07-10-2013, 05:42 AM
"Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers" the Gaddafi Plot chapters
Excerpts from the book.….The MI6/Al Qaeda con*spir*acy, Part 1
The MI6-funding of Islamic extrem*ists and Al Qaeda mem*bers to assas*sin*ate Col*onel Gad*dafi, is the main reason why David Shayler finally left MI5. It is the real case that made [him] quit'. To quote David:
"Although I knew about the plot before mak*ing my decision to leave I believed at the time that it was more MI6 Boys Own' stuff I was nev*er*the*less phys*ic*ally sickened by the fact that MI6 wanted to spon*sor Islamic extrem*ists to carry out ter*ror*ism. At around the time I was debat*ing whether to leave because of the Vic*toria Brit*tain invest*ig*a*tion, MI6's David Wat*son told me he had in fact sup*plied his agent with $40,000 to buy weapons to execute the oper*a*tion to assas*sin*ate Gaddafi.
"I joined the ser*vices to stop ter*ror*ism and pre*vent the deaths of inno*cent people, not to get involved in these despic*able and cow*ardly acts. I still can*not believe that the Prime Min*is*ter has refused to take my evid*ence or invest*ig*ate this mat*ter as this decision has sent out a clear mes*sage to the intel*li*gence ser*vices that they can fund ter*ror*ism; con*spire to murder people with impun*ity; and take enorm*ous risks with our security.
"After all, would you give an indi*vidual you hardly know who has admit*ted to con*nec*tions with Al Qaeda an enorm*ous sum to carry out a ter*ror*ist attack, when you know the group he is lead*ing is opposed to the val*ues of West*ern soci*ety? It is dif*fi*cult to ima*gine a greater dis*reg*ard and con*tempt for the lives and secur*ity of the Brit*ish people."
Key points
- The fol*low*ing issues arise from David's whis*tleblow*ing about MI6 sup*port for Al Qaeda:
Con*trary to mis*in*form*a*tion pub*lished in some news*pa*pers, the fol*low*ing account was not bar-room gos*sip'. David's MI6 coun*ter*part, PT16/B David Wat*son, briefed him offi*cially on the plot as it unfol*ded. As MI5 officers both David and I knew the ser*i*ous threat the fund*ing of Al Qaeda posed at the time.
- Des*pite the then For*eign Sec*ret*ary Robin Cook's deni*als in 1998, I have now found out that intel*li*gence officer, , was MI6's man Tun*worth. He is a mem*ber of the Islamic Fight*ing Group (IFG) aka the Mil*it*ant Islamic Group, an Al Qaeda affil*i*ate based in Libya.
French intel*li*gence has also estab*lished that lead*ing mem*bers of the IFG like Tun*worth are also mem*bers of Al Qaeda.
- The MI6 agent Tun*worth admit*ted his con*nec*tions with Islamic extrem*ists and Al Qaeda mem*bers dur*ing a debrief with his MI6 hand*ler David Wat*son, in late 19952 so MI6 can*not deny it did not know what it was enter*ing into.
- At the very least, MI6 failed to real*ise that it had prior intel*li*gence about an Al Qaeda coup in Libya. If suc*cess*ful, MI6 would have allowed Al Qaeda to take over an oil-rich state in North Africa, put*ting the lives of Brit*ish and US cit*izens, in par*tic*u*lar, at far greater risk.
- By the time MI6 paid the money, Osama Bin Laden's organ*isa*tion was already known to be respons*ible for the 1993 World Trade Centre bomb*ing and MI5 had set up G9C, a sec*tion ded*ic*ated to the task of defeat*ing Bin Laden and his affiliates.
- Under the 1994 Intel*li*gence Ser*vices Act, the real James Bonds do have a licence to kill or immunity for crim*inal acts car*ried out abroad in the course of their work, provided they gain the per*mis*sion of the For*eign Sec*ret*ary. But without that per*mis*sion they are break*ing the law, should they become involved in a con*spir*acy to murder and to cause ter*ror*ism. In this case, they did not even seek that permission.
- MI6 gave money to indi*vidu*als who posed a greater threat to our lives and secur*ity Al Qaeda to assas*sin*ate an indi*vidual who posed a lesser threat, Col*onel Gad*dafi. It just doesn't make any logical sense. In fact, it demon*strates that MI6 was motiv*ated by revenge on Gad*dafi, rather than any desire to pro*tect Brit*ish lives and national secur*ity, because he nation*al*ised the Libyan oil industry in 1976 at the expense of BP3.
In sum*mer 1995, at the height of the illegal invest*ig*a*tion into Vic*toria Brit*tain, David was first briefed on the plot. David Wat*son, David's coun*ter*part in MI6, asked to meet to dis*cuss an unusual case which he could not men*tion over the phone. At the sub*sequent meet*ing, PT16/B told David that:
A senior mem*ber of the Libyan mil*it*ary intel*li*gence ser*vice had walked into the Brit*ish embassy in Tunis and asked to meet the res*id*ent MI6 officer.
The Libyan walk-in' had asked for funds to lead a group of Islamic extrem*ists in an attemp*ted coup, which would involve the assas*sin*a*tion of Col*onel Gad*dafi, the head of the Libyan state.
Although the Libyan mil*it*ary intel*li*gence officer led the group, he had said he was not an Islamic extrem*ist himself.
The Libyan had a brief MI6 record, which PT16/B thought was enough to con*firm that the Libyan did have the access to the régime that he claimed.
In exchange for MI6's sup*port, the Libyan offered to hand over the two Lock*er*bie sus*pects after the coup. Get*ting them to the UK for trial had at the time been one of MI6's object*ives for about three years but there is no guar*an*tee that the coup plot*ters could have done this. It is debat*able whether the coup plot*ters would have had either the resources or expert*ise required to track down the sus*pects after their planned coup. At first, David was scep*tical to the point of ennui. After all, MI6 officers had often claimed that the Lock*er*bie two were about to be handed over or that Gad*dafi was about to die or be toppled but noth*ing had come of this sup*posedly keen and reli*able intelligence.
