Swedish National Defence College
www.fhs.se
The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe
By Evan F. Kohlmann
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two years, as a result of major terrorist attacks in Madrid and
London, European leaders have finally become aware of a lurking extremist threat that
has been brewing in dark corners across the continent for almost two decades. Western
European democraciesmany of whom thought that they were insulated from the threat
of organized international terrorismare discovering growing numbers of disaffected
Muslim youth, hardened by scenes of televised bloodshed in the Middle East and the
unwelcoming demeanor of some "native" Europeans. Frustrated by a perceived lack of
social or political mobility, these men eventually become ideal recruits for the growing
network of "pan-European mujahideen."
However, to fully understand the current mujahideen phenomenon in Europe, one
must first recognize its proper origins. Ironically, the flourishing of local Muslim
extremist movements during the 1990s came primarily not as a result of Usama Bin
Laden's progress in Sudan and Afghanistanbut, arguably, rather due to a Muslim
conflict much closer to the heart of Europe. Indeed, some of the most important factors
behind the contemporary radicalization of European Muslim youth can be found in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the cream of the Arab mujahideen from Afghanistan tested
their battle skills in the post-Soviet era and mobilized a new generation of pan-Islamic
revolutionaries. When I spoke to Al-Qaida recruiter Abu Hamza al-Masri in London in
2002, he tried to explain to me the mindset of the first volunteers who came to Bosnia at
the start of the war in 1992: "People are dedicated to the [religion]… They went to
Afghanistan to defend their brothers and sisters. So, they find Afghanistan now, the
destruction of war and Muslims fighting against each other." As a result, in the aftermath
of the Afghan jihadi debacle, "they want to [struggle against] something that is
indisputable, which is non-Muslims raping, killing, and maiming Muslims."1
The Bosnian conflict was cynically offered by jihad recruiters to desperate youths
in many European capitals as a chivalrous escape from the drudgery of their own boring
urban lives. Yet even some of the smartest and most promising members of the European
Muslim community were sucked into this bizarre netherworld. "Abu Ibrahim", a 21-year
old medical student from London at Birmingham University, took a break during training
in Bosnia to be interviewed for a jihad propaganda video. Brandishing an automatic
weapon, he scoffed:
"When you come here, people they think, when you go into Bosnia you are sitting
around and there are shells coming down and they are firing everywhere around you.'
They don't know that we sit here and we have kebab. They don't know that we have ice
cream and we have cake here. They don't know that we can telephone or fax anywhere
in the world. They don't know that this is a nice holiday for us where you meet some of
the best people you have ever met in your life. People from all over the world, people
1 Interview with Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri at the Finsbury Park Mosque; June 28, 2002.
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from Brazil, from Japan, from China, from the Middle East, from America, North, South,
Canada, Australia, all over the world you meet people."2
Beyond its propaganda value, Bosnia's unique geographic position directly
between Western Europe and the Middle East was the ideal jumping-off point for
organizational expansion of various Muslim extremist movements into the United
Kingdom, Italy, France, and even Scandinavia. Bosnia provided an environment where
trained foreign Muslim fighters arriving from Afghanistan could mingle with
unsophisticated but eager terrorist recruits from Western Europe, and could form new
plans for the future of the jihad. No such contact had ever occurred before for groups like
Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya and Al-Qaida, and it provided these organizations limitless
possibilities for development and growth. After fighting for six months during the
opening stages of the Bosnian war in 1992, Saudi Al-Qaida commander Abu Abdel Aziz
"Barbaros" told journalists during a fundraising trip to Kuwait, "I have come out of
Bosnia only to tell the Muslims that at this time this offers us a great opportunity… Allah
has opened the way of jihad, we should not waste it… This is a great opportunity now to
make Islam enter Europe via jihad. This can only be accomplished through jihad. If we
stop the jihad now we will have lost this opportunity."3
For their part, the European radicals inducted into the ranks of the foreign
mujahideen in Bosnia were equally eager to make themselves useful. Babar Ahmada
British Muslim currently awaiting possible extradition to the United States to face
charges of running an Al-Qaida support cell in Londonboasted in an early jihadi
audiotape that the contributions of the new European mujahideen were "instrumental":
"nstrumental… not just to the jihad in Bosnia, but the world-wide jihad, for what they
managed to achieve. And you think this is an exaggeration, but by the hands of the
brothers they did many things that you wouldn't believe. Books were translated and
produced, in the front-lines, because you had the English brothers that could speak
English and the Arab brothers that could speak Arabic and a bit of English, and they go
together and translated books about Jihad. Now, these books are guiding other brothers
back to the Jihad again. They've computerized whole computer networks because of
their computer knowledge."4
From the moment the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in 1992, the Bosnian
Muslim government secretly tracked the arrival of foreign volunteers from Europe
seeking to wage a jihad, or "holy struggle", against the Christian Serbs and Croats.
According to ARBiH military intelligence documents, "the channels for their arrival in
[Bosnia] went through the Republic of Croatia, majority of them came from Western
Europe and Great Britain and they have the passports from these countries. According to
the operative information from the State security service, [a] large[] number of these
persons were recruited and transported to the BiH area through… London and Milan, and
there are some indications that some individuals also came through Frankfurt and
2 Video interview clip of Abu Ibrahim al-Brittanee; 21-years old, Goulders Green, London.
3 "The Jihad in Bosnia." Al-Daawah (Islamabad). P.O. Box 3093; Islamabad, Pakistan. Publisher: Shaykh
Waseem Ahmed. January 1993.
4 Azzam Publications. "In the Hearts of Green Birds." Audiocassette tape transliterated by Salman Dhia
Al-Deen.
http://www.azzam.com.
