America's Mexican Border Wars

[Magda Hassan]

More like a big big deep black lie. (though I know it is a reference to Levine's book) I wonder how they will deal with this? They are not looking good.

[David Guyatt]

http://narcosphere.narconews.com/noteboo...-cia-fraud

Former DEA agent's lawsuit exposes CIA "fraud"
Posted by Bill Conroy - July 26, 2009 at 4:16 pm
Litigation also claims spook agency engages in wholesale spying on other federal agencies
The CIA was recently caught with its pants down.
As part of the course of his 15-year legal battle with the CIA, former DEA agent Richard Horn finally got the opportunity to demonstrate to the world that the emperor of clandestine activity has no clothes.
The secretive government agency is now coping with the embarrassing exposure of its deceit in a lawsuit filed by Horn, who previously served as the DEA’s country attaché in Burma (now officially known as the Union of Myanmar) from June 1992 to September 1993. In addition, the events that prompted the CIA’s lie appear to point to serious dysfunction within the agency that potentially poses a threat to the very U.S. national security it is charged with protecting.
The judge in Horn’s civil case, which is still pending in federal court in Washington, D.C., recently ruled that the CIA had committed a fraud on his court by failing to reveal in a timely manner that a CIA employee — who is key to Horn’s case — is no longer considered a covert operative. In fact, that employee, Arthur Brown, who served as CIA station chief in Burma at the same time Horn was DEA’s top gun in that Southeast Asian nation, had his official CIA cover lifted in 2002. The judge, Royce Lamberth, determined, based on pleadings filed in Horn’s case, that those responsible for the fraud allegedly include several attorneys with the CIA’s Office of General Counsel, and Brown himself.
The assertion of Brown’s covert status was key to the government’s defense in the Horn case since it was from that premise that former CIA Director George Tenant argued in 2000 court pleadings that Horn could not proceed with his case because the evidence he would need to present to prove his allegations was protected by state secrets privilege — a legal cloak designed to protect national security interests.
After Tenant filed his declaration with the court invoking state secrets privilege, Judge Lamberth discovered that several CIA attorneys were likely aware as early as 2002 that Brown was no longer officially deemed to be undercover, yet those attorneys and Brown failed to inform the court. That deception resulted in a ruling by Lamberth, and subsequently a U.S. Appeals Court, that hamstrung Horn’s case under national security restrictions and led to Brown being dismissed as a defendant in the case.
Earlier this week, Horn’s case finally made it onto the radar of the mainstream media after Judge Lamberth, clearly upset with the CIA’s dishonesty in the case, ordered that the court pleadings in Horn’s case be unsealed and made available for public viewing. The judge also ordered that Brown be reinstated as a defendant in the case and also indicated he would entertain civil, and possibly criminal, sanctions against Brown and several CIA attorneys as a consequence of the “fraud” they allegedly perpetrated against the court.
Narco News has previously reported at length on the Horn case in a 2004 story that was based on leaked court pleadings. That story can be found at this link.
Horn’s lawsuit was filed in 1994 against Brown and State Department Chief of Mission in Burma Franklin Huddle Jr., who also was stationed in Burma at the same time Horn served as DEA’s country attaché. In the litigation, both Brown and Huddle are accused of violating Horn’s constitutional rights by conspiring to plant an eavesdropping bug in his government-leased quarters in Burma. Horn also alleges in the lawsuit that the eavesdropping was part of a larger effort by Brown and Horn to undermine DEA’s anti-narcotics mission in Burma.
From Horn’s lawsuit:
While stationed in Burma, Horn made substantial progress working in concert with the Burmese government to improve its performance to address major drug issues, and Burma is and was the leading opium producing country in the world and is a major source country for the heroin that enters the United States. Even though the country of Burma was making substantial progress in its drug law enforcement efforts, Defendant Charge Huddle was sending reports to the Department of State stating that the government of Burma was not making any progress. Horn strongly encouraged Defendant Huddle to more accurately report on the drug situation in Burma to policy makers in Washington.
Horn alleges further that as a result of his efforts to expose Brown and Huddle’s dishonest agenda, the two launched a campaign to discredit him — which included illegally eavesdropping on his conversations in order to, among other motivations, dig up some dirt. The eavesdropping effort failed to produce any damaging information against Horn, yet in September 1993, Horn alleges, Huddle used his State Department authority to expel the DEA agent from Burma.
More from Horn’s litigation:
These actions by the Defendants [Brown and Huddle] were taken in furtherance of their political and personal agenda to thwart and undermine DEA’s mission in Burma … and to retaliate against Plaintiff [Horn] for Plaintiff's urging that the truth regarding Burma's drug enforcement efforts, which were substantial, be told to the U.S. Congress and the executive branch; whereas the DOS [Department of State] and CIA in its report to Congress desired to deny Burma any credit for its drug enforcement efforts. Plaintiff's “whistleblowing” would harm the dishonest DOS and CIA agenda, and thus the reason for Defendants’ actions. [Emphasis added.]
Twisted Course
Horn’s case will now proceed, for the most part, in the light of public sunshine, under special procedures designed to protect, yet still entertain as evidence, sensitive government disclosures, according to Judge Lamberth’s recent rulings.
However, current CIA Director Leon Panetta is still seeking to invoke the state secrets privilege claim in the Horn case going forward, requesting that certain evidence, such as portions of two Office of Inspector General investigations into Horn’s allegations, be declared off limits for purposes of evidence in Horn’s case due to their national security implications.
But Judge Lamberth has already taken issue with Panetta’s claims, pointing out that his declarations on that front — one classified and one unclassified — contain contradictory information.
From a recent ruling issued by Lamberth:
Confusingly, Director Panetta’s unclassified declaration appears to significantly conflict with his classified declaration. His unclassified declaration states that: “Plaintiff [Horn] has provided a declaration in which he stated that the alleged wiretap at issue [the one allegedly planted in Horn’s government home in Burma through the orchestrations of Brown and Horn] … was allegedly the result of an eavesdropping transmitter placed under a coffee table located in [Horn’s] residence in Burma. … To the extent that this is his allegation, he is permitted to proceed with discovery to determine whether such a transmitter was used.”
Panetta later states, however, that [Horn] cannot inquire into information about the “U.S. Government’s capabilities to conduct electronic surveillance.” If a method of intelligence is unclassified and publicly available, it is not immediately apparent why it suddenly becomes a state secret to even argue that it could be used by the U.S. Government. Moreover, [Horn] makes a credible argument not only that the device is publicly known, but that the fact that the government uses this type of device is publicly available, as this type of device is on display at the Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. Indeed, Panetta’s classified … declaration significantly conflicts with the unclassified declaration and appears to acknowledge that the plaintiff can present evidence as to the coffee table eavesdropping transmitter, even if it is used by the U.S. government.
That battle is still to be fought in Horn’s case. But there is a larger issue raised in the Horn case that seems to shed some light on the CIA’s still ongoing extraordinary efforts to shield elements of the case under the draconian cloak of state secrets privilege.
The larger issue appears to be revealed in some of the other charges raised in Horn’s litigation. In addition to the eavesdropping allegations and the accusations that State Department Chief of Mission Huddle was sending misleading reports to Congress and executive branch agencies about Burma’s anti-narcotics efforts, Horn also contends that CIA Chief of Station Brown attempted to sabotage a DEA informant and also sought to undermine DEA’s high-level liaison contact with the government of Burma.
