Wallenberg Family

[Magda Hassan]

STUCK IN NEUTRAL
The Reasons behind Sweden's Passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg Case
Susanne Berger
4793 Williamsburg Blvd
Arlington, VA 22207 USA
sberger@prodigy.net
22 August, 2005
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 2
I. Introduction
II. The Swedish Definition of the Raoul Wallenberg Case
1. The Swedish Public
a. The not-so-favorite son
b. "Proper"
c. The dangers of simplification
2. The Swedish Government and the Swedish Foreign Office
a. A strange creature
b. "Moral courage is our only secret weapon"
c. Hidden motives
d. Old mindsets
III. Other Definitions
1. The U.S.
a. Swedish diplomat with an American task
b. The general definition of the Budapest Mission
c. Intelligence aspects of the Budapest Mission
d. Lack of Swedish - American coordination
2. The Wallenbergs
a. Curious passivity
b. Distant relation?
c. Wallenberg business interests in Hungary
d. Wallenberg interests and their political effect
e. Wallenberg Intelligence connections
f. Signs of doubt
3. Russia
a. The Soviet legacy
b. The current Russian view
c. Early definitions
d. More relevant records have to exist
e. Different possibilities
f. A possible watershed
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 3
IV. Deeper Problems
1. The Limits of the Eliasson Report
a. Question of motives and limited areas of inquiry
b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context
c. Focus on early years
d. Lack of systematic analysis
e. Consequences of failure to conduct a systematic analysis
2. Current Definitions
a. Sweden today
b. The neutrality dilemma
"In the minds of responsible government officials it is a far smaller evil to leave a missing
person case unsolved than to seriously question the foundations of the state."
(Arvid Fredborg)
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2003 the first independent, non-governmental Commission in the Raoul Wallenberg case presented its findings in
Stockholm.1 Headed by Ingemar Eliasson, a centrist politician and the current Swedish Riksmarskalk,' the group had the task of
examining the Swedish political leadership's actions in the Raoul Wallenberg case from 1945-2001.2 After a twelve-month
investigation the Commission's analysis officially confirmed what everyone has known for decades: That the Swedish government
in large part mishandled the Wallenberg case, especially through its disturbing lack of initiative during the critical early years
1945-47.
Wide-ranging and impressive in both exposition and analysis, the report nevertheless falls short in a number of ways: It cannot
fully explain why Swedish officials in charge behaved the way they did, nor does it clarify why successive Swedish governments
pursued the case with so little enthusiasm. That Sweden chose to abandon Raoul Wallenberg is one thing - that the abandonment
occurred with relative ease, despite the serious and persistent doubts concerning Russian claims about his fate, is quite another. In
its search for Wallenberg over the years Sweden has resembled a car where the driver always has one foot on the brake. Why such
excessive caution? Was the mishandling of the Wallenberg case simply a matter of individual ineptitude and indifference or is it
symptomatic of deeper problems?
Even though answering these questions would pose a challenge to any commission, other shortcomings are less understandable.
The Commission excluded from its deliberations several critical areas of inquiry, among them the full activities of the Swedish
Legation [including those of Swedish Intelligence] and the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest in 1944/45, and later, the Swedish
Foreign Ministry's often questionable handling of witness testimonies in the case. It also did not consider the deeper economic and
political aspects of the Budapest mission and its aftermath, as well as their associated effects on the Wallenberg investigation.
Most importantly, by focusing almost exclusively on the early phase of the Wallenberg case, the Eliasson Commission missed a
chance to determine whether Swedish passivity was a unique and isolated phenomenon, or if it fit a more general pattern of
behavior. So far, official Swedish criticism, like the Russian, has stayed firmly confined to the past. It has not yet touched the
present and with it any individuals who are still living.
Nevertheless, the publication marks a decisive step in the right direction: For the first time Sweden has cast a critical eye on its
own behavior in the Wallenberg affair. In doing so, it has firmly established the idea that earlier Swedish approaches to the
Wallenberg question were too narrow and that a deeper, broader analysis is necessary in order to come to terms with the case.
The report is a 700+ page acknowledgment that in historical investigations details and complexities matter; especially details that,
for various reasons, were long ignored or never considered.
The new study did not yield any direct clues about Wallenberg's fate, but that was never the intention: The truth about what
happened to Raoul Wallenberg is surely known in Moscow and, as the Eliasson report emphasizes, a resolution can only come
from there. The Report concludes that if Russia has stubbornly kept the Wallenberg secret, Sweden largely has enabled Russia to
do so. As for the U.S., the Commission argues it failed Raoul Wallenberg twice. First, by not providing him with adequate
protection for an extremely dangerous mission, which the U.S. had co-initiated and financed; and secondly, by not independently
insisting on a resolution of his fate after Sweden repeatedly rejected U.S. assistance.
In the Eliasson Commission's assessment a closer reading of previously released U.S. and Swedish records raises important
questions about the nature of Raoul Wallenberg's assignment, including his association with Allied Intelligence Services during
the war. The Report argues that uncertainty about Wallenberg's mission may in part explain early Swedish passivity in the case
because Swedish officials considered Raoul Wallenberg primarily an American problem, not a Swedish one. The Eliasson
1Kommissionen om den Svenska Utrikesledningens Agerande i Fallet Raoul Wallenberg. Ett Diplomatiskt Misslyckande. SOU 2003:18.
Stockholm, 2003. The group included some of Sweden's leading historians and political scientists, including Christer Joensson and Kristian
Gerner
2The Riksmarskalk at the court of the Swedish King is the nominal chief of the Court's staff. The Riksmarsalk is responsible for the King's
contacts with parliament and government, and is also involved in the supervision of the Court's financial affairs.
In July 1944 Raoul Wallenberg, a young Swedish businessman, was appointed as a Swedish diplomat and was sent to Budapest, Hungary to aid
the last surviving Jewish community in Eastern Europe. In January 1945 Wallenberg was arrested by Soviet occupation troops and his ultimate
fate remains unknown.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 5
Commission sharply criticizes the Swedish position, but stops short of asking why Sweden so readily embraced such an excuse.
The Commission also chose not to examine the complex American-Swedish political relationship during and after World War II
and its possible effects on the handling of the Wallenberg case
The Commission's Report and other current Wallenberg research ultimately leave two key issues unaddressed:
1. Why did Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance evoke such extreme passivity from his own government and his powerful relatives,
the Wallenberg family? And
2. Why does Russia refuse to reveal the truth about Raoul Wallenbergs fate, despite strong indications that it almost certainly
knows what happened to him? [It certainly knows much more than it has publicly revealed so far]
The Eliasson Report claims that Swedish actions over the years were primarily determined by the changing pictures' that officials
constructed for themselves from the few available fragments of information about Raoul Wallenbergs disappearance. As the
Commission sees it, since this information was often incomplete and contradictory, it further contributed to some of the
inconsistent behavior by Swedish officials.3 Here too, however, the Commission's analysis does not go far enough. Diplomats do
not merely assemble facts: They interpret them in terms of their potential consequences, be it political, economic or strategic. In
other words, how the major actors in Sweden and in Russia assessed the associated risks and overarching interests for themselves,
how they defined the case through the years against the twin backdrop of neutrality and Cold War politics - therein lies the key to
the riddle.