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Munich."5 A second document from Bosnian Muslim military intelligence detailing the
infrastructure of the foreign mujahideen brigade lists the names of prominent individual
jihad financiers and recruiters based in Zagreb, London, Vienna, Milan, and Torino.6
The Bosnians also noticed something else about their new would-be European
Muslim allies: while some genuinely sought to defend innocent Muslims, others were
fleeing to Bosnia after being "expelled from their [home] countries for various reasons
and they cannot return there."7 ARBiH memoranda suggest that the Bosnian Muslim
military regarded mujahideen arriving from Afghanistan and the Middle East as
potentially useful, but reserved a much more skeptical attitude towards some of their
idealistic and irreverent young comrades who hailed from various capitals of Western
Europe. In a report written in September 1994, sources within the ARBiH Security
Service Department warned that "their not providing their personal data is most probably
due to possible links with [intelligence services] or having committed criminal offenses
in their countries of origin, for in case their countries learnt about their stay here, they
would demand their extradition."8 A second analytical report from the ARBiH Military
Security Service issued in May 1995 further noted that, "a significant number of these
persons [who] entered in our country are from some West European countries and they
have the citizenships and passports from those countries… After the arrival in our
country, these persons are hiding their identity and as members of the unit El
Mudzahedin' they submit the requests to enter the BiH citizenship… because they are the
persons from the Interpol wanted circulars."9
One of the European mujahideen cited in particular by the Bosnian Muslims for
his thuggish behavior was "Abu Walid", a medic "originally from France" who
reportedly seized control of a local hospital in Zenica in July 1994 with weapons drawn
and "harassed the medical staff there. Simultaneously, outside the… Center, there were
ten armed members of El-Mujahidin' Unit."10 Within months of being discharged of his
duties with the foreign mujahideen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Abu Walidbetter known as
French Muslim convert Christophe Cazewent on to lead an infamous Algerian Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) terrorist network based in northern France known as the "Roubaix
5 "Review of the Information on Activities of the Persons from Afro-Asian Countries Directly Before the
War and During the War in the Territory of BIH Republic." Report written by the BIH Administration of
the Military Security Service Department for Analytical and Informative Affairs." Sarajevo; May 6, 1995.
6 "Shema Hijerarnijskim Odnosa OpO VAZAL.'" Report written by the ARBiH Military Intelligence
Service. November 28, 1995. See sections marked: "Lica Sa Kojima Kontaktira Abu Maali Hasan" and
"Donatori Jedinice El Mudzahidin.'"
7 "Review of the Information on Activities of the Persons from Afro-Asian Countries Directly Before the
War and During the War in the Territory of BIH Republic." Report written by the BIH Administration of
the Military Security Service Department for Analytical and Informative Affairs." Sarajevo; May 6, 1995.
8 "Disruption of the enemy's activities." Memorandum dispatched from Zenica by Colonel Ramiz Dugalic,
commander of the Ministry of Defense Security Administration Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) Security Service Department. Classified No. 258-33.
September 14, 1994.
9 "Review of the Information on Activities of the Persons from Afro-Asian Countries Directly Before the
War and During the War in the Territory of BIH Republic." Report written by the BIH Administration of
the Military Security Service Department for Analytical and Informative Affairs." Sarajevo; May 6, 1995.
10 "Disruption of the enemy's activities." Memorandum dispatched from Zenica by Colonel Ramiz
Dugalic, commander of the Ministry of Defense Security Administration Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) Security Service Department. Classified No.
258-33. September 14, 1994.
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Gang."11 Caze was eventually killed during a suicidal highway battle with local police
near the Belgian border as he fled French counter-terrorism investigators in mid-1996.
Even the mujahideen themselves were critical of some of the hotheaded European
volunteers recruited by Syrian Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas (a.k.a. Abu Dahdah) in
Madrid, Spain for the purpose of waging jihad in Bosnia. When Barakaat telephoned a
mujahideen training camp in Zenica in November 1995 to check on his new crop of
students, the personnel director at the camp picked up the line and "complain[ed] about
the young men who had been sent by Barakat to the camp."12 Yarkas was finally arrested
by Spanish authorities in 2001 and sentenced to a 27-year jail term for providing
substantial logistical support to, among others, the 9/11 suicide hijackers dispatched by
Al-Qaida.13
However, while the new European faces among the mujahideen may have caused
consternation in some Bosnian government circles, generally speaking, the foreign
terrorist organizations active in the region (primarily Al-Qaida, Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya,
and the GIA) were pleased to benefit from the situation and use the Bosnian war as a
massive engine for recruitment and financing. In December 1995, these terrorist
commanders further profited from NATO's interest in expelling the foreign mujahideen
from Bosnia. Hundreds of veteran fighters, accused of brutal wartime atrocities and
expertly trained in urban warfare, were readily granted political asylum in a collection of
European countries, Australia, and Canada. It was a devious tactic that allowed nefarious
groups like the GIA to infiltrate several Western European nations with highly skilled
and motivated terrorist sleeper cells. A French report written by French counterterrorism
magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière later concluded that the "exfiltration" of significant
numbers of veteran fighters from Bosnia was beneficial in the sense that it enabled the
mujahideen "to be useful again in spreading the Jihad across other lands." In fact, as
Bruguière noted in his report, "among the veterans of the Moudjahiddin Battalion' of
Zenica, many would go on to carry out terrorist acts following the end of the Bosnian
conflict."14
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Despite its relatively high standard of living and social equality, the United
Kingdom has been and remains one of the most active bases of radical Islam across
Western Europe. Certainly, it can be said that the Iranian revolution and the war in
Afghanistan together started the ball rolling for the Sunni British fundamentalist
movement. However, their ideas did not begin to have a wide appeal among local
11 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 157.
12 "Jucio a la Célula Espanola de Al Qaeda." El Mundo (Spain). June 6, 2005.
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/06/06...66833.html.
13 "Spanish court jails 18 in al-Qaida trial." Al-Jazeera. September 26, 2005.
14 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 169.