From Horn’s pleadings:
Included in this category was Horn's complaint that Brown surreptitiously obtained and delivered a sensitive DEA document, which he well knew was signed by a DEA informant, to an official of the government of Burma. [Horn] asserts this act was accomplished without ever consulting Plaintiff [Horn] or a representative of DEA. [Horn] asserts that Brown knew the government of Burma would likely engage in some form of retribution against the informant after seeing the document.
… In approximately September, 1992, Mr. Brown asked me [Horn] to introduce him to DEA's liaison contact. I refused, not wanting the Government of Burma to confuse the DEA mission with the CIA mission. DEA's mission was much different than the CIA's mission. It was the Government of Burma who designated who was to be each of the U.S. Government agencies’ liaison persons operating in Burma. Since the Burmese Government had designated DEA’s liaison in Burma, I, in conjunction with my superiors, believed that it was inappropriate for me to introduce my liaison contact to Brown, nor did DEA believe it was appropriate for Brown to share DEA’s liaison contact, since it was the Government of Burma that chose who was the contact. … Subsequently, in approximately November, 1992, Defendant Huddle told me that Defendant Brown approached him suggesting that he (Huddle) order me to restrict DEA liaison to police, and specifically, DEA discontinue contact with its present high-level contact [within the Burmese government]. Huddle told me he denied Defendant Brown's request. Huddle asked me to hold this conversation in confidence and not to reveal to Defendant Brown that I knew his motives.
Those revelations are important when connected with another piece of information disclosed in a declaration filed by Horn with the court. That declaration reveals that Horn had asked for help from Brown and the CIA in targeting a major narco-trafficker who was operating from an office in Rangoon, Burma.
More from Horn’s court pleadings:
During the same month, Horn discussed electronic eavesdropping with Brown. Horn asked Brown if his agency had the capability and interest to assist Horn in conducting an electronic telephone intercept (in DEA parlance a Title III, or in CIA parlance a "teletap") on the business phone of a major international trafficker who had an office in Rangoon [Burma].
[Emphasis added. A large block blacked-out text follows the above sentence in Horn’s declaration.]
The Agenda
Assuming Horn’s allegations are on the money, it does not seem an unreasonable speculation that part of Brown and CIA’s motives in thwarting DEA’s mission in Burma at the time might have been to protect the narco-trafficker, and possibly others, who would be compromised by a DEA investigation. And why would Brown, or the CIA, do such a thing if those DEA targets were not somehow deemed valuable to the CIA — possibly active CIA assets?
If that is the case, it might explain why the CIA, with the help of the State Department, sought to defang Horn in Burma.
In fact, as part of his litigation, Horn filed a class-action complaint on behalf of DEA agents who he claims have been subjected to similar clandestine efforts by CIA to sabotage their work overseas. The court dismissed the class-action complaint, but Horn’s attorney told Narco News that the issue might well be raised again as the case proceeds in the wake of the CIA’s past alleged deceits.
From the class-action complaint filed by Horn:
The interception of Hom's conversation [in Burma] was accomplished through a concerted effort by the Department of State, the CIA, and the NSA [which is part of the Department of Defense]. When later stationed in New Orleans as a Group Supervisor for DEA, Special Agent Horn [who is now retired from the DEA] acquired reliable information that it was a pattern and practice of the three Defendant agencies to intercept conversations that DEA agents and others had either from their GLQ's [government-leased quarters] in foreign posts, or from DEA offices at American Embassies, and Consulates and other locations at foreign posts. This pattern and practice was not isolated to this one incident in Rangoon, Burma, nor was it isolated to Special Agent Horn, nor was it isolated to the country of Burma, but instead, it was a pattern and practice of the three Defendant agencies to conduct such activity in other foreign posts wherein DEA has offices.
… Special Agent Horn and all of the DEA foreign post class Plaintiffs allege that it is a pattern and practice of these three Defendant agencies to unlawfully intercept and disclose conversations of DEA agents, other DEA employees, and family members at and from DEA agent offices, and their GLQ's and other locations at foreign posts, on a worldwide basis, and that this pattern and practice has existed for many years, and continues to be done by the three Defendant agencies against DEA Special Agents, employees, and family members serving in foreign posts, and will likely be continued in the future.
Horn’s attorney, Brian Leighton, a former federal prosecutor, told Narco News that he is convinced that this CIA surveillance dragnet is still quite active.
“I believe the CIA is still spying on DEA overseas,” he says.
The purpose of this extensive surveillance of other federal agents, according to Leighton, is to assure that law enforcement's overseas missions remain subsurvient to CIA’s agenda.
“Rick [Horn] is seeking monetary damages in his case, but he also wants to expose this [the covert surveillance] so that someone in Congress wakes up and realizes that DEA can’t be treated like the red-headed stepchild when it comes to overseas missions,” Leighton says. “We can’t assign DEA overseas and expect them to do their jobs and then let the CIA and State Department prevent them from doing that job, unless it is related to some huge, legitimate issue where an exception is warranted.
“But in that case, it can’t be the CIA deciding [what the exception is] because the CIA thinks its lunch menu should be classified. So it has to be someone outside that agency making these decisions.”
Narco News did seek a response from CIA about whether it engages in surveillance of DEA agents overseas.
CIA spokesman George Little provided the following response:
Separate and apart from any specific instance, this kind of allegation is absurd. The CIA is a foreign intelligence organization.
Brown, Huddle and the CIA itself have denied any role in setting up surveillance on Horn while he was stationed in Burma, according to court pleadings.
However, in court pleadings in the Horn case, Leighton points out that Michael E. Grivsky, an investigator with the CIA’s Office of Inspector General, told Horn “that former Rangoon [CIA Chief of Station] Arthur Brown may very well have employed a local informant to initiate the illegal intercept [of Horn] and not gone through official channels or utilized conventional CIA resources.”
That may well be the case. But even so, it still opens up a can of worms for the CIA, one the agency undoubtedly would like to keep shielded from public view.
Because, if the surveillance of Horn, and the accompanying efforts to sabotage DEA’s mission in Burma, occurred as alleged by Horn, and that activity was not part of an official CIA operation, then it means Brown was acting as a rogue agent in conjunction with Huddle, his cohort at the State Department.
If that’s the case, and the CIA, Congress and the White House does not come to grips with that reality, but instead seeks to continue shielding such activity under national security, what is to prevent such rogue activities from being carried out by other CIA officials now and in the future, since there would seem to be no check in place to discourage such adventurism?
It would seem, in such a case, the very core of national security, and the ability of the president of the nation to assure its preservation, would be put at risk, left to the unchecked avarice of CIA and State Department bureaucrats seeking to protect their turf, political agendas and career aspirations.
On a wide enough scale, tolerance by our elected leaders of such mechanizations, for the sake of avoiding political embarrassment or blowback, would subject the democracy to the capricious agenda of a self-interested group of bureaucrats who are beyond the control of even the White House. Even more disconcerting is the possiblity that this alleged CIA sabotage mission is actually officially sanctioned from within the agency’s covert chambers, in which case we may already be well on our way to becoming subjects of a shadow government.
Stay tuned….