In Sweden this refers foremost to the Swedish government and Foreign Office [Utrikesdepartementet or UD], but also to the
Wallenberg Family and the Swedish public, including journalists and historians; in Russia this means the former Soviet
government and its successors, with strong emphasis on the Security Services. Their basic definitions and interests determined the
early responses to Wallenberg's disappearance and continue to shape actions today. For most of the major parties involved, with
the exception of Raoul Wallenberg's immediate family, the case remains a hot iron that few like to touch. Consequently, they find
the current status quo in the Wallenberg question not only acceptable but in many ways preferable - for very different reasons.
There are indications that the basic definitions and, with them, the basic attitudes to the Wallenberg case are changing. However,
so far these changes have not been substantial enough to penetrate to the core of the mystery.
What follows is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the most important aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg case as
well as the most recent findings of the Eliasson Commission and other current research, and to place the case in a larger
framework of reference and analysis than has been provided up to now.
II. THE SWEDISH DEFINITION OF THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE
1. The Swedish Public
a. The not-so-favorite son
Sweden's relationship with what should be its favorite son has always been a complicated one. His courage and accomplishments
are admired but one senses little obvious affection for the man himself. Most often a question about him will earn little more than a
shrug: "In Sweden nobody cares about Raoul Wallenberg", followed by "The Wallenberg case is dead." Appearances, however,
can be deceiving. While the distance between Raoul Wallenberg and his countrymen is certainly real, the reasons for this distance,
and therefore its basic nature, are quite complex. In fact they are both deeply cultural and historical, as well as purely
circumstantial.
Despite his background as a member of one of Sweden's most powerful families, Raoul Wallenberg has stayed very much a
stranger in his own country. Surprisingly little is known about him, in particular about his adult life immediately before his
departure for Budapest. Wallenberg the person has remained elusive and literally two-dimensional: The public knows him only
from three or four black and white photographs. He has left no tangible inheritance in Sweden, very little correspondence, no
3Together with a number of other "Stoerfaktoren " [disruptive factors], among them contradictory statements by Soviet officials about the state
of Swedish-Soviet relations, as well as the publication of author Rudolph Philipp's book about Wallenberg in 1947 which publicly revealed
Raoul Wallenberg's association with the U.S. War Refugee Board Representative and OSS agent Iver Olsen.
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publications, no wife or child, or even close friends. It has been forgotten that in the early years the question of Raoul
Wallenberg's fate evoked great sympathy at home. Thousands of Swedes signed petitions demanding Wallenberg's return. In June
1964, during Soviet Premier Khrushchev's official visit to Stockholm, the daily newspaper "Expressen" - against advice from the
Foreign Office - boldly ran the provocative headline, in Russian:
"Question: Where is Raoul Wallenberg?"4
Various Swedish governments, however, failed to capitalize on this public support and also did nothing to encourage it further.
Sweden began the critical evaluation of its wartime behavior much later than most European countries. As a result, many of the
issues which inevitably affect the Wallenberg case, such as Swedish neutrality policy and Swedish wartime business dealings,
including those of the Wallenberg family, remained largely taboo topics until the 1970's, 1980's and even the 1990's. Unwilling or
unable to dig in their own backyard, only a few Swedish historians subjected the case to scholarly analysis.5 Most did not consider
Wallenberg a serious research topic and simply assumed that most of the facts were known. Even now one senses a certain
reluctance to delve deeply into the subject. It is no surprise that the first in-depth economic-historical study of Wallenberg
business affairs during WW II was made by two Dutch scholars and not by Swedish historians or that no full-length biography has
been published in Sweden on either Raoul Wallenberg or, for example, Count Folke Bernadotte.6 The history of the Holocaust and
Wallenberg's role until recently were not part of the regular Swedish school curriculum.
The Swedish public today is clearly weary of the Wallenberg question. Mixed with this may well be irritation at its own
helplessness. Unable to pierce not only one but numerous walls of silence, the public simply gave up. But while Sweden has never
openly embraced Raoul Wallenberg, there are signs that it is paying attention. The fact that the Press conferences for both the
presentation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in January 2001 and Eliasson Commission reports attracted record requests
from journalists is just one example.
b. "Proper"
A major reason for Sweden's reticence in the Wallenberg case may be found in the country's socio-political history which is rather
unique in comparison to the rest of Europe. Most notably, the relationship between ordinary Swedes and their government has
been relatively conflict free.7 Swedish neutrality in WWII further confirmed and even enhanced this trait. As a result, Swedish
citizens traditionally have not been inclined to question official rules or to directly challenge the role of the government. In his
memoirs, renowned Hungarian cancer researcher Georg Klein recounts his first impression of Sweden when he arrived there in
1947 as a young university student:
"Clean, rich, well dressed, proper, an almost incredible contrast to
the war hardened Europe. Is this really a peninsula on Europes body?
No, this is an island, protected not only from the war, but also from the
strength derived from shared suffering, this down-to-earth perspective on
life and death." 8
"Proper" is the operative word here: Klein recalls how a waiter refused him entry to a restaurant because he was not wearing a tie.
Given the state of the world at the time, an almost absurd insistence on formality, with a clear message: Above all, form matters.
4Expressen, 22 June, 1964. The article was signed by Per Wrigstad, Expressen's editor-in-chief at the time. See also ECR, Bilaga 4.
5Like Hans Vilius, Bernt Schiller and Rolf Karlbom
6Gerard Aalders and Cees Wiebes. 1989. Affaerer till Varje Pris: Wallenbergs Hemliga Stoed till Nazisterna. Wahlstroems: Stockholm. Swedish
historians who dared to broach the subject, like Gunnar Adler-Karlsson and Maria Pia Boethius, faced strong opposition.
7See for example Rojos, 1991.
8Klein, p. 89.