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Muslim youths until the era of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When scenes of devastation and war
crimes began to air on BBC television broadcasts, many British Muslims were shocked
that such horrific events could take place in the context modern Europe without any
Western intervention. It gave sudden and unexpected credence to the calls of violent
radicals who suggested it was time for Muslims to start taking their personal security into
their own hands. Dr. Zaki Badawi, the principal (at that time) of the Muslim College in
London, acknowledged in early 1992, "Bosnia has shaken public opinion throughout the
Muslim world more deeply than anything since the creation of Israel in 1948."15
The Bosnian war caused a particularly strong backlash in the outspoken circles of
indignant British Muslim college students. These educated and idealistic youths angrily
protested against the persecution of fellow Muslims in Bosnia. One student, a classmate
of several men who had left to seek training in Afghanistan and Bosnia, saw nothing
wrong with taking up arms against the "enemies of Islam": "You cannot turn a blind eye
when Muslims are being massacred, because what will you do when it is happening on
your doorstep?"16 Inside Bosnia, the 21-year old Londoner "Abu Ibrahim" criticized the
"hypocrites" among his peers back in Britain who swore revenge on the Serbs and
Croats, yet were too afraid to join the jihad in Bosnia: "…what we lack here is Muslims
that are prepared to suffer and sacrifice. There in Britain, I see Muslims, every medical
student is saying that my third year is for Islam, my third year is for the Muslims. They
get their job, they get their surgery. 50, 60, £70,000 a year they're earning. And then, no
struggle, no sacrifice." Abu Ibrahim spoke of the intense sense of satisfaction he felt
fighting in the Bosnian war, as compared to the apathy of the secular Muslims who
remained in London. In Britain, "I watch the TV and tears roll down my face when I see
the Muslims in Bosnia, Muslims in Palestine, Muslims in Kashmir. And then I come [to
Bosnia] and you feel a sense of satisfaction. You feel that you are fulfilling your duty.
You feel that you are doing what the Prophet and his companions done[sic] 1400 years
ago."17 Another British recruit from south London featured on the same Bosnia jihad
video sneered, "this is what they like to do in England, they like to talk, they like to talk,
they like to organize… big conferences… in the London Arena… and they make a nice
conference… Then, after the talk, they go back home and they sleep. They carry on
watching Neighbors'… They carry on watching Coronation Street'… What life is this?
These people talk too much… You want to see true Muslims, with unity, come to this
place, and then you'll see."18
Even those who remained behind in the United Kingdom did their part to help the
cause of the mujahideen. Young activists in the fundamentalist Muslim Parliament
established a charity to support jihad in Bosnia that later became known as the "Global
Jihad Fund" (GJF).19 According to its later website, the GJF was established to aid "the
15 Philps, Alan. "New arc of crisis' fuels fears over Muslim aggression." The Daily Telegraph (London).
October 8, 1992. Page 15.
16 Aydintasbas, Asla. "Why they can't turn their backs on the veil." The Independent (London). April 28,
1994. Page 22.
17 Unidentified video interview of "Abu Ibrahim." Originally obtained from the Finsbury Park Mosque,
London.
18 Unidentified video interview of "Abu Ibrahim." Originally obtained from the Finsbury Park Mosque,
London.
19 Sohail A Osman (sohail@muslimsonline.com). "Subject: Global Jihad Fund." Newsgroup:
soc.religion.islam. August 30, 1998.
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Growth of various Jihad Movements around the World by supplying them with sufficient
Funds to purchase Weapons and train their Individuals."20 Two months after the signing
of the Dayton Accords officially ending the Bosnian war, GJF administrators announced
the distribution of a new brochure entitled, "IslamThe New Target": "Contents
include… a reprint of an acknowledgement certificate from the Commander of the
Bosnian 7th Corps to Muslim Parliament (on behalf of the fund). Why don't you get a
copy or many copies of the brochure for local distribution or get a master to reprint. You
and your friends could use it to increase genocide awareness and Jihad awareness in your
locality."21 Two years later, following a twin Al-Qaida suicide bombing attack on U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the administrators of the GJF indicated that the fund
was being run by Saudi Al-Qaida spokesman Mohammed al-Massari and had found a
new cause célébre in "support[ing] Sheikh Mujahid Osama bin Laden."22 When
confronted by British investigative reporters, the GJF webmaster in London admitted, "I
work for two people, really… Mr. Massari and Osama Bin Laden."23
On the battlefield in Bosnia, British-born mujahideen recruits had a noticeable
and significant impact. On June 13, 1993, a British patrol of four APC's was stopped at a
roadblock near the central Bosnian town of Guca Gora.24 A group of approximately 50
mujahideen fighters, who "looked north African or Middle Eastern," had assembled there
to intercept mobile enemy troops. The frightened British soldiers told journalists later
that the foreigners had long, wispy beards, Afghan-style caps, and uniforms unlike
anything worn by local Bosnian guerillas.25 Though the jihadis instantly trained their
rocket propelled grenade launchers and rifles at the UN vehicles, the mujahideen
commander on scenean unidentified British Muslim wearing an Afghan hat and a blue
scarf over his faceaddressed the British officer in charge of the patrol, Major Vaughan
Kent-Payne, in perfect English and coldly reassured him, "be cool, these people won't
fire until I give them the order."26
In the summer of 1993, the British mujahideen began to suffer their first series of
combat casualties, including a Muslim convert named David Sinclair. Sinclair (a.k.a.
Dawood al-Brittani) was a 29-year old employee of a computer company in the UK.
After suddenly converting to Islam and adopting traditional Muslim dress, Sinclair ran
into problems with senior management at his company. Within a week of wearing his
new clothes to work, he was reportedly terminated. Mobilized into action, he thereupon
decided to travel to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to join the Islamic military organization
based there. In the midst of his training, he generously gave away his two British
passports to Arab-Afghan "brothers in need." Dawood refused to return to the UK
20 "Global Jihad Fund: Mission Statement."
http://www.ummah.net/jihad/about.htm. November 2000.
21 Mohammed Sohail (info@zakat.org.uk). "One Deen, One Ummah, One Struggle." Newsgroups:
alt.religion.islam. January 31, 1996.
22 Sohail A Osman (sohail@muslimsonline.com). "Subject: Global Jihad Fund." Newsgroup:
soc.religion.islam. August 30, 1998.
23 Hastings, Chris and Jessica Berry. "Muslim militia training in Britain." The Ottawa Citizen. November
07, 1999. Page A6.
24 Frost, Bill. "British troops poised to quit Vitez base." The Times (London). June 14, 1993.
25 Bishop, Patrick. "Islamic warriors lead Balkan attack." The Daily Telegraph. June 14, 1993. Page 10.
See also: O'Kane, Maggie. "Mujahedeen fighting in Bosnia, British say." The Guardian (London). June
14, 1993. Page A6.
