Wallenberg Family

[Magda Hassan]

If there really was a special file, i.e. "Lefortovo File", that contained a note that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947, this may have
been the Smoltsov note from 17 July, 1947 or a similar note to that effect. It raises the question whether or not this special file was
the one used in preparation of the Gromyko memorandum from 1957. It remains unclear what documentation exactly Soviet
officials relied on in 1956-57 when the memorandum was drafted. Foreign Minister Molotov at least had some direct knowledge
of the events on 17 July, 1947, because MGB Minister Abakumov had personally informed him about developments in the
Wallenberg case on that very date. 240 Did Soviet officials in 1956 then find the Smoltsov note in the "Lefortovo file" [or other
files] or did they construct it on the basis of the information contained in the material and/or Molotovs knowledge, and made the
date retroactively fit Abakumovs notification to Molotov from 1947?
Russian officials have always maintained that the Smoltsov note is authentic, if not in fact, [meaning cause of death by
heartattack,] then in spirit, [meaning Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 or sometime around then.] In her analysis of Russian
documents in 1997 Swedish historian Helene Carlbaeck concludes that Abakumov's letter to Molotov from 17 July, 1947
"strongly increased the validity of the Smoltsov note.241
If indeed authentic, a question nevertheless remains, based on the currently available documentation, whether or not the
[Smoltsov] note about Raoul Wallenberg's alleged death in 1947 could have been conceived as part of an effort to create a false
237SWR, p.139
238SWR, p. 145
239UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Testimony of Sergei Ivanovich Stepanov, 1992. Stepanov bases his statements on his own experiences as well as those
of a colleague, identified as "Dzhirkvelov". This appears to have been either Ilya Dzhirkvelov who had defected to the West in the early 1980's
or a relative.
240A small chance exists that Abakumov did not tell Molotov the full facts of the Wallenberg case. Soviet experts point out that Abakumov in
some cases acted directly on the orders of Stalin, bypassing even the most senior members of the Soviet leadership. In the case of a foreign
diplomat, however, some semblance of information sharing appears to have been upheld.
241Carlbaeck, p. 7
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 50
set of documents, a false trace, with the intention of hiding Wallenberg's fate and/or his identity from certain individuals in the
Soviet administration at that time. 242 The circumstances of Wallenberg's death or disappearance were apparently a matter of great
sensitivity and it is know that as late as 1954 even high ranking Soviet officials were not fully briefed. 243 The effort might have
been abandoned at some point, yet the documentation survived. 244 The issue attains further significance due to the many
unresolved questions concerning the employment status of the physician A.L. Smoltsov in the summer of 1947. Full
documentation on this issue needs to be presented by the Russian side. 245
If two former Soviet Intelligence officials indeed had access to Wallenberg's case file in the archives of the First Main Directorate
of MGB [later KGB], there may be a chance that other individuals with similar access in other years may still be alive and could
testify about what they saw. Further research will have to clarify the contradictions contained in their statements.
The Soviet leadership's wish to steer guilt away from themselves and to implicate Abakumov and Smoltsov, both of whom were
dead by 1957, may account for some of the vague aspects of the Soviet pronouncements. The Swedish Working Group Report
states that by the Russians' own acknowledgment the Gromyko Memorandum was not supposed to reflect the full truth - it was
just to be "a half-truth that would do." 246 The possibility exists that even if Wallenberg had lived beyond 1947, Soviet control or
knowledge of the matter was such that Soviet officials felt reasonably sure that at that moment - in 1956/57 - Raoul Wallenberg
was dead. But if that was so, the question remains why they did not choose to convey this fact - if it indeed was fact - more
forcefully.
Both Russian and Swedish experts have argued that after a few years Raoul Wallenberg was simply not "exchangeable" because
of the sensitive information he would have acquired during his Soviet imprisonment. Beyond that, releasing Wallenberg after
years of denying any knowledge about him would have constituted an enormous embarrassment for the Soviet Union and an
immense propaganda coup for the West. There would have been little or no chance for Soviet officials to "save face." Yet, it is
equally questionable whether or not a deal could not have been struck if the right offer had come along.
Interestingly, even after the Wallenberg case had not been officially raised by Sweden for fifteen years, the documentation shows
that the Russian side, at least in private conversation, did not categorically insist that Raoul Wallenberg was definitely dead in
1947. A good example is the discussion between a Swedish official [Jan Lundvik] and his unidentified Soviet contact in 1979,
immediately after the Swedish side had reopened the case. In his assessment of the meeting Lundvik wrote:
"The official position that the case is once and for all closed and that no new information
can appear because Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 was not expressed. .. In fact he [the
contact] admitted implicitly that there could in fact come information of such a type that it
may cast new light on the case." 247
242There were several cases in which false death certificates were produced by Soviet authorities.
243When Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in October 1954 asked I.A. Serov, the Chairman of the KGB, "when and under what
circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died," Serov gave an evasive reply, referring indirectly to A. Vishinsky's note from August 18, 1947 which
stated that Raoul Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union. In 1954 Gromyko was not yet a full member of the Soviet Politburo. It is not clear
what prompted Gromyko's inquiry.
244The document carries certain notations such as an apparent page number that it would appear to have been part of a file or set of other
documents. As is known from a note written on the side of the document, Smoltsov apparently never sent his report to Abakumov but he
supposedly informed the Minister personally of what had allegedly transpired. This notation would then account for why the document was not
found in other relevant collections. Some researchers have questioned the authenticity of this postscriptum note in the document's margin which
states that he body was cremated without autopsy. The lack of autopsy is suspicious.
245The role of Smoltsov's deputy, a female physician, also needs to be further scrutinized.
246SWR, p. 141
247UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Jan Lundvik to Leif Leifland. 6 September, 1979. Another example is the formulation used by then Russian Foreign
Minister Primakov to his Swedish counterpart, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, in a letter from 17 July, 1997 on the occasion of the supposed 50th
anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's death. Primakov opens the letter saying "If the Soviet authorities can be believed, [my emphasis] today marks
fifty years after Raoul Wallenberg's death ...." see also report by Goeran Rydeberg, 2001.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 51
What then prevents Russia from telling the truth? There are four basic possibilities why Russia insists on 1947:
1. Nobody knows the truth. Therefore, the case is indeed purely circumstantial. Russian officials argue that the level of internal
secrecy within the Security Services remains so high, that those few individuals who know what happened to Raoul Wallenberg
either still refuse to speak or are now dead. Any documentation that does exist is supposedly incomplete and does not shed light on
Wallenberg's ultimate fate. High-level institutional knowledge, however, was available until very recently and to some degree
remains available today. Anastas Mikoyan survived until 1978. Sergei Kartashov, [Head of the Fourth Department, Third Main
Directorate, MGB in 1947] died only in 1979. Other top members of the Soviet hierarchy lived well into the 1980's and 1990's.
