US/NATO War on Russia

[Lauren Johnson]

From Pat Lang

"The West on the wrong path

In view of the events in Ukraine, the government and many media have switched from level-headed to agitated. The spectrum of opinions has been narrowed to the width of a sniper scope. The politics of escalation does not have a realistic goal and harms German interests.
…
Newspapers we thought to be all about thoughts and ideas now march in lock-step with politicians in their calls for sanctions against Russia's President Putin. Even the headlines betray an aggressive tension as is usually characteristic of hooligans when they 'support' their respective teams.

The Tagesspiegel: "Enough talk!" The FAZ: "Show strength". The Süddeutsche Zeitung: "Now or never." The Spiegel calls for an "End to cowardice": "Putin's web of lies, propaganda, and deception has been exposed. The wreckage of MH 17 is also the result of a crashed diplomacy."

Western politics and German media agree.

Every reflexive string of accusations results in the same outcome: in no time allegations and counter-allegations become so entangled that the facts become almost completely obscured.
…
Our purpose is to wipe off some of the foam that has formed on the debating mouths, to steal words from the mouths of both the rabble-rousers and the roused, and put new words there instead. One word that has become disused of late is this: realism."

I wholeheartedly agree with the general tenor of this rather remarkable Leitartikel. The Essay is available in German, English and Russian.

[B]#1 - Geography holds Europe hostage to US follies[/B]

The author is absolutely correct in observing that unlike the US, we have to be a little more serious in our relationship towards Russia and look beyond domestic political expedience. After all, we live here. The US have the luxury of distance from the mess it stirs up of late in Ukraine (or in the Middle East for that matter).

US trade with Ukraine or Russia is neglectable. They don't pay a price in the civil war in Ukraine either: The Ukrainians do the killing and the dying, and the US in the meanwhile merrily blames Putin for everything. More, the US will not for years poison their relations with an immediate neigbour (Alaska nobody in DC cares about anyway).

For Poland, the Batic States and Germany, there are immediate real life consequences of generating Russian hostility. Not only will we be less secure as a result of it, we will also pay for it economically, and pay for what?

The Handlesblatt article rightly points out that "If economic ties were maintained for mutual profit, then severing them will lead to mutual loss. Punishment and self-punishment are the same thing in this case."

So we are supposed to punish ourselves so the Obama administration can feel good about themselves and increase their electoral chances at home by pandering to latent US russophobic sentiments? True: Considering how mindlessly aggressive as their policy is, they cannot possibly be outhawked here.

[B]#2 - Let's assume Russia is on its knees. And then?[/B]

That last question is a very serious question that nobody in America is asking, let alone answering in a serious way. If anything, it is as if the US political scene and the court journalists look at this as fans cheering on a soccer match. Only that it isn't and we're talking about baiting a nuclear power.

If the US got Russia back on their knees again, as it was under the execrable drunken bum that was Jelzin, the US better prepare for a backlash. Russia not just Putin but whole of Russia - will never forgive that. No German in his right mind wants a hostile Russia to the east, bent on revenge. The US, thanks to the luxury of geographic isolation and a couple thousand nukes, can look more relaxed at this.

Also, it is beyond me how someone like McFaul was was at least nominally in a position to have learned something about Russia, can portray the days of misery and rampant looting that characterized the Jelzin era as anything but dystopic. Probably it was so much fun because he had been let in on the joke. The majority of Russians weren't.

Jelzin needed to do something profoundly undemocratic to push through US economic shock therapy - shoot up Moscow's parliament. The Jelzin era pretty much sucked unless your name was something like Chodorkowski. Russians knew it. A slogan like that "Putin gave Russia back its pride" would not have resonated if the Russians had shared McFaul's cheery view of how wonderful the Jelzin era was. [B]

#3 - Back to Ukraine - the German proposal for a settlement in Ukraine, and MH17[/B]

The German proposal for a settlement in Ukraine had the following elements:

• Russia will withdraw support for separatists
  
• Kiev will grant separatists devolved rights
  
• Ukraine will not enter NATO
  
• Russia will not block or interfere with Ukraines trade relations with the EU
  
• Russia offers long term agreement on gas supply and pricing
  
• Russia compensates for loss of rent for Sevastopol harbour until declaration of independence
  

This package was then or is now palatable for the US. Germany and Russia had made good progress on the deal. If it ever came back on the table again, the US will do their best to sabotage the offer at every turn: While we don't have an interest in the Ukraine crisis, they do.

The US, just like the right-wing radicals in the Ukrainian government had a clear incentive to stop that deal dead since it would deprive them of their splendid little crisis. And along came, fortuitously, the MH17 shootdown.

[B]#4 - Vowärts immer, rückwärts nimmer![/B]

That motto, first expressed by the late Erich Honecker has by now become the official motto of the US state department and indeed, this proud creed permeates US foreign policy over the last decade.

The Handelsblatt put it well when they referred to the American tendency for verbal and then also military escalation, isolation, demonization and attacking of enemies, and more often than not they are enemies of choice, choosen wilfully.