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And from the very beginning, Raoul Wallenberg's life has defied those clear forms. He was born a Wallenberg but was raised
outside the influential banking family. He was an architect by training but jobbed as a businessman. He was not a real diplomat,
not a real spy and ultimately neither dead nor alive. And, like any visionary, he was not afraid to test boundaries and to break the
rules. For form-abiding Swedes this has been very difficult to handle. Making waves or rocking the boat - all that is seriously
frowned upon in Viking culture. Nordic tradition teaches the value of community and equality through its concept of "Jante", a set
of social rules which stresses the importance of modesty, and above all the idea that no one person should consider him-or
herself more important than others.9
c. The Dangers of Simplification
A certain pique over Wallenberg's flaunting of this cultural code resonates in the reproach of his former colleagues who have
characterized Raoul Wallenberg's behavior in Budapest as, among other things, "dumb-daring" [dumdristig] and who have
wondered out loud whether this attitude may not have been at least partially responsible for Wallenberg's later fate.10 It implies
that Wallenberg's absolute determination to succeed, while surely idealistic, was also inherently reckless and egotistical; that there
was a selfishness in his action for which he now paid the price.
Wallenberg's colleagues considered his behavior un-diplomatic, in the truest sense of the word. In their minds, rather than having
set an example for what a diplomat can be, his impetuous approach seriously jeopardized larger Swedish interests.11 Worse, as
Wallenberg's fellow diplomats saw it, he not only broke the rules but in the process he put their own lives in danger. The net
result was a ready reservoir of anger and resentment. Some of his colleagues also objected to the subsequent glorification of his
achievements which they considered exaggerated and which did not adequately acknowledge the assistance Wallenberg had
received from many quarters .
They are not alone. Swedish historians like Paul Levine and Attila Lajos have argued that Wallenberg's fame today is due mainly
to the uncertainty about his later fate.12 They claim that the post-war "myth making" around Raoul Wallenberg has prevented a
realistic evaluation not only of his achievements but of the events in Budapest in general. Levine and Lajos make an important
point: In the end "myth making" is always a form of simplification. When it goes too far, when things are over-simplified, the
essence of any problem is lost. It is therefore absolutely necessary to place Wallenberg into the correct historical context, because
only then can the mechanisms of the Holocaust on all sides - perpetrators, victims, rescuers and bystanders - be fully analyzed
and understood .
But the argument misses the larger issue: The possible exaggeration of Raoul Wallenberg's accomplishments, while certainly of
concern, is merely one aspect of a much larger problem.13 Wallenberg's legacy, after all, ultimately rests less in the number of
people he rescued [and he saved many], than in the humanitarian spirit he embodied and the courage he displayed. What he
9The Jante Laws' are derived from a novel by Danish author Axel Sandemose. Stability and homogeneity are prized values in Swedish society.
10ECR p. 313-317; also Margareta Bauer. Minnesanteckningar fran krigsaren i Budapest 1943-1945 (unpublished). The accounts make it clear
that Wallenberg's humanitarian section worked in chaotic conditions that interfered with the regular operations of the Swedish Legation. There
are contradictory statements as to the degree of corruption, meaning the supply or even the sale of protective papers to German and Hungarian
Nazis, by Wallenberg's staff, and whether or not he knew of or condoned these activities. He certainly knew and condoned the "inflation" of
protective papers in circulation as a result of duplication and forgeries. ECR, p.332
11ibid; see also RA, Rudolph Philipp Papers. Letters by Lars Berg to Rudolph Philipp. Although of course mindful of the influence Swedish
diplomacy afforded him, Wallenberg chafed at its formalism and restrictions. He expresses himself almost sarcastically in a memorandum from
August 1944 in which he asks Per Anger - who was about to depart on a trip to Stockholm - to please urge the Swedish Foreign Ministry to "..
give up the sacred institution of the Provisional Passport and grant us full rights to hand such passports out." RA, Kalman Lauer papers, "P.M.
fuer Gesandschaftssekretaer Anger", 6 August 1944.
12Levine, 2001 and Lajos, 2004.
13Wallenberg was certainly not the lightweight Attila Lajos in particular makes him out to be. Eichmann and his staff were so irritated by
Wallenberg's activities that they openly and repeatedly threatened his life. These threats drew a formal protest from Swedish representatives to
German authorities in both Budapest and Berlin. see Raeddningen, p. 234 -38.
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brought to Budapest was the idea of possibility - that rescue was indeed attainable.14 It was this attitude, the will to take action and
to sustain it, combined with a unique talent for organization and negotiation, which turned a small Swedish protective effort into
an extensive rescue operation with safe houses, organized food and clothing supplies and with care offered to orphans and the
sick.15 In the brutal months between the Fascist takeover in October 1944 to the Soviets entering Budapest in January 1945 many
living on the Pest side of the city survived only due to the tireless efforts from men like Swiss legation representative Peter
Zuercher, Raoul Wallenberg and the aid network they had put in place.
Wallenberg's official status as diplomat of a neutral country enabled him to be effective and he had the help of many people who
have not received adequate credit. But Wallenberg inspired those around him and that will always be his greatest accomplishment.
The very real and much more serious problem that remains today, both for Holocaust research and the Wallenberg case, is the
overall simplification of events - before, in and after Budapest - on all levels - political, social and economical - which has led to
serious distraction from the deeper questions about the origins of genocide as well as those surrounding Wallenbergs fate. 16
2. The Swedish Government and Foreign Office
a. "A strange creature"
If the success of Wallenberg's operation is the perfect illustration of what a man with both the vision and the will to make it work
can achieve, then Sweden's efforts to save Raoul Wallenberg are its direct counterpoint. Lack of creativity and imagination run
like a red thread through the official handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Eliasson report chronicles the repeated missteps
and half measures taken by Swedish officials in the early phase of Wallenberg's disappearance, the most critical time to have
brought about his safe return. Many diplomats in the Foreign Office did not consider Wallenberg one of their own, plus his
mission as such did not necessarily enjoy their full sympathies. Pro-German sentiments, deep seated and longstanding, were
prevalent among the Swedish elite which filled the higher ranks of the Foreign Ministry during World War II17
The Eliasson report concludes that Swedish officials considered Wallenberg basically a "saeregen foereteelse," a somewhat
"strange creature".18 Wallenberg was too much of an outsider and in addition he had acquired the stigma of a troublemaker. As
an official Swedish representative in Hungary he had been wildly successful, but his success had the flair of an individualistic
achievement. It did not really altogether constitute a triumph of Swedish diplomacy. Instead, like his Budapest colleagues, many
in the Foreign Office felt that Wallenberg, through his unbridled enthusiasm and impulsiveness, had gotten himself into a mess of
his own making which they now resented having to solve it for him.
The notion that Wallenberg in January 1945 had left to contact the Russians without seeking prior authorization from his superiors
14Both Raoul Wallenberg as well as British SOE operative, Lt. Col. Howie, noted in their respective reports concerning the state of Jewish rescue
in the spring and summer 1944 the general sense of apathy among the Jewish population as a major obstacle to be overcome. As Wallenberg
wrote: "The Jews of Budapest are completely apathetic concerning their own fate. and are hardly doing anything to save themselves." see
Raeddningen, p.151, Raoul Wallenberg's report from 18 July, 1944. And as British Major G.S. Morton noted in his written debriefing of Howie:
""H" said that the treatment of the Jews was most barbarous but at the same time the Jews made no show of resistance whatsoever." PRO.