And

http://www.narconews.com/Issue34/article1063.html

DEA Agent’s Whistleblower Case Exposes the “War on Drugs” as a “War of Pretense”
Agent’s Sealed Legal Case Dismissed on National Security Grounds; Details Leaked to Narco News

By Bill Conroy
Special to The Narco News Bulletin
September 7, 2004

Former DEA agent Richard Horn has been fighting the U.S. government for the past 10 years trying to prove the CIA illegally spied on him as part of an effort to thwart his mission in the Southeast Asian country of Burma.

After being removed from his post in Burma, Horn filed litigation in federal court in Washington, D.C., in 1994 accusing top officials for the CIA and State Department in Burma of violating his Fourth Amendment rights.

After languishing in the federal court system for some 10 years, Horn’s case was dismissed in late July of this year after crucial evidence in the case was suppressed on national security grounds. Because the entire court record had been sealed by the judge, no one would have even known that Horn’s case was torpedoed, if it were not for the fact that an anonymous source leaked the judge’s ruling to Narco News.

Horn served in the early 1990s as the DEA country attaché to Burma – which ranks as one of the top opium poppy producing countries in the world.

As the highest-ranking in-country DEA representative in Burma (also known as Myanmar), Horn was charged with overseeing the agency’s mission in that country of eradicating the opium poppy, which is used to produce heroin.

From the start, Horn ran into problems with the top U.S. State Department official in Burma, Charge d’Affaires Franklin Huddle Jr., and the CIA chief of station in Burma at the time, Arthur M. Brown.

Horn’s attorney, Brian Leighton, describes what Horn was up against in Burma in a letter he sent in 1997 to U.S. Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala. In the letter, Leighton claims Huddle and Brown were bent on portraying the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) – the oppressive military junta ruling Burma – in the worst possible light.

However, Horn, according to the letter to Shelby, had made inroads in gaining the assistance of the SLORC in working toward opium poppy eradication in Burma. Horn’s success set in motion a series of overt and clandestine efforts on the part of Huddle and Brown to undermine DEA efforts in the region, Leighton alleges.

The reason, Leighton claimed in a recent phone interview, was that if Horn’s strategy proved successful, it would have undercut the State Department’s goal of vilifying the SLORC in the eyes of Congress and the public at large.

Sources within the intelligence community, however, tell Narco News that the CIA’s motivations in the region are likely far more complex, and that Horn simply found himself in the path of the Agency’s buzz saw.

In the end, Huddle managed to get Horn run out of Burma through the machinations of the State Department, Leighton contends, but only after Horn discovered that the CIA had planted eavesdropping equipment in his private quarters in Burma.

Horn’s attorney claims the bug was planted by Brown or one of his cronies as part of an effort to set up Horn and to undermine DEA’s mission in Burma. The eavesdropping, in the end, failed to produce any dirt that could be used against Horn, but it was a clear violation of his civil rights, according to Leighton.

Sources within DEA contend Horn’s claims against the CIA and State Department are on target, adding that the Department of Justice went as far as to claim that no U.S. citizen is protected from eavesdropping by its government when overseas.

“Horn’s whole story is true,” contends one DEA source. “They spied on his home, and the Department of Justice defended the CIA’s actions.”

Horn’s attorney, in his letter to Sen. Shelby, contends that the CIA’s net is far wider than Burma, and that the Agency regularly spies on DEA agents overseas:

… My client has learned that many DEA agents have been the subject of electronic eavesdropping by the State Department and our U.S. intelligence agencies.
… There are, no doubt, countless times when DEA’s operation plans have been foiled by “the listeners,” without DEA even knowing what happened.

What really happened in the Horn case, though, is not supposed to come out, if the government has its way. From the start, Horn’s litigation was sealed and critical evidence that could have supported his claims censored by the court.

Specifically, the evidence – two federal Inspector General (IG) reports that centered on Horn’s accusations – was determined by the court to be protected from disclosure based on something called state secrets privilege. The privilege, which was established as part of a 1953 Supreme Court ruling known as the Reynolds case, allows the government to deep-six information if it is deemed a threat to national security.

“Having determined that state secrets privilege bars disclosure of the IG Reports and certain attachments … the case cannot continue and must be dismissed,” wrote U.S. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth in his July 28, 2004, ruling in the Horn case. “As a result of the state secrets privilege, plaintiff cannot make out a … case, defendants cannot present facts necessary to their defense and the very subject matter at the heart of this case is protected from disclosure as a state secret.”

Leighton says he plans to appeal the judge’s ruling in the case.

Horn’s Charges

So what are these terrible state secrets that must be protected at all costs – even at the expense of Horn’s constitutional rights? Well, we may never know given how Horn’s case has been swept up into the world of cloak and dagger secrecy. Even in the sealed court ruling leaked to Narco News, all references to the alleged “state secrets” have been redacted.

However, it is clear that some of these state secrets are not really so secret. For example, in the sealed Lamberth ruling, among the material redacted is the name of the CIA chief of station in Burma who is one of the defendants in Horn’s lawsuit.

Horn’s attorney told Narco News that he would be subject to criminal prosecution for disclosing the name. However, the individual’s name, Arthur Brown, has been published numerous times in past media stories about the CIA’s operations in Burma and is referenced in the letter Leighton sent to Sen. Shelby. So it’s really not so secret after all, except when it comes to the peculiar rules of the U.S. Justice system.

Even though we cannot know for certain what the U.S. government deems to be “state secrets privilege” material in Horn’s case, we can assume that not everything is as it appears on the surface. An examination of Horn’s specific charges against Huddle and Brown offers additional insight as well.

For starters, Horn’s attorney claims Huddle and Brown used the resources of the State Department and CIA to sabotage a DEA plan to gain the government of Burma’s cooperation in conducting an opium yield study in the region. Leighton also claims that Huddle undermined Horn’s efforts to provide Burma’s prosecutors and police with U.S. assistance in implementing the country’s drug laws.

“In stark contrast,” Leighton points out in his letter to Shelby, “Mr. Huddle allowed the CIA to send Burmese military officers to Langley, Virginia, for training put on by the CIA.”

Horn also claims, according to assertions outlined in Judge Lamberth’s July 28 ruling in his case, that Brown compromised a DEA informant.

“… (Brown) turned over a copy of a DEA document that included the name of a confidential DEA informant to certain persons within the Burmese government without DEA permission,” the ruling states.

Leighton, in his 1997 letter to Sen. Shelby, describes the same event as follows:

DEA’s well-placed contact from the largest opium producing area in Burma provided DEA with a proposal to withdraw from opium production. The document was even signed by DEA’s informant. … If released, its contents would be highly inflammatory to the Central Government of Burma (GOB).
… Brown chose to deliver a signed copy of this document (which he surreptitiously obtained without Horn’s permission or knowledge) to a ranking figure of the Central Government of Burma knowing full well the outcome would be disastrous. It held the overall potential of causing the death of the informant, depreciating DEA’s credibility with the GOB and derailing the entire project – all at once.

… It seemed a near miracle that Brown’s plan failed. Horn and his agents still managed (after much work) to convince the Central Government of Burma not to arrest DEA’s informant and to give the crop substitution program a chance to succeed.