Vyacheslav Molotov was still alive in 1986 and Georgi Malenkov lived until 1988. Viktor Abakumov's Deputy, Nikolai
Selivanovsky, died as recently as 1997. Yevgeni Pitovranov, the Head of the Second Main Directorate MGB, was alive until 1999,
Danil Kopelyanski [interrogator with the Third Directorate, Fourth Department is still living, his colleague Solovov died only
recently.
2. Full knowledge of Wallenberg's death in 1947 exists, but documentation is withheld by an extremely small circle at the
top. Such a scenario is possible, but it raises questions as to why officials would not reveal details if they have already publicly
pondered death by poison and have admitted to Wallenberg's execution by shooting [Yakovlev]. There may be a reluctance to
release the documentation if the cause of death was gruesome or if Wallenberg suffered irreversible physical or psychological
damage as a result of mistreatment. The truth may compromise still living officials who either dealt with the case directly or in its
aftermath. In addition, it may prove impossible to strictly separate and keep separate the facts of Wallenberg's fate from other
aspects of his case, i.e. reasons of his arrest, etc. The culture of the Security Services may well present an insurmountable obstacle,
such as an ingrained unwillingness to acknowledge guilt or to provide essential details to the public. A stalemate then may seem
to be the preferable solution.
3. Wallenberg lived beyond 1947, but not for long. Wallenberg died but later than claimed by the Russians. The Russian side
has steadily retrenched in its position on Raoul Wallenbergs fate. It has moved from complete denial of Wallenberg's presence in
the Soviet Union [1945-1957], to claim of death in 1947 by heart attack [Smoltsov], to death by Execution [Yakovlev]248 Further
adjustments or corrections about Raoul Wallenbergs supposed death, either about the cause or date of death would have serious
repercussions for Russia; and particularly so if he was held beyond the deaths of both Stalin and Beria in 1954 and he then died or
was executed. So, it may not be considered advantageous to admit to the later death date. Again, only a few people know the facts.
This could be a plausible alternative to 1947, especially since some former Soviet officials themselves have raised this possibility.
249
4. Wallenberg lived beyond 1947 and for a considerable time. A less likely scenario, but based on the current evidence it
cannot be dismissed. If in fact true, Wallenberg's survival could not be revealed because it would cast all involved in a very
negative light. 250
248Interfax, 6 December 2000. "In the opinion of .... Academician Alexander Yakovlev, Wallenberg was executed by gunfire at Moscow's
infamous Lubyanka prison in the years of Stalin's regime .."
249UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, see for example testimonies of Remenyi [1984], Stepanov [1992], and Solovov [1997] Most Soviet officials who
consider it possible that Raoul Wallenberg lived past July 1947, believe he was no longer alive after the mid- 1950's. In 1952/53 the Hungarian
government, on Soviet orders - apparently in connection with the so-called [Jewish] Doctors' Plot' -, prepared a number of show trials which
were to expose an alleged "conspiracy" by certain Jewish organizations, [especially the Joint], and American/British interests, charging
collaboration with both Hungarian and German Fascists during World War II. In a subplot to this conspiracy it was to be "proven" - by forced
testimony - that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered in Budapest already in January 1945. A key question is why Stalin decided to take up the
Wallenberg issue precisely at this time. A similar effort to prove Raoul Wallenberg's death in Budapest in 1945 had been made by the Hungarian
High Court already in 1948. The planned trials in Hungary fit the theme of Stalin's anti-Semitic campaign of the period, exemplified by the
'Doctors' Plot', which in turn was connected to the arrest of MGB Minister of State Security V. Abakumov. Interestingly, Abakumov was never
charged with Raoul Wallenberg's murder. One would think that Stalin would have liked to blame Abakumov for this crime. The early 1950's
also saw increased pressure by the Swedish government to obtain clarity about Wallenbergs fate. After Stalin's death in 1954 the preparation for
the show trials in Budapest continued for some months before they were finally stopped by Beria. see Ember, 2000.
250For an analysis of the Russian failure to present valid evidence for Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947 and for the possibility of Raoul
Wallenberg's longterm survival after 1947 see Mesinai. "Beyond Reasonable Doubt." 2001
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 52
d. More relevant records have to exist
The possibility that Raoul Wallenberg's fate is not known is minimal. So is the chance that all critical documentation has been
destroyed. There are strong indications that at least part of Raoul Wallenberg's personal file is available in Moscow. This idea
appears to be supported by some of the items among Wallenberg's personal belongings which were returned to his family in
October 1989. These consisted, among other things, of large amounts of foreign currencies, his diplomatic passport and his
prisoner registration card. Russian claims that these items were discovered by chance in a sealed packet found on a shelf in the
FSB archives seem hardly credible. Under the extremely strict Soviet bureaucratic rules items such as Wallenberg's passport
should under normal circumstances have been kept as part of his prisoner/personal and/or his investigative file.251
The existence of the currency too raises questions. Money was held on the prisoner's behalf, and his belongings traveled with him from prison to
prison, where they were stored by the respective prison administration. As Susan Mesnai has pointed out, once the prisoner in question died,
under official Soviet administrative rules any currency was permanently confiscated by the State within six months of his death. If Raoul
Wallenberg indeed died in 1947, why then was the currency not confiscated?
If, on the other hand, Soviet authorities in 1989 did not return the original bills taken from Raoul Wallenberg, but simply issued authentic World
War II bills - from their vast holdings - to reimburse Wallenberg's family, then the question arises how they knew what amount they should
return. A receipt stating the precise amount taken from Raoul Wallenberg when he arrived in prison should have been kept as part of his prisoner
file. Therefore, this raises the question whether in 1989 Soviet officials did not in fact take the information directly from Wallenberg's file.252
Critical records of Wallenberg's fellow prisoners that have so far not been shown to researchers also appear to exist. In a new
documentary on the Wallenberg case former Soviet Intelligence official Igor Prelin on several occasions cites information which
he claims come directly from the interrogations with Vilmos Langfelder. According to Prelin, Langfelder made potentially
compromising statements concerning Raoul Wallenberg's activities in Budapest:
"Together with Wallenberg his driver, Vilmos Langfelder, was arrested. He was also
questioned, he told us where they drove together and what they were interested in. And he said
that in the actions of Wallenberg there were moments which, as you would say, fell outside the
framework of his regular duties as a representative of the Red Cross or as a diplomat. That is
he did not concern himself only with matters which dealt exclusively with Jewish rescue. He
[Langfelder] told us many interesting things."253
Prelin also claims that according to existing documentation in Russian prison archives, Raoul Wallenberg was called to
interrogation the day before his supposed death on 17 July, 1947. No such documentation - if it indeed exists - was shared with
Swedish representative during the official ten year investigation of the Wallenberg case. 254
There are plenty of other indications that at least some relevant documentation survives. Declassification of official secrets in
Russia is, by Russian archivists'own admission, in a deplorable state. 255 Anatoly Prokopienko, former head of the Special
Archives, has repeatedly gone on record to say that the current failure to solve the Wallenberg case is due to a lack of political
will, not lack of documentation 256 Other leading experts, like Nikita Petrov of 'Memorial', agree with this assessment.257 It is
251see UD, P2 EU I, RWD, Memo to the Swedish-Russian Working Group Vadim Birstein and Arseny Roginsky. 28 March, 1991; and Mesinai.
