17-10-2010, 07:58 PM
Draft Policy Would OK Troops’ Tweets
* By Noah Shachtman Email Author
* September 29, 2009 |
* 5:23 pm
The Defense Department may allow troops and military employees to freely access social networks — if a draft policy circulating around the Pentagon gets approved, that is.
For years, the armed services have put in place a series of confusing, overlapping policies for using sites like Twitter and Facebook. But a draft memo, obtained by Nextgov, allows members of the military to use Defense Department networks to get on the social media sites — as well as on “e-mail, instant messaging and discussion forums.”
The new policy “addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the internet,” writes Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn. “This policy recognizes that emerging internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners.”
Over the summer, it looked like access to Web 2.0 sites might be banned altogether in the military. U.S. Strategic Command told the rest of the Defense Department it was considering a near-total block on social media, because the sites have become sieves for Trojans and spam. Not long afterward, the Marine Corps banned Web 2.0 sites from its networks. The moves only added to the military’s Web 2.0 confusion. Months earlier, the Army ordered all U.S. bases to provide access to social media. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up a Twitter account, which today has more than 7,000 followers.
That prompted Defense Secretary Robert Gates to order the first Department-wide review of how the American military uses the sites. It’s a review that’s not yet complete, cautions Pentagon social media czar Price Floyd. “No decisions have been made,” he tells Danger Room. “The memo hasn’t gone to the leadership yet.”
But a decision is expected shortly, he added — within a matter of weeks. And if Secretary Gates and the Pentagon’s poobahs approve the draft memo, servicemembers finally be allowed to tweet and blog, with the full backing of the U.S. military.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/dr...-troops-tweets/
###
Pentagon Web 2.0 Strategy Could Give Spies, Geeks New Roles
* By Noah Shachtman Email Author
* September 30, 2009 |
* 10:52 am
Letting troops blog and Tweet is just the start. The Defense Department’s spooks, spinners, geeks, and top generals would all get new roles and responsibilities, if the Pentagon approves a draft policy on how the armed services handle Web 2.0.
The draft memo outlining that policy, first revealed yesterday by Nextgov, is designed to end years of confusion over the military’s interactions of social media. It hasn’t been okayed by the Pentagon’s leadership. But if it does, the new guidelines would allow servicemembers to use the Defense Department’s unclassified networks to hop on everything from “social networking sites” to “image and video hosting websites” to “Wikis” to “personal, corporate or subject-specific blogs” to “data mashups.” (That’s right: “mashups” are now being discussed at the Defense Department’s highest levels.)
According to the memo, troops can Facebook or YouTube or Flickr all they want — it doesn’t have to be work-related. The servicemembers just can’t claim to be officially representing the military or “have an online presence that could be viewed as representing the Department of Defense (e.g., may not use official title, military rank, military identifiers (i.e., e-mail address), or post imagery with their military uniform).” Of course, the servicememebers would also have to comply with pre-existing regulations “regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities,” too.
Some in the military have called for banning or severely restricting the Web 2.0 sites, because of their potential to leak secrets or spread Trojans. It’d be up to the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence “develop and maintain threat estimates” from these “current and emerging Internet-based capabilities,” the memo states. The Pentagon’s top spook would also be responsible for making sure operational security “education, training and awareness activities” would also include blogs and the like.
The heads of the military’s various “components” — from the Secretary of the Army to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness — would get some extra work, as well. They’d have to put up “Computer Network Defense mechanisms that provide adequate security to access Internet-based capabilities” from the military’s networks.
The Defense Department’s public affairs chiefs would oversee policies for official social media sites. While the military’s Chief Information Officers would put together policies for Web 2.0’s “use, risk management and compliance oversight,” and be on the lookout for “emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.”
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/pe...eeks-new-roles/
UPDATE: Here’s the memo itself:
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT: Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) - Responsible and Effective Use of Internet-based Capabilities
References. See Attachment 1
Purpose. This memorandum establishes Departmental policy on the responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities, including publicly accessible social networking services, which are not owned, operated, or controlled by the DoD. The policy addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the Internet. This policy recognizes that emerging Internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners. It does not change DoD policy concerning operation and security of the DoD Information Enterprise, including the Global Information Grid (GIG), nor does it change the current procedures under which public affairs offices release information to the media or general public. This DTM is effective immediately and will be converted to a new DoD issuance or incorporated into an existing DoD issuance within 180 days.
