24-08-2011, 04:12 AM
In Honolulu, (Camp Smith) a conference reportedly on Viet Nam policy begins at 8:00
AM, involving Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, Taylor, Felt and Harkins. There is no record of what
happens at this meeting. From 8:30 to 10:15, all conference members meet in the command center
to listen to presentations on Agenda Items A -- "Country Team Review of Situation" and B --
"Prospects and War Under the New Government." For these briefings, we have a record created
at CINPAC. After a short break, the principals, joined this time by McGeorge Bundy, McCone
and David Bell, retire to the executive conference room for another restricted session. There is
no record of what happens at this meeting either, which takes place form 10:35 to 12:00. While
this is going on, the rest of the conferees are broken down into four groups to carry out separate
discussions "of programs to produce recommendations to Principals." In effect, the topics of
discussion at this conference will be the same topics covered in LBJ's NSAM #273, dated
November 26 (four days after JFK's death in Texas) and will begin to totally reverse Kennedy's own
policy, as stated in the Taylor-McNamara report and in NSAM #263, Dated October 2, 1963. Of
this meeting, Fletcher Prouty writes: " How did it happen that the subject of discussion in Hawaii,
before JFK was killed, was a strange agenda that would not come up in the White House until after he had
been murdered? Who could have known, beforehand, that this new -- non-Kennedy -- agenda would be
needed in the White House because Kennedy would no longer be President?" "President Kennedy would
not have sent his cabinet to Hawaii to discuss that agenda. He had issued his own agenda for Vietnam on
October 11, 1963, and he had no reason to change it...... If JFK had no reason to send them to Hawaii, who
did, and why?" Whereas JFK had ordered, in NSAM #263 of October 11, 1963, the return of the
bulk of American personnel by the end of 1965, the November 20 agenda and an November 26
briefing will move in direct opposition to Kennedy's intentions and pave the way for the
enormous #288 of March 1964 which will complete the full turnabout.
http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v2n1/chrono1.pdf
AM, involving Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, Taylor, Felt and Harkins. There is no record of what
happens at this meeting. From 8:30 to 10:15, all conference members meet in the command center
to listen to presentations on Agenda Items A -- "Country Team Review of Situation" and B --
"Prospects and War Under the New Government." For these briefings, we have a record created
at CINPAC. After a short break, the principals, joined this time by McGeorge Bundy, McCone
and David Bell, retire to the executive conference room for another restricted session. There is
no record of what happens at this meeting either, which takes place form 10:35 to 12:00. While
this is going on, the rest of the conferees are broken down into four groups to carry out separate
discussions "of programs to produce recommendations to Principals." In effect, the topics of
discussion at this conference will be the same topics covered in LBJ's NSAM #273, dated
November 26 (four days after JFK's death in Texas) and will begin to totally reverse Kennedy's own
policy, as stated in the Taylor-McNamara report and in NSAM #263, Dated October 2, 1963. Of
this meeting, Fletcher Prouty writes: " How did it happen that the subject of discussion in Hawaii,
before JFK was killed, was a strange agenda that would not come up in the White House until after he had
been murdered? Who could have known, beforehand, that this new -- non-Kennedy -- agenda would be
needed in the White House because Kennedy would no longer be President?" "President Kennedy would
not have sent his cabinet to Hawaii to discuss that agenda. He had issued his own agenda for Vietnam on
October 11, 1963, and he had no reason to change it...... If JFK had no reason to send them to Hawaii, who
did, and why?" Whereas JFK had ordered, in NSAM #263 of October 11, 1963, the return of the
bulk of American personnel by the end of 1965, the November 20 agenda and an November 26
briefing will move in direct opposition to Kennedy's intentions and pave the way for the
enormous #288 of March 1964 which will complete the full turnabout.
http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v2n1/chrono1.pdf