In the fol*low*ing weeks, PT16/B told David that the Libyan was code*named Tun*worth. At some point in the fol*low*ing weeks David briefly saw the prin*tout of MI6's record of him. It con*tained around two or three sep*ar*ate men*tions. They sup*por*ted his claim to be a senior mem*ber of Libyan mil*it*ary intel*li*gence but were not detailed. David checked the Libyan's name against Durbar and Star, MI5's records, but the ser*vice had no trace of him. David did not make any effort to remem*ber the name because he believed that the whole thing would come to noth*ing as other MI6 plots had done. Wat*son also issued at least two CX reports detail*ing intel*li*gence provided by Tun*worth at his meet*ing with the res*id*ent MI6 officer in Tunis4. David remem*bers it con*cerned changes in per*son*nel in the Libyan régime. MI5 had col*lat*eral for it so G9 assessed that Tun*worth had some access to the régime. David takes up the story:
"Through*out this pro*cess, I briefed my line man*ager, G9A/1 Jerry Mahoney until Decem*ber 1995, Paul Slim, after that about these devel*op*ments. As the oper*a*tion was in its infancy when Mahoney left, I don't believe that I told him any*thing other than the bare basics. When brief*ing his suc*cessor, Paul Slim, I told him that this might be more Boys' Own stuff' on the part of MI6 and that we shouldn't take it too ser*i*ously although we agreed to review this in the light of new information.
"It is incon*ceiv*able that G9A/1 did not think an MI6-funded plot to engin*eer a coup in Libya was worthy of men*tion*ing to his line man*ager, G9/0, Peter Mitchell. In turn, it is unthink*able that G9/0 did not raise the mat*ter with his line man*age*ment who would have informed his boss until the DG her*self had been made aware. I won*der if it was included in the first draft of Dame Stella's book and removed on the orders of the authorities."
In Decem*ber 1995, James Wor*th*ing, R/ME/C at MI6, cir*cu*lated CX95/ 534526 report to White*hall and other address*ees, warn*ing of a poten*tial coup in Libya. It con*firmed that a mem*ber of the rebel group gave detailed intel*li*gence to his MI6 hand*ler in anti*cip*a*tion of help from Bri*tain. The report clearly demon*strated that Wat*son knew that Tun*worth was plan*ning ter*ror*ism and his group had already been involved in attempts on Gaddafi's life:
"In late Novem*ber 1995 [Tunworth's iden*tity removed]7 described plans, in which he was involved, to over*throw Col*onel Gad*dafi. […] The coup is sched*uled to start at around the time of the next Gen*eral People's Con*gress on Feb*ru*ary 14, 1996. Coup will start with unrest in Tripoli, Mis*ra*tah and Benghazi." […]
"The coup plot*ters were respons*ible for the death of [blank Names removed to pro*tect security-blank] was about to take up the pos*i*tion as head of Mil*it*ary Intel*li*gence when he was forced off the Tripoli-Sirte road and was killed. The 2 coup plot*ters involved escaped unhurt. In August 1995, 3 army cap*tains who were part of the coup plot attemp*ted to kill Col*onel Gaddafi."
The report then lis*ted Libyan install*a*tions that would be attacked and described sup*port*ers in Libya's prin*cipal cit*ies and their occu*pa*tions. The start of the coup was to be sig*nalled through coded mes*sages on tele*vi*sion and radio. It also said that at least 250 British-made weapons were dis*trib*uted among the plotters.
Tun*worth also told his MI6 hand*ler that:
"plot*ters would have cars sim*ilar to those in Gaddafi's secur*ity entour*age with fake secur*ity num*ber plates. They would infilt*rate them*selves into the entour*age in order to kill or arrest Gaddafi…
"One group of mil*it*ary per*son*nel were being trained in the desert area near Kufra for the role of attack*ing Gad*dafi and his entour*age. The aim was to attack Gad*dafi after the GPC [Gen*eral People's Con*gress], but before he had returned to Sirte. One officer and 20 men were being trained for this attack."
David also remem*bers another MI6 CX report being issued about the plot in early 1996. It was a shop*ping list of the group's require*ments to carry out the coup, includ*ing the sup*ply of weapons and basics like jeeps and tents.
Around the same time, Christ*mas 1995, Wat*son told David that he had met Tun*worth, in Geneva and paid him $40,000. Jackie Barker, who had replaced Sue Thomas as G9A/15, told him that Wat*son had told her the same inform*a*tion in con*fid*ence'. Dur*ing routine G9/PT16 meet*ings around this time, officers occa*sion*ally men*tioned the plot. Wat*son then met Tun*worth on two fur*ther occa*sions early in 1996 in Geneva. David does not know of any fur*ther details except that Wat*son men*tioned that he had paid sim*ilar sums' to Tun*worth on each occa*sion. Although PT16/B never spe*cific*ally men*tioned it, it was tacitly under*stood that Wat*son was work*ing with the approval of his dir*ect line man*ager, PT16, Richard Bartlett.
Lack of gov*ern*ment sanction
At some point David can't be sure when exactly Wat*son men*tioned that the sub*mis*sion', MI6 jar*gon for the let*ter request*ing per*mis*sion from the For*eign Office for oth*er*wise illegal oper*a*tions, was going to go "all the way to the top". In about Janu*ary 1996, Wat*son told him that the sub*mis*sion had been suc*cess*ful, indic*at*ing that the For*eign Sec*ret*ary him*self had signed the doc*u*ment per*mit*ting the operation.9 When David briefed Paul Slim on the details of the plot, he spe*cific*ally drew atten*tion to the fact that the ser*vice only had Watson's word for this. He urged his boss to task senior MI5 man*age*ment to raise the mat*ter form*ally, to check that the oper*a*tion was legal.
Then, in either Feb*ru*ary or March 1996, David read two, pos*sibly three intel*li*gence reports quot*ing inde*pend*ent sources the Egyp*tian and Moroc*can intel*li*gence ser*vices. They all stated that an attack had been made on Col*onel Gad*dafi in Sirte, Libya. Two of the reports indic*ated that the attack*ers had tried to assas*sin*ate Gad*dafi when he was part of a motor*cade but had failed as they had tar*geted the wrong car. As a res*ult of the explo*sion and the ensu*ing chaos in which shots were fired, civil*ians and secur*ity police were maimed and killed.
"At a meet*ing shortly after, PT16/B ven*tured to me in a note of tri*umph that Tun*worth had been respons*ible for the attack. "Yes that was our man. We did it" was how he put it. He regarded it, curi*ously, as a tri*umph even though the object*ive of the oper*a*tion had not been met and report*ing indic*ated there had been civil*ian cas*u*al*ties. Des*pite that, I very much got the impres*sion that this was regarded as a coup for MI6 because it was play*ing up to the repu*ta*tion that the real James Bonds wanted to have. I then promptly passed the inform*a*tion on to my line man*ager, G9A/1. Although ini*tially reluct*ant, he said he would deal with the mat*ter. I've no idea whether he did. In later months, I asked Wat*son sev*eral times what had happened to Tun*worth, but was not given answers."