"Conversation with Lt.Col. Howie, Monday 2nd October, 1944."
15Wallenberg based his efforts on already existing aid mechanisms instituted by the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish Legation, Budapest
in the aftermath of the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, such as the granting of Provisional Passports to Jews with formal ties to
Sweden, as well as the efforts of the Swiss Legation under Carl Lutz. Wallenberg boldly expanded this program, introduced the so-called
"Schutzpass" [Protective Pass] and managed to obtain, together with the representatives from other neutral legations, assurances from German
and Hungarian authorities that these papers would be formally recognized. see Gann, 1999 and Levine, 1996.
16For further reading on the origins of genocide see for example Simpson, 1995.
17Richardson, 1996 A number of officials who rose to prominence in the 1960's and 70's even had joined a right-wing extremist party in the
early 1930s, the Nationella Foerbundet, among them former Ambassadors Sverker Astroem [1935] and Gunnar Jarring [until 1939]
18ECR, p. 95
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 9
has persisted for years. The Swedish Minister in Moscow, Staffan Soederblom, wrote in an early telegram to Stockholm that
Wallenberg had disappeared while "sneaking over" to the Russian lines. 19 A recently discovered document proves this not to have
been the case. 20 Yet none of his Budapest colleagues who knew better bothered to publicly correct this misconception.
Consequently, it confirmed the image of Raoul Wallenberg as a slightly reckless, somewhat irresponsible individual.
b. "Moral courage is our only secret weapon"
In stark contrast to Raoul Wallenberg's all out can-do/must-do approach, Swedish officials never took the position that
Wallenberg's case had to be pursued, no matter how difficult the circumstances or uncertain the outcome. As a result, looking for
Wallenberg became a reluctant duty rather than a need. In tens of thousands of pages in the Raoul Wallenberg file at the Foreign
Ministry one cannot find a single hint that Sweden ever considered staking anything on Raoul Wallenberg's return or, as the years
progressed, for information about his fate. The Swedish government also never appealed to the international community for much
needed support and the implication is that Wallenberg had little to no tangible worth for Sweden. The key problem clearly lies in
how Sweden chose to define the Wallenberg question. Most officials saw it strictly as a problem of Foreign Policy, not an issue of
principle. As such, Wallenberg never ranked high on the list of priorities. As the years went by, the Swedish Foreign Office placed
more and more emphasis on handling the case, not solving it.
Even when doubts crept in, the Foreign Office stuck to its position. And these doubts were sometimes severe. In 1958 new
witnesses came forward who claimed to have had contact with Raoul Wallenberg in Vladimir prison after 1947. In light of these
developments the Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, William Owen, had a conversation with his Swedish
colleague Gunnar Lorentzon. According to Owen's report to the State Department from April 1959, Lorentzon readily admitted
that Foreign Minister Unden's highly legalistic approach to the Wallenberg question had been a mistake. He acknowledged that
rather than waiting until Sweden had full proof of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union, the Swedish government
should have insisted on the truth much more forcefully. In fact, Lorentzon added, Oesten Unden had recently asked him
"whether in his judgment Wallenberg was still alive, to which [Lorentzon] replied that he
thought that there was a 75-35 or 65-25 chance that he was..."21
Owen continued:
"When Lorentzon was asked whether he would rule out the possibility that Khrushchev might
produce Wallenberg alive at some future time, re replied that he thought it possible, and that
in such an event it would be a major sensation in Sweden. "
But doubts and policy have to balance, and even with doubts this strong, policy always won out. When in 1981 a Soviet U-boat
ran ashore in Swedish territorial waters many thought this incident should be used to press the Soviets for the truth about Raoul
Wallenberg. Instead, Swedish officials, in this case former State Secretary Leif Leifland, again retreated and invoked once more
the arguments of propriety:
"We were then, and I am still of the opinion that a civilized nation should not engage in
blackmail." 22
Those who were advocating a more activist Swedish position in the Raoul Wallenberg question simply found themselves
outnumbered. The memoirs of Carl Fredrik Palmstierna, the Private Secretary of King Gustav VI, make it abundantly clear that
Swedish passivity was a general problem and not limited to a handful of individuals. In 1956 Dag Hammerskjoeld, then Secretary
19P2 EU 1, RWD, Soederblom to Foreign Ministry Stockholm, Telegram 14 April , 1945: "Wallenberg smoeg pa eget initiativ oever till
ryssarna."
20 RA, Rudolph Philipp papers. The document summarizes a report by Per Anger from 20 April, 1945 in which he states that Wallenberg asked
for and received permission from Swedish Minister Ivar Danielsson before contacting the Russian authorities in Pest. The document is
unfortunately undated and unsigned and its provenance is unclear. It may be an account of Per Anger's statement, as noted down by Fredrik
von Dardel.
21NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, [DARE release, NND018001]. American Embassy, Stockholm to U.S. Department of State. 28 April , 1959
22 "Was wurde aus Wallenberg?" Documentary. German Television, ZDF 1997. Interview with Leif Leifland.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 10
General of the U.N., was supposed to travel to Moscow, but decided not to raise the Wallenberg case. Palmstierna's anger is
palpable:
"Again that damn UD attitude."23
Palmstierna clearly felt that only determined Swedish insistence vis a vis the Soviets, based on the righteousness of its cause,
would yield any result. In 1956 he summarized his views in a letter to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow,
emphasizing that
"moral courage is our only secret weapon." 24
The Swedish King Gustav VI also showed little interest in Wallenbergs fate, remarking to his Secretary:
"You surely understand that Raoul Wallenberg is long dead."
Palmstierna blamed Undens influence for the Kings conviction and commented:
"Would royal interference have been of any use? Maybe yes, maybe no. However, when it
is a matter of life and death for a Swede who has been cast out by his own country's
highest authorities into such an adventure, every effort should be made on his behalf.
