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Gert Nylander[/FONT]
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GERMAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND ENGLAND[/FONT]
Carl Goerdeler and the Wallenberg Brothers[/FONT][/FONT]
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No. 2 Stockholm 1999[/FONT]
Electronic issue[/FONT]
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Stiftelsen för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande[/FONT]
The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise[/FONT]
Box 16066 S-103 22 STOCKHOLM[/FONT]
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Telephone + 46 8 661 70 55 Facsimile + 46 8 665 34 57[/FONT]
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arkivstiftelsen@sfehf.se http://arkiv.wallenberg.org/[/FONT]
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No. 1 Ulf Olsson: Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Bosch Group, 1939-1950 (1998, 64 pages)[/FONT]
No. 2 Gert Nylander: German Resistance Movement and England. Carl Goerdeler and the Wallenberg Brothers (1999, 100 pages)[/FONT]
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ã Gert Nylander and The Foundation 1999[/FONT]
Translation by Björn Norrbom[/FONT]
Printed in Sweden 1999 by Centraltryckeriet, Borås[/FONT]
ISSN 1403-2198[/FONT]
Stockholm[/FONT] 1999[/FONT]
Electronic issue[/FONT]
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Banking and Enterprise[/FONT]
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The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise was established in 1994 for the purpose of promoting research into economic history, esp. business history. With this end in view, the Foundation collects, organizes and manages the historical archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank (1856-1971) and its Management, as well as those of other companies and foundations closely associated with that bank. In 1994-1995, these historical archives were transferred to refurbished premises close to the Villa "Täcka Udden" at Djurgården in Stockholm. [/FONT]
The archives have been made available for research within those areas supported by the Foundation. Since the 1950's these archives are among the most useful and well-used for different business history monographs. Sources from here form the basis of a long series of research. [/FONT]
In order to provide information about its archives, the Foundation has decided to issue a series of publications on the theme Bank and Enterprise. The series will be published mainly in English and present the results of research, which to an essential extent is based upon the archives of the Foundation.[/FONT]
A more detailed, up-to-date information about these matters can be obtained via the Internet. The web-service of the Foundation may be found under http://arkiv.wallenberg.org.[/FONT]
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Marcus Wallenberg[/FONT]
Chairman[/FONT]
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Contents[/FONT]
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Preface 7[/FONT]
Background 9[/FONT]
The Documents 21[/FONT]
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Reproduced documents 31[/FONT]
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Carl Goerdeler. Undated memorandum, typed in Stockholm [/FONT]
20 May, 1943. 35[/FONT]
Letter from Jacob Wallenberg to Marcus Wallenberg [/FONT]
21 May, 1943. 41[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg´s handwritten notes from a meeting [/FONT]
with Desmond Morton in June, 1943. 46[/FONT]
Handwritten notes by Jacob Wallenberg from a meeting in [/FONT]
Berlin 12 August, 1943. 51[/FONT]
Handwritten draft letter from Marcus Wallenberg to [/FONT]
Desmond Morton 13 August, 1943. 54[/FONT]
Handwritten letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus [/FONT]
Wallenberg 25 August, 1943. 54[/FONT]
Handwritten draft letter from Marcus Wallenberg to [/FONT]
Desmond Morton, undated (6 September, 1943). 55[/FONT]
Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg [/FONT]
25 September, 1943. 56[/FONT]
Handwritten letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus [/FONT]
Wallenberg 29 September, 1943. 57[/FONT]
Handwritten letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus [/FONT]
Wallenberg 19 October, 1943. 59[/FONT]
Typed letter from Carl Goerdeler to Jacob [/FONT]
Wallenberg 8 November, 1944. 60[/FONT]
Carl Goerdeler´s handwritten letter 24 December, [/FONT]
1944. 64[/FONT]
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Notes 70[/FONT]
References 72 [/FONT]
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Preface[/FONT]
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A description of the history of Stockholms Enskilda Bank played a central part in the preparations for the 100th anniversary of the Bank in 1956. This meant that the archives of the Bank, which had not been used before, were made available to historical research. These archives would prove to contain a great deal of highly interesting and fruitful material.[/FONT]
A historical presentation was published in two parts in connection with the anniversary. After that, a number of monographs on the development of the Bank and several biographies on its leaders have been published on the basis of source material from the archives of the Bank. Several monographs on corporate customers have furthermore benefited from valuable information from these archives.[/FONT]
When word spread about the existence of the archives, many inquiries were received, which generally could be answered. In one particular area, however, the material was too fragile to provide sufficient information, viz. as regards the role that the Wallenberg brothers played as connecting links between the leaders of the German Resistance against Hitler and the British Government.[/FONT]