By this time, David had already decided to leave the ser*vice and was act*ively look*ing for jobs in the private sec*tor. As a res*ult of MI6 fund*ing Al Qaeda, on top of the gen*eral ineptitude and bungling I had wit*nessed, I also decided I no longer wanted to work for intel*li*gence ser*vices who had ceased to pro*tect demo*cracy and instead fun*ded our ter*ror*ist enemies. The ser*vices are sup*posed to pro*tect us, not put our lives at greater risk from ter*ror*ist attack. It was time to leave.
The MI6/Al Qaeda con*spir*acy, Part 2
David had briefed the MoS with the bare bones of the plot in the sum*mer of 1996 and again when pre*par*ing the dis*clos*ures of 24 August 1997. How*ever, given the con*tro*ver*sial and sens*it*ive nature of the mater*ial, he had always wanted to sub*mit it to the gov*ern*ment for invest*ig*a*tion. Since then, min*is*ters and other respons*ible agen*cies like the PM's ISC and the Cab*inet Office have con*sist*ently refused to take pos*ses*sion of David's evid*ence con*cern*ing the plot. Des*pite his repeatedly writ*ing to them to inform them that ele*ments of the ser*vices were oper*at*ing out*side the law.
As the author*it*ies had shown no interest in tak*ing his evid*ence, in early Decem*ber 1997 David gave Mark Urban, at the time the BBC's Defence and Dip*lo*matic Cor*res*pond*ent, a full, recor*ded inter*view about the MI6/Al Qaeda plot. Then, after he had entered into nego*ti*ations, David again tried to give his evid*ence to the Brit*ish author*it*ies, but they repeatedly refused to take it. By June 1998, Urban had stood up key aspects of the story. Although David urged Urban to sub*mit the doc*u*ment*ary to the author*it*ies for imme*di*ate clear*ance under the injunc*tion, BBC man*age*ment appeared reluct*ant to face the gov*ern*ment and the intel*li*gence ser*vices head-on. They sat on the pro*gramme, while they debated it internally.
By July 1998 the gov*ern*ment had shown no real will to come to a nego*ti*ated set*tle*ment with David. In frus*tra*tion at the government's fail*ure to dis*charge its demo*cratic duties by tak*ing his evid*ence and at the same time faced with BBC iner*tia, in July 1997 David told the MoS that he was look*ing into set*ting up an Inter*net site to ensure that the crimes of the intel*li*gence ser*vices could be prop*erly exposed.
"Noth*ing will threaten the secur*ity of MI5 agents or staff," he said, "or com*prom*ise its work*ing meth*ods. But there are vital mat*ters that need a pub*lic air*ing and the Inter*net is the way to do it."
David hoped the art*icle would prompt min*is*ters to take his evid*ence. As there was no response after a week, David again told the MoS that he inten*ded to pub*lish his dis*clos*ures ï€ with due care for national secur*ity ï€ on the Inter*net in the US, where it would be pro*tec*ted under the first amendment.
"I don't see how the Gov*ern*ment can com*plain," said David, "when I've been try*ing to talk to them for months."
Three days later, his www​.shayler​.com site was hacked, before it was even up and run*ning. Verio aka Tab*net, the ser*vice pro*vider in the US, said that the hack*ing was done by a pro*fes*sional, after the pass*word to gain access to the site was inter*cep*ted en route to David's com*puter. There is no actual evid*ence to indic*ate that the intel*li*gence ser*vices were respons*ible but they are the like*li*est cul*prits. Hack*ers do not nor*mally attack anti-establishment web*sites, par*tic*u*larly when they are not yet up and running.
On 31 July 1998, David and I met the MoS in Paris, in an effort get the MI6/Al Qaeda con*spir*acy out to a wider audi*ence. On the strict under*stand*ing that the news*pa*per sub*mit*ted the story to gov*ern*ment, David gave the paper the details of the plot (without men*tion*ing the names of intel*li*gence officers). Min*is*ters refused the paper per*mis*sion to pub*lish the inform*a*tion in any mean*ing*ful form, while also deny*ing the story. David also met Nick Rufford and David Lep*pard of The Sunday Times and gave them a brief*ing on the plot, with the same caveat. David comments:
"The denial and cen*sor*ship do not add up12. Either the dis*clos*ure is untrue, in which case the gov*ern*ment can*not cite national secur*ity reas*ons for sup*press*ing the inform*a*tion. Or the dis*clos*ure is true, in which case the gov*ern*ment has a duty to invest*ig*ate exactly how Brit*ish intel*li*gence officers came to use tax*pay*ers' money to fund ter*ror*ism and murder inno*cent civil*ians. The gov*ern*ment has used the injunc*tion and the 1989 OSA to restrain the free*dom of the press, in order to pro*tect itself from embar*rass*ment rather than pro*tect national security."
David's arrest in con*nec*tion with the Plot
Unbe*known to David and me, a couple of hours after he had legally13 sub*mit*ted his very ser*i*ous evid*ence to min*is*ters, those self-same min*is*ters sent an urgent request to extra*dite David for his ori*ginal dis*clos*ures which had appeared almost a year earlier in the MoS. David says:
"In these cir*cum*stances, it is dif*fi*cult to see how any*one could believe that our over*sight arrange*ments work. Indeed, the act of impris*on*ing an indi*vidual who uses a legal route to report ter*ror*ism on the part of MI6, is hardly likely to encour*age other indi*vidu*als to use the sys*tem. It has all the hall*marks of des*pot*ism and tyranny."
The next day, 1 August 1998, the French DST, the equi*val*ent of MI5 and Spe*cial Branch, arres*ted David in the foyer of our hotel when he returned from watch*ing his foot*ball team, Middles*brough, lose 10 on Sky to Empoli in a pre-season friendly. He was held for over 24 hours in the Pal*ais de Justice most of the time in sol*it*ary and denied access to a law*yer. The day after, he was trans*ferred to La Santé prison in Paris's 14[SUP]th[/SUP] arron*disse*ment. At the instig*a*tion of the Brit*ish author*it*ies, he was held under dra*conian secrecy legis*la*tion and first saw a law*yer over two days after he had been arres*ted. He con*tin*ued to be denied access to all other vis*it*ors for most of his time in prison.
But for David's quick think*ing, I would not have known what had happened to him. He would have van*ished. The DST asked him for his papers. Know*ing I was wait*ing for his return in our hotel room, he told them his pass*port was in his bag upstairs (it was not). I there*fore only knew he had been arres*ted when the DST came knock*ing on my door. I was not to see him again for over two months.
Two days after David was arres*ted, The Daily Tele*graph splashed on dis*clos*ures he had given to its intel*li*gence cor*res*pond*ent Michael Smith, a few weeks before, about secur*ity blun*ders con*cern*ing the IRA main*land bomb*ing cam*paign. The Tele*graph included some details of the fail*ures but was blocked by the injunc*tion from reveal*ing how a num*ber of attacks could have been pre*ven*ted. Rather curi*ously, the paper then edited by Charles Moore called for David to be horse*whipped' in its leader column for provid*ing inform*a*tion about secur*ity fail*ures, which The Tele*graph pub*lished in its news section.