Applicability. This DTM applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components") and authorized users of the Non Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).
Definitions. These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this DTM.
External Official Presence. Representation on the Internet external to the DoD, e.g., outside of the .MIL domain, by DoD organizations in an official public affairs capacity.
Internet-based capabilities. The full-range of publicly accessible information services resident on the Internet external to the DoD, e.g., outside of the .MIL domains, including Web 2.0 tools such as social networking services, social media, user generated content sites, social software, as well as email, instant messaging, and discussion forums. This does not include DoD-owned, DoD-operated, or DoD-controlled capabilities.
Policy. It is DoD policy that:
The Department of Defense shall permit and encourage official use of Internet-based capabilities to leverage their potential while managing risk to build an information advantage for DoD personnel and mission partners.
The establishment of External Official Presences by DoD organizations is permitted with the approval of the appropriate DoD Component Head. Approval signifies that the DoD Component Head concurs with the intended use and has determined that the Internet-based capability has an acceptable level of risk.
External Official Presences are considered public affairs activities. As such, they shall comply with Reference (a) and clearly identify that their content is provided by the Department of Defense. The DoD shall maintain a publicly accessible Internet repository of External Official Presences.
Business transformation, professional networking, education, and other official uses of Internet-based capabilities unrelated to public affairs are permitted. However, because these interactions take place in a public venue, personnel acting in their official capacity shall maintain liaison with public affairs staff to ensure organizational awareness.
Personal, unofficial use of Internet-based capabilities by DoD employees from the NIPRNET is permitted, but users shall not claim representation of the Department or its policies, or those of the U.S. government.
All use of Internet-based capabilities from the NIPRNET shall comply with all applicable policy regarding the sharing and safeguarding of information including Information Assurance (References (B) and ©), Personally Identifiable Information (Reference (d)), Public Release of Information (Reference (e)), and operations security (Reference (f)); and shall comply with the Joint Ethics Regulations (Reference (g)).
The NIPRNET shall be configured to enable access to Internet-based capabilities.
Internet-based capabilities shall not be used to transact business that generates records subject to records management policy (reference (h)) unless applicable records management requirements can be met.
All use of Internet-based capabilities shall comply with the basic guidelines set forth in Attachment 2.
Responsibilities. See Attachment 3
Releasability. UNLIMITED. This DTM is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
Attachments:
As state
ATTACHMENT 1
REFERENCES
(a) DoD Instruction 5400.13, "Public Affairs (PA) Operations," October 15, 2008
(B) DoD Directive 8500.1, "Information Assurance (IA), " October 24, 2002
© DoD Instruction 8500.2, "Information Assurance (IA) Implementation," February 6, 2003
(d) DoD Directive 5400.11, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 8, 2007
(e) DoD Directive 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, " August 22, 2008
(f) DoD Manual 5205.02-M, "DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual," November 3, 2008
(g) DoD Regulation 5500.7-R, "Joint Ethics Regulation," August 30, 1993 (updated March 23, 2006)
(h) DoD Directive 5015.2, "DoD Records Management Program," March 6, 2000
(i) DoD Instruction O-8530.2, "Support to Computer Network Defense (CND)," March 9, 2001
ATTACHMENT 2
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR USE OF INTERNET-BASED CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1. GENERAL. This attachment applies to the use of Internet-based capabilities by DoD employees for official and personal purposes. Examples include, but are not limited to:
a. Social networking sites
b. Image and video hosting websites
c. Wikis
d. Personal, corporate or subject-specific blogs
e. Data mashups that combine similar types of media and information from multiple sources into a single representation (i.e., a web page).
f. Similar collaborative, information sharing-driven Internet-based capabilities where users are encouraged to add/generate content.