Gustav VI Adolf never took the courageous step he alone could have taken. 25
c. Hidden Motives
While the Eliasson report outlines for the first time in full the early actions and attitudes of Swedish decision makers, it only
partially explores the deeper motives that may have prompted them. Among basic factors the report cites Sweden's small size and
hence small influence compared to Russia, and the strictly hierarchical authority structure of the Soviet system as a possible
explanation for the failure of Swedish officials to bring about a positive Soviet reply in the Wallenberg question. Only the highest
Soviet representatives were authorized to provide information on central issues. It would therefore have fallen to Oesten Unden as
senior official to demand answers, which he simply did not - not at the formal discussions with his Soviet counterparts at the
United Nations in November 1946, nor during the long months of difficult negotiations that had led to the signing of the
$300,000,000 Swedish-Russian Credit and Trade Agreement in October 1946. 26
The Eliasson Commission sees these failures as evidence that statements by the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Staffan
Soederblom, to Stalin and other highranking Soviet officials in 1946 - when he repeatedly expressed his belief that Raoul
Wallenberg had died in the chaos of war - did not simply reflect Soederblom's personal opinion. Instead, the Swedish Minister
apparently had been quite certain that the position he presented in those meetings was in general agreement with UD's ideas on the
subject. This assessment is further supported by the fact that Soederblom had returned home to Stockholm for consultations both
before his discussions with Alexander Abramov, departmental head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in December 1945
(Soederblom had been on leave in late1945) and with Stalin in June 1946 (Soederblom had just returned from a brief trip to
23 Palmstierna, p. 195 [Aterigen den daer foerdoemda UD-andan ]. Carl Fredrik Palmstierna's father was a second cousin of Raoul
Wallenberg's mother, Maj von Dardel.
24Ibid, p. 201 [Moraliskt mod var vart enda hemliga vapen]
25Ibid, p. 195 [Du foerstar vael att Wallenberg aer doed foer laenge sen]
Ibid, p. 198 [Kunde ett kungligt ingripande ha lett nagan vart? Kanske, kanske inte. Alltjaemt anser jag, att naer det gaeller liv och doed foer
en svensk som av sitt lands hoegsta myndigheter kastats ut i sadana aventyr, boer dylika foersoek goeras. Gustaf VI Adolf tog aldrig den
frimodiga steg han, ensam av alla, hade kunnat ta.]
26On 7 November, 1946 Sweden and Russia signed a Credit and Trade Agreement, the so-called "Ryssavtalet. " It provided credits of about 1
billion Swedish Crowns, approx. $300,000,000 at the time, to the Soviet Union. Gunnar Haeggloeff apparently urged Unden at some point to
raise the issue of Raoul Wallenberg as part of the negotiations, but Unden refused to consider it. ECR p. 649. In its analysis of the Swedish-
Russian Trade Agreement the Eliasson Commission comes to the conclusion that Soviet interest in the agreement was at its highest by the
summer of 1946, precisely around the time of Stalin's meeting with Staffan Soederbom.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 11
Stockholm in May 1946).
At the very least, Soederblom's statements appear to have had Unden's tacit backing. When in the spring of 1946 Soederblom
suddenly relays to the Swedish Foreign Ministry his impression that despite all expectations Abramov may well be hinting at a
possible exchange of Raoul Wallenberg, he receives no answer. In May 1946 he returns to Stockholm for consultations with
Unden and from that moment on he does not mention the issue of exchange again. Instead, one month later he conveys to Stalin
his conviction that Raoul Wallenberg is dead.
Like his Ambassador in Moscow, Unden appears to have readily embraced the idea that already in 1946 Raoul Wallenberg was
either dead or could not be saved. His reasoning remains largely unclear, considering Sweden held in hand a formal "receipt" for
Wallenberg from the highest Soviet authorities: Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov's official note from 17 January, 1945 which
stated that Raoul Wallenberg and his possessions had been placed under Soviet protection.27 According to the Eliasson
Commission, a partial explanation may be found in Unden's political philosophy which was rooted in a fervent belief in
international law and the values of collective security, born out of the ruins of World War I. This left him almost "reflexively
opposed" to any ideas of official government representatives exchanging or bartering human beings. 28 Unden considered such a
thing unacceptable conduct among states.
The wish to position a small country like Sweden to play a meaningful role between the superpowers further inclined the Swedish
leadership against placing any demands on its Soviet neighbor. So did a slight sense of guilt over Swedish actions during the war
which in 1941 had allowed German troops transit through its territory from Norway to Finland.29 The extradition of 167 Baltic
refugees in January 1946, as well as certain aspects of the negotiations for the Trade and Credit Agreement have to be evaluated
against this very background. However, while these surrounding conditions made an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg undeniably
difficult, they also offered opportunities. The Eliasson Commission stresses that while it can appreciate the "moral dilemma" the
Swedish officials faced over the question of a possible exchange,
" in hindsight it can be stated as remarkable that the Swedish Foreign Policy leadership never
appears to have considered the question at all." 30
Instead, as Oesten Unden defined it, in the Cold War era Sweden had to make a choice - to search for Wallenberg or to protect the
larger national interest. By March 1957 Unden let it be known officially that for all intents and purposes the search for Raoul
Wallenberg was over. Publicly the Swedish government challenged the Soviet assertion of February 1957 that Wallenberg had
died of a heart attack in prison already in 1947.31 Behind the scenes, however, Unden gave different marching orders. Only one
day after the receipt of the Gromyko memorandum the American Embassy, Stockholm reported to the State Department in a
confidential message that
"the [Swedish] Foreign Office indicated to the [U.S.] Ambassador that since it had no
proof that Wallenberg was alive after 1947, it is inclined to believe the Soviet story." 32
To his own staff Unden announced that
27MID, Dekanosov to Soederblom, 16 January 1945. Others in the Swedish leadership, like Rolf Sohlman, exhibited similar behavior. See ECR,
p. 507, Letter Sohlman to Unden, 16 May, 1947.
28ECR, p. 510-512. Swedish Security expert Lars Ulfving argues that Unden's failure not to pursue the Wallenberg case was most likely not "a
conscious strategy." If so, Ulving argues, Unden would have referred to it in his diary. The diaries, however, were not kept regularly and were
often sketchy. Ulfving, p. 135
29ECR, p. 514-16
30ECR, p. 602
31On 7 February, 1957 the Soviet Union declared in an official memorandum that Raoul Wallenberg had died in a Moscow prison on 17 July,
1947. Delivered by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the statement is generally referred to as the Gromyko Memorandum.
32NARA, RG 84, American Embassy, Stockholm to the U.S. Department of State. Foreign Service Dispatch. 8 February, 1957.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 12
" .. It appears that Raoul Wallenberg is dead ... One can speculate about other
possibilities, for example, that he has disappeared or is in such a state that he cannot be
shown. These are theoretical possibilities and not very likely. To maintain or build a
relationship with the Soviet Union in a way that this can happen without sacrificing more
important values, belongs to our most important tasks in Foreign Policy. We have in my
opinion no reason to hold a continuous grudge against the Soviet Union." 33
This was the first official formulation of UD's dualist-pragmatist position that in fact had marked the case from the very
beginning: It claimed publicly that the search for Wallenberg's fate was of the highest priority when in reality it certainly was not.