David's soli*citor John Wadham said:
"It's a strange coin*cid*ence that before this import*ant story about this assas*sin*a*tion attempt was going to break, the Gov*ern*ment ensured that David was arres*ted and incommunicado."
The New York Times breaks the story
While David lan*guished in a prison cell, and while the dis*clos*ure had been injunc*ted in the Brit*ish press, a public-spirited indi*vidual passed the details of the MI6/Al Qaeda con*spir*acy to The New York Times. On 5 August 1998, it repor*ted that the Brit*ish media had been banned from report*ing the plot.
Did the Brit*ish gov*ern*ment try to assas*sin*ate Col Mum*mar Gad*dafi, the Libyan leader, in Feb*ru*ary 1996 by plant*ing a bomb under his motor*cade? And did the plan go awry because agents from MI6, the for*eign intel*li*gence ser*vice, put the bomb under the wrong car, killing sev*eral Libyan bystand*ers?" it asked. […]
"A sweep*ing injunc*tion has barred news*pa*pers and tele*vi*sion news pro*grammes from pub*lish*ing the embar*rass*ing alleg*a*tions about the inner work*ings of Britain's secur*ity ser*vices, brought up by a dis*gruntled former officer. The media have been forced to dis*cuss the alleg*a*tions without actu*ally say*ing what the alleg*a*tions are. I've known these things for some*thing like 16 months, and I am not allowed to pub*lish any of it,' said Jonathan Hol*borow, editor of The Mail on Sunday."
The paper added that the gov*ern*ment had told the press it could report the alleg*a*tions as long as it did not men*tion details, like the pay*ment to Islamic extrem*ists of around £100,000.
The Pan*or*ama programme
The BBC began intense nego*ti*ations with the gov*ern*ment for per*mis*sion to show David's inter*view with Mark Urban. Only after threat*en*ing to chal*lenge the tem*por*ary injunc*tion through the courts, did the gov*ern*ment back down. Two days after the pub*lic*a*tion of The New York Times art*icle, the BBC was per*mit*ted to broad*cast more details of the con*spir*acy in a Pan*or*ama spe*cial presen*ted by Mark Urban. He con*firmed that the Islamic group involved was the Mil*it*ant (or Fight*ing) Islamic Group, led by Abdul*lah Al-Sadiq. Cam*ille Tawil, an Arab journ*al*ist based in Lon*don, told the pro*gramme that shortly after the attack in Feb*ru*ary 1996, he received a fax from the group, claim*ing respons*ib*il*ity for the attack and nam*ing the mem*bers of its team who had died in the attack:
"I felt it was cred*ible inform*a*tion given to me but I wanted to verify the story. I con*tac*ted other Libyan groups and they gave me a sim*ilar account of what had happened. This is why I decided to pub*lish the story."
Pan*or*ama also reported:
"Libya has pub*licly accused Bri*tain of giv*ing refuge to the leader of the Mil*it*ant Islamic Group. In response to our enquiry, the For*eign Office said it does not know whether Abdul*lah Al Sadiq is in this country".
The pro*gramme also con*firmed that MI6 did not get the vital per*mis*sion from its min*is*ters to carry out the attack which is a legal require*ment so the officers involved have immunity under Eng*lish law.
"Two well-placed people have told me that the Tory min*is*ters run*ning the depart*ment at the time gave no such author*isa*tion. […] In short, that means Britain's intel*li*gence ser*vice was oper*at*ing com*pletely out of control."
Urban con*cluded:
"It is true of course that Shayler's know*ledge of this affair depends entirely on what the SIS man, PT16/B, told him at their meet*ings. But cer*tain pieces of this Libyan jig*saw can*not eas*ily be argued away by SIS. There was an assas*sin*a*tion attempt. Numer*ous Libyan sources con*firm it. Bri*tain did have a rela*tion*ship with Tun*worth. Any inquiry into David Shayler's alleg*a*tion will be able to find the key CX report which detailed the plot against Gad*dafi, so show*ing Tunworth's inside knowledge. […]
"Only a thor*ough going inquiry would stand a chance of get*ting to the bot*tom of whether some intel*li*gence officers played fast and loose with the rules. David Shayler has provided Pan*or*ama with other details about the Libyan oper*a*tion and the people con*nec*ted with it. Com*bined with our own inform*a*tion, it sug*gests that SIS have a very ser*i*ous case to answer".
The Pan*or*ama pro*gramme estab*lished that MI6 had oper*ated out*side the con*trol of its polit*ical mas*ters. In other words, unac*count*able intel*li*gence oper*at*ives were decid*ing Brit*ish for*eign policy, not a demo*crat*ic*ally elec*ted gov*ern*ment. When you think about it, this means that middle rank*ing intel*li*gence officers have the power of life and death over an indi*vidual without being account*able for their actions16. While that is all very well in a James Bond film, in the real world intel*li*gence officers are now required to oper*ate within the law.
Sep*ar*ate sources con*firm the story
On 9 August 1998, the MoS added still fur*ther con*firm*a*tion of the plot and the pay*ments. It reported:
"David Shayler's rev*el*a*tions that MI6 tried to blow up Col*onel Gad*dafi were given strong cre*dence by US intel*li*gence sources yes*ter*day. They insisted that, des*pite claims to the con*trary, the Brit*ish secret ser*vice was fin*an*cing the group behind the attempt on the Libyan leader's life. [Accord*ing to the US] the Brit*ish ser*vice [MI6] turned to the Fight*ing Islamic Group [FIG] and its leader, Abu Abdul*lah Sadiq, who was liv*ing in London."
A sep*ar*ate source, a former senior ana*lyst with Amer*ican intel*li*gence, told the paper:
"I'm sure that Brit*ish intel*li*gence has all the plaus*ible deni*ab*il*ity that it needs. Cer*tainly there were con*tacts between MI6 and FIG."
Yet another source in Wash*ing*ton told the paper that MI6 had provided vari*ous kinds of sup*port' to FIG, includ*ing fin*an*cial help.
The same day, The Sunday Times repor*ted that it had iden*ti*fied one of the per*pet*rat*ors of the attack as Abd Al Muhay*meen. Accord*ing to the paper, he was a Libyan fun*da*ment*al*ist' or Islamic extrem*ist, to use MI5 phras*eo*logy, who had trained and fought in Afgh*anistan. On the day, he also chose the tim*ing of the attack.
