JFK: What we know now that we didn't know then

[Gary Craig]

Well, when you are wrong, you are wrong. And both Adele and Coogan are wrong. LBJ was the guy who pressured JFK to come to Texas. He even told Henry Gonzales that he didn't want to make the trip, but that Lyndon was insisting. Connally was the one who, apparently faking a phone call to the White House, claimed that Kenny O'Donnell had approved the change of venue to the Trade Mart, even though the Secret Service felt it was less secure than The Women's Forum. I think those who want to get this straight ought to do more research, especially LBJ: MASTERMIND OF JFK'S ASSASSINATION.

"Connally was the one who, apparently faking a phone call to the White House, claimed that Kenny O'Donnell had approved the change of venue to the Trade Mart, even though the Secret Service felt it was less secure than The Women's Forum. I think those who want to get this straight ought to do more research, especially LBJ: MASTERMIND OF JFK'S ASSASSINATION."

Hmmmmmmmm

"Friday, 15 c. November 1963
A change in the route of Kennedy's Dallas motorcade is made by a person or persons unknown.

What was announced on this date was not a change in the motorcade route, but the site selected for the luncheon. There had been a feud
over which site to use, and selection of the Trade Mart was made by White House aide Ken O'Donnell, in consultation with Bill Moyers,
and was due to "unbearable" pressure from Connally to have the luncheon at the Trade Mart instead of the Women's Building.
Dallas SS agent in charge Forrest Sorrels then selected the Elm Street route as the "most direct" route to the Trade Mart, considering
the presence of a raised divider which would have to be driven over if Main Street were used to reach the expressway. Continuing down
Main to Industrial Boulevard was rejected, in consultation with Asst. Police Chief George Lumpkin, because of the undesirable neighborhood."

From HSCA v. 11:

(Advance man) Bruno's explanation of how the matter was finally resolved is found in his journal in the entries of November 14 and 15, 1963:
November 14-- The feud became so bitter that I went to the White House to ask Bill Moyers, then Deputy Director of the Peace Corps, and close
to both Connally and Johnson, if he would try to settle the dispute for the good of the President and his party. On this day, Kenney O'Donnell
decided that there was no other way but to go to the mart. November 15--The White House announced that the Trade Mart had been approved. I met
with O'Donnell and Moyers who said that Connally was unbearable and on the verge of cancelling the trip. They decided they had to let the
Governor have his way. (149) . . .

As the Dallas SAIC, Forrest Sorrels told the Warren Commission, he selected the Main-Houston-Elm turn through Dealey Plaza because it was
the "most direct" route to the Trade Mart. (189) Sorrels' questioning by Warren Commission staff counsel Samuel M. Stern, however, prevented
a total picture of motorcade route logistics from emerging. Stern asked Sorrels why the expressway was proached from the Elm Street ramp
instead of from Main Street just beyond the triple overpass at the westen boundary of Dealey Plaza. Sorrels explained that the size and
cumbersomeness of the motorcade, along with the presence of a raised divider separating the Elm Street lane from the Elm Street lane at
the foot of the ramp up to the expressway, deterred him from trying to route the motorcade under and through the overpass on Main Street.
Such a route would have assigned the drivers in the motorcade the almost impossible task of making a reverse S-turn in order to cross over
the raised divider to get from the Main Street lane into the Elm Street lane. (190) However, this question-and-answer process failed to make
clear that the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple overpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp
to the expressway. The motorcade could have progressed westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the overpass, and then
proceeded on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart. (191)
George L. Lumpkin, assistant police chief in Dallas in 1963, was consulted by the Secret Service about the motorcade aspect of security
planning. (192) Lumpkin explained that the alternate route, continuing straight on Main through and beyond Dealey Plaza and thereby reaching
the Trade Mart on Industrial Boulevard, was rejected because the neighborhood surrounding Industrial Boulevard was "filled with winos and
broken pavement." (193) Additionally, Lumpkin stated that Kennedy wanted exposure and that there would have been no crowds on Industrial Boulevard.
(194)
Advance Agent Lawson informed committee investigators that he had nothing to do with the selection of the Main-Houston-Elm turn before November
14, since only Main Street, not Dealey Plaza, had been selected for the motorcade at that time. He did not specify the exact date on which the
turn was selected nor did he identify the person selecting the turn.(195) Sorrels stated that he and Lawson did drive the entire route together,
but did not specify when this occurred. (196)
Sorrels' Warren Commission exhibit No. 4 suggested that both men drove the entire route on November 18. (197) It is not certain that both
men knew about the turn earlier than this date.