This situation was completely reversed in 1997 through the recovery of a number of documents in the Bank. Due to their special character, these documents had not been sorted among the series belonging to the Management archives, which was normal procedure, but placed in various envelopes with the instructions that only Jacob Wallenberg, or Marcus Wallenberg, was allowed to open them. There may be several explanations for the fact that these documents were kept separately from the beginning: They had no connection with the regular activities of the Bank, but existed due to the personal action of the top executives of the Bank; They touched upon sensitive issues regarding the relations with foreign powers. The war was still going on and it was important not to bring the documents to the knowledge of unauthorized persons and that they, in case of occupation, quickly could be taken care of and destroyed. It would have been more difficult to arrange for this, if they had been sorted among other documents.[/FONT]
The course of events reflected by the documents had been made possible thanks to Carl Goerdeler, a member of the German Resistance Movement, who had been given a new employment with the company Robert Bosch GmbH in Stuttgart after he broke with the Nazi regime in 1936. Robert Bosch, founder and owner of the company, was a prominent but distinctive personality among the German industrialists. He took a keen interest in social issues and gave important donations to welfare institutions and educational establishments. According to Ritter, he was one of the active opponents of the Hitler rule. He did not content himself with donating large sums of money to the victims of this regime, particularly prosecuted Jewish compatriots and students of divinity. He also gathered a circle of people of a like mind around himself, including Carl Goerdeler.[/FONT]
As a representative of the Bosch Group, Goerdeler got into contact with Stockholms Enskilda Bank and Jacob Wallenberg. Gradually, this business relation developed into a close personal contact that aimed at the establishment of a connection between the German Resistance Movement and the British Government. In addition to Carl Goerdeler and Jacob Wallenberg, the principal parts were played by Marcus Wallenberg and Charles Hambro and it is from these people that the published documents emanate. The purpose of this presentation is to put these people into their proper context, rather than to make an in-depth analysis. It furthermore focuses on the new documents only and has not been expanded to comprise other sources.[/FONT]
The study was recently published in German in the magazine Nordeuropaforum (1998:1) and in Swedish in the magazine Scandia(1998:2). The present presentation has been slightly revised and expanded.[/FONT]
The original texts are naturally the most important for an analysis. But to assist the reader, the Swedish and German texts have been translated into English. [/FONT]
My warm thanks to Björn Norrbom, who is responsible for the English translation.[/FONT]
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Stockholm[/FONT], February, 1999 [/FONT]
Gert Nylander[/FONT][/FONT]
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Background[/FONT]
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After Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the German Reich on 30 January, 1933 the Nazis quickly took control of the entire government apparatus. The National Socialist German Workers' Party, as the complete name read, became the only permitted political party in July 1933. These unparalleled successes could be gained without meeting with any real resistance. The political opposition was paralysed and never given an opportunity of preparing any counter*measures. Opponents and other dissidents were forced away with the help of a superior propaganda machine and through a wave of assaults, arrests and threats. The Nazis were thus able to infiltrate the whole society. In other words, there was a total lack of opportunities for organized resistance by political groups against the Nazis.[/FONT]
The brutal force of the Nazi regime, its oppression of people of different opinions and its special treatment and prosecution of the Jews provoked a hidden opposition, although it took a while before it assumed a more definite shape. It was never widely supported by the population at large. Hitler's expansive foreign policy programme, particularly after he had declared his intention of occupying Czechoslovakia in 1937, made it ever more obvious that his policy would lead to war with the Western Powers. Opposition against such a development was centred around Ludwig Beck, Head of General Staff. In September, 1938, advanced plans existed for an intervention in order to remove Hitler from power. Towards the end of the month, however, the Western Powers gave in to Hitler's demands, allowing Germany to occupy Sudetenland. This success for Hitler led to a serious backlash for the opposition. One problem on this occasion, just like on other later occasions, was that the sworn opponents were dependent upon events beyond their control in order to implement a coup. After the failure, the military opposition disintegrated. Only a core was left. Beck had resigned at an early stage, but remained a unifying figure for the opposition. He was regarded as the obvious choice to become German Head of State, in the event of a change of regime.[/FONT]
As from 1938, the underground civil resistance that had started to grow within Bourgeois conservative circles found a leader in Carl Goerdeler, who built a network of like‑minded people among civil servants, academics, priests and leaders among the workers. In addition, he tried to organize co‑operation between various sectors of opposition within the Church, among students and radical intellectuals. Resistance centred around the groups surrounding Beck and Goerdeler, for which the objective was to implement some kind of a coup d'état. One important feature of their plans was to establish contact with like‑minded people in other countries, particularly in England and the U.S.A., in order to achieve a commitment regarding a separate peace agreement in the event of a coup. These attempts were made through various channels via neutral countries. The Wallenberg brothers represented one of these channels for contacts with England.[/FONT]
Several plans for capturing or liquidating Hitler were prepared, but all failed. Hitler would suddenly change his programme, without any forewarning, as well as place of residence. He was always surrounded by bodyguards. Once Colonel Graf von Stauffenberg eventually implemented a coup on 20 July, 1944, it was a failure. The accounts were ruthlessly settled with the coup-*makers: over a thousand people were arrested, two hundred were sentenced to death by the People's Court and liquidated. [/FONT]