"He waited in ambush with a group of feday*deen from a force known as the Islamic Fight*ing Group. […] The group appeared to be gain*ing in strength and dar*ing, mostly due to the expert*ise of Afghan vet*er*ans such as Al Muhay*meen. […] As the con*voy approached, Al Muhay*meeen gave the word and the sounds of battle erup*ted. When it was over, Gad*dafi had sur*vived yet again. So had Al Muhay*meen. But sev*eral of their men lay dead on each side. So did bystanders."
For*eign Secretary's comments
On 9 August 1998, Robin Cook, the then For*eign Sec*ret*ary, told the BBC's Break*fast with Frost programme:
"The tale about the MI6 plot to assas*sin*ate Gad*dafi is pure fantasy. First of all, let's be clear about this claim that Shayler can bring down the gov*ern*ment, [the claim appeared in The Sunday Times, but David never made it] the alleg*a*tions are about some*thing that is alleged to have happened not under this gov*ern*ment but under our pre*de*cessor. […] I have pur*sued these alleg*a*tions. I am abso*lutely sat*is*fied that the pre*vi*ous For*eign Sec*ret*ary did not author*ise any such assas*sin*a*tion attempt. I am per*fectly sat*is*fied that SIS never put for*ward any such pro*posal for an assas*sin*a*tion attempt, nor have I seen any*thing in the 15 months I have been in the job which would sug*gest that SIS has any interest, any role or any exper*i*ence over the recent dec*ade of any such escapade. It is pure fantasy.
"I have already made my own enquir*ies. I have sat*is*fied my mind. I see no basis for the reports in today's papers about any forth*com*ing enquiry. There was no SIS pro*posal to do it and I am fairly clear that there has never been any SIS involve*ment. I do wish people would recog*nise that what is being said here is that there is some*body who has left another ser*vice, not SIS, was never in SIS, is mak*ing alleg*a*tions no doubt for his own reas*ons. We would like to see him back in Bri*tain in order that we can pur*sue those charges that have been made against him.
"I am clear these alleg*a*tions have no basis in fact and secondly I am quite clear that the SIS oper*a*tions that I have author*ised have noth*ing remotely to do with the kind of fantasy that has been pro*duced over the last two days."
Without ever both*er*ing to take David's evid*ence, Cook repeated from The Sunday Times an alleg*a*tion that David had never made: that he could bring down the government'17, a tac*tic that Straw had used in the first use of the sub*mis*sion pro*cess in Octo*ber 1997.
Cook also unequi*voc*ally denied the exist*ence of any MI6 oper*a*tion at all; "The tale about the MI6 plot to assas*sin*ate Col*onel Gad*dafi is pure fantasy." There is no men*tion here that Cook is claim*ing that aspects of the story may be fantasy such as the pay*ments, which the For*eign and Com*mon*wealth Office (FCO) later and wrongly claimed were the sub*ject of the pure fantasy' jibe.
Without both*er*ing to hold a proper enquiry, he was uncrit*ic*ally put*ting out the MI6 line, adding: "I am clear these alleg*a*tions have no basis in fact." Min*is*ters can*not leg*ally ban inform*a*tion that is fantasy. After all, min*is*ters had already indic*ated in off-the-record brief*ings at the time of the Israeli Embassy dis*clos*ure that dis*clos*ures on the part of former officers, which they accept to be untrue, could not harm national security.
Indeed, when Cook said: "I am abso*lutely sat*is*fied that the pre*vi*ous For*eign Sec*ret*ary did not author*ise any such assas*sin*a*tion attempt", he merely con*firmed a key aspect of the Pan*or*ama invest*ig*a*tion; that MI6 did not have the per*mis*sion of min*is*ters to carry out the attack, mak*ing any actions by MI6 a crim*inal offence. Although Cook then claimed he was fairly clear' that there had never been any MI6 involve*ment and per*fectly clear' there was no basis in fact, he did not relate how exactly he had estab*lished this or why he was per*fectly clear' of one pos*i*tion but only fairly clear' about another.
Des*pite his claims, he obvi*ously hadn't had time to organ*ise and carry out a full inquiry, even though there were officers in MI5 who had been briefed about the plot, and who could have been inter*viewed. In fact, it appears that Cook in the same way that Straw had done before him went to the head of the agency con*cerned (in this case, MI6) and asked if it had been involved in ter*ror*ist fund*ing and murder. Not sur*pris*ingly, the lat*ter appears to have denied it.
After the Pan*or*ama pro*gramme was shown, Mark Urban offered his evid*ence to Robin Cook, who refused to take pos*ses*sion of it, inform*ing him that the mat*ter was closed. As this was an alleg*a*tion of murder and ter*ror*ist fund*ing, Cook should have dis*charged his legal duty and imme*di*ately referred the mat*ter to the police to investigate.
Libya con*firms plot
On Wed*nes*day 25 Novem*ber 1998, Libyan TV broad*cast foot*age of the assas*sin*a*tion attempt. It showed Gad*dafi lean*ing out of his open-topped car to greet the crowds, then ming*ling with the crowd, then it showed an object fly*ing through the air, Gad*dafi look*ing down, then sud*denly being sur*roun*ded by body*guards, who hustled him away. The TV zoomed in on the face of a man in the crowd, and his face was circled in red. Libyan TV named the assail*ant as Abdul*lah Rad*wan, a part*ner of Abu Abdul*lah Sadiq, the leader of the Islamic Fight*ing Group. Accord*ing to the report:
"Abdul*lah Rad*wan suc*ceeded in reach*ing the front ranks and threw a gren*ade when the brother leader left the car."
Libyan TV then showed an inter*view with Hasan Al Sadiq Al Shahh, an alleged accom*plice of Radwan:
Ques*tioner: Who entrus*ted you with the mis*sion of enter*ing the Jamahir*iya [the People's Repub*lic of Libya]?
Al Shahh: Abu Abdul*lah Al Sadiq.
Q: Did he give money?
A: Yes
Q: How much money?
A: $20,000
Q: $20,000?
A: Yes
Q: What is the total amount of money you obtained from Abu Abdul*lah Al Sadiq?
A: Per*haps, $40,000 or $41,000
Q: $41,000?
A: Approx*im*ately, yes
Q: Where did the money you got come from?
A: I do not know. But there is a group in those coun*tries
Q: What coun*tries are these?
A: Bri*tain
Redac*ted text on orders of MI5
Our recent enquir*ies with Swal*low Tail, a former intel*li*gence officer who can*not be named for fear of reprisals20, have con*firmed that the man caught by the Liby*ans in the attack, was the agent Tun*worth. This is fur*ther con*firm*a*tion that an MI6 agent, whom we know was work*ing to Wat*son in Lon*don, was involved in the plot. The officer also con*firmed that was either killed dur*ing the attack that Feb*ru*ary or shortly after. This rather under*mines the claims of min*is*ters that they banned the story in order to pro*tect national secur*ity, since the agent was clearly no longer at risk of reprisal and was not then provid*ing intel*li*gence to the Brit*ish services.