The Eliasson Commission strongly questions Unden's framing of the Wallenberg question in terms of an either-or argument, as
well as the extent of negative repercussions Unden foresaw for Sweden if it had insisted too forcefully on a resolution of the
Wallenberg case. And rightly so, because Unden was not afraid of challenging Russian officials on other occasions. Unden's
biographer Yngve Moeller describes how Unden flew into a rage during a talk with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm,
Rodionov, because the Russians had expressed objections to the so-called "Trondheim Shipping Lane" [Trondheimleden].34 The
Norwegian port city of Trondheim allowed Sweden to receive shipping merchandise even when the Baltic Sea was frozen.
Moeller writes that Unden was so angered by the Russian position, that he threatened to cancel his official vacation in the Soviet
Union,
"...but the Kremlin was so perplexed about Unden's outburst that they buried their objections
in deep silence."
For some reason Unden was not willing to be equally blunt in the Raoul Wallenberg question. In the end the Eliasson Commission
can only describe Unden's behavior as "remarkable." The report does cast a wide net of criticism: Cabinet Secretary Erik
Boheman, Foreign Minister Christian Guenther, Head of the Political Department, Sven Grafstroem and even former Prime
Minister Tage Erlander are all singled out for severe reprimand. The report draws the conclusion that the attitudes of Unden and
his colleagues had proved devastating for Raoul Wallenberg's chances of return, yet it clearly considers their behavior a unique
phenomenon, unique and unexplained.
The Eliasson Commission report focuses heavily on the time of 1945-47, what the report considers the decisive years. Later years
are only sketchily dealt with. One wishes that the same detail were available here. As the Commission sees it, since Raoul
Wallenberg's fate was most likely decided by 1947, later Swedish behavior was not as relevant. Furthermore, the Commission
claims that with the presentation of the Gromyko Memorandum, which asserted that Raoul Wallenberg had died of a heart attack
in 1947, the Soviet position was intractably locked down. 35 With that, the chances of winning Raoul Wallenberg's release in later
years sharply declined, according to the report.
It is not clear why the Eliasson Commission considers the Soviet position so entrenched. The Gromyko memorandum was, after
all, so vague that it appeared to leave room for future adjustments.36 In fact, there are indications that the content of the
memorandum may have been influenced at least in part in its preparatory stages by the attitude and remarks of high ranking
Swedish officials. As the Eliasson Report stresses repeatedly, both Rolf Sohlman and Oesten Unden in 1955/56 had gone so far as
to suggest to the Soviets possible explanations for Raoul Wallenberg's fate. In retrospect, especially Sohlman's remark to Nikolai
Bulganin in November 1955 appears noteworthy. Sohlman directly alludes to the possibility that
33UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Internal Memorandum, 26 February, 1957.
34Moeller, p. 404 [Men i Kreml hade man tydligen blivit sa perplex oever de Undenska utbrottet, att man begravde sin framstoet i djup tystnad.]
35ECR, p.563 and p.577
36Among other things the statement by the attending physician, A.L. Smoltsov, was not accompanied by an official death certificate or autopsy
report, Wallenberg's personal information was incomplete and the text stated that the information found in Russian archives "might" refer to
Raoul Wallenberg. In addition, Smoltsov's report did not adhere to the very strict rules and channels of communications which governed Soviet
bureaucracy; see SWR and Mesinai. Liquidatsia. 2001. Numerous questions also remain about Smoltsov's service and employment status in July
1947. Smoltsov at the time supposedly was on an extended leave of absence from his job, due to illness. The full facts still remain to be
established.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 13
"Beria and his consorts were to blame (for Wallenberg's fate)." 37
Lack of urgency on the part of Swedish officials to press the case also emerges from a report distributed to the members of the
Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in preparation for Prime Minister Erlander's impending state visit to Moscow in
March 1956:
" ... Some people who are close to Erlander told the members of the Soviet Embassy in
Sweden that Erlander would not have raised the [Wallenberg] question in Moscow but was
forced to discuss it in order to prevent the bourgeois parties from blaming the Swedish
government in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections .... for not being active enough .. in
.... the Wallenberg case." 38
While the Eliasson Commission acknowledges that Unden's reaction to the Gromyko Memorandum marks the full official
formulation of Swedish Realpolitik' in the Wallenberg case, it rejects the notion that Sweden gave up on Raoul Wallenberg after
1957. It cites, for example, the official Swedish demarche of 1959 as an example of continued efforts. 39 It does, however, not
explain how such a demarche could possibly have been effective without the appropriate policy in place to back it up.
d. Old mindsets
In the summary of its findings the Eliasson report states that it
"cannot find any substantial fault with the actions taken by the [Swedish] foreign policy
leadership during the 1950's."40
This may well be its most controversial statement, especially since - by the authors own acknowledgement - their own report in
part contradicts this assertion. In light of the many important questions which remain concerning Swedish conduct in later years,
such a carte-blanche appears inappropriate or at the very least premature. The following decades also were far from problem free.
One example is the decision to officially close the Wallenberg case in 1965. It remained closed for a full fifteen years, until 1979,
when a new witness and the efforts of US Congressman Tom Lantos revived the issue. 41 The Swedish government's approach to
the Soviet Union that same year to exchange Raoul Wallenberg for Stig Bergling, a former Swedish Security official who had been
arrested in March as a Russian spy, was clearly too little too late. 42 The Eliasson Commission strongly questions the wisdom of
37ECR, p. 597. Unden made similar statements when he delivered a note on 9 March, 1956 to Soviet Ambassador Rodionov. In Soviet
documentation Unden is quoted as saying that "the Swedish government would be satisfied with an answer that would hint at Wallenberg's
disappearance being an act of Beria." see among others Carlbaeck-Isotalo, p. 17 and p.23. Carlbaeck also pointed to Tugarinov's [of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's Information Department] memorandum to Andrei Gromyko from 30 December, 1956, which recommended a quick answer to
the Swedes in the Wallenberg case. Tugarinov suggests that Swedish-Soviet relations could hardly get worse, in light of the crisis brought about
by the squashing of the civil uprising in Hungary that autumn and that in light of the remarks by Swedish officials a quick reply would result in
limiting further damage of bilateral relations. see also SWR, p.113
38MID, Information about negotiations with Swedish Prime Minister Erlander during his visit to Moscow, March 1956
As the Swedish- Russian Working Group points out in its report, one has to be careful with interpretation of Russian documents, especially in
terms of deducing true intentions. As it concerns reports from members of the Soviet Legation, Stockholm, for example, there is a tendency of
those representatives to fit the message to what they believed their superiors in Moscow wanted to hear. SWR, 2001
39UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD. On 9 February, 1959 the Swedish government formally asked the Soviet Union to investigate whether or not Raoul
Wallenberg had been imprisoned in Vladimir prison.
40ECR, p. 39
41In 1980 U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-California) introduced legislation in the U.S. Congress that made Raoul Wallenberg an honorary
U.S. citizen.