Huddle was finally able, through the clout of the State department, to get Horn run out of Burma in September of 1993, a little more than a year after Horn had arrived in Burma as the top DEA agent in the country. But about a month before his departure, Horn discovered that his home in Burma had been wired up by the CIA.

Leighton describes how Horn discovered the bug in his letter to Sen. Shelby:

Before leaving Burma, Horn happened to see a teletype which had quotes, ellipsis and summary of a private telephone conversation Horn had from the telephone in his living room. This cable clearly demonstrates that an electronic intercept had been planted – probably by Brown.
… As if that is not enough, Mr. Horn then learned about the technology used to conduct the intercept. … My client learned from a friend in the intelligence community (now retired) who served with him in Burma, how the intercept was likely accomplished and where the transmitter and receiver were likely located.

… Meanwhile, my client and I were threatened with prosecution if we told anyone details about this technology (designed specifically for use against other American diplomats) while at the same time, the government claimed it did not eavesdrop on my client.

In addition to the compromising of the DEA informant in Burma, the alleged illegal monitoring of Horn’s private residence is also referenced in Judge Lamberth’s sealed ruling. In fact, the ruling states that they were the subjects of the two Inspector General reports that have since been cloaked under state secrets privilege.

From Lamberth’s ruling:

(Horn’s) allegations regarding the handling of the DEA document was the subject of an Inspector General report that the court determined on Aug. 15, 2000, to be protected from disclosure by the state secrets privilege. (Horn) further argues that the purpose of the phone tap was to assist (Huddle) in obtaining information that would justify (Huddle) demanding (Horn’s) removal from Burma or otherwise justify expelling him directly. (Horn) alleges that (Huddle) sought (his) removal from Burma as retaliation for (Horn) sending reports to congressmen that conflicted with State Department reports prepared by (Huddle).
(Horn) supports his accusations of wire tapping with the contents of a cable sent by (Huddle) on or about Aug. 13, 1993, to his superiors in the State Department that contained allegedly verbatim quotations from the Aug. 12, 1993, phone conversation. The alleged phone tapping incident is the subject of a second Inspector General Report that the Court determined on Aug. 15, 2000, to be protected from disclosure by the state secrets privilege.

To understand the context of Horn’s incredible story, we have to explore the back story of Burma in the early 1990s. The SLORC is a brutal regime with a horrendous civil rights record that came into power through a military coup in 1988. That junta is now known as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC.

However, today, as was the case in the early 1990s, the ruling junta of Burma, because of financial and military limitations, does not control various regions of the country. This holds true in particular in the Golden Triangle region of the nation – an area that borders Laos, Thailand and China and is the source of much of the world’s opium poppy production.

The narco-trade in the Golden Triangle region is controlled by warlords who are able to field large armies that are funded with the proceeds of their illicit trade, according to sources in the intelligence community. In some cases, Burma’s military junta has struck bargains with these powerful factions, such as the United Wa State Army, which has had a ceasefire in effect with the government of Burma since 1989.

The relationship between the powerful warlords who control the lucrative narco-trade in Burma and the corrupt military junta that controls the government is very complex and layered. Sources in the intelligence community say that relationship is similar to two parasites, each sucking the blood out of the other, in a symbiotic union. As a result, drug money often finds its way into government coffers and personal accounts through agreements of convenience between corrupt government officials and the narco-traffickers.

The intelligence game in the region, then, according to sources, involves penetrating both worlds, and using information gained to manipulate the politics and forces in the region. As a result, the CIA would have assets planted inside both the government and the major trafficking organizations – with some of those assets likely working both sides of that fence. The CIA officials handling these human assets have built their careers on the information obtained from this spying game, and in some cases may have become corruptly involved in the system itself, according to sources in the intelligence community.

“If you want to cultivate assets in the drug trade to get information, then you have to let the drug trade continue, and that’s why you don’t want a noisy DEA agent getting in the way,” explains one source who does consulting work in the intelligence field. “The reason the opium economy will not stop is that the CIA does not see a value in stopping it when they want intelligence. … We don’t have a drug policy, we have a drug pretense.”

Former FBI agent Lok Lau says the Horn case is a perfect illustration of how there “is no coordination at all” between the intelligence community and other federal law enforcement agencies. Lau drew national attention last year after revealing he spied on China in the late 1980s and early 1990s for the Bureau.

Although Lau is prohibited from discussing the specifics of his spying mission due to national security concerns, his assignment did provide him with the expertise to brief CIA agents on the topics of “Chinese alien smuggling, Asian organized crime and Asian cultural issues in general,” according to government documents.

Like Horn, certain pleadings in an employment discrimination case Lau brought against the government were later stricken from the public record under the cloak of national security. Documents filed in Lau’s case show that he was successful in penetrating the Chinese diplomatic community as well as organized crime organizations that had strong links to the Chinese government.

A partially classified brief filed by the League of Untied Latin American Citizens in support of Lau’s legal claims offers a glimpse of the nature of Lau’s spying assignment:

“From a reading of the record, it is not difficult to discern that Lau was involved in espionage activities, kidnappings, trading in human slavery, illegal immigration, murder, torture, extortion, hostage-taking and any number of other criminal activities that involved crimes against humanity. Lau penetrated the Chinese Triads, the Tong, and other Chinese Organized Crime Organizations that trade in all of these things as a way of life … For six years Lau had to be on his guard and had to participate in whatever these hostile forces demanded of him.”
Lau explains that if the U.S. Government was really serious about eradicating the drug trade, “they would have done it. But they do not really want to.”

“Let’s say the DEA was successful in eradicating all drug trafficking,” Lau adds. “What would be left to prop up pro-U.S. regimes that rely on the drug trade? … The CIA can use the proceeds of the drug trade to pay for armies to support a friendly government.”

Lau also says a lot of careers in the intelligence community have been built around human assets who have been planted within the ranks of the narco-trafficking organizations. If you take down the drug trade, you take down the very assets that are helping to make careers – and at times, corrupt fortunes – within the intelligence community, Lau points out.

In fact, Lau alleges in his lawsuit against the FBI, which was dismissed in late 2003 and is currently on appeal, that on the eve of one of his overseas spying trips, he learned that one of the Bureau’s “highly placed assets had betrayed him.”

“I did not cancel my trip for it would confirm the asset’s allegation,” Lau contends in his court pleadings.

Lau says no effort was ever made by the FBI “to flush the asset out, because some (FBI) agent had made his career running that asset.”

“So they sold me out so that agent wouldn’t have to give him up,” Lau adds. “… Nothing ever happened to that informant….”

“War of Pretense”

Given that backdrop, it doesn’t take much of a leap of imagination to conclude that the intelligence community has a lot of motivation to keep a lid on the Horn case. Because the DEA agent actually wanted to do his job and take down the narco-trafficking trade in Burma, he was in fact likely threatening the opposing mission of the State Department and CIA in the region. Their mission was to maintain the status quo so that the information pipeline could continue to prop up careers and U.S. interests in the region – which had nothing to do with eradication of the opium market.

Clearly, the game as it is played is reprehensible in the eyes of most decent people, but it’s an old game that is not likely to end without a major reshuffling of the status quo. However, when that game starts to reach into this country’s courts and subverts the ultimate U.S. interest, the Constitution, it may be time to start drawing some lines.