Other than using the sub*mis*sion pro*cess to inform the PM about ser*vice abuses of power, David also wrote to min*is*ters Tony Blair, Jack Straw, Robin Cook, John Prescott and the Attor*ney Gen*eral on sev*eral occa*sions, ask*ing them to invest*ig*ate his dis*clos*ures of MI6's fund*ing of Al Qaeda. At no point did any min*is*ter hear his evid*ence. In June 1999, David sent min*is*ters Secrets and Lies, a doc*u*ment he had pre*pared on his case to counter the mis*in*form*a*tion put out by gov*ern*ment. It provided details of the con*spir*acy but min*is*ters still refused to call in the police or hold any kind of enquiry. And that would have been that, if it hadn't been for the public-spirited former intel*li*gence officer who obtained the CX doc*u*ment issued by MI6 in Decem*ber 1995, and put it on the Inter*net. That officer said:
"I've just about had it up to here with the lies of min*is*ters. It is dif*fi*cult to ima*gine a more ser*i*ous abuse of power than MI6 fund*ing our ter*ror*ist enemies with the res*ult that inno*cent people are murdered in cold-blood. If there had been a legal way of present*ing that doc*u*ment to inde*pend*ent invest*ig*at*ors, I would have used it. As there was not, I had to resort to the Inter*net. Thank God for mod*ern technology."
The MI6/Al Qaeda con*spir*acy, Part 3
In Feb*ru*ary 2000, The Sunday Times provided cor*rob*or*a*tion that MI6 had con*spired with an agent in a plan to assas*sin*ate Col*onel Gad*dafi, when it repor*ted that a leaked MI6 doc*u*ment, CX95/ 53452 had appeared on the web*site www​.geo​cit​ies​.com/​b​y​a​n​y​m​e​a​n​s​n​e​c​e​s​s​a​r​y​2​000. When inter*viewed about the doc*u*ment, the then For*eign Sec*ret*ary Robin Cook refused to con*firm that it was genu*ine. David can though con*firm that it is the doc*u*ment sent by MI6's R/ME/C to White*hall depart*ments and the intel*li*gence ser*vices in Decem*ber 1995. It refuted Cook's claims, which had caused many to believe that David had simply made the whole thing up:
"The tale about the MI6 plot to assas*sin*ate Gad*dafi is pure fantasy.
"It is pure fantasy"
"I am clear these alleg*a*tions have no basis in fact"
The MI6 report clearly demon*strated that an MI6 agent among the coup plot*ters was meet*ing his MI6 hand*ler to dis*cuss the assas*sin*a*tion of Col Gad*dafi in which he was involved':
"The coup plot*ters would launch a dir*ect attack on Gad*dafi and would either arrest him or kill him."
"The mil*it*ary officer said that the plot*ters would have cars sim*ilar to those in Gaddafi's secur*ity entour*age with fake secur*ity num*ber plates. They would infilt*rate them*selves into the entour*age in order to kill or arrest Gaddafi."
Remem*ber, Tun*worth had already out*lined his plans and his request for fin*ance to the res*id*ent MI6 officer in Tunis in sum*mer 1995. David Wat*son, PT16/B, had then met Tun*worth in the full know*ledge that the lat*ter wanted to assas*sin*ate Gad*dafi to obtain details of the oper*a*tion, which were pub*lished in the CX report. If this report had been a record of a meet*ing between a Libyan ter*ror*ist and an IRA mem*ber plan*ning to assas*sin*ate Tony Blair, which had fallen into MI5 or police hands, it would have been accep*ted in a court of law as clear evid*ence of a con*spir*acy between the two to cause terrorism.
The MI6 intel*li*gence report also con*firmed that Sirte was the site of the attack in Feb*ru*ary or March 1996, inform*a*tion David had told Urban who had stood it up for the Pan*or*ama invest*ig*a*tion into the plot. It also estab*lished that the group of coup plot*ters were at least look*ing for sup*port from the Brit*ish state. (As a CX report going out to min*is*ters, it could not detail the illegal payments):
"The officer was dis*clos*ing this inform*a*tion in the hope that if the coup was suc*cess*ful, the new gov*ern*ment could enlist HMG support."
Accord*ing to the report, Tun*worth also admit*ted con*tacts between the plot*ters and Islamic extrem*ists, described as Libyan stu*dents' and Libyan vet*er*ans who served in Afgh*anistan'. As already dis*cussed, vet*eran Libyan Islamic extrem*ists who served in Afgh*anistan are con*sidered by MI5 to be de facto mem*bers of Al Qaeda.
The CX report oth*er*wise played down the agent's con*tacts with Islamic extrem*ists, pre*sum*ably because the report went to min*is*ters who would have been appalled at the pro*spect of Islamic ter*ror*ists top*pling Gad*dafi, given that the former posed a greater threat to Brit*ish lives. As we now know from the sexed-up dossier, it is not unusual for incon*veni*ent pieces of inform*a*tion to be left out of offi*cial reports.
David is adam*ant that, when Wat*son was brief*ing him, he told David that Tun*worth was lead*ing a rag tag' group of Islamic extrem*ists. David also briefed Paul Slim, his boss at the time, with this inform*a*tion and provided it in his sworn state*ment to the police. He has not been charged with per*jury. Other media reports already quoted have estab*lished that the Islamic Fight*ing Group were respons*ible. The Libyan TV broad*cast also indic*ated that a lead*ing mem*ber of the IFG might be Tun*worth, as he led the attack in much the way that Tun*worth out*lined in the CX report.
The report also made it abso*lutely clear that the Per*man*ent Under Secretary's Depart*ment Sir Humphrey Appleby's equi*val*ent in the For*eign Office GCHQ, MI5; the Min*istry of Defence; and MI6 sta*tions in Tunis, Cairo and Wash*ing*ton knew of the assas*sin*a*tion attempt at least two months in advance. They would there*fore have had cop*ies on file. Did none of them bother to brief Cook with this rather per*tin*ent inform*a*tion before he went on the Break*fast with Frost pro*gramme on 9 August 1998? Were our Sir Humphreys and our George Smi*leys delib*er*ately keep*ing min*is*ters in the dark? Or did Cook know about Tun*worth but think he could get away with brand*ing the plot pure fantasy' in the belief that doc*u*ments detail*ing the rela*tion*ship between Tun*worth and MI6 would never see the light of day?