2. EXTERNAL OFFICIAL PRESENCES. External Official Presences established pursuant to this DTM shall:
a. Receive approval from the responsible DoD Component head. Approval signifies that the Component head concurs with the planned use and has determined that the Internet-based capability has an acceptable level of risk.
b. Register on an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) -managed External Official Presences list.
c. Comply with references (B) through (g).
d. Use official branding in accordance with ASD(PA) guidance.
e. Clearly indicate role and scope of the External Official Presence.
f. Provide links to the organization's official public .Mil website.
g. Actively monitor for fraudulent or objectionable use.
3. OFFICIAL USE. DoD employees officially using Internet-based capabilities that are not part of a public affairs activity may discuss their relationship to the Department of Defense and their duties but shall:
a. Comply with references (B) through (g).
b. Ensure that the information posted is relevant, accurate, and professionally portrayed.
c. Provide links to official DoD content hosted on DoD-owned, operated, or controlled sites.
d. Include a disclaimer when personal opinions are expressed. (e.g., "This statement is my own and does not constitute an endorsement or opinion of the Department of Defense").
e. Comply with applicable DoD Component policies regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
4. UNOFFICIAL USE. When acting in a personal or unofficial capacity, individuals shall:
a. Not claim representation of the Department or its policies.
b. Comply with references (B) through (g).
c Not have an online presence that could be viewed as representing the Department of Defense (e.g., may not use official title, military rank, military identifiers (i.e., e-mail address), or post imagery with their military uniform).
d. Comply with applicable DoD Component policies regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
ATTACHMENT 3
RESPONSIBILITIES
1. UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I) shall:
a. Develop procedures and guidelines to be implemented by the DoD Components for OPSEC reviews of DoD information shared via Internet-based capabilities
b. Develop and maintain threat estimates on current and emerging Internet-based capabilities.
c. Integrate guidance regarding the proper use of Internet-based capabilities into existing OPSEC education, training and awareness activities.
2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION/ DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER. The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO shall:
a. Establish and maintain policy and procedures regarding Internet-based capabilities use, risk management and compliance oversight.
b. Integrate guidance regarding the proper use of Internet-based capabilities with existing IA education, training and awareness activities.
c. Establish mechanisms to monitor emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.
3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ASD(PA)). The ASD(PA) shall:
a. Extend the existing website registry to include registration of External Official Presences.
b. Provide policy for news, information, photographs, editorial, and other materials distributed via External Official Presences.
4. HEADS OF DOD COMPONENTS. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
a. Approve the establishment of External Official Presences.
b. Ensure the implementation, validation and maintenance of applicable IA controls and OPSEC measures.
c. Ensure Computer Network Defense mechanisms that provide adequate security to access Internet-based capabilities from the NIPRNET are in place, effective, and compliant with reference (i).
d. Educate, train and promote awareness for the responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
5. DoD COMPONENT CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICERS (CIOs). The DoD Component CIOs shall:
a. Advise the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO and ensure that the policies and guidance issued by ASD(NII)/DoD CIO are implemented. Provide Component-specific implementation guidance on responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
b. Provide advice, guidance and other assistance to the Component Head and other Component senior management personnel to ensure that Internet-based capabilities are used responsibly and effectively.
c. Assist the Component Head to ensure effective implementation of Computer Network Defense mechanisms as well as the proper use of Internet-based capabilities with existing IA education, training and awareness activities.
d. Establish risk assessment procedures to evaluate and monitor emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerro..._draft_memo.txt
###
After Leaflet Drop Kills Afghan Girl, a Search for Safer Psyop Tech. Missiles, Anyone?
* By David Hambling Email Author
* September 30, 2009 |
* 12:01 pm
The Royal Air Force has accidentally killed a young girl in Afghanistan — by dropping a box of leaflets on her. The British Ministry of Defence is carrying out a full investigation. Meanwhile, the seemingly antiquated practice of leaflet bombing continues. In the 21st century, it remains one of the primary tools of psychological warfare; U.S. Special Operations Command is even looking to build leaflet-carrying missiles. And while top American commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal has virtually banned “kinetic” air strikes, paper bombs are in regular use.
According to the BBC, the leaflet box was supposed to open in mid-air, spreading pro-coalition propaganda over rural Helmand province. But the container failed to break apart, landing on top of the girl, who died later in the hospital.
