Custer at Little Bighorn: A Deep Political Hypothesis

[Charles Drago]

Was there a similar "disconnect" in understanding the degree to which the local populace would fight to defend their turf? Was there a blindness in some sense to the technique of the ambush? There shouldn't have been, but perhaps they did not think the Indian capable of an ambush on a larger scale than they had experienced.

No misunderstanding whatsoever. A tried-and-true Army tactic when attacking a village was to capture women and children, and then use the hostages to force the warriors to surrender. I share a minority viewpoint that Custer tried to do just that at Little Bighorn (LBH).

And let's be clear: There was no "ambush" in play at LBH. This postulate has been used to enhance the image of a treacherous and otherwise hapless enemy aided and abetted by half-breed America-haters. In point of fact Custer's advance on the village was so unexpected that his column was first noticed by women picking wild turnips along the riverbank -- hardly the activity and location to be expected of non-combatants of a village knowingly about to be attacked.

With regard to point #3, I might take issue with you, but -- as noted-- the material is not in front of me, nor fresh, not had I been introduced to deep political thinking when I read it. I know better than to argue jazz with you, and I'm not sure I want to argue with you in terms of deep politics, either. I'm still learning about both.

NONSENSE! If you refuse to take issue with me, then there is no point in carrying on this or any other discussion. I respect your mind and your knowledge. Use 'em or lose 'em.

[Tonight's lesson in jazz was listening to Herb Alpert and Lani Hall and their ensemble on their album "Anything Goes".]

But if you would dare characterize the Alpert/Hall ensemble as "jazz" (which is tantamount to characterizing Oswald as an "assassin"), then you are wise indeed to avoid discussion of the music I most love.

(Out of the kindness of my heart: If you want to experience the epitome of female jazz ballad singing, try Shirley Horn's Here's to Life CD.)

With regard to the communications, I think the Plains Indian was superior at scouting; their very survival depended upon it, and the US Army used friendly Indians for this purpose themselves; there may have been some mission communications interference as a result, though I doubt this was a significant factor, as they used tribal hate in a way that is parallel to today.

Custer's advance was not discovered until his attack had begun; thus the scouting issue in terms of hostile advantage is moot.

Custer's Crow and Arikara scouts were the blood enemies of the Sioux. Pitting tribe against tribe is one of the oldest and most effective of deep political tactics. I give you Liberal v. Conservative.

In addition, at short distances, the Native Americans may have had at their disposal a faster (or more effective) communications system; this deserves some research. In addition, some mechanism of graphically depicting or simulating the speed with which the specific communications flowed would be useful. I have no doubt that the telegraph served the US Army well; the question is the extent to which it extended and penetrated and reached front-line command posts or generals in the saddle.

Within the context of the LBH, the only communication issue worth noting relates to inter-battalion messaging. Clearly Custer's written order to Benteen to "come on" arrived in a timely fashion; Benteen's failure to ride to his commander's aid was a function of willful disobedience rather than any breakdown in communication.

Battlefield communication under LBH-like circumstances included the aforementioned volley fire -- a technique Custer used in vain as Benteen, well within earshot of the signals, held his then-safe ground. As one military veteran has observed, a commander cannot expect to carry the day when two-thirds of his troops are within the sound of his rifle fire yet do nothing.

This, by the way, is very similar to the kinds of debates, writing, etc. that surrounds many similar military events; one of the more notable is the one that posits that the South might have actually won at Gettysburg if Stuart had shown up properly, or if Ewell could have pushed his men hard enough to have secured Culp's Hill.

The more we know for certain about an event, the less there is to debate. A deep political analysis of LBH is long overdue -- not to mention highly relevant to studies of more recent events.