We also have to ask ourselves what role the PM played in all this, as the fig*ure ulti*mately respons*ible for our ser*vices. What did he know and when did he know it?
Julie Ann and the bul*lies in government
The gov*ern*ment had always claimed it was not in the busi*ness of pre*vent*ing legit*im*ate dis*cus*sion of the intel*li*gence ser*vices. But on 6 March 2000, that all changed when Spe*cial Branch officers arres*ted Julie Ann Dav*ies, a stu*dent at King*ston Uni*ver*sity, under the 1911 and 1989 OSAs, dur*ing a lec*ture at the col*lege. She was held for sev*eral hours at King*ston Police sta*tion but was not charged. She was later released on police bail. The uni*ver*sity con*firmed that it had com*plied with a search war*rant, giv*ing police the right to access Davies's com*puter at the uni*ver*sity. Dav*ies had recently vis*ited David in France and had begun to rally sup*port for him.
"Dur*ing that meet*ing I became con*vinced that the man was genu*ine and so I felt the need to do some*thing about his situ*ation," she said at the time.
The day after the CX doc*u*ment appeared on the Inter*net, Dav*ies cir*cu*lated an e-mail to fel*low cam*paign*ers and journ*al*ists. In it, she stated:
"You have prob*ably heard about the doc*u*ment on the web that appears to back up David Shayler's alleg*a*tions of an MI6 plot to assas*sin*ate Col*onel Gaddafi."
It is also clear from the con*text of the ques*tions that police asked her that Spe*cial Branch sus*pec*ted her of put*ting the CX doc*u*ment on the Inter*net. Under ques*tion*ing, Dav*ies denied hav*ing any*thing to do with this. After keep*ing her on police bail for a num*ber of months without char*ging her, Spe*cial Branch even*tu*ally dropped the invest*ig*a*tion. As a res*ult of the police action, she was forced to drop out of her uni*ver*sity course. She is cur*rently suing police for wrong*ful arrest. As a res*ult of dis*clos*ure in this case, police have provided her with the evid*ence' which led to her arrest. It con*sists only of three anonym*ous let*ters claim*ing that she put the doc*u*ment on the Inter*net. As they are anonym*ous, they would not be con*sidered admiss*ible evid*ence in a court of law.
Mr Peter Scott, King*ston Uni*ver*sity vice chan*cel*lor, said:
"The uni*ver*sity, as an insti*tu*tion com*mit*ted to free*dom of expres*sion, would be par*tic*u*larly con*cerned if it turned out that a dis*cred*ited piece of legis*la*tion like the OSA was being used to sup*press legit*im*ate journ*al*istic invest*ig*a*tion and the public's right to know about alleged abuses by the secur*ity services."
The arrest of Julie Ann Dav*ies proved once again that min*is*ters were rather more con*cerned with intim*id*at*ing David's sup*port*ers and pro*tect*ing the intel*li*gence ser*vices from proper scru*tiny, includ*ing crim*inal invest*ig*a*tion, than free speech, one of the corner*stones of demo*cracy. It was also a clear example of bul*ly*ing. The Sunday Times, which had pub*lished the ori*ginal art*icle about the report and quoted from the doc*u*ment, had not been invest*ig*ated, nor had any of its journ*al*ists been arres*ted in con*nec*tion with the mat*ter.
This is also clear evid*ence that mater*ial from CX reports can be pub*lished without caus*ing dam*age to national secur*ity, as the gov*ern*ment did not pro*sec*ute the paper or its journ*al*ists under s5 of the 1989 OSA, where the Crown has to prove dam*age, for pub*lish*ing and quot*ing from the report. But the bul*ly*ing was set to continue.
The Observer taken to court
Hav*ing used the OSA to intim*id*ate one of David's sup*port*ers for try*ing to expose ter*ror*ism fun*ded out by MI6, Blair's gov*ern*ment then turned its sights on the ele*ments of the press who were bravely try*ing to expose the con*spir*acy. Comedian and journ*al*ist Mark Thomas had agreed to deliver his evid*ence about the conspiracy23 to the Brit*ish Embassy by hand in Novem*ber 1999. As Straw did not even bother to reply, David briefed Mar*tin Bright of The Observer. In Feb*ru*ary 2000, he repor*ted that Straw had done noth*ing to ensure that there was a crim*inal invest*ig*a*tion into PT16/B's activities.
The art*icle also revealed for the first time in pub*lic that Tun*worth was a senior mem*ber of Libyan intel*li*gence, who had walked into the Brit*ish Embassy in Tunis, and that reports quot*ing Moroc*can and Egyp*tian intel*li*gence sources had con*firmed the assas*sin*a*tion attempt, shortly after it took place in Feb*ru*ary 1996.
A For*eign Office spokes*man changed the offi*cial pos*i*tion on the con*spir*acy, try*ing to play down Robin Cook's claim that the tale about the MI6 plot to assas*sin*ate Gad*dafi was pure fantasy':
"We have never denied know*ledge of coup attempts against Col Gad*dafi," he told the paper. "We always described alleg*a*tions of involve*ment as fantasy25. We have noth*ing to add or subtract".
If the For*eign Office and Cook had been hon*est when the dis*clos*ure was first made, they would have said at the time:
"We are aware of a con*spir*acy to assas*sin*ate Col*onel Gad*dafi in early 1996. We are still mak*ing enquir*ies about any MI6 involvement."
Tun*worth was after all an MI6 agent who had by the time of the attack met David Wat*son, an MI6 officer, at least twice to dis*cuss his plans. On that evid*ence alone, we can con*clude that MI6 was involved. How*ever, Tun*worth could not have gone ahead with the plot without the back*ing of MI6, fin*an*cial or oth*er*wise. As we have seen, sep*ar*ate sources have con*firmed pay*ments were made to the IFG, the group Tun*worth belonged to.
On 14 March 2000, both The Observer and The Guard*ian were taken to court by the author*it*ies. Spe*cial Branch sought a court order to seize any note*books and browse through The Observer's com*puter for fur*ther evid*ence of breaches of the OSA on David's part. It sought from The Guard*ian the ori*ginal of a let*ter David had writ*ten, which was pub*lished in news*pa*per on the 17 Feb*ru*ary 2000. As Nick Cohen, The Observer's colum*nist put it:
"No one would dream of telling a news*pa*per about offi*cial cor*rup*tion, incom*pet*ence or crime, if they thought the police or in this case, the secret police might read every jot*ting and e-mail."
A couple of days later, Detect*ive Ser*geant John Flynn, from the fin*an*cial invest*ig*a*tions unit of Spe*cial Branch, told The Guard*ian that there were reas*on*able grounds' for pro*sec*ut*ing Mar*tin Bright and Roger Alton, the editor of The Observer, under s5 of the OSA.