Leaflets have been used by militaries since at least the Napoleonic wars, when the British navy dropped them over France using kites. And they continue to be employed, because leaflets have some advantages over other media. Radio and TV are fine if the audience happen to be tuned in at the time, but printed matter is durable. As the U.S. Army’s Psychological Operations Field Manual explains, a printed leaflet has the advantage that it can be passed from person to person without the message being altered. It can convey a complex message which can be reinforced with pictures if the recipient is illiterate. And a leaflet can be hidden and read in private, and shared around with others.
Delivery methods have ranged from artillery and mortar shells to loose airdrop by hand to “leaflet landmines.” The M129E1/E2 Psychological Operations Leaflet Bomb weighs 200 pounds and can disperse some 60,000 to 80,000 leaflets which are scattered by a length of detonator cord.
However, U.S. Special Operations Command is looking for a wider range of options, and their current R&D budget calls for a “Next Generation Leaflet Delivery System,” which will:
…provide forces a family of systems consisting of unmanned air vehicles, drones,
missiles, and leaflet boxes that safely and accurately disseminate variable size and weight paper and electronic leaflets to large area targets, at short (10-750 miles) and long (>750 miles) ranges. These systems can be utilized in peacetime and all threat environments across the spectrum of conflict, and are compatible with current and future U.S. aircraft.
The fact that the commandos are seriously developing missiles to deliver leaflets shows the importance given to this mission. Hopefully, improved safety measures will mean less chance of tragic accidents.But the technology does not stop there. In addition to digital broadcast capability and advanced loudspeakers, new psychological operations tech also includes development of appropriate emerging technologies including “remote controlled electronic paper.”
This sounds a lot like the video advertising inserts being pioneered by Entertainment Weekly, which includes a wafer-thin screen which plays up to 40 minutes of video. (See “video in print” in action here, featuring Tony Stark, appropriately enough.) It’s like an evolution of the musical greeting cards, with added video. But the difference with the Special Operations version is that it is remote-controlled, so presumably new messages or video can be sent as required. The applications for such a device would be endless, and as a shiny gadget it would have a much greater chance of being picked up, retained and shown around — if it can be made cheap enough to distribute in significant quantities.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/le...issiles-anyone/
* By Noah Shachtman Email Author
* September 29, 2009 |
* 5:23 pm
The Defense Department may allow troops and military employees to freely access social networks — if a draft policy circulating around the Pentagon gets approved, that is.
For years, the armed services have put in place a series of confusing, overlapping policies for using sites like Twitter and Facebook. But a draft memo, obtained by Nextgov, allows members of the military to use Defense Department networks to get on the social media sites — as well as on “e-mail, instant messaging and discussion forums.”
The new policy “addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the internet,” writes Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn. “This policy recognizes that emerging internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners.”
Over the summer, it looked like access to Web 2.0 sites might be banned altogether in the military. U.S. Strategic Command told the rest of the Defense Department it was considering a near-total block on social media, because the sites have become sieves for Trojans and spam. Not long afterward, the Marine Corps banned Web 2.0 sites from its networks. The moves only added to the military’s Web 2.0 confusion. Months earlier, the Army ordered all U.S. bases to provide access to social media. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up a Twitter account, which today has more than 7,000 followers.
That prompted Defense Secretary Robert Gates to order the first Department-wide review of how the American military uses the sites. It’s a review that’s not yet complete, cautions Pentagon social media czar Price Floyd. “No decisions have been made,” he tells Danger Room. “The memo hasn’t gone to the leadership yet.”
But a decision is expected shortly, he added — within a matter of weeks. And if Secretary Gates and the Pentagon’s poobahs approve the draft memo, servicemembers finally be allowed to tweet and blog, with the full backing of the U.S. military.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/dr...-troops-tweets/
###
Pentagon Web 2.0 Strategy Could Give Spies, Geeks New Roles
* By Noah Shachtman Email Author
* September 30, 2009 |
* 10:52 am
Letting troops blog and Tweet is just the start. The Defense Department’s spooks, spinners, geeks, and top generals would all get new roles and responsibilities, if the Pentagon approves a draft policy on how the armed services handle Web 2.0.
