21-09-2010, 12:39 AM
Footnote #128, page 166, from "Cognitive Infiltration" by David Ray Griffin:
"Beyond the problems in Sunstein's alternative account of a crippled epistemology discussed in the text, there is a deeper problem, which lies in the very concept of "crippled epistemologies". Being derived from episteme, which is the Greek word for knowledge, and the suffix "ology", which signifies "the study of" or "doctrine of", epistemology means the doctrine or study of knowledge. As such, it is a branch of philosophy. It is, in particular, one of the two major branches of metaphysics; the other is ontology, the study of being. To engage in epistemology is to ask about the nature of knowledge, the difference between knowledge and (mere) opinion, how knowledge is acquired, and so on. To "have am epistemology" is ot have a doctrine or theory about such matters. If philosophers would ever say of someone that he or she had a "crippled epistemology", they would mean that this person, probably another philosopher, had a poor theory of knowledge. They would not, in other words, use this phrase to indicate that someone had inadequate knowledge about the world – that this person was, in short, ignorant.
This, however, is how Sunstein uses the term, defining it as having "a sharply limited number of (relevant) informational sources" or "know[ing] very few things", most of which are wrong.
The confusion inherent in Sunstein's concept of "crippled epistemologies" was taken over from Russell Hardin's essay, "The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism" (in Political Extremism and Rationality, ed. Albert Breton, Gianluigo Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002]. 3-22). While Hardin is an astute thinker in his field, which is political philosophy, he treats the issues involved in epistemology in a careless and confused manner. For one thing, he simply equates "knowledge" and "beliefs", even though beliefs cannot be counted as knowledge unless they are justified – meaning that the person has good reasons for holding them – and also true, meaning that they correspond to reality: Knowledge is justified true belief. Hardin knows that this is the standard view in philosophical epistemology, but he dismisses it, saying that what interests him as a social scientist is "the ways people come to hold their beliefs" (4-5). He is, in other words, not interested in epistemology, which is a normative discipline, dealing with knowledge, but in the sociology of belief formation. This is an important and fascinating subject, but it is not epistemology, so it is unfortunate that Hardin coined the term "crippled epistemology," because he thereby used a normative discipline's name for a sociological description.
His blurring of the distinction is illustrated in a passage in which, after pointing out that philosophers might say that "those who assert the truth of some particular view have inadequate grounds for their assertions," Hardin dismisses this concern by saying: "But this is a claim from standard philosophical epistemology. In their own epistemology, [those people] may genuinely suppose that they do have grounds" (10). Of course they may suppose this, but this doesn't mean that they actually have good grounds for their beliefs, and it certainly does not mean that they "have an epistemology".
To justify his ignoring of traditional epistemological distinctions and concerns, Hardin says: "Most of us do not have the time or incentive to be deeply committed philosophers or scientists and we need not even suspect that there is anything questionable about our beliefs" (10). That is true. But if one is not interested in epistemology, one should not use the word. If one is interested in the sociology of belief, there is a perfectly good term for this area of interest: "sociology of belief" (often misnamed "sociology of knowledge").
In any case, Hardin's ignoring of necessary distinctions led him to speak of "crippled epistemology" when he was simply talking about a crippled (distorted) process of belief-formation, meaning one that is likely to result in ignorance and hence a false-belief system. It would have been better if Hardin and Sunstein, if they wanted to use the term "crippled," had simply spoken of a "crippled process of belief-formation." This would not have been so catchy, but it would have had the virtue of accuracy."
"Beyond the problems in Sunstein's alternative account of a crippled epistemology discussed in the text, there is a deeper problem, which lies in the very concept of "crippled epistemologies". Being derived from episteme, which is the Greek word for knowledge, and the suffix "ology", which signifies "the study of" or "doctrine of", epistemology means the doctrine or study of knowledge. As such, it is a branch of philosophy. It is, in particular, one of the two major branches of metaphysics; the other is ontology, the study of being. To engage in epistemology is to ask about the nature of knowledge, the difference between knowledge and (mere) opinion, how knowledge is acquired, and so on. To "have am epistemology" is ot have a doctrine or theory about such matters. If philosophers would ever say of someone that he or she had a "crippled epistemology", they would mean that this person, probably another philosopher, had a poor theory of knowledge. They would not, in other words, use this phrase to indicate that someone had inadequate knowledge about the world – that this person was, in short, ignorant.
This, however, is how Sunstein uses the term, defining it as having "a sharply limited number of (relevant) informational sources" or "know[ing] very few things", most of which are wrong.
The confusion inherent in Sunstein's concept of "crippled epistemologies" was taken over from Russell Hardin's essay, "The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism" (in Political Extremism and Rationality, ed. Albert Breton, Gianluigo Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002]. 3-22). While Hardin is an astute thinker in his field, which is political philosophy, he treats the issues involved in epistemology in a careless and confused manner. For one thing, he simply equates "knowledge" and "beliefs", even though beliefs cannot be counted as knowledge unless they are justified – meaning that the person has good reasons for holding them – and also true, meaning that they correspond to reality: Knowledge is justified true belief. Hardin knows that this is the standard view in philosophical epistemology, but he dismisses it, saying that what interests him as a social scientist is "the ways people come to hold their beliefs" (4-5). He is, in other words, not interested in epistemology, which is a normative discipline, dealing with knowledge, but in the sociology of belief formation. This is an important and fascinating subject, but it is not epistemology, so it is unfortunate that Hardin coined the term "crippled epistemology," because he thereby used a normative discipline's name for a sociological description.
His blurring of the distinction is illustrated in a passage in which, after pointing out that philosophers might say that "those who assert the truth of some particular view have inadequate grounds for their assertions," Hardin dismisses this concern by saying: "But this is a claim from standard philosophical epistemology. In their own epistemology, [those people] may genuinely suppose that they do have grounds" (10). Of course they may suppose this, but this doesn't mean that they actually have good grounds for their beliefs, and it certainly does not mean that they "have an epistemology".
To justify his ignoring of traditional epistemological distinctions and concerns, Hardin says: "Most of us do not have the time or incentive to be deeply committed philosophers or scientists and we need not even suspect that there is anything questionable about our beliefs" (10). That is true. But if one is not interested in epistemology, one should not use the word. If one is interested in the sociology of belief, there is a perfectly good term for this area of interest: "sociology of belief" (often misnamed "sociology of knowledge").
In any case, Hardin's ignoring of necessary distinctions led him to speak of "crippled epistemology" when he was simply talking about a crippled (distorted) process of belief-formation, meaning one that is likely to result in ignorance and hence a false-belief system. It would have been better if Hardin and Sunstein, if they wanted to use the term "crippled," had simply spoken of a "crippled process of belief-formation." This would not have been so catchy, but it would have had the virtue of accuracy."
"Where is the intersection between the world's deep hunger and your deep gladness?"