2001. Liquidatsia. Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic passport should have been kept in an envelope attached to his personal file. Addressbooks
were in some instances kept as part of the investigative file.
252see SWR, p. 324, Appendix 44, excerpt from Susan Mesinai's report "Strict Isolation and the numbering of prisoners."
253Klaus Dexel, Bechert & Dexel Gmbh, 2004. Interview with Igor Prelin,
254Prelin's statement have proven to be of questionable validity at times. However, the matter deserves to be thoroughly checked.
255Mikhail Prozymenschikov. 2004. "Declassifying Soviet Archives." RIA Novosti, 2 February.
256see for example Anatoly Prokopienko. Izvestia, 25 September, 1997. Systematic document destruction in the Raoul Wallengberg case
appears to have taken place, especially in the 1950's . See Rydeberg, 2001. However, most experts, including the late Andrey Sakharov, argue
that the critical information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate was almost certainly preserved.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 53
clear that all critical decisions concerning important foreign prisoners were not made by Stalin alone but were a matter of approval
in some form for the Politburo. According to Petrov, Abakumov should have formally reported to Stalin about his actions
concerning Raoul Wallenberg and such a report should have been given in writing. 258
In his memoirs Vadim Bakatin who headed the KGB for four short months in 1991, expresses his surprise how many Politburo
decisions were taken in the Wallenberg case in later years and how little documentation was found which would explains the
genesis of these decisions. 259 It is precisely this type of documentation which currently remains inaccessible. Ocobye Papki, the
special papers of the Instantsi, i.e. the Central Committee and the Politburo [especially for the years 1946/47] - open only up to
1934; Stalin's personal papers - only partially released; records of Foreign and Military Intelligence - most have remained
completely closed. 260 In addition, no access currently exists to critical correspondence records of MGB/KGB with the Soviet
leadership, records of the Soviet rezidentura' in Stockholm for pertinent years, records of the Soviet side of the Allied Control
Council, Hungary or Rumania and its communications with Moscow - the list goes on.
That highly relevant information existed at least into the mid-1950's is made clear by a remarkable document from the Russian
Foreign Ministry collection. The document refers to a letter from a man called "Shiryagin" who apparently in April 1956
possessed important information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the letter
significant enough to forward it to the Committee of State Security [KGB] with the following comment and a direct request to
silence Shiryagin:
"The Foreign Ministry received a letter written probably by I.S. Shiryagin who lives in the
village of Vodenino, Charkov region,which contains some information about the Swedish
diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. Probably Comrade Shiryagin, having a sincere motive to help
search for Wallenberg, will reveal the content of his letters to other people and finally the
Swedish Embassy would hear about the matter. Probably you will come to the conclusion that
it will be necessary to advise Shiryagin - in a very careful manner - through your channels not
to spread the news about Wallenberg." 261
It should also be noted that it is almost impossible for a prisoner to be lost in the Soviet system, at least not for extended periods of
time. A special Commission after Stalin's death, headed by Anastas Mikoyan, made a thorough appraisal of all prisoners in Soviet
prisons and camps, foreigners and secret prisoners included. MVD [Ministry of Interior] headquarters in Moscow also conducted
strict regular inspections and reviews of all facilities, especially of those prison and camp departments which dealt with secret
documentation and/or prisoners. This took place in close cooperation with MGB/KGB which oversaw a number of special prisons
and camps. 262
e. A possible watershed
A rather interesting exchange between an unidentified Russian journalist and Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov, head
of the FSB archives, during the presentation of the Russian Working Group Report at a press conference in Moscow on 16
257Memorial' is the leading Human Rights Group in Russia concerned with chronicling the fates of millions of citizens who perished in Soviet
camps and prisons.
258Bob Kimmel [Producer]. 2001. Searching for Raoul Wallenberg. Intrepid Documentaries. Interview with Nikita Petrov.
259Bakatin, p 188,"Sixteen Politburo decisions for approval of the Wallenberg notes between 1952 and 1986! That I had not expected." These
included the Svartz-Myasnikov discussions from 1961-1965 which were presented for Central Committee and Politburo review. Only a few
papers about this issue have been recovered so far.
260No representative of SVR, Russian Foreign Intelligence, was a member of the Swedish-Russian Working Group.
261MID, Raoul Wallenberg File, Gribanov to KGB, 13 April, 1956. Neither Shiryagin's original letter nor any other follow up documentation is
supposedly available in the archives of the former KGB. It is not clear whether or not Shiryagin's information did indeed pertain to Raoul
Wallenberg or to which time Shiryagin's information refers, before or after 1947.
262GARF, Fond 9414, opis 3366, Files of the Control and Inspection Department of the Gulag. MVD SSSR.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 54
January, 2001 provides a strong hint that officials know more than they have said and that there may be strong internal factors at
play which have so far prevented a full disclosure of Raoul Wallenberg's fate:
Question: It is common knowledge that the Soviet leadership distorted the truth intentionally. ... When did it happen that the Soviet
or Russian leadership decided sincerely to find out the truth? Was is it in 1985 or 1989?263
Vinogradov: It's an interesting question, but you should address it to the government. You always put me in a tight spot. I have to
express my position as a citizen. ...