The draft memo outlining that policy, first revealed yesterday by Nextgov, is designed to end years of confusion over the military’s interactions of social media. It hasn’t been okayed by the Pentagon’s leadership. But if it does, the new guidelines would allow servicemembers to use the Defense Department’s unclassified networks to hop on everything from “social networking sites” to “image and video hosting websites” to “Wikis” to “personal, corporate or subject-specific blogs” to “data mashups.” (That’s right: “mashups” are now being discussed at the Defense Department’s highest levels.)
According to the memo, troops can Facebook or YouTube or Flickr all they want — it doesn’t have to be work-related. The servicemembers just can’t claim to be officially representing the military or “have an online presence that could be viewed as representing the Department of Defense (e.g., may not use official title, military rank, military identifiers (i.e., e-mail address), or post imagery with their military uniform).” Of course, the servicememebers would also have to comply with pre-existing regulations “regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities,” too.
Some in the military have called for banning or severely restricting the Web 2.0 sites, because of their potential to leak secrets or spread Trojans. It’d be up to the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence “develop and maintain threat estimates” from these “current and emerging Internet-based capabilities,” the memo states. The Pentagon’s top spook would also be responsible for making sure operational security “education, training and awareness activities” would also include blogs and the like.
The heads of the military’s various “components” — from the Secretary of the Army to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness — would get some extra work, as well. They’d have to put up “Computer Network Defense mechanisms that provide adequate security to access Internet-based capabilities” from the military’s networks.
The Defense Department’s public affairs chiefs would oversee policies for official social media sites. While the military’s Chief Information Officers would put together policies for Web 2.0’s “use, risk management and compliance oversight,” and be on the lookout for “emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.”
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/pe...eeks-new-roles/
UPDATE: Here’s the memo itself:
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT: Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) - Responsible and Effective Use of Internet-based Capabilities
References. See Attachment 1
Purpose. This memorandum establishes Departmental policy on the responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities, including publicly accessible social networking services, which are not owned, operated, or controlled by the DoD. The policy addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the Internet. This policy recognizes that emerging Internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners. It does not change DoD policy concerning operation and security of the DoD Information Enterprise, including the Global Information Grid (GIG), nor does it change the current procedures under which public affairs offices release information to the media or general public. This DTM is effective immediately and will be converted to a new DoD issuance or incorporated into an existing DoD issuance within 180 days.
Applicability. This DTM applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components") and authorized users of the Non Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).
Definitions. These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this DTM.
External Official Presence. Representation on the Internet external to the DoD, e.g., outside of the .MIL domain, by DoD organizations in an official public affairs capacity.
Internet-based capabilities. The full-range of publicly accessible information services resident on the Internet external to the DoD, e.g., outside of the .MIL domains, including Web 2.0 tools such as social networking services, social media, user generated content sites, social software, as well as email, instant messaging, and discussion forums. This does not include DoD-owned, DoD-operated, or DoD-controlled capabilities.
Policy. It is DoD policy that:
The Department of Defense shall permit and encourage official use of Internet-based capabilities to leverage their potential while managing risk to build an information advantage for DoD personnel and mission partners.
The establishment of External Official Presences by DoD organizations is permitted with the approval of the appropriate DoD Component Head. Approval signifies that the DoD Component Head concurs with the intended use and has determined that the Internet-based capability has an acceptable level of risk.
External Official Presences are considered public affairs activities. As such, they shall comply with Reference (a) and clearly identify that their content is provided by the Department of Defense. The DoD shall maintain a publicly accessible Internet repository of External Official Presences.
Business transformation, professional networking, education, and other official uses of Internet-based capabilities unrelated to public affairs are permitted. However, because these interactions take place in a public venue, personnel acting in their official capacity shall maintain liaison with public affairs staff to ensure organizational awareness.
Personal, unofficial use of Internet-based capabilities by DoD employees from the NIPRNET is permitted, but users shall not claim representation of the Department or its policies, or those of the U.S. government.
All use of Internet-based capabilities from the NIPRNET shall comply with all applicable policy regarding the sharing and safeguarding of information including Information Assurance (References (B) and ©), Personally Identifiable Information (Reference (d)), Public Release of Information (Reference (e)), and operations security (Reference (f)); and shall comply with the Joint Ethics Regulations (Reference (g)).
