22-07-2012, 07:00 PM
http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/aurora-cinema-shooting
An excerpt shows the question is central, significant, and unanswered:
Batman Aurora Theater Shootings: Why did the cinema safety system fail?
Why did a cinema multiplex fire door allow access the wrong way? Why didn't the alarm go off when they were opened? How did four guns, and body armor end up accessible through that door? What happened to the manager checking the fire door when James Holmes left (with silent alarm triggered) and securing it? And why was the Cinemax not put into emergency evacuation' mode automatically with gas/smoke hitting detectors, the fire door triggering the silent alarm, and a manager hitting the evacuation button?
I don't know.
As one of the thousands of people who have worked large Cineplex movie houses, I cannot understand how so many things went wrong with the Cinema system to allow this event to occur. Even so far as to have someone in an adjoining theater to end up shot through the wall because the cinema was not evacuated.
Linda and I were both shocked and saddened to hear of the shooting. I was looking forward to the final Batman film by Nolan, like those attending the midnight Premier showing in Aurora, CO. According to the BBC, James Holmes exited the emergency exit, returned in bulletproof vest, body armor and gloves, a gas mask, with four guns and threw two tear gas grenades before he started shooting. 70 people were injured or killed, 12 died, 11 in critical condition. James Holmes was a Ph.D. candidate who, like many of the film goers to the Premier was dressed up, and told the police when arrested he was The Joker.' The shooting took place only 20 miles from the Famous Columbine School shooting.
I worked four to five years at a Multiplex of 12 screens during many big openings, including some of the Lord of the Rings and Star Wars. So having hundreds line up in costumes in advance is part of movie experience. My job, or specialization was in crowd control and movement during large events.
The Batman screening at the Aurora was in a 16 screen multiplex owned by Cinemax, the second largest cinema chain in the US (probably after ones owned by VIACOM who is part of the group which owns BlockBuster and Coka). My visit last week the Cineplex, and talking to staff showed me that the system from seven years ago is still in place, including the blue shirts' (managers). Part of staff training from day one is for an event just like the one which happened was, for everyone who worked at the multiplex where I was, a mandatory monthly requirement. And every six months full live' tests with schools of children bussed in to replicate a potential life threat to the 2,000+ people in the screen was conducted. If what the BBC reported happened, it could not have done so and wouldn't have done so at the Multiplex/Cineplex where I worked: so what happened here?
The reason there is a higher standard around the world for a Cinema/Theatre is because Cinema's have regular lethal starting with the death of over 600 at the Iroquois Theatre in 1903; then Laurier Theatre Fire in Montreal (77 dead), but occurring regularly around the world in 1955, 1960, 1977 (694 dead), 1978 (438 dead), 1983, 1997 and 1999 (75 dead). The danger of Cinema's was due to the extreme flammable nature of old film stock (now replaced with less flammable or digital). Then there is the use of large and complex projectors for 14 hours or more straight, which use oil and can get very hot, as well the number of people in a fixed location, like a concert or club where injury by trampling occurs. All these require high safety standards met by building design, door, alarm, dectors, and other inert safety measures and high levels of staff training.
Staff who work at a cinema, particularly a multiplex, should be aware, like those who work on a ship, that due to the history of disasters, they are the trained people who will ensure no one dies. After 9/11 we all knew that, like a Stadium, a cinema multiplex, with 2,000-4,000 people at capacity, is a target.
So: How did James Holmes leave the fire exit and return without the alarm going off?
Fire Exits are meant to do just that, help people exit in case of fire. At the start of every shift in a cinema, I or someone would have to radio to the central office that I was doing a fire exit' check. The alarm which would send the fire department was turned off, and I would check every single door at the start of the day, and again at the end of the day to make sure they were not blocked, and the walkway out was not blocked in any way. Then the alarm is turned back on. Where I worked there was a delay, to allow for a visual check before the signal went to the fire department.
Why?
Because with 12, or with Century Aurora, CO Cinemark 16 screens, there is no way to be able to tell if there is a fire, or other emergency simply by the working staff seeing it in time (staff are taking tickets, seating, cleaning screens, selling popcorn, selling tickets, cleaning toilets, etc). The opening of a fire door during a film is a signal to check out why, and quickly. [B]So with Associated Press saying that a Federal Law Enforcement Person told them James Holmes propped open a emergency exit side door during the movie, donned his protective gear and returned to the cinema screen to open fire with guns on the crowd. Again, why when the alarm went off in the office was no one sent to check on this fire door.[/B]
Yes, during the five years I worked at the multiplex/cineplex there were maybe hundreds of false alarms to check, over a dozen full evacuations and not one emergency involving loss of life. But that is the job. You check because without checking, and ensuring the door is tight, and that it can swing open for exit easily but cannot be opened the other direction, you are not ready for when trouble comes.
_____________________________
Phil's footnote:
A former employee of a comparable cinema complex describes a silent alarm with delay: step one: a silent notification to management; step two: alarm at fire department.
Is it likely that a global corporation runs theaters wherein exit doors can be opened and propped for unticketed entry without notifying management.
Those doors are specially marked and located next to the Free Popcorn machines.
And when we find that there WAS a silent alarm, and it was not noticed due to dereliction, the lawyers will begin to swarm in a National Geographic special narrated by the hushed British voice we've become accustomed to: ". . .beginning in wide, silent arcs, the massive lawyers circle the prey, gradually converging into a violent storm cloud of exploding pink blood. . ."