42The idea for an exchange had apparently been conceived by Bergling himself who had heard of new testimony in the Raoul Wallenberg case,
which stated that he had been alive in the Soviet Union some years earlier.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 14
closing the case for fifteen years, but adds that
"it is not really clear what could have been done."43
Yet the decades after 1950 certainly saw a number of opportunities where it may have been possible to learn more about
Wallenberg's fate. However, these were not pursued or if so, rather halfheartedly. One of the most memorable was an apparent
Soviet approach in 1966, delivered through a representative of the Protestant Church in Berlin, Carl-Gustav Svingel, which
appeared to suggest an exchange, for unspecified compensation, of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem who had been
arrested in 1963 as a Soviet agent, The Foreign Office refused to even discuss the offer and never even formally interviewed
Svingel.44 Whatever might have been behind the overture, one fact remains: Sweden captured one of the most important Cold War
spies and got absolutely nothing in return.45 This issue alone should be worth a closer look.
The question of what type of signals Sweden sent Russia concerning Raoul Wallenberg in later years, and vice versa, also
deserves closer scrutiny. While Swedish leaders like Prime Minister Tage Erlander continued to raise the question of Wallenberg's
fate after 1957, all the while earning strong Soviet rebuffs, there are indications that many of these later approaches lacked in
both determination and conviction. 46
In May 1964, for example, Swedish and Russian diplomats held discussions in preparation for Soviet Prime Minister Nikita
Khrushchev's upcoming state visit to Sweden. The political atmosphere at the time was highly charged and the lingering issues in
the Raoul Wallenberg threatened to further strain Swedish-Soviet relations. During one of these preparatory discussions Swedish
Ambassador Gunnar Jarring indicated to the head of the Scandinavian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Kovalyov that
Sweden's main priority was to avoid any negative fallout for the planned visit, especially in the media.
"[Raoul Wallenberg's] family and the press will never tolerate a missed opportunity for
inquiry but it should cause for sure unpleasant publicity." 47
Jarring was particularly anxious about the testimony of Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz which had not yet been released to the
public. In early 1961 Professor Svartz reported that while attending a medical conference in Moscow she had been told by a
leading Soviet physician, A. L. Myasnikov that Raoul Wallenberg was alive at the time in Soviet captivity.48 In their conversation
Jarring explains to Kovalyov that Sweden requires clarification of Svartz's report. However, far from seizing the opportunity of
either Wennerstroem's arrest, or Khrushchev's visit to press for answers, Jarring appears to go out of his way to inform the
Russians that the Wallenberg case as such is no longer a priority for Sweden:
"We do not doubt the note that was presented in 1957," Jarring tells Kovalyov, "but .... it
would certainly not be inappropriate ... to conduct "a new check or - put differently - a
completing check."
43ECR, p. 598
44UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD; see for example P.M. by Leif Belfrage, "ang. Herr Svingels beraettelse." 19 March, 1966. It remains uncertain who
initiated the discussions - whether it was the Soviet side, Svingel's colleague, the East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel [as Svingel claims] or
Svingel himself [approaching Vogel].
45After having been sentenced to life in prison in 1964, Wennerstroem received clemency in 1974 and was released from prison.
46One exception was Erlander's direct request to Khrushchev to immediately return Raoul Wallenberg to Sweden, following the testimony by
Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz.
47UD, P2 Eu 1 RWD, Gunnar Jarring to Leif Belfrage, 26 May, 1964
48UD, P2 Eu I, RWD, Report by Nanna Svartz, 1 February 1961. Myasnikov claimed that Svartz had misunderstood his comments. A formal
face-to-face meeting between Myasnikov and Svartz failed to resolve the issue. Another physician who had been present for part of time during
the initial meeting between Myasnikov and Svartz, Professor Grigory Danishevsky, was never formally questioned. It is not known what
Danishevky has reported to the Russian side of this encounter.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 15
In the following paragraphs of his memo Jarring acknowledges that it is all pretense:
We [Jarring and Kovlayov] pretended to await the results [of the check] and we understood
fully well that they could not be ready before Khrushchev's visit."
According to Kovalyov's account of the meeting, Jarring was even more explicit:
"... The Swedish side only wants to make the Khrushchev visit a success. Investigation, Jarring
added, which the Soviet government would promise, could bring the same result as the
investigation in 1957. On my question what additional investigations the Swedes are talking
about .... Jarring could not answer. Jarring said that he personally understands the difficulties
involved but in this particular case he must take the position as an official representative of
Sweden."49
Even with concessions to the often murky phrasing of diplomatic language and the difficult political conditions at the time, the
message to the Russians was clear: The Raoul Wallenberg case was by now little more than a political irritant and all that was
needed were Russian assurances of a "completing check." When Kovalyov, at the end of the discussions about Wallenberg,
casually mentions Wennerstroem's upcoming sentencing, Jarring informs Kovalyov that
"Sweden does not link these two issues."
It would be quite interesting to know exactly how and why the Swedish government arrived at this position.
The Eliasson Commission argues that after 1950, with the arrival of Swedish Security Police Inspector Otto Danielsson and
Permanent Undersecretary of State, Arne Lundberg, UD's handling of the Wallenberg case dramatically improved. How far these
improvements ultimately reached, however, is open for debate. Oesten Unden was after all still firmly in charge. And when Unden
left office in 1962, the Unden mindset remained deeply entrenched, embodied, among others, by his protege, Sverker Astroem.
Per Ahlmark, former head of the centrist Folkpartiet and one of Astroem's harshest critics, points out that although Astroem was
present in key decision making positions at all critical moments in the case, he does not mention Raoul Wallenberg with one word
in his memoirs:
"The search for Wallenberg was one of the most important issues in UD. Not one word about
that in the book. He claims that the different governments after the war used every
opportunity to bring forth a positive reply about Wallenberg.' ... Why such a lie? Perhaps it is
because Unden was Astroems boss and idol. Unden's ideological neutralism between Stalin's
Soviet Union and the Western powers was shared by his pupil." 50
It is an open secret that high-ranking UD decision makers, especially Oesten Unden and Rolf Sohlman, bore strong sympathies
for the Soviet Union. In 1956 the CIA received information which cast suspicions on Sohlman's attitudes and CIA officials
considered an official investigation.51 Sverker Astroem, for his part, has been publicly accused of aiding Stig Wennerstroem
before his arrest in 1963.52 If in fact real, what effects did those Soviet sympathies have in practical terms? The Eliasson
49MID, from Kovalyov's diary, resolution by Andrey Gromyko, 31 May , 1964
50 Ahlmark. 2002. [Soekandet efter Wallenberg blev det stoersta enskilda aerendet inom UD. Inte ett ord om det i boken. Han pastod dock att
de olika regeringarna efter kriget har utnyttjat alla tillfaellen att fa fram ett hederligt sovjetiskt besked' om Wallenberg. ... Varfoer denna
osanning? Kanske foer att Unden blev Astroems chef och idol. Undens ideologiska neutralism mellan Stalins Sovjet och vaetmaekterna blev
ocksa laerjungens.].