The US routinely climbed up this latter from blustering insult up to political paralysis or outright bombardment, only to see their efforts end in failure, and they just can't seem to be able to make their way down again (loss of face and all that). Apparently the way is the goal, which is why we see them do the same stupid thing again, and again, and again.

sanctions [on Russia] have become and end in themselves for the United States [and that] my outsider's impression is that the US foreign policy for Russia has been pretty much captured by doctrinaire anti-Russians in a diplomatic and military deep state that pretty much permeates and survives every incoming administration - See more at: http://www.conflictsforum.org/2014/ukrai...NtPYv.dpuf
[B]#5 - Method to the madness[/B]

Peter Lee is correct to say that sanctions on Russia

"have become and end in themselves for the United States [and that] my outsider's impression is that the US foreign policy for Russia has been pretty much captured by doctrinaire anti-Russians in a diplomatic and military deep state that pretty much permeates and survives every incoming administration"

The conflictsforum, in their comment The Risks of Strategic Incoherence observe something deeper at work:

"Perhaps the only area where there is clear US policy is on Ukraine, where the neo-con element within the US Administration has been haranguing Europeans to enact tougher sanctions on Russia (though Washington has not as EU politicians are beginning to complain explained to them why the penalties in question are required; or why they make strategic sense i.e. in possibly damaging EU businesses more than Russian ones).

The effect of this particular activism however has been no less dysfunctional as in cases where the Administration has opted for passivity (or succumbed to internal paralysis). The Administration efforts to undermine Angela Merkal's efforts to work with Putin towards a diplomatic solution of the Ukraine crisis (by urging Poroshenko to undertake yet more military action), its arm-twisting on sanctions and its brushing aside of German concerns about US spying have put a key alliance (that with Germany) in real jeopardy. It has split the EU too: with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia favouring conciliation with Russia, a further camp' which inclines to the German line, and a much smaller block of opponents of Russia (Poland and the three Baltic countries in particular), who take the American line.
…
It is hard not to conclude that the US escalation against Russia (and against Putin personally) has more to do with domestic political tactics and lacks any deeper desire to try to understand the strategic risks inherent in allowing incoherence to dominate across a range of very volatile situations. Just to be clear, this is not to suggest that America or Europe should act more. They should not. But if it is thought easier' to let events take care of themselves, with little further understanding required they should not then be surprised at being surprised by events. The lacunae is deeper understanding. It is this omission that defines the quality of geo-political risk that we face now.

And what accounts for it? Why is it that so many highly dangerous issues the repeat firing-up of radical Sunni Islam, the proxy war in Ukraine, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the approaching deadline on the Iran negotiations and the repression in Gaza are being met by strategic incoherence? It is not that senior officials do not get it'. Many of them do: yet they seem sealed in an intellectual and political retort that renders them unable to take decisions, or to challenge worn out policy shibboleths.
...
Perhaps the only area where there is clear US policy is on Ukraine, where the neo-con element within the US Administration has been haranguing Europeans to enact tougher sanctions on Russia (though Washington has not as EU politicians are beginning to complain explained to them why the penalties in question are required; or why they make strategic sense i.e. in possibly damaging EU businesses more than Russian ones). The effect of this particular activism however has been no less dysfunctional as in cases where the Administration has opted for passivity (or succumbed to internal paralysis). The Administration efforts to undermine Angela Merkal's efforts to work with Putin towards a diplomatic solution of the Ukraine crisis (by urging Poroshenko to undertake yet more military action), its arm-twisting on sanctions and its brushing aside of German concerns about US spying have put a key alliance (that with Germany) in real jeopardy. It has split the EU too: with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia favouring conciliation with Russia, a further camp' which inclines to the German line, and a much smaller block of opponents of Russia (Poland and the three Baltic countries in particular), who take the American line.

Here too we find a paradox: The prevalent western meme is that is that while western diplomatic sanctions against Russia have been treated with derision, the one thing that will severely cripple the Russian economy is America's unilateral sanction of a capital market embargo, which has been imposed on certain Russian businesses: Russian companies are facing $115 billion of debt repayment due over the next 12 months, and no Russian Eurobond issue has been successfully priced since Crimea. But as Bloomberg reports, the expectation that Russia's major corporations will be crippled may prove to be fanciful:

"Russian companies, facing $115 billion of debt due over the next 12 months, will have the funds even as bond markets shut because of the Ukraine crisis, according to Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings. Firms will have about $100 billion in cash and earnings at their disposal during the next 18 months, Moody's said in an analysis of 47 businesses. Almost all 55 companies examined by Fitch are "well placed" to withstand a closed refinancing market for the rest of 2014, it said in a note on 16 April. Banks have more than $20 billion in foreign currency to lend as the tensions prompted customers to convert their rouble savings", ZAO Raiffeisenbank said.

"The amount of cash on balances of Russian companies, committed credit lines from banks and the operating cash flows they will get is sufficient for the companies to comfortably service their liabilities," Denis Perevezentsev, an analyst at Moody's in Moscow, said by phone".