The use of the state secrets privilege in the Horn case is the “government’s nuclear option when it comes to litigation,” explains Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists. “By claiming state security issues, the government can effectively shut down a lawsuit.

“It used to be a fairly rare procedure, but its use is on the rise in recent years, and based on perception at least, there is a question about the government’s good faith in citing the privilege.”

Mark Zaid, a Washington, D.C.-based attorney who has represented a number of high-profile government whistleblowers, says often the use of state secrets privilege “is an abuse, a way for the government to cover up wrongdoing or incompetence, and the judiciary goes along with it because they are intimidated.”

Zaid is the attorney representing former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds, who claims she was fired from the FBI for blowing the whistle on serious security and management dysfunction within the FBI’s translator program. Edmonds filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice in 2002 claiming the government violated her civil rights.

However, this past July, a judge threw her case out of court after ruling evidence Edmonds needed to prove her claims was protected by state secrets privilege. As in the Horn and Lau cases, Edmonds was prevented from exposing alleged government corruption and mismanagement because of the national security trump card. Edmonds case is currently on appeal.

Zaid points out that the Horn case has particularly serious implications for open government, because not only was state secrets privilege invoked, but the case itself was sealed, which meant no one would even know that national security had been used to torpedo the case if the judge’s order had not been leaked to Narco News.

“The CIA will do what it needs to do to suit its interests,” Zaid says. “If that means taking steps against another agency employee, they will do it.

“… But there is a double tragedy in the use of the state secrets privilege (in the Horn case) in that because the case is sealed, no one would even know the government invoked the privilege. … The ridiculous thing is that (Horn’s) case is still under seal. There is very little classified information involved in the case (and what is there has already been redacted from the record).

“So why is this case being covered up by the government?” Zaid asks.

That is a question that goes to the heart of our Constitution, and whether the document still has any meaning. Ironically, Horn could not be reached for comment on this story because, according to sources, he fears the government will retaliate against him if he exercises his First Amendment right to discuss his case.

Phone calls to the CIA and State Department were never returned.

Their silence, like the pall that the national security trump card lays over the truth, only contributes to the “war of pretense” being waged against the civil rights of people around the globe.

One DEA source summed up the danger of the government’s continued expansion of that pretense as follows:

Illegal eavesdropping, the centerpiece of Horn’s civil case, is also a criminal offense. An analogy of the government’s position is this: If a CIA chief of station had stabbed Horn with a butcher knife in the American Embassy, he could not be prosecuted because the very existence, location and name of chiefs of station are considered classified and cannot be disclosed. Moreover, the chief of station would not be able to defend himself without using classified information. Therefore, the state secrets privilege kicks in and the case disappears. This theoretical “stretch” of the privilege is not unlike what was done in Horn’s civil action.
In practice, both cases could move forward, but only if fair treatment is accorded by the court.

It is apparent that the state secrets privilege has expanded and evolved in such a way that it effectively immunizes persons and agencies of crimes and other misconduct. It no longer just protects troop movements, satellite imagery, etc. It now seems to include everything the intelligence community does. The intelligence agencies are no longer held accountable for wrongdoing. They have the all-inclusive trump card.

… In the Horn case, the state secrets privilege has been used to immunize people and agencies from wrongdoing – a far cry from what the United States Constitution intended.

[Tosh Plumlee]

Today Oct 16,2009.....eight of the weapons uncovered in a raid yesterday near Columbus New Mexico and Palomas MX had belong to the 101st Airborn Div in 1987.

one of these weapons was ID'ed as the automatic weapon that killed the mayor of Palomas, MX last week:

Previous post from last Spring:


04-15-2009, 02:23 PM
Tosh Plumlee
Member

"............

......That was not the only thing found at this place... that was only what they wanted released to the media.... there is more to this puppy than whats been released. Perhaps more details after Obama's trip to Mexico City.

"... confidental memo to JOC -J2.......

...........
I do not know how this could be checked out but... if you remember a sensitive source mentioned there were military weapons that were taken off the GAO books after the 101st and 82nd Airborne held maneuvers in Honduras back in the mid eighties. There was a GAO report on these lost weapons sometime around that time frame. There were Stinger missiles, grenade launchers, millions of rounds of various ammo, night vision goggles, helicopter parts, etc that went to Panama's Noriega and then into the Escobar, Ochoa cartel hands.

I think what was recently found in Mexico is a very small part of those missing weapons. I think we can get the numbers, although I have been told that the Mexican authorities have told ATF that the ID numbers have been filed off of that gun, but they have others which have been ID'ed......."..

Mexican Intell has also told the joint task force that they will be releasing information of another captured high profile drug Lord... the rumor is that it is "Guzman", and he will be turned over to American military at the border... we will perhaps see real soon...

I am going back to Coyote Hill today and will be out of cell phone range most of the day.... there is an Intel report that there is to be a "run" across the border going south from Columbus, I am told it is planned for today. I hope to get close up pictures and lic numbers and photos of the drivers, They are going to use another Ryder Truck reg in Arizona, I am told.

My sources have told me this information has been received from a Mexican military intelligence unit working out of Juarez, also I have received information from a sensitive source that the BP will not be in this area when the cross over is suppose to happen. (???)

If I can get more information on the other Ryder Truck which was found abandon near here yesterday or the day before, I will forward it to you... It might fit into something you have already uncovered... (we will see if this information from our sources checks out... so far there are three for four on Mexico Intel info)..... I still don't know what the motive is for feeding this info.... could be a set up to make the CIA look bad for having a UC team inside Mexico... anyway I am xxxx... however, Mexico just confirmed that they are working with a Navy SEAL team starting April 20, 09. (reference article I sent you last night) That would tie in with the US Ranger Team working Juarez and surrounding areas.... could be a joint assassination team down here tracking some of the cartel's gang members for all I know.

[David Guyatt]

The 101st Airborne weapons "heist" would have been under the Reagan Administration then.

Should we assume that this "theft" was was, in fact, a political gift to Noriega who had earlier participated with the CIA/Pentagon's drug smuggling "Operation Watchtower" back in 1975/6 (the Ford Administration)?

[Tosh Plumlee]

The past sins of the Bushes and Clintons are about to see the light of day... its been a long time coming. The CIA, Drugs and Mexico and the death of a DEA agent is causing some in DC to "Duck and Cover".


"... Declassified field report: JSOC DoJ Oct 23, 09

Drug War-Cartel Leader, 1st Ld-Writethru,0130
Mexican drug kingpin pleads guilty to US charges
Eds: APNewsNow. CHANGES slug from Mexico-US-Drug Extradition. Will
be led. XXXXXXX (sensitive clearence required)

AP

"....DENVER (AP) - A Mexican drug kingpin who led a fearsome cartel
for more than a decade has pleaded guilty to U.S. drug and
racketeering charges.
Miguel Angel Caro Quintero pleaded guilty in Denver federal
court Friday to one count of racketeering in Colorado and one
county of conspiracy to distribute marijuana in Arizona. He faces
up to 20 years in prison when he is sentenced at a future date.
Prosecutors said the 46-year-old led the Sonora Cartel, which
smuggled thousands of tons of marijuana and cocaine from Mexico to
the United States in the 1980s.
Caro Quintero's brother, Rafael Caro Quintero, played a role in
the 1985 torture-slaying of undercover Drug Enforcement
Administration agent Enrique Camarena Salazar. Rafael Caro Quintero
is in prison in Mexico. ...".