The NIPRNET shall be configured to enable access to Internet-based capabilities.
Internet-based capabilities shall not be used to transact business that generates records subject to records management policy (reference (h)) unless applicable records management requirements can be met.
All use of Internet-based capabilities shall comply with the basic guidelines set forth in Attachment 2.
Responsibilities. See Attachment 3
Releasability. UNLIMITED. This DTM is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
Attachments:
As state
ATTACHMENT 1
REFERENCES
(a) DoD Instruction 5400.13, "Public Affairs (PA) Operations," October 15, 2008
(B) DoD Directive 8500.1, "Information Assurance (IA), " October 24, 2002
© DoD Instruction 8500.2, "Information Assurance (IA) Implementation," February 6, 2003
(d) DoD Directive 5400.11, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 8, 2007
(e) DoD Directive 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, " August 22, 2008
(f) DoD Manual 5205.02-M, "DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual," November 3, 2008
(g) DoD Regulation 5500.7-R, "Joint Ethics Regulation," August 30, 1993 (updated March 23, 2006)
(h) DoD Directive 5015.2, "DoD Records Management Program," March 6, 2000
(i) DoD Instruction O-8530.2, "Support to Computer Network Defense (CND)," March 9, 2001
ATTACHMENT 2
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR USE OF INTERNET-BASED CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1. GENERAL. This attachment applies to the use of Internet-based capabilities by DoD employees for official and personal purposes. Examples include, but are not limited to:
a. Social networking sites
b. Image and video hosting websites
c. Wikis
d. Personal, corporate or subject-specific blogs
e. Data mashups that combine similar types of media and information from multiple sources into a single representation (i.e., a web page).
f. Similar collaborative, information sharing-driven Internet-based capabilities where users are encouraged to add/generate content.
2. EXTERNAL OFFICIAL PRESENCES. External Official Presences established pursuant to this DTM shall:
a. Receive approval from the responsible DoD Component head. Approval signifies that the Component head concurs with the planned use and has determined that the Internet-based capability has an acceptable level of risk.
b. Register on an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) -managed External Official Presences list.
c. Comply with references (B) through (g).
d. Use official branding in accordance with ASD(PA) guidance.
e. Clearly indicate role and scope of the External Official Presence.
f. Provide links to the organization's official public .Mil website.
g. Actively monitor for fraudulent or objectionable use.
3. OFFICIAL USE. DoD employees officially using Internet-based capabilities that are not part of a public affairs activity may discuss their relationship to the Department of Defense and their duties but shall:
a. Comply with references (B) through (g).
b. Ensure that the information posted is relevant, accurate, and professionally portrayed.
c. Provide links to official DoD content hosted on DoD-owned, operated, or controlled sites.
d. Include a disclaimer when personal opinions are expressed. (e.g., "This statement is my own and does not constitute an endorsement or opinion of the Department of Defense").
e. Comply with applicable DoD Component policies regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
4. UNOFFICIAL USE. When acting in a personal or unofficial capacity, individuals shall:
a. Not claim representation of the Department or its policies.
b. Comply with references (B) through (g).
c Not have an online presence that could be viewed as representing the Department of Defense (e.g., may not use official title, military rank, military identifiers (i.e., e-mail address), or post imagery with their military uniform).
d. Comply with applicable DoD Component policies regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
ATTACHMENT 3
RESPONSIBILITIES
1. UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I) shall:
a. Develop procedures and guidelines to be implemented by the DoD Components for OPSEC reviews of DoD information shared via Internet-based capabilities
b. Develop and maintain threat estimates on current and emerging Internet-based capabilities.
c. Integrate guidance regarding the proper use of Internet-based capabilities into existing OPSEC education, training and awareness activities.
2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION/ DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER. The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO shall:
a. Establish and maintain policy and procedures regarding Internet-based capabilities use, risk management and compliance oversight.
b. Integrate guidance regarding the proper use of Internet-based capabilities with existing IA education, training and awareness activities.
c. Establish mechanisms to monitor emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.
3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ASD(PA)). The ASD(PA) shall:
a. Extend the existing website registry to include registration of External Official Presences.
b. Provide policy for news, information, photographs, editorial, and other materials distributed via External Official Presences.