An excerpt shows the question is central, significant, and unanswered:
Batman Aurora Theater Shootings: Why did the cinema safety system fail?
Why did a cinema multiplex fire door allow access the wrong way? Why didn't the alarm go off when they were opened? How did four guns, and body armor end up accessible through that door? What happened to the manager checking the fire door when James Holmes left (with silent alarm triggered) and securing it? And why was the Cinemax not put into emergency evacuation' mode automatically with gas/smoke hitting detectors, the fire door triggering the silent alarm, and a manager hitting the evacuation button?
I don't know.
As one of the thousands of people who have worked large Cineplex movie houses, I cannot understand how so many things went wrong with the Cinema system to allow this event to occur. Even so far as to have someone in an adjoining theater to end up shot through the wall because the cinema was not evacuated.
Linda and I were both shocked and saddened to hear of the shooting. I was looking forward to the final Batman film by Nolan, like those attending the midnight Premier showing in Aurora, CO. According to the BBC, James Holmes exited the emergency exit, returned in bulletproof vest, body armor and gloves, a gas mask, with four guns and threw two tear gas grenades before he started shooting. 70 people were injured or killed, 12 died, 11 in critical condition. James Holmes was a Ph.D. candidate who, like many of the film goers to the Premier was dressed up, and told the police when arrested he was The Joker.' The shooting took place only 20 miles from the Famous Columbine School shooting.
I worked four to five years at a Multiplex of 12 screens during many big openings, including some of the Lord of the Rings and Star Wars. So having hundreds line up in costumes in advance is part of movie experience. My job, or specialization was in crowd control and movement during large events.
The Batman screening at the Aurora was in a 16 screen multiplex owned by Cinemax, the second largest cinema chain in the US (probably after ones owned by VIACOM who is part of the group which owns BlockBuster and Coka). My visit last week the Cineplex, and talking to staff showed me that the system from seven years ago is still in place, including the blue shirts' (managers). Part of staff training from day one is for an event just like the one which happened was, for everyone who worked at the multiplex where I was, a mandatory monthly requirement. And every six months full live' tests with schools of children bussed in to replicate a potential life threat to the 2,000+ people in the screen was conducted. If what the BBC reported happened, it could not have done so and wouldn't have done so at the Multiplex/Cineplex where I worked: so what happened here?
The reason there is a higher standard around the world for a Cinema/Theatre is because Cinema's have regular lethal starting with the death of over 600 at the Iroquois Theatre in 1903; then Laurier Theatre Fire in Montreal (77 dead), but occurring regularly around the world in 1955, 1960, 1977 (694 dead), 1978 (438 dead), 1983, 1997 and 1999 (75 dead). The danger of Cinema's was due to the extreme flammable nature of old film stock (now replaced with less flammable or digital). Then there is the use of large and complex projectors for 14 hours or more straight, which use oil and can get very hot, as well the number of people in a fixed location, like a concert or club where injury by trampling occurs. All these require high safety standards met by building design, door, alarm, dectors, and other inert safety measures and high levels of staff training.
Staff who work at a cinema, particularly a multiplex, should be aware, like those who work on a ship, that due to the history of disasters, they are the trained people who will ensure no one dies. After 9/11 we all knew that, like a Stadium, a cinema multiplex, with 2,000-4,000 people at capacity, is a target.
So: How did James Holmes leave the fire exit and return without the alarm going off?
Fire Exits are meant to do just that, help people exit in case of fire. At the start of every shift in a cinema, I or someone would have to radio to the central office that I was doing a fire exit' check. The alarm which would send the fire department was turned off, and I would check every single door at the start of the day, and again at the end of the day to make sure they were not blocked, and the walkway out was not blocked in any way. Then the alarm is turned back on. Where I worked there was a delay, to allow for a visual check before the signal went to the fire department.
Why?
Because with 12, or with Century Aurora, CO Cinemark 16 screens, there is no way to be able to tell if there is a fire, or other emergency simply by the working staff seeing it in time (staff are taking tickets, seating, cleaning screens, selling popcorn, selling tickets, cleaning toilets, etc). The opening of a fire door during a film is a signal to check out why, and quickly. [B]So with Associated Press saying that a Federal Law Enforcement Person told them James Holmes propped open a emergency exit side door during the movie, donned his protective gear and returned to the cinema screen to open fire with guns on the crowd. Again, why when the alarm went off in the office was no one sent to check on this fire door.[/B]
Yes, during the five years I worked at the multiplex/cineplex there were maybe hundreds of false alarms to check, over a dozen full evacuations and not one emergency involving loss of life. But that is the job. You check because without checking, and ensuring the door is tight, and that it can swing open for exit easily but cannot be opened the other direction, you are not ready for when trouble comes.
_____________________________
Phil's footnote:
A former employee of a comparable cinema complex describes a silent alarm with delay: step one: a silent notification to management; step two: alarm at fire department.
Is it likely that a global corporation runs theaters wherein exit doors can be opened and propped for unticketed entry without notifying management.
Those doors are specially marked and located next to the Free Popcorn machines.
And when we find that there WAS a silent alarm, and it was not noticed due to dereliction, the lawyers will begin to swarm in a National Geographic special narrated by the hushed British voice we've become accustomed to: ". . .beginning in wide, silent arcs, the massive lawyers circle the prey, gradually converging into a violent storm cloud of exploding pink blood. . ."