From the Toshplumlee.info web site: (1991)

DEA FILES
INFORMATION
DEAfiles.pdf
DEA Mexico OPS: These documents make reference to "Guatemalan Guerrillas" training at a ranch owned by Drug Lord CARO- Quintero in Vera Crus, Mexico. It was reported at the time this was a CIA training site where weapons were exchanged for drugs in support of the Contra effort in Nicaragua and Costa Rico. DEA Agent Enrique Camarena (KIKI) and his pilot found out about this operation known as "The CIA Thing" and were killed because of this knowledge. Plumlee and other American undercover pilots had flown into this ranch many times as reported in various sections within these documents and other news media leaks in Mexico and America. The operation was known as "AMSOG" and, as reported to Senator Gary Hart and his Senate investigators in early 1983, was an "illegal" smuggling operation through Mexico into the United States, supported by the US Military, Panama Southern Command. (end)

http://toshplumlee.info/pdf/DEAfiles.pdf

sengaryhart.pdf
Letters from U.S. Senator Gary Hart and Telluride Journal. (letter on Website)

senate1.pdf (reference Quintero classified TS testimony, reference Plumlee)

Notice of voucher for expenses for Senate testimony
senate2.pdf
Voucher for Tosh Plumlee appearing before Senate

[Magda Hassan]

Well, I hope that it comes real soon and that they all get their just deserts. Couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of sociopaths.

[Tosh Plumlee]

This Sunday Dec. 13,09 The National Geo Explorer will air a special report on Juarez Mexico and Arizona as well, New Mexico. CBS, NBC, CNN, and FOX all passed
on doing this series after they had received information from the Pentagon... "in the interest of National Security"... Where have I heard that before?

XXXXx Task Force AMSOGxxxxxxx

INTEL REPORT SENSITIVE
MEXICO: THE WAR WITH THE CARTELS IN 2009

Editor's Note: This week's Global Security & Intelligence Report is an abridged version of STRATFOR's annual report on Mexico's drug cartels. The full report, which includes extensive diagrams depicting the leadership of each cartel, will be available to our members next week.

There are two cartel wars currently raging in Mexico that have combined to produce record levels of violence in 2009. The first war is the struggle between the government of Mexico and the drug cartels. The second, a parallel war, is the fight among the various cartels as they compete for control of lucrative supply routes. Shortly after his inauguration in December 2006, President Felipe Calderon launched an all-out effort to target the cartels, which he viewed as a major threat to Mexico's security and stability. Over the past three years, the government's effort has weakened and fragmented some of the major cartels (namely the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels), but this government progress has upset the balance of power among the cartels, which has resulted in increased violence. Former cartel allies have been pitted against each other in bloody battles of attrition as rival cartels have tried to take advantage of their weakened competitors and seize control of smuggling routes.

In this year's report on Mexico's drug cartels, we assess the most significant developments of the past year and provide an updated description of the country's powerful drug-trafficking organizations as well as a forecast for 2010. This annual report is a product of the coverage we maintain on a weekly basis through our Mexico Security Memo as well as other analyses we produce throughout the year.

Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations

La Familia: This cartel has garnered a great deal of media attention during the past year, especially after being labeled in May "the most violent criminal organization in Mexico" by former Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora. La Familia has grabbed headlines mainly because of its brazen attacks against government forces and its pseudo-ideological roots. In spite of its public image, the La Familia organization still remains relatively small and geographically isolated compared to the larger and more established cartels. The La Familia organization's headquarters and main area of operation is in the southwestern state of Michoacan, hence the name of the principal group: La Familia Michoacana. The organization also has regional franchises that operate in the neighboring states of Guerrero, Guanajuato and Mexico, as well as a limited presence in Jalisco and Queretaro states. The degree to which these groups coordinate with each other and how much autonomy they possess is unclear, though they all reportedly follow the same cult-like ideology. Without direct access to the U.S.-Mexico border, La Familia is geographically constrained and must pay "taxes" to the organizations that control the border corridors through which La Familia's product is moved.

Gulf cartel: At the beginning of Calderon's campaign against the cartels, the Gulf cartel was considered the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in Mexico. After nearly three years of bearing the brunt of Mexican law enforcement and military efforts, however, the Gulf cartel is today only a shell of its former self. At its height, a great deal of the Gulf cartel's power came from its former enforcement arm, Los Zetas. Today the two are separate entities, with Los Zetas being the dominant organization and controlling much of the Gulf cartel's former territory. The relationship between the two organizations reportedly was somewhat strained over the past year when the Gulf cartel leadership refused to take orders from Los Zetas chief Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano. Despite this rift, the two organizations continue to work together when their interests align.

Los Zetas: Over the past year, the group has held firm its position as one of the most powerful cartels operating in Mexico while trying to extend its presence southward into Central America from its core area of operations along Mexico's eastern coast and the Yucatan Peninsula. The organization remains fully under the control of "El Lazca." There have been rumors that Lazcano Lazcano has tried to consolidate control over what is left of the Gulf cartel over the past year and integrate the remaining personnel into Los Zetas' operations, but these reports have not been confirmed. Los Zetas have a well-documented relationship with Los Kaibiles (Guatemalan special forces deserters turned criminal muscle) since at least 2006, which has helped facilitate Los Zetas' expansion into Guatemala. A Guatemalan joint military and law enforcement operation in March raided a Los Zetas camp and air strip in the border department of Ixcan that were being utilized for the tactical training of Los Zeta recruits as well as a destination for aerial deliveries of cocaine -- further indication that Los Zetas have an established presence in Guatemala. This push southward has given the organization greater control of its overland cocaine supply line into Mexico and enabled it to control much of the human smuggling from Central America into Mexico and the United States.

Los Zetas have also worked with the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) throughout 2009. The two organizations are currently trying to wrest control away from La Familia in the Michoacan and Guerrero regions to gain access to the lucrative Pacific ports of Lazaro Cardenas and Acapulco. There has also been a concerted effort by the Los Zetas leadership to become stakeholders in the BLO over the past year, but currently their role remains that of hired muscle to supplement the BLO's ongoing operations as the organization pursues its own agenda. Los Zetas have also contracted themselves out to the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization, also known as the Juarez cartel, to serve as advisers and trainers for the organization as they both battle their common rival, the Sinaloa cartel, for control over the Juarez border region.

Beltran-Leyva Organization: After a very active 2008, the BLO has kept a relatively low profile throughout much of 2009. After the BLO secured control of its territory in mid-2008 following its split with the Sinaloa cartel (the BLO/Sinaloa battle for territory accounted for a significant portion of the violence in Mexico in early 2008), the cartel was able to concentrate on consolidating and streamlining its narcotics smuggling operations. After the consolidation, the group went on the offensive again in October and November when it teamed up with Los Zetas to target La Familia in Guerrero and Michoacan states. The BLO remains under the command of Arturo Beltran Leyva, who is supported by a well-established network along Mexico's Pacific coast and into northeastern Mexico. The BLO has been in the narcotics business a long time and has perhaps the most sophisticated intelligence capability of any of the cartels.