26 "Moslem fighters led by Briton.'" Daily Mail (London). October 29, 1993. Page 2.
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evidently out of a determination to avoid living the life of an infidel. During deadly
clashes with Croatian HVO forces, he was shot and killed near an enemy bunker.27
Indeed, British Muslims were present for some of the most important ARBiH
victories of the Bosnian war, including the conquest of the Vozuca region in late summer
1995. That battle, popularly known among the Arab-Afghans as "Operation BADR",
cost the lives of dozens of foreign fightersincluding "Abu Mujahid" from the United
Kingdom, killed on September 10, 1995. Abu Mujahid was a recent British university
graduate who had finished his studies in 1993, when the Islamic community in the UK
was still in an uproar over the war crimes being committed by the Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. He first came to the Balkans in 1993 as a humanitarian aid worker
purportedly transporting food and medicine to the embattled Muslims in central Bosnia.
Abu Mujahid was using his position as charity employee as a cover for other, more illicit
activities: "Over the next two years Abu Mujahid hurried back and forth between Bosnia
and Britain carrying valuable supplies to the brothers there. Between trips he traveled the
length of Britain reaching its smaller parts in his efforts to raise money for the cause and
increase the awareness among Muslims there." Abu Mujahid returned to Bosnia-
Herzegovina in August 1995 and enlisted in a jihad training camp soon after his arrival,
receiving instruction fromamong otherstwo elite Egyptian trainers imported to the
region directly from Al-Qaida-run camps along the Afghan-Pakistani border. For all his
anti-Western vigor, Abu Mujahid nonetheless proudly wore a G-Shock watch and U.S.
Army boots. According to his teachers, he "excelled" at shooting and throwing grenades
and he insisted that he would remain in Bosnia "until either we get victory or I am
martyred'… One thing which was strange about him was that he always used to say,
thinking back, I remember, maybe three, four, five times a day, he would say to me that
Inshallah ["God-willing"] I am going to be martyred. Inshallah, this time in Bosnia, I
am going to be martyred.'"28
Following the initial assault during Operation BADR, Abu Mujahid disappeared
in the fog of war. Over a week later, a mujahideen search party recovered his body from
the battlefield. One of the men who found Abu Mujahid later recalled, "At that point, the
thought that went through my mind was that the brother had been there, left behind when
I was there in Bosnia and he intended to stay there longer than me. But only Allah knew
what could he have done for him to die in such a beautiful way? And the thought that's
still in our minds, Inshaallah, may Allah accept it from him, and may the people who
loved him in this life, Inshaallah join him in the next." Abu Mujahid's body was brought
back down from the mountain and then taken in a van to the frontline base camp. The
lead commander present, Abu Hammam al-Najdi from Saudi Arabia, would only allow
fellow British mujahideen to go inside the van to see the remains of their departed
compatriot.29
The foreign mujahideen who survived the end of the war in 1995 grew
apprehensive when they discovered that the Bosnian Muslims were about to sign the
27 Azzam Publications. "In the Hearts of Green Birds." Audiocassette transliterated by Salman Dhia Al
Deen.
28 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
29 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
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Dayton Accords"the peace of the enemy"with the United States and Europe. British
jihadi recruits were among the voices urging their commanders to wage an apocalyptic
all-out terror campaign in central Bosnia targeting Western peacekeepers, the Serbs and
Croats, and even other Muslims. In a direct English-language message aimed at fellow
British Muslims, one mujahid fighter appealed, "the amir [commander] of the jihad… is
here. And the amir of the mujahideen here says he needs more people, and more
equipment, and more everything. So for the people who are sitting at home and saying
that, well, they don't need people anymore', it's not true, it's not true… we need as
many people and as much money and everything that people can send us to help us."30
One British Muslim guerilla recounted the discussions taking place at the El-Mudzahedin
Unit headquarters in a propaganda audiotape:
"[W]hen the Americans came to Bosnia… the situation had developed in such a way that
it seemed as if we were going to have to fight the Americans. And [commander] Abul-
Harith [the Libyan], he turned to me and he said, We will become an example for these
Bosnians. We will fight for our belief and the lost land. Please Allah, will give us
victory and we will defeat [the Americans] or they will kill us. But we will not flee, and
we will be an example for the Bosnians.'"31
According to various accounts, on the day of December 12, 1995, several fighters
had left a non-descript delivery van in the parking lot of the Zenica mujahideen base. A
Bosnian police investigation later concluded that these radicals were in the final stages of
"trying to rig a car bomb" when they ran into an unknown technical error, and it
prematurely exploded.32 The massive and unexpected detonation killed as many as four
mujahideen bombmakers and injured several other foreigners in the area. One wounded
mujahid recounted, "You could feel the explosion… like a shining light… as I was on the
floor, I remember seeing the face of Abul-Harith [the Libyan] as he ran to me. And he
took me and put me on the stretcher… And the building that he wanted to open, it was
locked. And Abul-Harith he didn't look for the key, he just knocked the door down and
took me inside."33
In this case, as reported by both Arab-Afghan and Bosnian authorities, the
deceased would-be bomber was an 18-year-old British honors student from southwest
London known as "Sayyad al-Falastini." Sayyad was born in the United Kingdom but
spent most of his early youth in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. When he returned to
London at age 12, he soon became involved in the radical Islamic fundamentalist
movement there that was recruiting young volunteers for jihad in Bosnia. At age 16, he
first sought unsuccessfully to join the mujahideen battalion in the Balkans after hearing
an inspiring Friday khutba (religious sermon) from an Arab veteran of Bosnia.34
30 Unidentified video interview of "Abu Ibrahim." Originally obtained from the Finsbury Park Mosque,
London.
31 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
32 O'Connor, Mike. "5 Islamic Soldiers Die in Shootout With Croats." The New York Times. December
16, 1995. Page 6.