Question: I am asking your personal opinion
Vinogradov: ... You know that there are always secrets in a family. Some things can be said, and some cannot be said. When we
read the cases, I wish I never read them. These are rather moral and ethical questions. But sometimes they go beyond political
considerations, like, for example Russian-Swedish relations. ... "264
If former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, intentionally misrepresented the truth in 1989 - when he invited Raoul
Wallenberg's immediate family to Moscow where they were presented with his personal belongings - then President Putin could
be placed in the unenviable position of exposing a number of former Soviet officials such as Gorbachev or people like former
Soviet Premier and Head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, to public embarrassment. 265 In the case of Gorbachev and others it could
even lead to possible legal prosecution - however theoretical that possibility may be. In a certain sense, Gorbachev's half-truths
may have complicated Putin's position considerably. The arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in London some
years ago has significantly and permanently changed the legal landscape in international human rights cases.266 So has the issue of
government compensation for victims of slave labor in Nazi Germany. It is clear that the concept of restitution can be transferred
to Russia. In more than one sense, the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's fate could prove to be a watershed event for Russia. Putin
so far has not touched the issue of Soviet era crimes. He has publicly condemned them, yet one of Putin's first acts after he came
to power was to lay a wreath at Yuri Andropov's grave. 267 The symbolic meaning of that gesture was understood by every
Russian watching on TV.
IV. DEEPER PROBLEMS
1. The Limits of the Eliasson Report
a. Question of motives and limited areas of inquiry
The Eliasson report states that due to time restrictions it had to leave out of its evaluation five relevant areas of inquiry, among
them important questions about Raoul Wallenberg's activities in Budapest, those of the Swedish Legation, Swedish handling of
witness testimonies in the case, as well as the fate of other Swedish citizens in Soviet captivity. 268 The report provides some
indication that the activities of the Swedish Legation - especially its representation of various foreign interests, its secret support of
Allied Intelligence and unresolved questions about unofficial contacts with Hungarian and German Nazi authorities - and the
2631985 marked the beginning of 'Perestroika', 1989 the return of Raoul Wallenberg's personal belongings.
264Press conference with Federal Security Service Official Vladimir Vinogradov on Raoul Wallenberg." RIA Novosti. 16 January, 2001
265President Gorbachev did not meet Raoul Wallenberg's family personally, but delivered his message through the chief archivist, Rudolf
Pikhoya.
266The British Magistrate Ronald Bartle announced his ruling concerning Spain's request for extradition of General Pinochet with the words
"There will be one law for one world." London, 8 October, 1999.
267Arkady Ostrovsky. "Inside the Kremlin: Russia still has the attributes of a democracy but, managed by the Siloviki, this could become
illusory." The Financial Times, 24 February, 2004.
268ECR, p. 64
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 55
Swedish Red Cross especially deserve closer scrutiny. 269 The release of excerpts from the interrogation protocols of Hermann
Grosheim-Krisko, a German/Russian businessman of dubious reputation, in 1991 offered confirmation that the Soviets suspected
the Swedish Legation personnel of both pro Nazi and anti-Soviet activities. 270
Newly discovered documentation raises questions about the work as well as the attitude of the Swedish Legation personnel and
the strains that this may have caused among the staff. 271 According to numerous witnesses, tensions between Valdemar Langlet,
the official Swedish Red Cross representative, and Wallenberg ran especially high. The two repeatedly clashed over funding and
competency issues. This notion is confirmed by a memorandum from 1962, which recounts a conversation between Swedish
professor Nanna Svartz and Hungarian physician Professor Ruszniak [sic]. Svartz writes that Ruszniak had known Wallenberg
personally and that he, according to his account, had had frequent contact with him in 1944. Svartz reports that according to
Ruzniak it was well known that in his own Legation
"Wallenberg faced great difficulties from different quarters ... especially from Valdemar
Langlet." 272
Of considerable importance is the question of why Swedish officials never formally debriefed the returning Swedish Legation and
Red Cross members. Interestingly enough, the Soviet protocols of interrogations conducted with the Swedish Legation staff in
Hungary and Rumania also have never been presented. It would be of some interest to know how exactly Wallenberg's colleagues
portrayed his activities for the Russians.273 Another intriguing question is why Lars Berg was allowed to leave when he, like
Raoul Wallenberg, was clearly suspected of collaboration with the Germans. 274
Important questions also remain concerning the issue of Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic status. What exactly was his status in the
eyes of both the Swedish and Soviet governments, specifically at the time of Wallenberg's arrest in January 1945? Inexplicably,
the Swedish Minister Ivar Danielsson handed over official authority to Mikhail Kutusov-Tolstoy, making him, a foreigner' [a
269Some of these questions are touched upon in Lajos, 2004. Lajos, however, emphasizes the socio-political aspects of Jewish rescue in
Budapest. He does not cover in depth the actions or contacts of particular individuals other than Raoul Wallenberg, both in terms of rescue
work as well as the numerous intelligence interests that existed in 1944 Hungary. His essay also does not address any economic issues, including
questions related to business or economic warfare.
270FSB, Interrogation protocol of Grosheim-Krisko from 20 April, 1945, Grosheim-Krisko had worked in Hungary since 1941, including for the
German Economic Administration [Deutsche Wirtschaftsdienst]. Through the years he had had business contacts with several Swedish firms. He
obtained a position at the Swedish Legation, Budapest through the intervention of Nandor Batisfalvy, the Hungarian Police Chief in charge of
foreigners. Grosheim -Krisko was one of the many controversial figured who associated with Swedish Legation, Budapest.
271In several letters to the Swedish Minister in Rumania, Reuterswaerd, Valdemar Langlet strongly insinuates his criticism of the Swedish
Legations behavior during 1944 and the handling of issues such as the safekeeping of valuables on behalf of certain individuals. ECR, p. 266;
also P57, letter from 24, 28 March and 1 April, 1945 respectively. See also poem by Lars Berg from June 1945. The poem gives the strong
impression that the Legation had a fairly restrained involvement with Jewish rescue efforts. Wallenberg is pointed out as the being the only one
who is always running around and who does not take time out to relax.
272von Dardel, private collection. Report by Nanna Svartz, 1962. A Dr. Istvan Ruzniak, a physician working in Szeged who provided
information to Raoul Wallenberg, is mentioned by Levai, p.267.
273ibid. Especially after they had heard the Kossuth Radio report on March 8, 1945 which stated that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered by on
the way to Debrecen. The member of the Swedish Legation, Budapest also had access to Langlet's letters to Reuterswaerd in Bukarest, in
which he speculates about Raoul Wallenberg possible death.
Questions remain also about the role of Edvard Engestroem who had been accused of reporting the activities of the Swedish Legation to German
and Hungarian Nazi officials. Engestroem was later detained by the Russians, but was quickly released,. His is file at SAEPO raises questions
about his possible role as a Soviet informer. Interestingly, U.S. archival records indicate that Engestroem received a payment of $1666 from the
U.S., as discussed with Count Bonde of the Swedish Legation, in 1946. NARA, RG 56, State Department, Special Projects Division. 14 January,
1946. Another entry from September 1945 discusses transfer of relief funds for Swedish subjects, so Engestroem may have been the recipient in
this connection.