Jacob Wallenberg's close co‑operation with the German Resistance, particularly with Carl Goerdeler, during the Second World War became better known in 1947 through the book "Germany's Underground", written by the American author Allen Welsh Dulles. Another study that was published at the same time was Hans Rothfels' work "Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung", which was published later in a revised and expanded version. In 1953, the German Resistance Movement was analysed in detail in Gerhard Ritter's study "Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung", still considered the standard work on the subject. 1 Several other works have also dealt with this issue. Joachim Fest has recently provided an instructive compilation of the course of events and persons involved in his book "Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. juli", published in English with the title "Plotting Hitler's Death. The Story of the German Resistance". In 1997 Ines Reich published her doctoral thesis on Carl Goerdeler's activities from the period as Lord Mayor of Leipzig under the Nazi regime, up to his resignation of office. For a couple of years Erik Carlsson, a Swedish historian, has been working on a doctoral thesis on the subject of Sweden and the German Resistance Movement, which was published in 1998.2[/FONT]
Goerdeler's main contact with England during the war was via the Wallenberg brothers. Both Rothfels and Dulles have emphasized this point. Dulles was able to reproduce an account of Jacob Wallenberg's connections with Goerdeler, which account had been prepared by Jacob Wallenberg himself.3 At an early stage, Goerdeler had reported on the plans for a coup d'état in Germany, aimed at putting Hitler into jail or achieving his liquidation and at substituting the Nazi Government for a new one. The main reason for Goerdeler's having chosen to ask assistance from the Wallenberg brothers was to find out how Western Powers would react to a coup and to assess the prospect of a new German Government reaching a separate peace agreement with the Allies. These plans were very much in focus in the spring and autumn of 1943. However, the plotters had to report repeatedly that they had failed to put them into effect. In November, 1943, Jacob Wallenberg met with Goerdeler for the last time. This was also his last visit to Berlin during the war. He had been dissuaded from returning there, since his contacts with the German Resistance had become known. However, he continued to communicate with Goerdeler. In July 1944 he was asked to receive a person in Stockholm. The person in question was to bring news of the completion of the coup. On 20 July, 1944, the ill‑fated attempt on Hitler's life took place. The proposed messenger was put into jail and executed. Some time later, Goerdeler was to suffer the same fate.[/FONT]
In February 1951 Gerhard Ritter turned to Jacob Wallenberg for further information and clarifications, referring to the above‑mentioned report that Dulles had published. When more than a year had passed without a reply having been received Ritter reverted to the subject. By this time his work on a biography on Carl Goerdeler was quite advanced. Jacob Wallenberg then sent him a memorandum by Goerdeler, dated in May 1943; and also promised to send him a translation of a letter from himself to Marcus Wallenberg from the same period concerning contacts with Churchill.4[/FONT]
Ritter thanked Jacob Wallenberg and expressed his great satisfaction over Goerdeler's memo, which fitted in well with what he had already learnt from papers left by Goerdeler. It furthermore served as a summary of the plans that Goerdeler had entertained at that time, which Ritter found important to have confirmed. Jacob's letter to Marcus Wallenberg was a long time coming. When October, 1953 arrived, Ritter still had not received the promised copy. On the other hand, he had met with Jacob Wallenberg and had had a long and detailed conversation with him in Stockholm in September, in which connection he had received complementary information as regards the above‑mentioned report. Jacob Wallenberg had also granted permission that Goerdeler's memo from May 1943 could be published. A copy is provided below. Ritter makes a full report on this conversation, stressing that the relevant memo is unusually short, compared with other reports by Goerdeler.5 This could probably be explained by the fact that Goerdeler had prepared this document during the night, as requested by Jacob Wallenberg, in order to have it ready for a Swedish courier the following morning.[/FONT]
This proves that both Dulles and Ritter were able to use material for their reports that originated from the Wallenberg brothers, particularly from Jacob. This is how their connections with German and English circles during the war became known outside Sweden. In Sweden, on the other hand, this has not been observed to any significant extent. On more than one occasion, Ritter makes reference to oral information that he has received from Jacob Wallenberg.6 However, the documents to which he refers have not been found in the archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank ‑ where they ought to have been, since all documents were submitted to the files of the Secretariat of the Management as a master of routine.[/FONT]
In the course of various conversations, Jacob Wallenberg was able to recall certain events from the war years and, above all, some of the individuals with whom he had had dealings. One person he mentioned in particular was Goerdeler. On one or two occasions, he made it clear to me that he had not kept any material concerning his contacts with the German Resistance Movement. This was due to the fact that he feared Sweden would be occupied and that such material would then end up in German hands. Or, as he put it: "Nobody should have to be hanged because of me", i.e. because of compromising material being found among his papers. It is in the nature of things that contacts of this sort do not give rise to much written material and that it is better to trust one's memory. Jacob Wallenberg had an excellent memory. Still, it is astonishing how few documents about these extraordinary events that have been preserved in the generally comprehensive and well‑arranged Management archives. Even more surprising and difficult to explain, however, is the fact that Dulles and Ritter were able to obtain copies of documents that undoubtedly existed in these archives as late as 1953.[/FONT]