4. HEADS OF DOD COMPONENTS. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
a. Approve the establishment of External Official Presences.
b. Ensure the implementation, validation and maintenance of applicable IA controls and OPSEC measures.
c. Ensure Computer Network Defense mechanisms that provide adequate security to access Internet-based capabilities from the NIPRNET are in place, effective, and compliant with reference (i).
d. Educate, train and promote awareness for the responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
5. DoD COMPONENT CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICERS (CIOs). The DoD Component CIOs shall:
a. Advise the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO and ensure that the policies and guidance issued by ASD(NII)/DoD CIO are implemented. Provide Component-specific implementation guidance on responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
b. Provide advice, guidance and other assistance to the Component Head and other Component senior management personnel to ensure that Internet-based capabilities are used responsibly and effectively.
c. Assist the Component Head to ensure effective implementation of Computer Network Defense mechanisms as well as the proper use of Internet-based capabilities with existing IA education, training and awareness activities.
d. Establish risk assessment procedures to evaluate and monitor emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerro..._draft_memo.txt
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After Leaflet Drop Kills Afghan Girl, a Search for Safer Psyop Tech. Missiles, Anyone?
* By David Hambling Email Author
* September 30, 2009 |
* 12:01 pm
The Royal Air Force has accidentally killed a young girl in Afghanistan — by dropping a box of leaflets on her. The British Ministry of Defence is carrying out a full investigation. Meanwhile, the seemingly antiquated practice of leaflet bombing continues. In the 21st century, it remains one of the primary tools of psychological warfare; U.S. Special Operations Command is even looking to build leaflet-carrying missiles. And while top American commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal has virtually banned “kinetic” air strikes, paper bombs are in regular use.
According to the BBC, the leaflet box was supposed to open in mid-air, spreading pro-coalition propaganda over rural Helmand province. But the container failed to break apart, landing on top of the girl, who died later in the hospital.
Leaflets have been used by militaries since at least the Napoleonic wars, when the British navy dropped them over France using kites. And they continue to be employed, because leaflets have some advantages over other media. Radio and TV are fine if the audience happen to be tuned in at the time, but printed matter is durable. As the U.S. Army’s Psychological Operations Field Manual explains, a printed leaflet has the advantage that it can be passed from person to person without the message being altered. It can convey a complex message which can be reinforced with pictures if the recipient is illiterate. And a leaflet can be hidden and read in private, and shared around with others.
Delivery methods have ranged from artillery and mortar shells to loose airdrop by hand to “leaflet landmines.” The M129E1/E2 Psychological Operations Leaflet Bomb weighs 200 pounds and can disperse some 60,000 to 80,000 leaflets which are scattered by a length of detonator cord.
However, U.S. Special Operations Command is looking for a wider range of options, and their current R&D budget calls for a “Next Generation Leaflet Delivery System,” which will:
…provide forces a family of systems consisting of unmanned air vehicles, drones,
missiles, and leaflet boxes that safely and accurately disseminate variable size and weight paper and electronic leaflets to large area targets, at short (10-750 miles) and long (>750 miles) ranges. These systems can be utilized in peacetime and all threat environments across the spectrum of conflict, and are compatible with current and future U.S. aircraft.
The fact that the commandos are seriously developing missiles to deliver leaflets shows the importance given to this mission. Hopefully, improved safety measures will mean less chance of tragic accidents.But the technology does not stop there. In addition to digital broadcast capability and advanced loudspeakers, new psychological operations tech also includes development of appropriate emerging technologies including “remote controlled electronic paper.”
This sounds a lot like the video advertising inserts being pioneered by Entertainment Weekly, which includes a wafer-thin screen which plays up to 40 minutes of video. (See “video in print” in action here, featuring Tony Stark, appropriately enough.) It’s like an evolution of the musical greeting cards, with added video. But the difference with the Special Operations version is that it is remote-controlled, so presumably new messages or video can be sent as required. The applications for such a device would be endless, and as a shiny gadget it would have a much greater chance of being picked up, retained and shown around — if it can be made cheap enough to distribute in significant quantities.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/le...issiles-anyone/
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