274According to Sudoplatov, representatives of Soviet Military Intelligence at the Hungarian front [Smersh] had received information that Raoul
Wallenberg was "an established asset of German, American and British Intelligence." Sudoplatov, p. 268
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 56
White-Russian national], and not Raoul Wallenberg the official Swedish representative in Pest. To make matters worse, even
though Raoul Wallenberg apparently had explicitly requested permission from his superior Danielsson to contact the Russian
troops in Pest, Danielsson claimed as early as April 1945 that Wallenberg had left without seeking prior authorization for such a
contact.275
Raoul Wallenberg had been included in the official list handed over by Staffan Soederblom to Soviet authorities in December
1944, requesting Soviet protection of official Swedish Legation Staff. And when Danielsson authorized Wallenberg to contact
Soviet troops he obviously asked him to do so in official [Swedish] capacity. Yet in the aftermath of Wallenberg's disappearance
Danielsson repeatedly went out of his way to stress that Wallenberg had not been official Swedish Charge d'Affaire when the
Soviets marched in to Budapest, clearly 276 So, precisely at the most critical time, Raoul Wallenberg's status was left completely
undefined. Goeran Rydeberg goes so far to say that this uncertainty, both about Wallenberg's original responsibility or authority
and the work that had been carried out, as well the lack of coordination with the rest of the Swedish Legation and with the
authorities in Stockholm, now in January 1945 left the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest open to "blackmail."277 If
there were fears of Soviet aggression, Rydeberg writes, it would conceivably have led to a wish to distance the Swedish personnel
from Wallenberg's activities.
Oddly enough, it was Staffan Soederblom who in the first weeks after Wallenberg's disappearance not only recognized the danger
of Wallenberg's situation but who urged the Swedish Foreign Office to take action on his behalf. 278 The tone of his early
communications with Stockholm is businesslike and shows traces of true concern. February 8, 1945:
"Question whether Wallenberg .. - who is registered as Secretary of Legation ... ought to
get instructions concerning his status."
And later:
"My thought .... was that Wallenberg is instructed to take up contact with the new Hungarian
government ... in his capacity as official representative... Some information of this kind seems
even more suitable since Wallenberg probably has not gotten the least sign of life from home."
279
Soederblom's attitude toward Wallenberg, however, undergoes a visibly strong shift one day after his meeting with Ivar
Danielsson and the other members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest on April 13, 1945 in Moscow. Whereas before
Soederblom's tone had been sober
- "Wallenberg disappeared since January 17 when he intended to depart by car "- ,
on April 14, he now suddenly claims that
"Wallenberg snuck on his own initiative over to the Russian lines,"
implying strong personal disapproval and even inappropriateness of Wallenberg's behavior.
Why such sudden hostility towards Wallenberg? Why did Danielsson portray Wallenberg's behavior in such a negative light, since
he himself had given Wallenberg permission to contact the Russian troops? And why was this impression never corrected once the
275In addition, Wallenberg's diplomatic passport which was due to expire on 31 December, 1944 had been only haphazardly extended by Per
Anger with a simple handwritten note. Wallenberg also had been issued a regular Swedish passport before his departure to Budapest [Nr. 1044,
issued on 14 June, 1944] This passport was not returned by the Russian side in 1989.
276UD, P2 Eu 1, Telegram Celsing to Stockholm, 19 November 1946.
277Rydeberg, p. 78
278see von Dardel. 1997
279UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD
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members of the Swedish Legation returned home to Sweden? 280
Other important questions remain. One day after the Soviet controlled Hungarian radio had announced on March 8, 1945 that
Raoul Wallenberg had been killed on his way to Debrecen, Ivar Danielsson on 9 March requested a meeting with the highest
Soviet representative in Hungary, General Pavlov to discuss issues concerning the conduct of the Swedish Legation during the
previous months. 281 No records of these discussions have been made available. On that same day, Margareta Bauer prepared a
formal statement concerning the handling of Russian records at the Swedish Legation, Budapest. 282 The issue appears to have
been of some concern.
During the half-day stay in Moscow on 13 April, 1945, Danielsson and Soederblom conferred for some time in private. Topics
covered, among other things, were the violence and destructive behavior of the Soviet occupation troops, the work of the Swedish
Red Cross [and the problem of Valdemar Langlet's activities], the interests of Swedish businesses, Raoul Wallenberg's activities
and disappearance, as well as the issue of valuables the Swedish Legation had stored on prominent Hungarians' behalf. This last
point in particular Soederblom stresses repeatedly and he also several time emphatically urges Stockholm
"to thoroughly analyze all information the Swedish Legation members have available."
before he takes further steps with Soviet authorities. 283
In an interview Per Anger recalls that a visibly agitated Soederblom, with a reference to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic
countries, admonished him
"Remember, when you get home to Sweden, not a bad word about the Russians." 284
When Soederblom returned to Stockholm for consultations in November 1945, neither he nor Ivar Danielsson met with Raoul
Wallenberg's parents Maj and Fredrik von Dardel, despite their repeated requests. Soederblom made it clear that his conclusion
that Raoul Wallenberg had died was based on information he had received from the returning members of the Swedish Legation,
Budapest. 285
The issue of what exactly transpired in Budapest, during and immediately after the humanitarian mission, the personal attitude of
the Swedish Legation members towards Raoul Wallenberg and the information they provided to the Russians need to be examined
in depth. Equally critical is it to determine the possible motives behind the Swedish government's inclination to accept Raoul
Wallenberg's death and who or what considerations may have influenced that decision. Even when word came in the fall of 1945
from a well-placed Hungarian source - the Hungarian National Bank President Takaczy who served at the will of the Soviet
occupation power - that Wallenberg had been arrested by Soviet forces, the Foreign Office apparently already had accepted the
inevitability of Wallenberg's demise and conveyed this conviction to U.S. officials. The last line of a telegram from the State
Department, addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and signed by the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, explains
that
"the [Swedish] FONOFF [Foreign Office] feels that even if the info is true [about
280The impression lingers to this day. The Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group even makes the point in its report of January
2001. Per Anger does mention Wallenberg's request for permission in his book Med Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest, published in 1979.
281See Stefan Lindgren. 1994. "Doeljer Sverige medvetet sanningen om Raoul Wlalenbergs oede?" Sveriges Radio. 3 October.
282UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD. Statement signed by Margareta Bauer. 9 March, 1945. In a joint statement written after the war Per Anger and Ivar
Danielsson reported that General Pavlov had informed them that he had received orders from Moscow to take charge of the members of the
Swedish Legation, Budapest and to send them home via Bukarest and Moscow. No documentation concerning Pavlov's alleged orders or his
conversation with Danielsson has been released from Russian archives.
283UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Soederblom, 17, April 1945.
284Per Anger. 1985. With Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. Holocaust Library. p. 132; see also Bob Kimmel [Producer]. 2001. Searching for
Raoul Wallenberg. Intrepid Documentaries. Interview with Per Anger.
285UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Soederblom to the Foreign Office, 18 December, 1945
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 58
Wallenberg's arrest], the Soviets will never produce Wallenberg alive."286
Aside from the understandable limitations of the scope of its research and for all its detail, the Eliasson Report is quiet on several
other critical points. One is not only the possible motives behind Swedish behavior, but also the larger implications of this
behavior. For example, one should ask what the consequences for the Raoul Wallenberg case would have been, if certain highranking
members of the Foreign Office sympathized with the Soviet Union, or perhaps even did the Soviets' bidding. Surely,
there would have been very little incentive to drive the search for Raoul Wallenberg energetically. What about the curious
passivity of the Wallenberg family? Did it set the tone for UD's actions in the case? And what would Raoul Wallenberg have
reported on his return to Sweden? That the Russians had ample reasons to be concerned about releasing Wallenberg is clear, but
were there also problematic issues resulting from Swedish activities - such as Wallenberg business, for example, or the activities
of the Swedish Legation/Red Cross in terms of representation of foreign interests and/or ties to various intelligence circles - that
can account for the general lack of enthusiasm in Sweden to actively pursue his return?
b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context
Closely related to this is the second problem: The Commission Report evaluates the Wallenberg case primarily against the larger
background of Swedish-Soviet relations, meaning Sweden's general security and economic policy considerations of the Cold War
period.287 The Eliasson Report, however does not focus on the ebb and flow of events within this larger framework or how specific
events affected the handling of Wallenberg case as such. This is a critical omission, since the Wallenberg case - as the Commission
recognizes but does not outline in detail - did not take place in isolation. Two main aspects characterized Sweden's behavior: Fear
of its neighbor to the East and need for accommodation. These were met by a policy that combined a strategy of deterrence - by
making it clear that in case of an attack Sweden would hold out long enough until it received help from Western powers - and
"bridge building" between the superpowers, which later turned into a policy of assuring the Soviet Union of Sweden's
commitment to neutrality. 288 By focusing purely on the larger picture, however, the Eliasson Commission neglects the subtlety of
the situation.
A mere month after the Gromyko memorandum, on 5 March, 1957 came the formal Soviet complaint over years of Swedish
espionage [in conjunction with American and British efforts] in the Baltic countries. Despite its clear guilt, Sweden denied all
knowledge. 289 Aside from the obvious intention of wishing to discredit Sweden, the timing of the revelation that the Soviets had
penetrated the Allied/Swedish network for the past seven years raised several questions. Rolf Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador
in Moscow suggested that "as odd as it may appear" there were in fact signs that the Soviet action
"was designed as a gesture to Sweden to improve relations." 290
In light of a number of internal and external pressures, like the worldwide condemnation the Soviets had received for the brutal
squashing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, there were strong signs that overall Soviet policy was designed to reach out to
286NARA, RG 59. Records of the U.S. Special War Problems Office. 20 September, 1945. It has not been possible to trace the source of this
comment on the Swedish side. The last line of the telegram is crossed out and a handwritten note states that "Mr. Clattenberg agreed to
omission." Clattenberg was then the head of the Special War Problems Office, which dealt with a variety of issues arising from the war,
including refugees and the tracing of lost diplomatic personnel. No additional material concerning the Wallenberg case has been found among
the records of this collection. The Special War Problems Office served as a type of liaison to the FBI and OSS/CIA.
287The Eliasson Commission commissioned three background studies on Soviet-Swedish relations which formed the basis of its analysis: Olof
Kronvall. Oesten Undens sovjetsyn och sovjetpolitik 1945-1962; Magnus Petterson. Svensk-sovjetiska saekerhetspolitiska relationer 1945-1960;
and Professor Kent Zetterberg. Oesten Undens syn pa det internationella systemet och den internationella politiken 1919-1965. The Commission
Report, however, does not relate the Raoul Wallenberg case to other specific events in those critical years
288In his analysis Petersson recognizes four distinct phases for Swedish-Soviet relations until 1960: 1945-1947: Relations were relatively good;
1948-1953 increasing tensions; 1954-1956 lessening of tensions; 1957-1960 relations again more tense.
289Kadhammar, p. 152-3. [Det aer med uppriktig foervaning ...Noten innehaller en rad orimliga pastaenden och beskyllningar ... faller pas sin
egen orimlighet svenska myndigheter star helt fraemmande foer varje slags agentverksamhet i spionagesyfte pas sovjetryskt territorium ...]
290UD, HP 1 Eu, P.M. by Rolf Sohlman, March 8, 1957 and Sohlman to Unden March 12, 1957.
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Sweden in the hope that it would continue its official Neutrality Policy. 291
Leaving aside for a moment the question whether or not Sohlman's assessment of the Soviet action is valid, it is clear that both
Sohlman and Unden at this moment define Raoul Wallenberg and the other arrested Swedish agents as the cost Sweden has to
incur for detente and not as the price it could possibly exact from the Soviets in return for Swedish assurances of continued
adherence to its Neutrality position. 292
In this connection, Soviet attempts from 1956-57 to conduct unofficial talks in the Raoul Wallenberg case between the Finnish
diplomat Ake Frey and Soviet official Pavel Erzine and later Viktor Vladimirov also deserve further scrutiny.293 During these
discussions the Swedes not only for the first time received Soviet confirmation [although unofficially] that Wallenberg had
indeed been held prisoner in the Soviet Union, they also received a hint that Wallenberg's background was of some interest to the
Russians. On 20 December, 1956, towards the end of a two-year exchange, Vladimirov asks Ake Frey whether it would be
possible to discuss "off the record" a Russian draft answer before the Soviets present the official answer in the Wallenberg case.
Vladimirov adds somewhat cryptically that
"humanitarian aspects do not have much meaning in Moscow."
That Wallenberg belonged to a well known family was "more to the point." 294
However, on 18 January, 1957 the head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Political Department at the time, Sverker Astroem,
informs Frey that from the Swedish side it would hardly be possible to conduct secret discussions. 295 Eighteen days later, on 6
February, 1957, the Soviets Deputy Foreign Minister presents the Soviet claim that Wallenberg had died in 1947.