In 1997, an investigation and inventory were made of the premises of Stockholms Enskilda Bank's Head office at Kungsträdgårdsgatan in Stockholm. This was done for a number of reasons: (i) A new organization for the preservation of the archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg family had been created. (ii) The desire to have a complete grasp and detailed knowledge of their contents for the purpose of various research projects. (iii) Pending re*organizations and relocations. A number of documents that had been hidden since the war were then found in a vault belonging to the Management Secretariat. They were found in sealed envelopes, upon which it was written that they could only be opened by Jacob or Marcus Wallenberg. They had been opened and re‑sealed on several occasions. The last time they were opened was in connection with Gerhard Ritter's visit to Jacob Wallenberg on 26 September, 1953. [/FONT]
In August, 1997 these documents were incorporated into the archives that had been set up for the preservation of documents belonging to Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg family in 1994. These archives are managed by the Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise.[/FONT]
The dating of the documents alone indicates that they are quite remarkable in nature. Basically, they are related to Goerdeler's efforts during the spring and autumn of 1943 to establish direct contact with Churchill, through his association with the Wallenberg brothers, in order to ascertain what kind of attitude England and the U.S.A. would adopt with respect to negotiations for a separate peace agreement with Germany after the opposition had managed to carry out its plans to depose Hitler and to form a new German Government. As shown above, this was essentially made known through the studies of Dulles, Rothfels and Ritter, although contemporary documents concerning the activities of the Wallenberg brothers in this connection have been lacking. Thanks to the newly discovered documents this can now be clarified.[/FONT]
In order to make the presentation as complete as possible, all other relevant documents in the Management archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank regarding the Wallenberg brothers' participation in the course of events and their relations with the resistance in Germany have been included together with the above‑mentioned documents. In addition, there is a report on the contacts maintained after the war with Goerdeler's widow Anneliese Goerdeler.[/FONT]
It is considered important to publish these documents and to make them available to research as soon as possible. The material is also of interest for the debate on Sweden's, not least the Wallenberg brothers', relations with Germany and Nazism during the war. It has been the ambition to contribute to presenting as complete a picture as possible of a chain of events during World War II, which was dramatic and important from both a Swedish and international point of view. Time does not allow for a more detailed analysis at this stage.[/FONT]
For background purposes, the following brief presentation of the main characters is provided, viz. Jacob Wallenberg, Marcus Wallenberg and Carl Goerdeler as well as certain basic facts of history.[/FONT]
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Jacob Wallenberg [/FONT](1892‑1980) attended the Naval College, in accordance with family tradition, and graduated as a Naval Officer in 1912. He left the Navy, however, and graduated from the Stockholm School of Economics in 1914. After a couple of years of banking practice in Basle, London and New York he started working for the family bank, Stockholms Enskilda Bank, where he was appointed Deputy Managing Director in 1920. Between 1927 and 1946 he was the Managing Director of the Bank.[/FONT]
From its start in 1856, Stockholms Enskilda Bank had been characterized by a strong focus on international business. During A.O. Wallenberg's period, 1856 to 1886, this business was channelled through German, British and, later on, also French banks. His sons and successors, K.A. Wallenberg and Marcus Wallenberg Senior, had continued this international orientation.[/FONT]
During the inter‑war period, business relations with Germany were strongly reinforced, largely owing to Marcus Wallenberg Senior's active participation in the European reconstruction work. This led to the Bank participating in a large number of bond loans to German federal states, towns and companies. Marcus Wallenberg Sr. played a particularly active and central role during the German banking crisis in 1931, when he acted as an adviser to the German Government in the reconstruction of German banks. He also acted as Chairman in the so‑called Stillhalte Court. Jacob Wallenberg managed the Bank's German business relations together with his father[/FONT], which led to a lively and comprehensive correspondence with the leaders of the large German banks.[/FONT][/FONT]
After the Nazis came to power, the conditions of Germany's foreign trade were radically changed. In the summer of 1934, the Swedish Government therefore appointed a Commission for the purpose of negotiating a trade and payment agreement with Germany. This Commission consisted originally of three persons: Arvid Richert, Under‑Secretary of State and later Swedish Envoy in Berlin, Björn Prytz, Managing Director of the Swedish ball‑bearing company SKF and Jacob Wallenberg. Later, the Commission was expanded to a considerable extent, and finally totalled some 50 people. Jacob Wallenberg took part in these negotiations up to 1944. He has been described as Sweden's main negotiator for the exchange of goods with Germany. This was absolutely vital to the Swedish economy during the war. In particular, his name is associated with the construction of a so‑called price scale, according to which a price balance was created between a certain quantity of Swedish iron ore, on the one hand, and certain quantities of German coal and coke, commercial iron and chemical products, on the other hand.7 The extensive network of contacts within the German world of banking and industry that Jacob Wallenberg had built up, partly taken over from his father, was gradually extended to those civil and military circles which formed the opposition against the Nazi regime. The most important figure among these persons was Carl Goerdeler. Through him and others, Jacob Wallenberg was afforded a unique opportunity of obtaining information about internal conditions prevailing in Germany during the war.[/FONT]