It is hard not to conclude that the US escalation against Russia (and against Putin personally) has more to do with domestic political tactics and lacks any deeper desire to try to understand the strategic risks inherent in allowing incoherence to dominate across a range of very volatile situations. Just to be clear, this is not to suggest that America or Europe should act more. They should not. But if it is thought easier' to let events take care of themselves, with little further understanding required they should not then be surprised at being surprised by events. The lacunae is deeper understanding. It is this omission that defines the quality of geo-political risk that we face now.

And what accounts for it? Why is it that so many highly dangerous issues the repeat firing-up of radical Sunni Islam, the proxy war in Ukraine, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the approaching deadline on the Iran negotiations and the repression in Gaza are being met by strategic incoherence? It is not that senior officials do not get it'. Many of them do: yet they seem sealed in an intellectual and political retort that renders them unable to take decisions, or to challenge worn out policy shibboleths.

- See more at: http://www.conflictsforum.org/2014/confl...WEmP9.dpuf
Perhaps the only area where there is clear US policy is on Ukraine, where the neo-con element within the US Administration has been haranguing Europeans to enact tougher sanctions on Russia (though Washington has not as EU politicians are beginning to complain explained to them why the penalties in question are required; or why they make strategic sense i.e. in possibly damaging EU businesses more than Russian ones).

The effect of this particular activism however has been no less dysfunctional as in cases where the Administration has opted for passivity (or succumbed to internal paralysis). The Administration efforts to undermine Angela Merkal's efforts to work with Putin towards a diplomatic solution of the Ukraine crisis (by urging Poroshenko to undertake yet more military action), its arm-twisting on sanctions and its brushing aside of German concerns about US spying have put a key alliance (that with Germany) in real jeopardy. It has split the EU too: with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia favouring conciliation with Russia, a further camp' which inclines to the German line, and a much smaller block of opponents of Russia (Poland and the three Baltic countries in particular), who take the American line.

Here too we find a paradox: The prevalent western meme is that is that while western diplomatic sanctions against Russia have been treated with derision, the one thing that will severely cripple the Russian economy is America's unilateral sanction of a capital market embargo, which has been imposed on certain Russian businesses: Russian companies are facing $115 billion of debt repayment due over the next 12 months, and no Russian Eurobond issue has been successfully priced since Crimea. But as Bloomberg reports, the expectation that Russia's major corporations will be crippled may prove to be fanciful:

"Russian companies, facing $115 billion of debt due over the next 12 months, will have the funds even as bond markets shut because of the Ukraine crisis, according to Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings. Firms will have about $100 billion in cash and earnings at their disposal during the next 18 months, Moody's said in an analysis of 47 businesses. Almost all 55 companies examined by Fitch are "well placed" to withstand a closed refinancing market for the rest of 2014, it said in a note on 16 April. Banks have more than $20 billion in foreign currency to lend as the tensions prompted customers to convert their rouble savings", ZAO Raiffeisenbank said.

"The amount of cash on balances of Russian companies, committed credit lines from banks and the operating cash flows they will get is sufficient for the companies to comfortably service their liabilities," Denis Perevezentsev, an analyst at Moody's in Moscow, said by phone".

It is hard not to conclude that the US escalation against Russia (and against Putin personally) has more to do with domestic political tactics and lacks any deeper desire to try to understand the strategic risks inherent in allowing incoherence to dominate across a range of very volatile situations. Just to be clear, this is not to suggest that America or Europe should act more. They should not. But if it is thought easier' to let events take care of themselves, with little further understanding required they should not then be surprised at being surprised by events. The lacunae is deeper understanding. It is this omission that defines the quality of geo-political risk that we face now.

And what accounts for it? Why is it that so many highly dangerous issues the repeat firing-up of radical Sunni Islam, the proxy war in Ukraine, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the approaching deadline on the Iran negotiations and the repression in Gaza are being met by strategic incoherence? It is not that senior officials do not get it'. Many of them do: yet they seem sealed in an intellectual and political retort that renders them unable to take decisions, or to challenge worn out policy shibboleths.

- See more at: http://www.conflictsforum.org/2014/confl...WEmP9.dpuf

The point here is that in neoliberal society there is no one who really manages political power. The economy regulates itself (through individuals maximizing their material self interest, which in aggregate, coalesce to maximize the welfare of society as a whole). Neo-liberals always seek to let these unseen market forces work unimpeded, so that they may yield the market verdict'. What we seem to be witnessing are the same technocratic' principles applied to foreign policy. In foreign policy, the dynamics of power are seen to yield their own rational market verdict' as power plays are "allowed to take care of themselves". The international market' of power plays, by extension, should be allowed to act out relatively unimpeded too."

I think they are both right and that these two things put together are among the driving factors in European and US foreign policy at the time. It apparently yet has to dawn on the Obamaites that it is foolhardy to let 'market dynamics' run their way in a game involving nukes.

Indeed. Why not roll dice for armageddon?