Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report Soon to disappear as no one wants to know about it.

[Magda Hassan]

http://www.fcic.gov/report

• Download Full Report with Dissents (PDF)
  
• Table of Contents
  
• Commissioners
  
• Commissioner votes
  
• Staff list
  
• Preface
  
• Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
  
• Part I: Crisis on the Horizon
  • Chapter 1: Before Our Very Eyes
    
  
  
• Part II: Setting the Stage
  • Chapter 2: Shadow Banking
    
  • Chapter 3: Securitization and Derivatives
    
  • Chapter 4: Deregulation Redux
    
  • Chapter 5: Subprime Lending
    
  
  
• Part III: The Boom and Bust
  • Chapter 6: Credit Expansion and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 7: The Mortgage Machine and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 8: The CDO Machine and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 9: All In and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 10: The Madness and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 11: The Bust and Conclusion
    
  
  
• Part IV: The Unraveling
  • Chapter 12: Early 2007: Spreading subprime Worries and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 13: Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 14: Late 2007 to Early 2008: Billions in Subprime Losses and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 15: March 2008: The Fall of Bear Stearns and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 16: March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 17: September 2008: The Takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 18: September 2008: The Bankruptcy of Lehman and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 19: September 2008: The Bailout of AIG and Conclusion
    
  • Chapter 20: Crisis and Panic and Conclusion
    
  
  
• Part V: The Aftershocks
  • Chapter 21: The Economic Fallout
    
  • Chapter 22: The Foreclosure Crisis and Conclusion
    
  
  
• Dissenting Views By Keith Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Bill Thomas
  
• Dissenting Views By Peter J. Wallison
  
• Appendix A: Glossary
  
• Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
  
• Notes
  
• Index
  
• Errata
  

How did it come to pass that in 2008 our nation was forced to choose between two stark and painful alternatives either risk the collapse of our financial system and economy, or commit trillions of taxpayer dollars to rescue major corporations and our financial markets, as millions of Americans still lost their jobs, their savings, and their homes?
The Commission concluded that this crisis was avoidable. It found widespread failures in financial regulation; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance; excessive borrowing and risk-taking by households and Wall Street; policy makers who were ill prepared for the crisis; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels. Here we present what we found so readers can reach their own conclusions, even as the comprehensive historical record of this crisis continues to be written.
Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Dissent Joined by Keith Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Bill Thomas
Dissent by Peter J. Wallison