Apart from his official mission as negotiator on behalf of the Swedish Government, Jacob Wallenberg was able to establish close contact with the German Resistance Movement and to serve, together with his brother Marcus, as a connecting link between this movement and the Western Powers.[/FONT]
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Marcus Wallenberg [/FONT](1899‑1982) passed his examination to become an officer in the reserve in 1919 and graduated from the Stockholm School of Economics in 1920. After banking studies in Geneva, London, New York, Paris and Berlin he started working at Stockholms Enskilda Bank. In 1927, he was appointed Deputy Managing Director and in 1946 he replaced his brother as Head of the Bank. [/FONT]
In September 1939 the Swedish Government appointed a large and well‑balanced delegation of representatives for negotiations with the British Government concerning trade and shipping issues. Erik Boheman, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, was appointed Chairman and Marcus Wallenberg participated as a member of the Delegation. It was probably particularly gratifying for Marcus Wallenberg to accept this assignment since his father had acted in a similar capacity during World War I.[/FONT]
The trade negotiations with Germany and Britain were conducted simultaneously during the autumn and agreements were signed in London on 7 December and in Berlin on 22 December, 1939.8 Due to the aggravation of the crisis between Finland and Russia, Erik Boheman had been recalled to Sweden at the end of October and Marcus Wallenberg had taken over his post as Chairman of the Swedish Delegation. After his return home Richard Sandler, Minister for Foreign Affairs, thanked him by expressing "the Swedish Government's great appreciation of the excellent way in which you both participated and led, the negotiations in London, taking good care of Sweden's interests". Marcus Wallenberg was also appointed Chairman of the Swedish representatives on the permanent Swedish‑British Government Commission, which had been set up to deal with issues associated with the implementation of the trade agreement.9 During the negotiations, Marcus Wallenberg's excellent business relations in London were of great use. [/FONT]They were particularly good with Charles Hambro, whom he got to know in the early 1920s. From then on up to 1939, there exists a comprehensive correspondence between them. Naturally, this close personal contact facilitated work when they became opposite parties in the trade negotiations, like their fathers, Eric Hambro and Marcus Wallenberg Sr., had been during World War I.[/FONT]
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Carl Goerdeler [/FONT](1884‑1945) after a successful career in the civil service became Lord Mayor of Leipzig in 1930. With roots in old monarchical Germany he was nationalistic and bourgeois conservative by nature. [/FONT]His organizational talent within administration and finance was noticed on a national level and, in 1931, he was appointed National Inspector of Price Control.[/FONT] After the Nazi take‑over he tried to co‑operate with the new regime for a couple of years. In 1934 he was again given the assignment to supervise the price control. When his term as Lord Mayor ended in 1936, he was re‑elected for a period of twelve years. However, clashes of opinion arose at local level and reached an acute stage in November, 1936. In Goerdeler's absence, the Nazi representatives in the City Administration forced through a decision to remove a monument to the Jewish composer Felix Mendelssohn, a decision that Goerdeler had opposed. After his return to Leipzig he demanded that the monument be restored, to which the party representatives objected. Goerdeler then handed in his resignation and left office effective 1 April, 1937.10 His upright position made him well known all over the country and gave him a great deal of personal prestige. As a result of this decision, Goerdeler retired from public service and had to look for other assignments. He had earlier been offered membership of the Executive Management of the Krupp Group, although Hitler would not approve this after the break. Instead, he was offered a rather independent position as adviser to the electronic company Robert Bosch GmbH in Stuttgart. Robert Bosch, founder and owner of the company, belonged to the opponents to the Hitler regime and had gathered around him a circle of like‑minded people. From the summer of 1937 until the summer of 1939, Goerdeler made a number of foreign travel on the company's behalf.[/FONT] Goerdeler ran into difficulties when his passport was confiscated, but after a call in person on Hermann Göring that problem was solved. He travelled [/FONT]to Belgium, Holland, England, France, Switzerland, Canada, the U.S.A., the Balkan countries, Africa and the Middle East. He established connections with politicians, business leaders and economists in all these countries.11 [/FONT]Goerdeler trusted his own ability to persuade his opposite party through his ways of arguing in personal meetings. [/FONT]He endeavoured to spread knowledge about the existence of a Germany that was different from that of the Nazis, in the hope that reason would prevail and that a World War could be stopped as a result of talks between various people.[/FONT]