Sinaloa cartel: In spite of losing some of its former allies like the Carrillo Fuentes Organization and the BLO in 2008, the Sinaloa cartel remains the most formidable and dominant cartel in Mexico today. Headed by the world's most wanted drug lord, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, the Sinaloa cartel demonstrated its resiliency in 2009 and remained quite active throughout the year. Guzman's partners, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada Garcia, Ignacio "El Nacho" Coronel Villareal and Juan "El Azul" Esparragoza Moreno, each have their own respective networks and continue to work together when necessary to traffic narcotics northward from South America.

The conflict in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua state between the Sinaloa cartel and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization (VCF), also known as the Juarez cartel, has undoubtedly been the primary focus of the Sinaloa cartel over the past year. The conflict has essentially resulted in a stalemate between the two organizations as they battle for control over the lucrative Juarez plaza. The Sinaloa cartel still maintains a significant presence in the territory along the Pacific coast of Mexico and the Sierra Madre Occidental. While violence has lessened significantly between the Sinaloa cartel and the BLO, their overlapping geography continues to generate some conflict between the two organizations, particularly in the state of Sinaloa. The Sinaloa cartel has also remained active in Central and South America throughout 2009 as it attempts to exert greater control over the flow of weapons and narcotics from South America to Mexico.

The Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization/Juarez cartel: The VCF is based out of the northern city of Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua state. The cartel is led by Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, who took over after the 1997 death of his brother and cartel founder Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Throughout 2009, the Juarez cartel has maintained its long-standing alliance with the BLO, which is helping the VCF in its vicious battle with the Sinaloa cartel for control of Juarez.

The VCF is yet another Mexican drug trafficking organization (DTO) that has fallen significantly in the past few years. The VCF and its enforcement arm, La Linea, have been locked in a battle for nearly two years with their former partners from the Sinaloa cartel for control over the lucrative Juarez plaza. The prolonged conflict has taken its toll on the VCF and has forced the cartel to resort to other criminal activities to finance its battle for Juarez, primarily kidnapping, human trafficking, prostitution, extortion and the retail sale of drugs to the domestic Mexican market. In its weakened state, the VCF has been forced to focus almost all of its efforts on fighting the Sinaloa cartel and has not been able to effectively project its influence much farther than the greater Juarez area.

Arellano Felix Organization/Tijuana cartel: The Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) -- also known as the Tijuana cartel -- is based in the far northwestern state of Baja California, across the border from San Diego. With the arrests of all the Arellano Felix brothers and several other high-ranking members, infighting has caused the once-powerful AFO to be split into two competing factions -- one led by Arellano Felix nephew Fernando "El Ingeniero" Sanchez Arellano and the other led by Eduardo Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental. Garcia initially sought the support of the rival Sinaloa cartel and it is now thought that the Garcia faction is essentially a Sinaloa proxy in the greater Tijuana area. The Sanchez faction has remained relatively dormant in 2009. The organization has been forced to diversify its operations into other criminal activities, such as kidnapping, human trafficking, prostitution and extortion. This was due in part to increased scrutiny by Mexican law enforcement after an extraordinary spike in violence in 2008 that saw, at its height, more than 100 executions during one week in the greater Tijuana area. Much of the violence that has occurred in Tijuana in 2009 has been a result of clashes between these two rival factions. The overall level of violence in Tijuana has been far lower in 2009 than it was during the height of the conflict in 2008.

Debate Over the Military's Mission

One of the most important facets of the Calderon government's campaign against the drug cartels has been the widespread deployment of Mexican military personnel. While previous presidents have used the military for isolated counternarcotics operations, the level to which Calderon has used Mexico's armed forces in that role is unprecedented. During Calderon's term in office, he has deployed more than 35,000 military personnel to a number of regions throughout Mexico to carry out counternarcotics operations. Because of this, 2009 witnessed a growing debate over the role of the Mexican military in the country's war against the cartels.

Domestic and international human rights organizations have expressed concerns over an increase in alleged civil rights abuses by Mexican military personnel, and U.S.-based Human Rights Watch has even gone so far as to call on U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton not to certify Mexico's human rights record, which would effectively freeze a portion of the Merida Initiative funds allocated by the United States to aid Mexico in its counternarcotics campaign. Even members of Calderon's own National Action Party have stated that there needs to be a better balance between the needs of the cartel war and the civil rights of Mexican citizens.

The Calderon administration's unprecedented use of the military is due in large part to the seemingly systemic corruption in the ranks of local, state and even federal law enforcement agencies in Mexico. Less corrupted as an institution, the military has been increasingly called upon to handle tasks that would normally fall under the responsibilities of law enforcement such as conducting security patrols, making traffic stops and manning checkpoints. As the military has taken over these traditional law enforcement tasks, it has come into closer contact with the Mexican civilian population, which has resulted in human rights-abuse accusations and the current controversy.

Calderon has defended this strategy saying that the military's large role in the war against the cartels is only a temporary solution and has tried to minimize the criticism by involving the federal police as much as possible. But it has been the armed forces that have provided the bulk of the manpower and coordination that federal police agencies -- hampered by rampant corruption and a tumultuous reform process -- have not been able to muster.

Calderon is aware that it is not ideal to use the military in this capacity, but the fact is that the military remains the most reliable and versatile security tool presently available to the Mexican government. While Calderon's ultimate goal is to professionalize and completely hand over all the traditional law enforcement tasks to the federal police, the military will be needed to help in Mexico's war against the cartels for the foreseeable future. The Mexican government has no other option. It will be years before the federal police will have the capability and manpower required to take over the missions currently being performed by the military.

Trends in Violence

As noted in last year's cartel report, the last three months of 2008 saw an explosion in violence and a dramatic increase in the number of cartel-related deaths across Mexico. The levels of violence seen at the end of 2008 have persisted into 2009 and have gradually worsened over the course of the year. Estimates of the current death toll for organized crime-related deaths in Mexico at the time this report was written ranged from 6,900 to more than 7,300. The previous yearly record was 5,700 deaths in 2008.

The geography of the violence in Mexico has remained relatively static from the end of the 2008 through 2009. Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Michoacan and Baja California were the five most violent states in 2009 -- and all happen to be the top five in terms of violence throughout Calderon's term. Chihuahua state once again sits atop the list as the most violent state, with more than 3,200 deaths so far in 2009, and more than 2,100 in Juarez alone. The extraordinary levels of violence seen in Juarez and Chihuahua state can be directly attributed to the ongoing conflict between the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez cartel and their street-gang proxies.

High levels of violence returned to Michoacan and Guerrero states in 2009 due in large part to the increased activities and expansion of the La Familia organization. La Familia has launched numerous high-profile attacks against the military and law enforcement personnel operating in Michoacan as well as its rivals in the region. Federal police and military patrols in the region frequently come under fire and are sometimes ambushed by La Familia gunmen. The attacks on security personnel are often associated with the capture of a high-ranking La Familia member.