33 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
34 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
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However, after being elected president of the Islamic society at his college,
Sayyad started to methodically plan and save his money in a fund that would finance his
dreamed jihad adventure. According to the mujahideen, Sayyad possessed this instinct
because he was of Palestinian descent, and therefore, there was "a background of
realizing the importance of Jihad in his family." During the summer of 1995, he left
London and traveled to a Bosnian mujahideen training camp, fighting alongside his
fellow comrades during Operation BADR. When combat hostilities gradually came to a
halt after "BADR," many foreign volunteers began filtering out of Bosnia and returning
home, including a number of British recruits. But Sayyad was not ready to leave; his first
taste of battle had exhilarated him and changed his life. Among the mujahideen, despite
his young age, he was well liked and highly esteemed for his proficiency in English,
Arabic, and Bosnian. Sayyad did not want the war to end, grumbling (like many of the
Arabs) that the peace accords had been negotiated only "in order to halt the victories of
the Mujahideen in Bosnia… For three years the world had sat back and allowed the
slaughter of the Muslims to continue. But now as soon as the Muslims began to fight
back and win, they ended the war." Even in light of the Dayton agreement, Sayyad
stubbornly refused to leave, and he recommitted himself to keeping the Islamic jihad
alive in Bosnia. In the first few days of December, as the terms of Dayton were about to
become a reality, Sayyad was torn by despair as he saw his beloved combat tour coming
to an inexorable end. He angrily demanded of his fellow mujahideen, "Why are we all
lost? Look at the [infidels]. Are they thinking of us and then they are laughing because
they have their own state. But look at us, the Muslims, we do not even have a state yet
but we continue to laugh!"35
At this point, Sayyad started to act peculiarly, as if he was readying himself for a
"martyrdom" operation. He would pray all night long and continuously recite verses
from the Qu`ran. Previously, he had telephoned his mother to ask her to send some
money for him to visit home. Suddenly, two days before the explosion in Zenica, he
called her and told her not to wire the cash as "he would not be needing it." There is
good reason to believe that Sayyad may have been preparing for an imminent role as a
suicide bomber. Regardless of his intentions, on December 12, something in his plan
went terribly wrong. While Sayyad stood beside the van, it prematurely detonated,
shaking the entire neighborhood and thoroughly frightening nearby Croatian civilians.36
By the "official" count of Al-Qaida, Sayyad became the sixth British Islamic volunteer
soldier killed in Bosnia only two days shy of his nineteenth birthday. He was buried in a
ceremony attended "by over three hundred of the cream of the foreign Mujahideen
fighters in Bosnia."37 The Arab battalion later eulogized him:
"Sayyad was a brother who made Jihad his wealth and his life giving every penny of his
wealth for the pleasure of Allah and eventually giving every drop of his blood for him.
We ask Allah (SWT) to accept Sayyad as a martyr, to make him an example for the
35 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
36 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
37 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
Swedish National Defence College
www.fhs.se
millions of youth in the West who have chosen this life in preference with the
hereafter."38
The shadow cast by British mujahideen volunteers in Bosnia-Herzegovina
continues to plague law enforcement and intelligence agencies even to this day. On
September 23, 2005, 34-year old British Muslim convert Andrew Rowe was convicted
and ordered jailed for 15 years by a court in the U.K. for possessing details on how to fire
mortar bombs and using secret codes to facilitate terror attacks. Back during the early
1990s, Rowe dramatically changed his loose lifestyle after converting at a mosque in
Regent's Park, Londonan event which Rowe said "put meaning into my life."39 Rowe
admits to traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 on a "humanitarian" missionin
reality, acting as an envoy for the foreign mujahideen. When he returned to the U.K., he
even claimed government invalidity benefits for wounds suffered during an alleged
mortar attack in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2003, Rowe was arrested on the French side of
the Channel tunnel while carrying a bound pair of socks bearing traces of TNT, plastic
explosives, RDX, and nitroglycerine. According to Crown Prosecutors, the socks were
likely used "to clean the barrel of a mortar or as a muzzle protector."40 Raids on Rowe's
various residences revealed coded documents with phrases such as "airline crew,"
"explosives," and "army base." Investigators also found video recordings of jihad in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin
Laden.41
ITALY
Perhaps more than any other nation in Europe, Italy played an overly dominant
role in hosting the transnational infrastructure of the Bosnian El-Mudzahedin Unit during
the mid-1990s. Italy was one of the very few Western European nations to provide a
direct land route through Croatia into Muslim Bosnia, andeven prior to the conflict in
the Balkanswas serving as an important hub for activity by various North African
Islamic extremist groups, including: the GIA, Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, and the Tunisian An-Nahdah movement. By the time of the war in 1992-
1993, forces within the influential Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya had already designated Italy
as one of three primary "support places" in Europe for its regional activities.42
No individual from Italy had a greater impact on the Bosnian mujahideen than
former top Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya commander in southern Europe, Shaykh Anwar
Shaaban (a.k.a. Abu Abdelrahman al-Masri), the late Imam at Milan's Islamic Cultural
Institute and the one-time overarching leader of Arab mujahideen forces fighting
38 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
39 Muir, Hugh. "British Muslim convert jailed for terrorism offences." The Guardian (London).
September 24, 2005.
40 Muir, Hugh. "British Muslim convert jailed for terrorism offences." The Guardian (London).
September 24, 2005.
41 Muir, Hugh. "British Muslim convert jailed for terrorism offences." The Guardian (London).
September 24, 2005.
42 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.
