06-09-2013, 05:41 PM
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-t...e 1947.pdf
[size=12]The Truman administration's third key decision
was to ensure that American intelligence
remained a loose confederation of agencies with
no strong direction from either civilian or military
decisionmakers. In late 1945, while reviewing
intelligence reform proposals, President Truman
endorsed the Army and Navy view that "every
department required its own intelligence."
[/SIZE][size=12]11 [/SIZE][size=12]His [/SIZE][size=12]January 1946 order that appointed a DCI and
established CIG accordingly stipulated that the
"existing intelligence agencies…shall continue to
collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate
departmental intelligence."
[/SIZE][size=12]12 [/SIZE][size=12]This concession, [/SIZE][size=12]while necessary to win military and FBI assent to
the creation of CIG, soon had unintended consequences.
President Trumanand in all likelihood
his advisers as welllacked current
knowledge of the true state of "departmental"
intelligence. They were unaware, for example, of
how far the departmental boundaries that
severely limited CIG's ability to conduct investigations
within the United States would complicate
its counterintelligence work. Moreover, the
sprawling but effective military intelligence capabilities
built during World War II were being rapidly
and inexorably demobilized in 1946, creating
a chronic weakness in military intelligence that
would last for decades and affect the development
of the US Intelligence Community in the
Cold War.
[/SIZE]
[size=12]The Truman administration's third key decision
was to ensure that American intelligence
remained a loose confederation of agencies with
no strong direction from either civilian or military
decisionmakers. In late 1945, while reviewing
intelligence reform proposals, President Truman
endorsed the Army and Navy view that "every
department required its own intelligence."
[/SIZE][size=12]11 [/SIZE][size=12]His [/SIZE][size=12]January 1946 order that appointed a DCI and
established CIG accordingly stipulated that the
"existing intelligence agencies…shall continue to
collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate
departmental intelligence."
[/SIZE][size=12]12 [/SIZE][size=12]This concession, [/SIZE][size=12]while necessary to win military and FBI assent to
the creation of CIG, soon had unintended consequences.
President Trumanand in all likelihood
his advisers as welllacked current
knowledge of the true state of "departmental"
intelligence. They were unaware, for example, of
how far the departmental boundaries that
severely limited CIG's ability to conduct investigations
within the United States would complicate
its counterintelligence work. Moreover, the
sprawling but effective military intelligence capabilities
built during World War II were being rapidly
and inexorably demobilized in 1946, creating
a chronic weakness in military intelligence that
would last for decades and affect the development
of the US Intelligence Community in the
Cold War.
[/SIZE]
Once in a while you get shown the light
in the strangest of places if you look at it right..... R. Hunter
in the strangest of places if you look at it right..... R. Hunter