While Mexican security forces have been able to weaken and divide some of the more powerful cartels, this diminution of cartel power has actually spawned even more violence as the organizations scramble to retain control of their territory or to steal turf from other cartels. Over the past few decades, the only time intercartel violence has diminished has been during periods of stability and equilibrium among the competing cartels, and the Mexican government's anti-drug operations will not allow for such stability and equilibrium. This means we can expect to see the high level of violence continue between the government and the cartels, and among the competing cartels, throughout 2010.

[David Guyatt]

Thanks for posting this Tosh.

[Tosh Plumlee]

CAUTION VERY DETAILED AND GRAPHIC

(declassified MX Security)

http://fotos.eluniversal.com.mx/fotogale...l?gal=7659


Declassified: AMSOG


[hide]
v • d • e
Mexican Drug War (2006–present)
Federal forces:
Mexican Army • Mexican Air Force • Mexican Navy • Federal Investigations Agency • Federal Police •
Édgar Eusebio Millán Gómez •

Beltrán-Leyva Cartel
Founders:
Marcos Arturo Beltrán-Leyva • Alfredo Beltrán Leyva • Mario Alberto Beltrán Leyva • Carlos Beltrán Leyva • Héctor Beltrán Leyva •

La Familia Cartel
Founders:
Nazario Moreno González • Carlos Rosales Mendoza • José de Jesús Méndez Vargas • Julio César Godoy Toscano • Enrique Plancarte • Arnoldo Rueda Medina • Servando Gómez Martínez • Dionicio Loya Plancarte • Rafael Cedeño Hernández •

Gulf Cartel
Founders:
Juan Nepomuceno Guerra • Juan García Abrego •
Current leaders:
Osiel Cárdenas Guillén • Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén • Jorge Eduardo Costilla •

Juárez Cartel
Founders:
Pablo Acosta Villarreal • Amado Carrillo Fuentes • Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo • Rafael Caro Quintero • Miguel Caro Quintero • Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo •
Current leaders:
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes • Juan Pablo Ledesma •

Sinaloa Cartel
(Armed wing: Los Negros)
Founders:
Pedro Avilés Pérez • Héctor Luis Palma Salazar • Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo •
Current leaders:
Joaquín Guzmán Loera • Ismael Zambada García • Ignacio Coronel Villarreal • Édgar Valdéz Villarreal (Los Negros) • Teodoro García Simental • Juan José Esparragoza Moreno •

Tijuana Cartel
Founders:
Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo •
Current leaders:
Luis Fernando Sánchez Arellano • Ramón Arellano Félix • Eduardo Arellano Félix • Francisco Javier Arellano Félix • Edgardo Leyva Escandon •

Los Zetas
Founders:
Arturo Guzmán Decena • Jesús Enrique Rejón Águila • Jaime González Durán • Heriberto Lazcano • Miguel Treviño Morales
Current leaders:
Heriberto Lazcano • Miguel Treviño Morales

•
Coded OPs Mexican Drug War
• Mérida Initiative • Narco submarine • Project Gunrunner • War on Drugs • Operation Solare • Operation Xcellerator • Project Coronado • Whalewatch Grasshoper

cxzdf109 zxa2 classified de xxx

Caro Quintero ref; 2006

http://archive.fwweekly.com/content.asp?article=3864

[Tosh Plumlee]

Recent declassified special ops field report; Task Force XXXX MX Army AMSOG:

(FWIW)

Sent: Thu, January 7, 2010 9:32:49 AM
Subject: US businesses at risk of becoming MX cartel targets

"... U.S. businesses at risk of becoming targets of Mexican drug cartels

American interests could become targets of Mexico's drug cartels as Washington deepens its involvement in the war against drugs south of the border, according to a leading global intelligence and security corporation.
In a report by Miami-based Kroll Associates issued by one of its executives at the Americas Conference in Coral Gables, the company cautions that ``the more the U.S. government gets involved... it is not unlikely that U.S. companies may be faced with extortion, that local managers are kidnapped for ransom, and that truck high-jacking increases.''
Under former President George W. Bush, Congress passed a law to provide $1.4 billion worth of equipment, training and intelligence in the span of three years to help Mexico fight drug cartels.
On Wednesday, Dan Restrepo, special assistant to President Barack Obama and senior director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council, pointed out that the current administration is committed to continue cooperating with Mexico. He said Washington has increased resources for drug programs and beefed up security along the southwest border to try to constrain the rampant smuggling of assault weapons heading into Mexico.
It is believed that 90 percent of smuggled weapons go to Mexico's four national drug cartels -- Sinaloa, Gulf, Tijuana and Juarez. As a result, these are better armed and more technologically advanced than the law enforcement agencies, said David Robillard, head of Kroll operations in Mexico.
Drug violence is also spilling across the border, with numerous cases of kidnappings for ransom and extortion reported in U.S. border states.
Kroll expects that the escalating war will also impose high costs for foreign companies operating in Mexico, who will have to invest additional resources to protect personnel and infrastructure.
``Virtually everybody today in Mexico is being directly or indirectly affected by security issues,'' said Robillard. ``More than 6,000 lives have been lost to cartel violence last year.''
Mexico's drug trafficking problem dates back to the 1980s but became more apparent after President Felipe Calderón took over in 2006 and declared a war on drugs. Since then, Mexico looks dangerously like Colombia's a decade ago, said Robillard.
The country is facing many of the same challenges Bogotá faced in 2000, he said, but it has good chances of succeeding in quashing the violence and defeating the powerful cartels, which generate between $25 and $40 billion a year and use part of it to corrupt law enforcement officials and government institutions.
Luis Enrique Mercado, a congressman for Calderón's PAN party agreed with Robillard that Mexico is looking more and more like Colombia at the peak of its fight against drug trafficking and that the challenges facing the government will take time to resolve.
``Yes, Mexico is getting `Colombianized'. Let's expect that we'll have the same capacity as Colombia to defeat the problem,'' he said.
Robillard cited the pervasiveness of extortion and kidnapping, the high level of sophistication of the weapons acquired by the cartels, and the impressive monetary power of the Mexican cartels as similarities with Colombia's war at the beginning of this decade.
``One thing in Mexico's favor, however, is that we don't have guerrillas. ... That makes the job easier,'' he said in an interview with The Miami Herald after his presentation.
A survey by the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico among its members showed that 75 percent of respondents felt that the insecurity had already had an impact on their businesses -- especially in the northwest region of the country. Fifty-seven percent said their companies planned to increase their security budget within the next two years. ..".

(note)

On another matter: The National Geo TV channel will show the second of a series of specials; "Border War" this Sunday, Jan 10th 2010 at 9 P.M. USA Eastern time. Its been a nightmare in getting this out to mainstream USA media. I see CIA fingerprints in keeping this under control and from the American mainstream media such as CBS, ABC, NBC and print media in the United States. National Geo took a high risk chance on filming and producing this series. It is not over yet.

Juarez MX Army field report Jan 5, 2010:

40 homicides in JZ as of 9am today. HOWEVER as of 4:13pm; 51 DEAD
11 murders in and around Juarez this AM and early PM

note: five of those murders were U.S. American citizens and the US State Department has "No Commit".

Over 2600 homicides in 2009 in Juarez Mexico and over 7000 for the year 2009 in Mexico proper.

Is this a WAR or just "Swine Flu"?