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Through his background and personality, Goerdeler became the driving force within civil opposition. The Resistance Movement regarded him as a suitable Chancellor of the Reich after Hitler, provided a coup could be carried into effect against the latter. During the war he tried to establish contacts with the British Government in order to avoid an unconditional capitulation after a coup d'état and to procure favourable peace conditions for a new German Government. Jacob Wallenberg and his brother Marcus represented one of his channels in this connection, as appears from the documents provided below. After the attempt on Hitler's life failed on 20 July, 1944, Goerdeler tried to keep out of the way, but was arrested after a couple of weeks, put before the People's Court and sentenced to death in September. Up to the day of his execution, on 2 February, 1945, he kept himself busy in prison unceasingly writing on various subjects.12 On Christmas Eve 1944 he wrote a letter in his prison cell, addressed to the Swedish Envoy in Berlin. This letter, which has been reproduced herein, was to be forwarded to Jacob Wallenberg.[/FONT]
Goerdeler's first contact with the Wallenberg family and Stockholms Enskilda Bank took place on 12 November, 1936 when he, equipped with a letter of introduction from Hjalmar Schacht, Governor of the Reichsbank, was received by Marcus Wallenberg Sr. He was on his way home from a lecture in Helsinki, when the news about the removal of the monument to Mendelssohn reached him in Stockholm. The next time Goerdeler paid a visit to the Bank was on 1 September, 1939, i.e. on the day of the outbreak of the Second World War. The purpose of his visit was to find a Swedish buyer for certain subsidiaries of the Bosch Group in neutral countries. Jacob Wallenberg showed interest and further discussions on the subject were held between him and the Jewish banker Waldemar von Oppenheim. In autumn 1939 rather complicated agreements were being drawn up. Hans Walz, who was close to Robert Bosch, together with K.E. Thomä, Head of the Legal Department, represented the company. The Bank was represented by Rolf Calissendorff and legal counsel.13 Calissendorff was of Jewish origin. He had been employed by the Bank in 1919, worked at the Secretariat of the Management and was later appointed Manager and head of the international section. He had become one of Jacob Wallenberg's closest associates.[/FONT]
In order to prevent Germany's enemies from seizing its foreign subsidiaries, as had been the case during World War I, the Bosch Group wished to place them in the hands of neutral owners. Jacob Wallenberg's interest in the proposed transaction was related to the opportunities that it offered to exchange doubtful German bonds in the portfolio of the Bank against shares in Bosch companies. According to the agreements entered into, the SEB Group purchased eight European subsidiaries in neutral countries as well as the American Bosch Corporation in the U.S.A. In a formal sense, the buyers were subsidiaries of the holding-company Providentia, but the transactions were financed by the Bank. Unsigned additions had been attached to the agreements, according to which the parent company in Stuttgart had the right to repurchase its subsidiaries after the war. As things developed, this sort of arrangement became embarrassing to the Bank. After protracted negotiations and frequent contacts between the Bank and Bosch, the Bank managed to get out of its ownership as regards the European companies in 1942 and 1943.[/FONT]
However, its engagement in the American company lasted much longer and was much harder to master. When the United States of America entered the war in December, 1941 there was an imminent risk that the shares of American Bosch Corporation would be seized by the American authorities, both because of the close relations between the American subsidiary and its German parent company before the war and because of its importance to the U.S. armaments industry.[/FONT]
The Bank now declared to Bosch that it neither could, nor wished to, be bound by any option agreements, due to the new situation. Bosch found itself compelled to agree to cancel the repurchasing rights to the shares and it was also agreed that all additions to the agreements regarding these rights be destroyed. The Bank acted accordingly. To the U.S. authorities the Bank maintained that the purchase of the American Bosch Corporation was a real purchase and a long‑term investment. However, the U.S. Government considered the ownership relations unclear and seized the company as enemy property in May, 1942. After the war, American troops found preserved copies of the cancelled provisions regarding repurchasing rights in the archives of Bosch in Stuttgart. This reinforced American suspicions that a dummy relationship had existed during the war.14 It was this that would then develop into the so‑called Bosch deal. It aroused great attention after the war and put the Bank and its Management in an extremely embarrassing situation. In early August, 1945 the U.S. Treasury declared Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg brothers "special blocked nationals". A permit was required in each individual case in order to have access to assets in the U.S.A. and the Bank was unable to do business in the U.S. on behalf of its customers. The Bosch deal led to an enormous loss of prestige for the Bank both within and outside Sweden and in its relations to both Swedish and U.S. authorities.[/FONT]
In 1947, the blockade was raised, after which the Bosch deal turned into a dispute between Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the American State concerning title to the shares of American Bosch. After years of preparations for a pending trial, a settlement was reached in 1950 to the effect that the Bank got back its original investment, albeit without recompense for any increase in value.15 An indirect consequence of the Bosch deal was that Jacob Wallenberg retired from the post of Managing Director a year or so earlier than expected. At the Annual General Meeting in March, 1946 his brother Marcus succeeded him as Head of the Bank.[/FONT]
The Bosch deal has a very special significance as regards this paper, because it served as a pretext for Carl Goerdeler to meet with Jacob Wallenberg without hindrance and also more frequently than otherwise would have been possible. It also afforded Goerdeler the opportunity of meeting with, and presenting his plans to, Marcus Wallenberg in Stockholm.16[/FONT]
In later conversations, Jacob Wallenberg expressed his astonishment at the fact that Goerdeler could move about so freely in Berlin, apparently without being followed. They nevertheless observed great caution in general, when meeting with each other, seeking places where they felt they could be safe and not overheard. Indoors, they preferred to sit in the centre of a room.[/FONT]
