Met Police Agent Provocateurs

[Jan Klimkowski]

The IPCC press release can be seen here.

That page has a link to the full 25 page report, which I've just read.

Note that this was a strictly limited investigation of Nottinghamshire Police's behaviour. The terms of reference are narrow.

The key officers, some of whom have now retired and thus are no longer subject to police disciplinary action, gave highly legalistic and strictly constrained answers to key questions.

I further note that:

The DCI from the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), now known as the National Domestic Extremist Unit (NDEU), provided a report on his involvement with the UCO and the product provided. This DCI has now retired and will be referred to as the NPOIU DCI throughout.

The conclusions begin at page 22.


Here they are.

UCO stands for Undercover Officer, namely Mark Kennedy/Stone/Flash.

Conclusions
108. This investigation was tasked to ascertain if there was a failure to disclose relevant material to the CPS by Nottinghamshire Police prior to the trial of six alleged offenders. The investigation has found that a UCO had been authorised to participate in criminal activity, which included aggravated trespass. During the operation the UCO used an audio recording device and a transcript and statement detailing this was later produced. It is these items that are at the centre of this investigation.
109. In his report, Sir Christopher Rose stated that he had read all of the RIPA authorities and reviews completed by ACC Ackerley. He made no criticism of them and it is noted that Sir Christopher Rose is the Chief Surveillance Commissioner. Whilst the authorities have stood up to the scrutiny of Sir Christopher Rose, ACC Ackerley failed to brief Det Supt Pearson, the SIO, about the UCO and what he had been authorised to do. He relied on the NPOIU to do this, yet Det Supt Pearson was a member of Nottinghamshire Police. Had ACC Ackerley fully prepared and briefed Det Supt Pearson, this may have assisted Det Supt Pearson to have an early understanding of the potential difficulties of the case and in particular the status of the UCO.
110. The dissemination of the sensitive material from the NPOIU through to the police is best described as ad hoc. The officers from the NPOIU should be considered experts in their field of work, which includes UCOs and the material they produce. The transcript should have been fully explained to Nottinghamshire Police with regard to its evidential value, whether it went beyond the UCO use and conduct, or if there were any issues around the UCO potentially having acted as an agent provocateur. There is no evidence that
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this conversation took place.
111. The Disclosure Manual explains that in cases involving highly sensitive and CHIS material, the person holding the material, in this case the NPOIU, should prepare a highly sensitive schedule and make contact with the prosecutor. The material must be viewed by a unit head, special case lawyer or a delegated prosecutor. This did not occur in this case.
112. Mr Cunningham stated that from 27 April 2009 he was aware a UCO had been involved with the operation and was shown a single piece of paper which outlined the UCO's tasking and report. He stated it was not until the week commencing 24 January 2011 that he saw the statement and transcript. He accepted that he saw the authorisation document of the UCO and believed it to be in order, but stated he did not recall the section describing the parameters of what the UCO had been authorised to do. If he had inspected all of the authorisation documents in full he would have been aware of what the UCO was authorised to do.
113. Det Supt Pearson accepted that he did not give this investigation his full attention as he had additional SIO roles to deal with. However he was content that he shared the crucial elements of the covert product, namely the UCO statement and the transcript with the CPS.
114. Although there is an inconsistency of the date, Det Supt Pearson and DI Roberts state that between 15 May and 31 May 2009 they met with Mr Cunningham and provided him with the transcript. They both state that he read it and commented that it was a safety briefing.
115. Det Supt Pearson also stated that a meeting occurred on 15 May in which he became aware that Mr Cunningham was already aware of the UCO. Det Supt Pearson does not elaborate on how he became aware of this and he also suggested that it was during this meeting that Mr Cunningham was shown the draft statement. Nobody else recollected the meeting as described by Det Supt Pearson.
116. DI Roberts stated that following a briefing with the CPS on 16 June 2009 it was agreed that it would be beneficial for the Disclosure Officer to compile a
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collection of all documents relating to the UCO which could be looked at in isolation by the CPS so further guidance could be given. There is no evidence to suggest this occurred.
117. The NPOIU DCI stated he had a meeting on 15 September 2009 with Mr Cunningham and Mr Paul, during which the transcript and statement were discussed. Mr Cunningham was asked if he wished to retain them, but he declined stating he did not have adequate storage.
118. DI Roberts, Det Supt Pearson, the NPOIU DCI and Mr Matharu all state that they discussed the transcript that had been generated by the UCO with Mr Cunningham at various points throughout the investigation.
119. In addition, the email between Mr Cunningham and Mr Paul gives a clear indication that they were both aware the UCO had been a participating informant, and Mr Cunningham himself accepts that he was aware a statement had been produced but he stated he decided not to read it. Had he done so, this would have explained that the UCO had been authorised to use an audio recording device.
120. Whilst none of the police officers involved with the investigation adequately recorded the details of any meetings, on the balance of probabilities Mr Cunningham had at the very least been told about the products generated by the UCO and had been given opportunities to read them prior to 24 January 2011. However the investigation cannot prove what Mr Cunningham had sight of, nor what his understanding of the implications may have been, before 24 January 2011.
121. The investigation has been unable to identify a one page document referred to by Mr Cunningham and Ms Gerry.
122. Whilst the investigation has shown that the CPS, and particularly Mr Cunningham, appeared to have knowledge of the products generated by the UCO, there was a failing by the police to disclosure them separately on the relevant MG6 schedules.
123. Mr Matharu was inadequately skilled in dealing with sensitive information and
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intelligence within covert investigations, and made an incorrect assumption about the transcript he was provided with. As a result, he failed to record this appropriately on the MG6D schedule. However, despite this, Mr Cunningham accepted that he signed off a MG6D schedule without having read it.
124. The investigation concludes that the failures highlighted in this investigation were a collective failing by a number of parties and that the police individual actions do not amount to misconduct.
125. The review conducted by Sir Christopher Rose concluded that the disclosure issues discussed throughout this investigation did have a bearing on the collapse of the criminal proceedings against the six alleged offenders.

The IPCC has interpreted the evidence as cock up, rather than a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.

On the available evidence, which is far from complete and which has not been rigorously challenged and tested, I do not share the IPCC conclusions.