Some years later Ake Frey explained that in his mind the negotiations in 1955-57 had been serious but that the Chief of the
Political Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Enckell, had suddenly ordered him to break off contact.296 Enckell
apparently acted in close coordination with the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Frey-Vladimirov contacts were conducted parallel
to official preparations of the Gromyko memorandum. In an interview with the Swedish-Russian Working Group Viktor
Vladimirov explained that the Soviet leadership wanted to find out exactly what information the Swedish government possessed in
1956.297
291He pointed out that Sweden had not been singled out for public criticism in either of the main Soviet newspapers, Izvestia or Pravda and that
the general tone of the Soviet protest had been exceedingly polite. Another indication is that Bulganin and Khrushchev through intermediaries
expressed the wish to be invited to Sweden for an official visit. They were told this would be impossible in light of recent events in Hungary. see
UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, P.M. from 2 July, 1957, Sven Fredrik Hedin reports about his discussion with Soviet official at the Soviet Embassy in
Stockholm, Slabov.
292In his memorandum Sohlman expresses no concern for the fate of the fourteen men who were arrested seven years earlier, nor does he raise
the question of how Sweden might obtain their release. On the importance of the timing of the Gromyko memorandum in light of events in
Hungary in 1956 see Barany, 1997. There is also no indication that Sohlman or Unden were considering taking advantage of the arrest in August
1956 - a few months after Prime Minister Tage Erlander's formal visit to Moscow - of Russian spy Anatole Ericsson, who had been charged with
stealing radar secrets from L.M. Ericsson. Ericsson was quickly sentenced to twelve years hard labor in October 1956.
293For a more detailed account see Berger, 2001.
294Records about the Vladimirov-Frey discussions are not accessible in Russian archives. These were highlevel exchanges: Pavel Erzine's
superior, the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Boris Podtserob, was for years Head of Vyatcheslav Molotov's Secretariat, including for the
critical years of the Raoul Wallenberg case, 1946/47; Pavel Erzine was the Chief KGB Rezident' in Turkey and later President of Patrick
Lumumba University in Moscow.
295UD, P2 EU1, RWD, P.M. signed by Sverker Astroem. 18 January, 1957.
296UD, P2 EU 1, RWD, handwritten P.M. by Sten Aminoff, 30 September, 1964. Frey further claimed that his career was ruined as a result of
his involvement in the negotiations.
297According to Victor Vladimirov, the Swedish/Finnish contacts had been ordered directly by Ivan Serov, the head of the KGB. Sudoplatov
[Russian edition], p. 651-653. The Soviets should have actually had a reasonably good idea about Swedish state of knowledge in the Raoul
Wallenberg case, through Swedish press accounts, formal and informal contacts in Sweden, etc. Experts generally agree that at the very least
Molotov and Serov knew the truth about Wallenberg's fate. Sudoplatov claims that the true purpose of Vladimirov's mission was to reestablish
contacts with the Wallenberg family. He also states that "Vladimirov had information that the Wallenberg family was definitely interested in
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 60
If Molotov and Serov had clear information about Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947, such efforts would seem somewhat
excessive, especially since the Soviet side should have had a fairly clear idea about the state of Swedish knowledge in the
Wallenberg affair from a variety of sources. It is possible that the discussions with Sweden served purely as a distraction and delay
tactic before the official Soviet response was to be presented.298 Ake Frey repeatedly reported his impression that at the time of the
discussions Raoul Wallenberg appeared to be dead. Nevertheless, it should be of some interest to determine how much the
Gromyko Memorandum is a reflection of the failure of these Russian contacts. In other words, it will have to be determined if it
would have been possible to gain further concessions from the Russians in light of their wish for improved relations with Sweden
than were reached during those years.
Instead of pursuing the problem from all possible angles, Swedish officials slowly stripped the Raoul Wallenberg case of all
relevant complexities and interrelated aspects. In fact, Sweden chose to handle all major Cold War cases - such as the
disappearance of a DC-3 spy plane with a eight-men crew in 1952 over the Baltic Sea or the arrest as a Russian spy of Swedish
Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem in 1963 - in perfect isolation from each other. Stig Wennerstroem operated as a Russian
agent for almost two decades and he apparently did not act alone. 299His betrayal of the DC-3 cost the lives of eight men, yet he has
been allowed to live out his life in comfort and security in his own country. If he had help, as has been alleged, those who
supported him were most likely just as well positioned in Swedish society as Wennerstroem himself. The full impact of his
activities and those of his potential helpers on the Swedish government's handling of various Cold War issues remains essentially
unexplored. 300
The important question is: Were these cases handled separately to increase chances of a resolution or mainly to prevent "cross
contamination," to avoid one issue dredging up related problems in another case? Even when the Russians tried to link them, as
happened on at least one occasion in the Wallenberg and Wennerstroem case, Swedish officials did not react.
c. Focus only on early years
The third problem is that, as already mentioned earlier, the Eliasson Report focuses on the early events in the Raoul Wallenberg
case. It is vital that the behavior in later years be subjected to the same scrutiny. It has to be determined how detrimental Swedish
Minister Staffan Soederblom's behavior in 1945/46 really was. In other words, one cannot simply assume that there was no chance
to rescue Raoul Wallenberg after 1947. The question posed by the Eliasson Commission for the time 1945-47 - What did Swedish
officials really know and when did they know it? - is just as relevant for the following decades.301 Were Swedish officials truly
safeguarding "a higher good" [viktigare vaerden], that is the national security of the many, as Oesten Unden claimed in 1957, or
were they primarily protecting the special interests of a few? Why, for example, are there essentially no records from the Swedish
Foreign Intelligence Service in this case? Even if it was beyond its scope to provide operational advice or intelligence, one would
expect it to have provided some type of evaluation in the question. If not, then this lack of referral or exchange between Swedish
agencies raises questions about how seriously the case was pursued in later years.
sabotaging any discussion of Raoul Wallenberg's mission in Hungary." Sudoplatov's statements have proved false or questionable on a number
of issues and have to be considered with greatest caution. No records concerning Vladimirov's contacts with Ake Frey have so far been released
from Russian Intelligence Archives.
298Soviet records from the period show that the Soviet leadership already in the spring of 1956 had decided to delay its answer to Sweden at least
until after Swedish parliamentary election in the Fall of 1956, apparently for tactical consideration. According to Aminoff's P.M. from 1964 Frey
stated that the Soviets appeared to not possess information about Wallenberg's fate after a certain point in time.
299Tore Forsberg, a former Swedish Security Police official, questions Anders Sundelin's theory that Stig Wennerstroem was helped by
unidentified accomplices. However, most analysts argue that the issue remains open. see Forsberg, 2003.
