the charges of the critics are without seriousfoundation, and that further speculative discussion only plays intothe hands of the opposition. Point out also that parts of theconspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communistpropagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourageunfounded and irresponsible speculation.
b.To employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of thecritics. Book reviews and feature articles are particularlyappropriate for this purpose. The unclassified attachments to thisguidance should provide useful background material for passage toassets. Our play should point out, as applicable, that the criticsare (i) wedded to theories adopted before the evidence was in, (ii)politically interested, (iii) financially interested, (iv) hasty andinaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated with their owntheories. In the course of discussions of the whole phenomenon ofcriticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Epstein's theoryfor attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article and Spectatorpiece for background. (Although Mark Lane's book is much lessconvincing than Epstein's and comes off badly where contested byknowledgeable critics, it is also much more difficult to answer as awhole, as one becomes lost in a morass of unrelated details.)
4.In private or media discussion not directed at any particular writer,or in attacking publications which may be yet forthcoming, thefollowing arguments should be useful:
a.No significant new evidence has emerged which the Commission did notconsider. The assassination is sometimes compared (e.g., by JoachimJoesten and Bertrand Russell) with the Dreyfus case; however, unlikethat case, the attacks on the Warren Commission have produced no newevidence, no new culprits have been convincingly identified, andthere is no agreement among the critics. (A better parallel, thoughan imperfect one, might be with the Reichstag fire of 1933, whichsome competent historians (Fritz Tobias, A.J.P. Taylor, D.C. Watt)now believe was set by Van der Lubbe on his own initiative, withoutacting for either Nazis or Communists; the Nazis tried to pin theblame on the Communists, but the latter have been much moresuccessful in convincing the world that the Nazis were to blame.)
b.Critics usually overvalue particular items and ignore others. Theytend to place more emphasis on the recollections of individualeyewitnesses (which are less reliable and more divergent -- and henceoffer more hand-holds for criticism) and less on ballistic, autopsy,and photographic evidence. A close examination of the Commission'srecords will usually show that the conflicting eyewitness accountsare quoted out of context, or were discarded by the commission forgood and sufficient reason.
JFK01, p.3
c.Conspiracy on the large scale often suggested would be impossible toconceal in the United States, esp. since informants could expect toreceive large royalties, etc. Note that Robert Kennedy, AttorneyGeneral at the time and John F. Kennedy's brother, would be the lastman to overlook or conceal any conspiracy. And as one reviewerpointed out, Congressman Gerald R. Ford would hardly have held histongue for the sake of the Democratic administration, and SenatorRussell would have had every political interest in exposing anymisdeeds on the part of Chief Justice Warren. A conspirator moreoverwould hardly choose a location for a shooting where so much dependedon conditions beyond his control: the route, the speed of the cars,the moving target, the risk that the assassin would be discovered. Agroup of wealthy conspirators could have arranged much more secureconditions.
d.Critics have often been enticed by a form of intellectual pride: theylight on some theory and fall in love with it; they also scoff at theCommission because it did not always answer every question with aflat decision one way or the other. Actually, the make-up of theCommission and its staff was an excellent safeguard againstover-commitment to any one theory; or against the illicittransformation of probabilities into certainties.
JFK01, p.4
e.Oswald would not have been any sensible person's choice for aco-conspirator. He was a "loner," mixed-up, of questionablereliability and an unknown quantity to any professional intelligenceservice.
f.As to charges that the Commission's report was a rush job, it emergedthree months after the deadline originally set. But to the degreethat the Commission tried to speed up its reporting, this was largelydue to the pressure of irresponsible speculation already appearing,in some cases coming from the same critics who, refusing to admittheir errors, are now putting out new criticisms.
g.Such vague accusations as that "more than ten people have diedmysteriously" can always be explained in some more natural way:e.g., the individuals concerned have for the most part died ofnatural causes; the Commission staff questioned 418 witnesses (theFBI interviewed far more people, conducting 25,000 interviews andreinterviews), and in such a large group, a certain number of deathsare to be expected. (When Penn Jones, one of the originators of the"ten mysterious deaths" line, appeared on television, itemerged that two of the deaths on his list were from heart attacks,one from cancer, one was from a head-on collision on a bridge, andone occurred when a driver drifted into a bridge abutment.)
5.Where possible, counter speculation by encouraging reference to theCommission's Report itself. Open-minded foreign readers should stillbe impressed by the care, thoroughness, objectivity and speed withwhich the Commission worked. Reviewers of other books might beencouraged to add to their account the idea that, checking back withthe Report itself, they found it far superior to the work of itscritics.