As official representative of Bosch, Goerdeler was able to travel abroad, which he otherwise would not have been allowed to do. Both for his own account and that of the German Resistance Movement he was able to use the Bosch deal as a pretext for maintaining contacts with neutral businessmen; these served as a connecting link with the Western Powers for a planned separate peace agreement and for a common European mustering of strength against the Communist threat.[/FONT]
In order to give an idea of how, and to what extent, these personal contacts were maintained during the war, the following list is provided of the Wallenberg brothers' trips abroad as well as of visits paid, by various people, to Stockholms Enskilda Bank in connection with the subject master of this paper. [/FONT]
[/FONT]
Foreign travel during the war:[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Jacob Wallenberg[/FONT]
10‑23 December, 1939 Berlin[/FONT]
13‑18 January, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
27 May ‑ 6 June, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
23‑26 August, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
12‑14 September, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
17‑19 October, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
20‑22 January, 1941 Copenhagen[/FONT]
23 January ‑ 1 February, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
22‑26 April, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
2‑5 May, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
3‑15 November, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
23 February ‑ 5 March, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
12‑15 March, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
4‑9 June, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
16‑26 November, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
17‑20 February, 1943 Berlin[/FONT]
31 May ‑ 3 June, 1943 Lökken Verk[/FONT]
11‑12 August, 1943 Berlin[/FONT]
30 November ‑ 3 December, 1943 Berlin[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg[/FONT]
24 September ‑ 9 December, 1939 London[/FONT]
10 January ‑ 3 February, 1940 London, Paris[/FONT]
22 February ‑ 16 March, 1940 Paris[/FONT]
6‑18 April, 1940 Paris, London[/FONT]
8‑9 August, 1940 Helsinki[/FONT]
11 October, 1940 ‑ 5 February 1941 Berlin-Lisbon-New York-Lisbon-Stuttgart[/FONT]
1‑2 March, 1941 Helsinki[/FONT]
28 April ‑ 3 May, 1941 Zurich[/FONT]
14‑15 July, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
8‑10 September, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
15‑18 October, 1941 Helsinki[/FONT]
22 October ‑ 22 December, 1941 London[/FONT]
16‑17 January, 1942 Helsinki[/FONT]
7 May - 22 June, 1943 London[/FONT]
5‑7 February, 1944 Helsinki[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Rolf Calissendorff[/FONT]
23‑25 October, 1939 Helsinki[/FONT]
13‑21 December, 1939 Bucharest[/FONT]
15 July ‑ 10 August, 1939 Moscow[/FONT]
10‑17 September, 1939 Moscow [/FONT]
14‑20 June, 1941 Budapest[/FONT]
2‑25 February, 1943 Berlin, Paris[/FONT]
10‑13 November, 1943 Paris, Madrid[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Visits to Stockholms Enskilda Bank:[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Otto Fischer[/FONT] 22 December, 1939[/FONT]
10‑12 January, 1940[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Carl Goerdeler [/FONT] 1 September, 1939[/FONT]
2 November, 1939[/FONT]
1‑2 December, 1939[/FONT]
13‑18 April, 1942[/FONT]
19‑21 May, 1943[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Alfred Knoerzer[/FONT] 14‑16 May, 1939[/FONT]
19‑22 July, 1940[/FONT]
17‑18 June, 1943[/FONT]
8‑9 September, 1943[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Waldemar von Oppenheim[/FONT] 13‑15 November, 1939[/FONT]
22‑25 January, 1940[/FONT]
21 ‑25 October, 1941[/FONT]
11‑17 February, 1942[/FONT]
9‑11 April, 1942[/FONT]
21‑23 October, 1942[/FONT]
19‑21 August, 1943[/FONT]
8‑13 March, 1944[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Erich Rassbach[/FONT] 2‑4 November, 1939[/FONT]
4‑5 April, 1940[/FONT]
25‑26 September, 1940[/FONT]
11‑12 June, 1941[/FONT]
27 March, 1942[/FONT]
[/FONT]
K.E. Thomä[/FONT] 1‑5 December, 1939[/FONT]
9‑13 January, 1940[/FONT]
4‑5 April, 1940[/FONT]
14‑16 May, 1940[/FONT]
19‑22 July, 1940[/FONT]
25‑26 September, 1940[/FONT]
9‑10 January, 1941[/FONT]
11‑13 June, 1941[/FONT]
12‑17 December, 1941[/FONT]
18‑20 April, 1942[/FONT]
27 May ‑ 2 June, 1942[/FONT]
25‑26 June, 1942[/FONT]
3‑5 August, 1942[/FONT]
5‑8 December, 1942[/FONT]
18‑21 May, 1943[/FONT]
16‑18 June, 1943[/FONT]
8‑10 September, 1943[/FONT]
25‑27 January, 1944[/FONT]
21‑24 April, 1944[/FONT]
8‑10 June, 1944[/FONT]
27 October ‑ 2 November, 1944[/FONT]
1‑7 December, 1944[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Hans Walz[/FONT] 1‑5 December, 1939[/FONT]
1‑7 December, 1944[/FONT]
[/FONT]
_________________________________________________________[/FONT]
[/FONT]
The Documents[/FONT]
_________________________________________________________[/FONT]
Only a few of Goerdeler's letters have been preserved in Jacob Wallenberg's correspondence and just two originals. Both reached him while visiting Berlin; one as a cable of 23 February, 1942, the other as a letter dated 18 February, 1943. The new documents are presented below in chronological order:[/FONT]
[/FONT]
20 May, 1943 Carl Goerdeler's plan of implementation.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
21 May Letter from Jacob Wallenberg to Marcus Wallenberg in various versions (drafts) and a letter dated 8 June from Jacob Wallenberg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a memorandum dated 7 June.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
June Marcus Wallenberg[/FONT]'s[/FONT] notes from a meeting with Desmond Morton in London.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
12 July Jacob Wallenberg[/FONT]'s[/FONT] notes from a telephone conversation.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
12 August Jacob Wallenberg[/FONT]'s[/FONT] notes from a meeting with Carl Goerdeler in Berlin.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
13 August Letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond [/FONT]
Morton (draft).[/FONT]
[/FONT]