Swedish National Defence College
www.fhs.se
alongside the ARBiH.43 Shaaban was a well-known veteran of the Afghan jihad who
(like many other Arab-Afghans) in 1991 decided he no longer felt safe in Afghanistan as
it collapsed into civil turmoil.44 He sought and obtained political asylum in Italy, and
was disappointed by what he found: "the Muslim community in Italy was just the same as
elsewhere in Europe: asleep and busy in the worldly affairs." Aided by a collection of
Afghan war veterans and Italian Islamists, Anwar Shaaban opened a major new
headquarters in a converted garage in Milan. Knowledgeable mujahideen sources have
praised Shaaban's efforts in Milan, and noted that Islamic Cultural Institute was "the
center of much activity and it gained much popularity amongst the local Muslims."45
Similarly, L'Houssaine Kherchtou, a former Moroccan member of the Al-Qaida
terrorist organization, testified during the federal trial of four Al-Qaida operatives in the
U.S. that Shaaban used the Islamic Cultural Institute as a critical Arab-Afghan recruiting
center for young Muslim extremists living in Europe. According to Kherchtou, Shaaban
had personally helped arrange Pakistani visas for him and three other mujahideen recruits
who then went on to an Al-Qaida military training camp in eastern Afghanistan.46 French
counterterrorism officials concluded that the ICI in Milan, under the lead of Shaaban,
served an "essential role" as a command center for a variety of North African armed
militant groups including Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya, the Tunisian An-Nahdah, and the
Algerian GIA.47 After searching Anwar Shaaban's office at the ICI, Italian
counterterrorism police concurred that the Institute was "characterized by… a constant
closeness to the activities of Egyptian terrorist organizations, especially those of [Al-
Gama`at al-Islamiyya], in the area of strategic and operational choices… the recruiting of
mujaheddin for the Yugoslavian territories…. the establishment of a European network
for the connection among fundamentalist cells… [and] logistic and operational support to
the armed cells active on Egyptian soil."48
In the summer of 1992, Shaykh Anwar Shaaban helped lead the first quasi-official
Arab-Afghan delegation to arrive in Bosnia, accompanied by a number of his Italian
colleagues. As the fighters themselves have testified, "Sheik Anwar was not a textbook
scholar: he was a scholar who practiced what he preached and fought oppression at every
level, just like the companions and the early generations of Muslims… with books in his
hands and military uniform on his body. Not only did he teach but he fought as well." In
one audiotape, mujahideen representatives attempt to unravel the mysterious life of
Shaaban and note that "in the footsteps of Sheik Abdullah Azzam, Sheik Anwar Shaaban
carried the responsibilities of the Mujahideen regiment in Bosnia… teaching,
43 Azzam Publications. "The Martyrs of Bosnia: Part I." PAL/NTSC Format. Length: 150 minutes
approximately. ©2000.
44 Ibid.
45 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
46 United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern
District of New York. Trial Transcript, February 21, 2001. Pages 1106-1107.
47 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 99.
48 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.
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encouraging, and inspiring the fighters, laying the same foundation in Bosnia that Shaykh
Abdullah Azzam laid in Afghanistan."49
Shaaban shuttled back and forth to his headquarters in Milan, bringing with him
to Bosnia a host of veteran fighters and new recruits. In a September 1994 fax sent to a
wealthy jihad donor in Qatar, Shaaban explained that he required additional funds "to
finance the purchase of camp equipment for the Bosnian mujaheddin in view of another
winter spent in war in former Yugoslavia." Shaaban continued in his letter, "I'm
convinced that based on today's facts, the Islamic projects in the European countries are a
priority over all general Islamic projects, especially when based on what we have seen
with regard to the possibility of establishing bases in these places in order to aid Muslims
all over the world."50 Undoubtedly, Shaaban hoped to use the Bosnian war to as a means
to create an unassailable garrison for North African militants in Europe. One document
later confiscated in Italy seemed to endorse this strategy, explaining that "Hot Islamic
questions such as Bosnia… raise the ardor of young Muslims and their desire to face the
inevitable."51 Not surprisingly, many of those that Shaaban introduced to the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina became "the commanders and trainers, the cream of the
Mujahideen."52
During their subsequent investigation of Shaaban and the ICI, Italian counterterrorism
police turned up numerous pieces of evidence showing how involved Shaaban
was in supporting jihad activity in nearby Bosnia. This included documents indicating
that "paramilitary training activities" were "organized by the I.C.I. for those individuals
who would fight on the Yugoslav territory."53 A second undated letter from Anwar
Shaaban recovered by Italian investigators details a meeting the former had in Sarajevo
"with an unidentified Islamic individual who was willing to host trained Muslim guys
capable of training others to use Russian and eastern firearms in order to open the door of
the Jihad against Orthodox Serbs in Yugoslavia."54 The Italians also found another
handwritten sheet of paper in Arabic:
"I am sending you this film from the center of Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the land of war
and the Jihad. In it there is what I succeeded in sending you, and I am very happy… In
the little remembrance book there are a few pages glued together, which you must open
because there are inside sections of small films that you will develop and watch… I
placed the small films inside the remembrance book, between the pages, but only
between some pages, not all of them… so that the Croatians may not find them and cause
49 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
50 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995."
51 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.
See: Shaaban, Anwar. "Conversations Among Friends: Where is the Damage?" Sawt al-Haqq Magazine.
No. 66; June 1995.
52 Azzam Publications. "Under the Shades of Swords." Audiocassette sequel to "In the Hearts of Green
Birds." November 1997. Azzam Recordings; London, UK.
53 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.
54 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.
Swedish National Defence College
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problems for us, because they can even decapitate; when the letter arrives, develop and
number them."55
A subsequent fax received in April 1995 confirmed that the ICI in Milan had been
officially assigned the task of distributing news bulletins and conducting other
"propaganda activity" on behalf of the Bosnian El-Mudzahidin Unit.56
Yet, almost immediately, Shaaban's mission in the Balkans strayed from its
purported goal of defending innocent Bosnian Muslims. In 1993, U.S. diplomats and
intelligence officials began to privately express concerns that Egyptian Islamic extremists
were targeting the U.S. embassy in Albania for a potential terrorist attack. According to
the CIA, "Al-Gama`at members, including… Anwar Shaban… were involved in the 1993
surveillance of the U.S. embassy in Tirana."57 The surveillance was confirmed when a
suspected militant was observed driving "repeatedly around the embassy."58 Separately,
the CIA gathered telephone intercepts that included an "apparent order from overseas
instructing a Muslim-charity worker to case the embassy."59 No successful attack was
ever carried out, likely as a result of close cooperation between the CIA and Albanian
security officials.