51NARA, RG 84, [NND 947008], message via Air Pouch from Stockholm, 7 December, 1956
52Sundelin. 1999. Sverker Astroem is the acknowledged 'Eminence Grise' of Swedish politics. He rose to prominence during World War II
when he emerged from relative obscurity to accompany Erik von Post to Denmark in 1945 to meet SS Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg in
preparation for Schellenberg's escape to Sweden. He later was assigned to spend time with Schellenberg during his stay at the home of Folke
Bernadotte. It was also by his own account Astroem who accompanied Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontai on her return to Moscow in
March 1945, the critical early phase in the Wallenberg case. He rose to become head of UD's Political Department, later Kabinettssekreterare, as
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 16
Commission does not address this issue in depth. It claims that they had no obvious effect, at least none that can be ascertained in
the official record. Nevertheless, as Magnus Petersson, a Swedish Security Policy expert, argues in an analysis written for the
Commission report, Sweden's attempt to balance Soviet interests, its so-called "Politics of Accommodation"
[Anpassningspolitik],
"combined with a not insignificant, ideologically determined anti-Americanism among many of
the responsible Swedish politicians, could border on or in effect constitute anticipation of
Soviet demands or wishes." 53
Regardless if accusations of espionage should turn out to be true or not, it is a fact that in the post-war years Astroem saw himself
as a critical counterweight to what he considered the false neutralism Sweden had entered into after WWII. While nominally
neutral, Sweden had secretly entered a quasi-alliance with the U.S. Astroem's views have been highly influential, especially in his
capacity as key advisor to the country's leadership, including former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme. In the eyes of Ahlmark
and other critics, like Unden, Astroem championed a policy of "practical neutrality" as the centerpiece of Swedish post-war
neutrality, with devastating consequences. As the critics see it, such a position ultimately draws
"no line between democracy and dictatorship" 54
and is a major reason behind Sweden's failure to submit its recent history to a more critical review, including its behavior in the
Raoul Wallenberg case. 55
The key question that is yet to be answered is exactly why Raoul Wallenberg's fate evoked so little sympathy and so little interest
from the people in charge of his case. Sweden's failure to take advantage of important openings, by not maximizing all efforts,
raises questions about possible hidden motives. Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna remarked on this already in 1976:
"I could very well imagine that certain gentlemen in UD were afraid of Wallenberg's return.
Those who had bet for the sake of prestige or career that he was dead, and had hindered the
investigation, would then appear in an unpleasant light." 56
As time went by, it became ever more difficult to pursue the case, especially in light of new political challenges, like the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and other crises. Former State Secretary Pierre Schori remarked on this in an internal
memorandum in 1985, closely echoing Unden's formulation from 1957:
"The point in time had to arrive some time where we had to tell ourselves that the likelihood
that Raoul Wallenberg lives is so little that it costs too much to continue to drive the
[Wallenberg] question. ... I cannot, dare not claim that he could not still be alive..... But I
think that after all years gone without us receiving new certain information, the likelihood
that he still continues to live has to appear so little that we cannot longer allow that the
question will burden - sometimes poison - our relationship with the Soviets..."57
well as Sweden's representative at the United Nations. Astroem has a reputation as a man of power, not distinct ideology. In an interview with
DN's Mats Wiklund in 2002 he emphasized that he was not "a joiner" and that he has never had a "firm political conviction." Wiklund, 2002.
53Petersson, 2003
54see, among others, Ekdal, December 2002.
55Other observers are less harsh in their assessment. Magnus Petersson, for example, points out that despite his pro-Soviet policies, Unden in
1952 condemned the excesses of Communism as " a fanatical belief system with no tolerance for those with opposing views." Petersson, p. 92.
Astroem was heard by the Eliasson Commission but only briefly, in a two hour interview.
56Palmstierna, p. 200 [Jag mycket vael kunde taenka mig att viss herar i UD var raedda foer Wallenbergs aterkomst. De som av prestige- eller
karriaerskael satsat pa att han var doed och motsatt sig utredningar, komme da i ett obehagligt ljus.]
57UD, P2 Eu 1, 12 February, 1985. P.M. signed by Pierre Schori.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 17
Today, it can be argued that Sweden has even less incentive to solve Raoul Wallenberg's fate. It is a fact, that the longer
Wallenberg lived in captivity, the more problematic the matter becomes for both Russia and for Sweden. Even if Wallenberg died
in 1947, revelations about the background of his case may bear a lot of risks or at the very least involve a number of uncertainties.
Other than the satisfaction of having done the right thing, there would be few potential benefits.
III. OTHER DEFINITIONS:
1. The U.S.
a. "Swedish diplomat with an American task"
In the assessment of the Eliasson report, one major reason why the Swedish Foreign Office officials did not vigorously pursue
Wallenberg's rescue was the idea that he had been a de-facto employee of the U.S. government.58 The reasoning was that since
Wallenberg had freely taken on the job with the War Refugee Board, he accepted the risks of such an assignment. Consequently,
primarily he and his U.S. employers were to blame for his fate. The Eliasson Commission emphatically states that such notions
and the neglect to vigorously pursue Raoul Wallenberg's return were "unacceptable."
The truly important question the Eliasson Commission does not sufficiently explore is why Sweden's distancing from Raoul
Wallenberg was so extreme. In the Commission's assessment the U.S. had designed the "content" of the mission - Sweden had
simply aided in its execution.59 In reality, however, the facts appear to have been far less clear cut. Wallenberg's assignment was
certainly not driven by American interests alone, but came about as a result of a confluence of various private and public interests.
60 Swedish and American interests overlapped in this on various levels.
Aside from its long humanitarian tradition, Sweden had two major incentives why it supported the American efforts in 1944:61 By
then it had become clear that the Allies and not Germany would win the war, plus Sweden had received strong US criticism for its
economic dealings with Nazi Germany which had gone far beyond the limits set by international [bilateral] trade agreements and
the rules governing Swedish neutrality. This concerned in particular the Wallenberg firm's SKF trade in ballbearings. As the
Eliasson Report points out, there are indications of a straightforward understanding: Swedish support for American aims in
Hungary would weigh favorably in U.S. consideration of Swedish behavior. 62 It does, however, not state the key irony: By a
58 The best example of this notion is the Swedish government's suggestion in January 1945 to the American Minister in Stockholm, Hershel
Johnson, to convey U.S. instructions to Raoul Wallenberg through the American Legation, Moscow, since Wallenberg seemed to be under Soviet
protection. ECR, p. 190. As the Commission points out, it would have had to appear rather odd to the Soviets for an official Swedish
representative