300Sweden also may have had one spy operating in Russia, aside from agents infiltrating the Baltic states. Isaac Markovich Wolfin, was an
employee of the Soviet Legation, Stockholm in the early 1940's and later served as a Swedish language instructor at a GRU [military
intelligence] School. He was arrested in the fall of 1946, on charges of espionage. His prisoner registration card carries the notation "Swedish
spy". Wolfin appears to have agreed to cooperate and seems to have functioned as a cell spy. [see Makinen/Kaplan, 2001]
301So is the state of knowledge in other countries, like the U.S. and Britain.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 61
An archivist once told me that
"the problem with the Wallenberg case in Russia is that everything is closed; and in Sweden,
that everything is open."
He was making an oblique reference to Sweden's principle of openness' [Offentlighetsprincipen] which makes it very difficult to
keep information secret by placing very severe restrictions on both the length of time and the reasons for which documents may be
classified. This has had the unintended effect that officials who may feel very strongly that certain documents should stay secret,
see no other option but to take them out of circulation. There are several instances, where former officials handed back
documentation they had removed from Swedish archives during their service. So, aside from unknown diaries and memoirs one
cannot discount that here and there additional information remains locked away in private attics or basements.
d. No systematic analysis
Out of this grows the fourth problem, namely that the Eliasson Commission does not thoroughly examine how much attitudes and
assumptions guided Swedish behavior, especially in later years. Many officials were inclined to believe and not afraid to say so in
private conversations that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947 and that any further search was futile. Most officials met the
continued insistence of Wallenberg's relatives to pursue the truth with thinly veiled impatience and downright irritation. Far
from a source of pride, for many officials the case became simply a cause for embarrassment. Quite a few let this personal belief
influence their official handling of the case. 302 This tendency was so strong that it persisted even when new information was
presented. As a result, important details were lost or simply ignored. Ambassador Krister Wickman's statement in 1972 in Vienna
summarized official UD policy for that time:
"For us, the Wallenberg case is a closed chapter." 303
Subconsciously or intentionally - nowhere did assumptions have such a devastating effect as in the handling of witness
testimonies. The report states that an effective system of evaluation for testimonies has been in place since 1951 [when Otto
Danielsson joined the case]. This is simply not true.304 One just has to read through the UD materials to ascertain that witness
interviews were far from uniform or systematic. Neither was analysis or follow-up of the gathered information. Instead both were
often haphazard and incomplete. There are countless examples of testimonies whose most critical points were not adequately
followed up despite compelling reasons to pursue the leads they provided.305 In many cases the witnesses themselves were
disparaged. It should be stressed that the problem was never with the rank and file. Many worked extremely hard for years to
record and pursue any trace of information about Raoul Wallenberg. The problem is that Sweden's present-day view and political
definition of the Raoul Wallenberg problem is in its essence not very different from Oesten Unden's definition of 1957. Another is
the Swedish Foreign Office's absolute determination to protect the country's carefully crafted image which officials fear might
suffer irreparable harm if certain facts came to light. 306
302As can be seen from the diary of Ulla Lindstroem, one of Undens closest associates, even in 1956 Unden did not believe that Raoul
Wallenberg had ever been held prisoner in the Soviet Union. SWR, p. 107 [Lindstroem's diary entry dates from 1 April, 1956, the time of Prime
Minister Erlander's official visit to the Soviet Union.]
303UD, HP1 G/Oesterrike, 14 January, 1971.
304There were occasional efforts to summarize and analyze accumulated material, i.e. Sjoeborg [1951] and Nystroem [1986], but this is not the
same as pursuing a continuous, systematic approach.
305For example, in the Svartz - Myasnikov question Swedish officials completely ignored the fact that a second physician - Professor Grigory
Danishevsky - had been present during parts of the meeting in 1961; no attempts to formally interview Carl Gustav Svingel were made until the
early 1990's; in 1984 Karoly Remenyi, a highranking Intelligence officer in AVO/AVH in the early 1950s, testified that his superior, Sandor
Rajnai had potentially important information in the Wallenberg case. Rajnai, a close associate of KGB Chief Yuri Andropov and by 1984 the
Hungarian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was never questioned. He died in 1994. Remenyi stated that from his contacts with Soviet advisors
he learned that Raoul Wallenberg was alive after 1947, but was presumed dead after 1954/55; in 2001 a witness reported quite detailed
information about a Swedish diplomat possibly having been held in a psychiatric facility in Barnaul during the 1970's. This information was not
followed up at all. Independent consultants to the Swedish-Russian Working Group did not have full or unhindered access to all witness
testimonies.
306A big factor also is the UD's deeply ingrained code of loyalty. Public criticism of UD officials is anathema and even internal disagreements
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 62
e. Consequences of the failure to conduct a systematic analysis
Most importantly, many officials failed to acknowledge the larger complexities of the problems posed by the Wallenberg inquiry.
Instead of systematically registering, analyzing and crosschecking all details, Swedish officials often handled each witness
testimony on its own terms. As a result, they routinely ignored statements which did not fit their expectations. For example, no less
than 38 individuals reported having contact or hearing of Raoul Wallenberg in Lubianka or Lefortovo prison in the years after
1947.307 Many of these testimonies were dismissed outright because it was assumed that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947 and
that the accounts echoed Wallenberg's earlier stay in these prisons. Or it was believed that the prisoner in question was simply
another Swede. There were in fact several hundred of them held captive in the Soviet Union through the years.
Not of all these men have been fully identified. In the case of Swedish espionage missions to the Baltic countries in the late 1940's
it is not known how many Swedes or individuals working in official Swedish capacity ended up in Soviet captivity. 308 Questions
also persist as to missing individuals from Swedish Red Cross or other missions in Eastern Europe after WWII. 309 For almost
sixty years the Swedish government has not had a comprehensive list/database of all Swedish citizens and other Scandinavians
held in Soviet captivity - it is finally now in the process of constructing one. 310
Swedish nationals were even reportedly held in Vladimir prison. A witness stated that in the early 1950's he met a Swedish man
named "Eriksson" who, together with two colleagues, had been officially associated with the Red Cross in Eastern Europe in the
mid 1940s. 311 A similar encounter with a "Swedish diplomat" arrested in Eastern Europe in 1945 was related by German prisoner
of war, Theodor von Dufving.312 Based on their very similar case profile, these men could have easily been mistaken for Raoul
Wallenberg throughout Soviet camps and prisons. Establishing their full identity and formal tracking when and where these men
were encountered, on the other hand, would have made the evaluation of witness testimonies and with that the whole Raoul
Wallenberg inquiry much more efficient. Instead, confusion was allowed to reign. What resulted was the wholesale dismissal of
testimonies as "unreliable" which might have yielded very useful information, if a larger framework of analysis had been
employed. 313
are to be avoided. As the former U.S. Ambassador to the United States, Jan Eliasson, recently put it in