Shaaban's influence also extended to a number of other Italian fundamentalist
clerics, such as Mohamed Ben Brahim Saidani, a volunteer fighter in Bosnia and Imam of
a mosque on Massarenti Street in Bologna, Italy. Saidani had been one of a number of
participants in a guerilla training course held in Afghanistan in 1993. Upon his return to
Italy, he quickly convinced 30 of his local followers to enlist in the foreign mujahideen
brigade active in Bosnia. He founded a front company in Italy known as Piccola Societa'
Cooperativa Eurocoop that provided seemingly legitimate work authorization permits to
jihadi volunteers and veterans, allowing them to travel without hindrance to different
parts of the world, including Bosnia.60 In witness testimony in the trial of conspirators
convicted of involvement in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, Al-Qaida
lieutenant Jamal al-Fadl discussed his trip to Zagreb in mid-1992, specifically how he had
been instructed to meet with Mohamed Saidani so he could get "information about what's
going on in Bosnia" and bring this intelligence back directly to Usama Bin Laden.61
55 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.
56 Italian Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) Anti-Terrorism Report.
"Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.
57 January 1996 CIA Report on "International Islamic NGOs" and links to terrorism. Page 2. See also:
Affidavit by Senior Special Agent David Kane (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security). United States of America v. Soliman S. Biheiri. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Case #: 03-365-A. August 14, 2003. Page
2.
58 Higgins, Andrew and Christopher Cooper. "CIA-backed team used brutal means to break up terrorist
cell in Albania." The Wall Street Journal. November 20, 2001.
59 Ibid.
60 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 97.
61 United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern
District of New York. Trial Transcript, February 20, 2001. Page 997.
Swedish National Defence College
www.fhs.se
Italian law enforcement and intelligence officials grew concerned after
intercepting a letter from a fundamentalist militant imprisoned in southern Italy in July
1993 discussing potential terror attacks on U.S. and French targets in the region. The
seized letter appears to be one penned by Mondher Ben Mohsen Baazaoui (a.k.a. "Hamza
the Tunisian"), an activist in the An-Nahdah movement and, according to an Italian
police statement, "a fighter for a mujahideen unit during the ethnic conflict in Bosnia…
believed to be in the front row of fundamentalist, Islamic terrorist networks."62 Baazaoui
wrote to Mohamed Saidani (the Imam in Bologna who was on close terms with both
Anwar Shaaban and Usama Bin Laden) to tell him that if his prison hunger strike did not
secure his immediate release, Baazaoui would commit a "homicide operation… [to] die
gloriously."63 He then pleaded with Saidani to avenge his death with a spectacular
eulogy of terror: "All I can suggest to you is the French: leave not a child nor an adult
[alive]. Work for them, they are very numerous in Italy, especially in the Tourist areas.
Do what you will to them using armed robbery and murder. The important thing is that
you succeed at sparking the flames that burn inside me against them, and this is to be a
promise between you and me."64
In November 1994, Italian authorities were even more alarmed when they learned
of a new assassination plot organized by elements of the Egyptian terrorist groups Al-
Jihad and Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya targeting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during
a three-day diplomatic trip to Rome.65 As a result, the Italian police stepped up their
effortsparticularly, their focus on Shaaban's Islamic Cultural Institute. On June 26,
1995, in a mission codenamed "Operation Sphinx," Italian police arrested 11 suspected
members of Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya (including 10 Egyptians and 1 Palestinian) and
carried out formal searches of 72 addresses across northern Italy, including Milan. The
detained terrorists were charged with criminal conspiracy, robbery, extortion, falsifying
documents, and illegal possession of firearms.66
One of those that Italian counterterrorism authorities were particularly seeking to
arrest, Shaykh Anwar Shaaban himself, was nowhere to be found. Evidently, having
been tipped off to the intentions of the Italian government, Shaaban had escaped and
found asylum at his mujahideen military stronghold in central Bosnia-Herzegovina.67
Shaaban's Bosnian exodus marked a critical period of development for the Arab-Afghan
mujahideen in southern Europe. Despite all the Arab-Afghan propaganda decrying the
62 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 94. See also: "Italian police arrest alleged Tunisian
militant." Reuters. September 29, 2002.
63 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 96.
64 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 96.
65 Rodan, Steve. "Mubarak on a powder keg." The Jerusalem Post. June 30, 1995. Page 11.
66 Willan, Philip. "Italians arrest suspected Islamic militants." United Press International. June 26, 1995.
67 Willan, Philip. "Italians arrest suspected Islamic militants." United Press International. June 26, 1995.
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suffering of the Bosnian Muslimsjust as in Afghanistantheir participation in the war
was ultimately being channeled toward an alternate purpose. By 1995, central Bosnia
was more than a mere mujahideen frontline. Instead, thanks to the work of Shaaban and
others, it had become a strategic foothold for Usama Bin Laden and his fanatical North
African allies to help infiltrate Western Europe.
With Bosnian war hostilities drawing to a close in September 1995, Anwar
Shaaban and his Italian-based Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya cohorts were free to turn their
attention and resources to issues of "more critical" importance. In late September, one of
the most important Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya leaders hiding in EuropeAbu Talal al-
Qasimy (a.k.a. Talaat Fouad Qassem)was captured by Croat HVO forces as he
attempted to cross through Croatian territory into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within days, the
Croats quietly rendered al-Qasimy through U.S. custody into the hands of Egyptian
authorities. At the time, a government official in Cairo noted, "[Al-Qasimy's] arrest
proves what we have always said, which is that these terror groups are operating on a
worldwide scale, using places like Afghanistan and Bosnia to form their fighters who
come back to the Middle East… European countries like Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland,
England and others, which give sanctuary to these terrorists, should now understand it
will come back to haunt them where they live."68
The first real Arab-Afghan response to Abu Talal al-Qasimy's arrest came on
October 20, 1995, when a massive explosion shook the quiet Croatian port town of
Rijeka.69 At 11:22am, a suicide bomber detonated 70 kilograms of TNT hidden in a
FIAT Mirafiori parked outside the Primorje-Gorani county police headquarters.70 The
mysterious suicide-bomber was killed, two bystanders were seriously wounded, and 27
other people received lighter injuries. The bomb was powerful enough to destroy the
police headquarters and damage several nearby buildings, including a Zagreb Bank
branch and a primary school.71 In the blast debris, Croatian police found fragments a
Canadian passport belonging to the suicide bomberwho had previously been
investigated by Italian counterterrorism officials for his connections to the Islamic
Cultural Institute in Milan controlled by Anwar Shaaban.72 The CIA later confirmed that
the bomber was "a member of Al-Gama`at [al-Islamiyya]."73
A day later, Western news agencies in Cairo received an anonymous faxed
communiqué allegedly from Al-Gama`at representatives, claiming responsibility for the
Rijeka bombing in order "to prove that the case of Sheik Talaat Fouad Qassem… will not
pass but will bring cascades of blood bleeding from Croatian interests inside and
68 Ibrahim, Youssef, M. "Muslim militant leader arrested on way to Bosnia, Egypt reports." The Houston
Chronicle. September 24, 1995. Sec. A; Page 31.