25 August Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
6 September Letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond Morton (draft).
[/FONT]
25 September Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
29 September Letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
19 October Letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
9 November Message from Jacob Wallenberg to Rolf Calissendorff.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
8 November, 1944 Letter[/FONT] from Carl Goerdeler to Jacob Wallenberg.[/FONT][/FONT]
[/FONT]
24 December Letter from Carl Goerdeler to the Swedish Envoy in Berlin.[/FONT][/FONT]
[/FONT]
In his important work "German Resistance against Hitler", Klemens von Klemperer presents a broad survey of those different groups which together formed the internal opposition against Hitler and the Nazi regime. In addition to the abundant literature, this presentation is based upon extremely comprehensive source material, mainly from British, German and American archives. Carl Goerdeler's activities are described in detail. Regarding Goerdeler's contacts with the Wallenberg brothers in Sweden the subject of the present study Klemperer writes: "The main sources for the encounters between Goerdeler and the Wallenbergs are Summary of Interview with M. Jacob Wallenberg': Unterredung mit Herrn Jacob Wallenberg, Samstag 26. Sept. 1953 in Stockholm, 14 Uhr 15-16 Uhr'. BA/K Ritter 131; also a summary put together by Jacob Wallenberg for Allen W. Dulles, in Dulles, Germany's Underground, 142-6." [/FONT]17 [/FONT]The last-mentioned memorandum dated 23 April, 1946 is reproduced below. More than anything, this statement by von Klemperer shows the importance of the new contemporary documents.[/FONT]
Between 19 and 21 May, 1943 Goerdeler was in Stockholm. This visit marked the beginning of concrete efforts at establishing contacts between the German opposition and the British Government, with the active participation of the Wallenberg brothers. During intensive conversations, Goerdeler described his own plans and hopes as well as those of the opposition. He also wrote a report on how the implementation of these plans, to which Ritter has made reference and commented upon. On the other hand, Jacob Wallenberg's letter to his brother Marcus who was in London at the time, regarding his (Jacob's) conversations with Goerdeler, has not previously been used in research. [/FONT]
Goerdeler wanted Marcus to report the contents of this letter to Churchill, or to Churchill's personal secretary. The German generals refused to act without having certain preliminary commitments. Such commitments referred to the stopping of all bomb attacks during the liberation action and to the declaration regarding unconditional surrender that had been issued at the Casablanca conference in January, 1943. No military was prepared to assume responsibility for overthrowing Hitler and then for surrendering immediately afterwards. The letter was sent to London via the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which also dispatched cables containing questions from Marcus Wallenberg to Jacob Wallenberg regarding certain wording.[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg referred to the contents of the letter on 4 June at a meeting with Winston Churchill's personal secretary Desmond Morton, whom he knew. Before his return to Sweden on 19 June he wrote a memorandum of this conversation, a document that has remained unknown to this day. Morton had reported that the war objectives had been fixed. Nazi Germany had to be crushed. Churchill's aim was to eradicate Nazi gangster rule, which had led the world into this war. It was unthinkable that any advance blessing or approval of any kind of anti-Nazi elements could be granted from responsible allied quarters. When Marcus Wallenberg asked whether a peace settlement without "unconditional surrender" were impossible, Morton categorically replied no. Churchill was unwilling to prolong the war for its own sake. The main objective was to obliterate Nazism and to create guarantees for the preservation of peace in the future. Morton had also said that the bombing of places in revolt would only be ceased if credible information about such a revolution could be provided.[/FONT]
On 12 August, Jacob Wallenberg met with Goerdeler in Berlin. He reported on the reaction in London and made notes of Goerdeler's views on the position. By now, the situation had developed to the point that generals in both east and west were prepared to break off relations with Nazism. After the implementation of a coup, Beck was to become the Supreme Commander and Regent and a new government should be formed on the basis of broad popular support. The representatives of the Nazi regime were to be called to account before a court. It was hoped that both Berlin as well as Leipzig and Stuttgart would be spared from bombings in order not to render a change of regime more difficult. An attempted coup was planned to be implemented before 15 September.[/FONT]
Immediately after his brother's return to Sweden, Marcus contacted Desmond Morton, saying that he had fresh and urgent news for Morton if he was interested. Morton thanked him for the letter via the British Minister in Stockholm. This encouraged Marcus Wallenberg to write a letter on 6 September, in which he gave an account of what his brother had learned from Goerdeler in more detail. The draft of this letter has been preserved.[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg received a reply to his letter from unexpected quarters and in an unusual form. It was addressed to him in a private letter from Charles Hambro, dated 29 September. In order to understand the relationship between Hambro and Marcus Wallenberg one must know that both knew each other since the early 1920s and that both, each in his own right, were principal characters in the trade negotiations between England and Sweden. It should also be mentioned that Hambro had remarried Marcus Wallenberg's first wife, Dorothy (Doie) Mackay and that their daughter Ann-Mari (Anis) was living with her mother and stepfather in London. Hambro's son from an earlier marriage was in Sweden during the war, where he attended a private school at Sigtuna together with Marcus Wallenberg's sons. He is referred to as "Poiken" ("the boy"). [/FONT]
Hambro's letter consists of five pages, of which the first and the last are of a private nature, with flowing text. In-between, there were three loose pages of the same paper as the letter itself, but with a completely different text. In this section, reference is made to Marcus Wallenberg's earlier conversations and letters in an indirect manner, which is very hard to understand for an outsider. Hambro wrote that the relevant person should continue his plans, although no promises of any kind could be made. He then underlines that no one was to know that Marcus Wallenberg and himself were in contact on this particular subject, especially not the British legation. All messages were to be forwarded to him alone and in the same way as Marcus Wallenberg had received this particular letter. The messenger was not aware of anything and that was to remain so. He was simply to receive and to pass on letters. The section concluded with an admonishment that it would probably be wise to destroy the pages in question. Special attention was to be paid to Hambro's letter in view of the high position that Hambro held at the time within SOE, Special Operations Executive. Hambro reverted to the subject in a letter dated 19 October, stressing that his earlier information had been approved by more prominent persons than himself and that it was not just a product of his own imagination. He concluded this letter by expressing the hope that he could find a pretext to come and see Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
These letters from Charles Hambro, which have remained hidden since World War II, are extremely interesting in that they provide important information about a course of events which it has not been possible to clarify up to now. It appears that, via Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, a channel had been opened between Carl Goerdeler and Charles Hambro - and thus the British Government.
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx
"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.
“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.
“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.