69 Croatian Radio. Broadcast in Serbo-Croat language in Zagreb. October 20, 1995; 1600 GMT.
70 Gatti, Fabrizio. "1995: From Milan a car bomb leaves for Fiume." Corriere della Sera (Italy).
November 11, 2001.
71 Croatian Radio. Broadcast in Serbo-Croat language in Zagreb. October 20, 1995; 1600 GMT.
72 Gatti, Fabrizio. "1995: From Milan a car bomb leaves for Fiume." Corriere della Sera (Italy).
November 11, 2001.
73 January 1996 CIA Report on "International Islamic NGOs" and links to terrorism. Page 13. See also:
Affidavit by Senior Special Agent David Kane (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security). United States of America v. Soliman S. Biheiri. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Case #: 03-365-A. August 14, 2003. Page
2.
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outside… You Croats will be mistaken if you think that this matter will go peacefully."74
In their statement, Al-Gama`at representatives firmly demanded that the Croatian
government "release Sheikh Qassimi and apologize formally through the media… Close
the gates of hell which you have opened upon yourselves ... otherwise you will be starting
a war the end of which only Allah (God) knows."75 U.S. intelligence indicated that
Anwaar Shaaban was personally responsible for overseeing the suicide bombing
operation in Rijeka. The terror attack was meant to be a mere prelude to a new strategy
employed by the mujahideen. As the long Balkan war began winding down, Shaaban
"and other mujahedin leaders had begun planning to attack NATO forces which would be
sent to Bosnia."76 French investigators believed that the October terror attack confirmed
that the military leadership of the El-Mudzahedin Unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina "was
closely related to [Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya], both ideologically and in practice."77
For several years afterwards, Croatian authorities sought other suspects believed
responsible for arranging the Rijeka bombing. Witnesses, including a police guard in the
headquarters parking lot, described a suspicious Mercedes driven by an Arab man that
sped away from the scene just before the blast. After looking at mugshots, those
witnesses were able to positively identify a wanted 36-year old Egyptian militant loyal to
Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya named Hassan al-Sharif Mahmud Saad. Saad, who had lived
in Cologno Monzese (a surburb of Milan), was a prominent figure at the Islamic Cultural
Institute. He even sat on the board of trustees of Anwar Shaaban's own Italian charitable
organization "Il Paradiso." In Italy, Saad was known to own a FIAT 131 Mirafiori with
Bergamo plates, the very same vehicle later used in the Rijeka attack. As early as 1993,
he was traveling back and forth between Bosnia and Italy. But everyone at the ICI
mosque was aware that something was different in June 1995, when Hassan Saad packed
his family and belongings in the FIAT and left permanently for Bosnia-Herzegovina. His
friends at the ICI said he had gone away to join the El-Mudzahedin Unit in Zenica led by
Anwar Shaaban.78
Immediately following the premature truck bomb explosion outside foreign
mujahideen headquarters in Zenica in December 1995, Shaaban finally met his own
violent end in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During a suspicious clash with Croat HVO forces,
Shaaban and four of his closest mujahideen advisors were ritually gunned down,
seemingly harkening the end of a major era in for the Arab-Afghans in Europe. But the
influential network Shaaban was responsible for establishing in Italy and Bosnia-
Herzegovina continued to survive and prosper long after his death. The credit for this
74 "Egyptian Radical Group Claims Bombing in Croatia." The Associated Press. October 21, 1995.
75 "Jamaa claims Croatia bombing, Mubarak cancels New York trip." Deutsche Presse-Agentur. October
21, 1995.
76 January 1996 CIA Report on "International Islamic NGOs" and links to terrorism. Page 13. See also:
Affidavit by Senior Special Agent David Kane (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security). United States of America v. Soliman S. Biheiri. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Case #: 03-365-A. August 14, 2003. Page
2.
77 Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. "Requisitoire Definitifaux aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De
Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel, de mantien sous
Controle Judiciaiare et de maintien en Detention." Cour D'Appel de Paris; Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris. No. Parquet: P96 253 3901.2. Page 160.
78 Gatti, Fabrizio. "1995: From Milan a car bomb leaves for Fiume." Corriere della Sera (Italy).
November 11, 2001.
Swedish National Defence College
www.fhs.se
unexpected resurgence largely goes to top Algerian mujahideen commander Abu el-
Ma`ali (a.k.a. Abdelkader Mokhtari) and his reputed lieutenant Fateh Kamel (a.k.a.
"Mustapha the Terrorist"). Kamel, who had lived in Canada since 1988, was originally
from Algeria and spent a good part of his life in a quarter of the capital Algiers.79 His
slick, polished exterior boasted a professionalism that was matched only by his pure
ruthlessness. First trained in Afghanistan in 1991, Kamel came to the attention of Italian
authorities while encouraging attendees at Anwar Shaaban's Islamic Cultural Institute in
Milan to join the mujahideen in Bosnia. By 1995, according to French intelligence, the
El-Mudzahedin Unit in Bosnia was headed politically by Anwar Shaaban, seconded
militarily by Abu el-Ma`ali, and in the third position was Fateh Kamel, in charge of the
brigade's "logistical matters" (a role that consisted mostly of coordinating the transfer of
weapons, new recruits, and false documents to and from the Arab headquarters in
Zenica).80 Investigators reviewing the phone records of lines serving the ICI between
1994 and 1995 found evidence of regular contacts between the triumvirate of Abu el-
Ma`ali, Anwar Shaaban, and Fateh Kamel.81
French intelligence determined that Kamel and his associates had "multiple links"
with "diverse Islamic terrorist organizations around the world, and parti
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