A month later, judge Mar*tin Steph*ens ruled that the papers had to hand over any mater*ial, even though he admit*ted that the let*ter to The Guard*ian con*tained noth*ing that had not already been prin*ted. David said at the time:
"The gov*ern*ment is adopt*ing the tac*tics of a total*it*arian state by attack*ing the press in this way. If they really believe I have doc*u*ments that could dam*age national secur*ity, why don't they come and talk to me about them, rather than intim*id*ate journalists."
Even the then For*eign Sec*ret*ary Robin Cook and the For*eign Office min*is*ter Peter Hain were repor*ted to be hor*ri*fied at such an attack on press free*dom. But we have to won*der why they chose to speak out at this point. Did Cook know that if the doc*u*ments were handed over then David might be pro*sec*uted for dis*clos*ing details of the MI6/Al Qaeda con*spir*acy, allow*ing Cook's pure fantasy' lies to be examined before a court?
On 19 July 2000, Mr Justice Igor Judge heard the case for Spe*cial Branch to access The Observer's com*puter. He over*turned the decision of the lower courts in his ringing defence of press freedom:
"The Gad*dafi Plot is either true or it is false, and unless there are reas*ons of com*pel*ling national secur*ity, the pub*lic is entitled to know the facts, and as the eyes and ears of the pub*lic, journ*al*ists are entitled to invest*ig*ate and report the facts, dis*pas*sion*ately and fairly, without pre*judge*ment or selectivity […]
"If true, it is dif*fi*cult to over*es*tim*ate its enorm*ity: a con*spir*acy to murder the head of another state, res*ult*ing not in his death, but in the deaths of inno*cent people who were not its inten*ded tar*gets.[…] Again, if true, the cir*cum*stances in which such a plan was con*ceived and developed, and the iden*tity of those who were informed about and approved it, or turned a blind eye to it, and equally those who were delib*er*ately kept in ignor*ance, raise crit*ical pub*lic issues about the activ*it*ies of the secur*ity ser*vices and those respons*ible for them"
In the middle of all this, a new devel*op*ment neatly poin*ted to the impot*ence of the ser*vices and the inef*fect*ive*ness of cur*rent legis*la*tion in pro*tect*ing state secrets in the age of the Inter*net. Por*tuguese intel*li*gence expert Fre*derico Duarte pub*lished the names of David Wat*son and Richard Bart*lett, PT16/B and PT16 respect*ively in Tal & Qual, the Por*tuguese equi*val*ent of Private Eye. As the names were also avail*able on the Inter*net, they could be accessed from Bri*tain. As they were now in the pub*lic domain, they could be repeated in the Brit*ish media, although only the Cam*paign for Press and Broad*cast*ing Free*dom dared to actu*ally pub*lish the names of the two MI6 ter*ror*ists involved.
The delayed police investigation
In March 2000, John Wadham and I had hand-delivered a state*ment which David had pre*pared and indic*ated he was pre*pared to swear to under oath to the Met*ro*pol*itan Police Spe*cial Branch at New Scot*land Yard. The police then refused to invest*ig*ate the plot claim*ing that con*spir*acy to murder did not amount to a crime in Bri*tain. Again, this demon*strates what would have happened if David had viol*ated the 1989 OSA s1 and approached the Met dir*ectly with his dis*clos*ures in 1997.
Finally in Decem*ber 2000, two and a half years after David had made the ori*ginal dis*clos*ure, he was finally given per*mis*sion by the author*it*ies to give evid*ence to the police. DS Gerry Mackin*non and Detect*ive Supt Lewis Ben*jamin work*ing for SO1 of the Met, inter*viewed him and pre*pared a sworn state*ment, which he signed in early 2001. SO1 then under*took the first ever police invest*ig*a*tion into the activ*it*ies of MI6. You don't have to be a cynic to point out that by this time, MI6 had had plenty of time to des*troy or tamper with the evid*ence. David and I have every con*fid*ence that the police in this case did their job thor*oughly and pro*fes*sion*ally but by then, we believe, it was too late.
In Feb*ru*ary 2001, SO1 sent a report to the Crown Pro*sec*u*tion Ser*vice. Pro*sec*u*tion sources said the author*it*ies had decided there was a prima facie case, mer*it*ing fur*ther investigation29. In all, the enquir*ies took nine months. In Novem*ber 2001, the Met*ro*pol*itan Police con*firmed that the MI6/Al Qaeda con*spir*acy was not pure fantasy':
"As you know, the Met*ro*pol*itan Police Ser*vice under*took an assess*ment of the avail*able mater*ial and sub*mit*ted two reports to the Crown Pro*sec*u*tion Ser*vice, an interim report in Feb*ru*ary 2001 and a final report in Septem*ber 2001. The police enquiry has been extremely thor*ough, examin*ing all rel*ev*ant material."
This clearly con*firms that the police have gathered evid*ence rel*ev*ant mater*ial' about the MI6 con*spir*acy, which con*firm there is a basis in fact' for David's dis*clos*ures refut*ing Robin Cook asser*tion that: "The tale about the MI6 plot to assas*sin*ate Gad*dafi is pure fantasy. [with] no basis in fact". At the same time, neither the police nor the CPS sought to arrest David or bring charges for per*jury or wast*ing police time, indic*at*ing that detailed sworn state*ment was hon*est, reli*able and true. On these avail*able facts, any reas*on*able observer can only con*clude that Cook is lying and David telling the truth. In fact, we have chal*lenged Cook to sign a sworn state*ment say*ing that the MI6/Al Qaeda plot was pure fantasy [with] no basis in fact'.
The CPS did con*clude that there is not enough evid*ence to secure a con*vic*tion. But it took them two months to come to this decision after the nine-month invest*ig*a*tion. Even then, the CPS sought to mis*rep*res*ent the find*ings of the enquiry:
"Final advice from the Crown Pro*sec*u*tion Ser*vice has now been received, say*ing that the mater*ial does not sub*stan*ti*ate the alleg*a*tion made by David Shayler."
The work of the police and the Crown Pro*sec*u*tion Ser*vice is not to sub*stan*ti*ate […] alleg*a*tions' or oth*er*wise. (Any*way, David made a num*ber of alleg*a*tions, not just one). Its job is to judge whether there is enough evid*ence to secure a con*vic*tion in front of a jury bey*ond any reas*on*able doubt. That is a very high stand*ard of proof. The usual test of proof for Par*lia*ment*ary or judi*cial enquir*ies is the bal*ance of probabilities'.
At the time, David commented:
"This is the first time that the police have invest*ig*ated an alleg*a*tion against MI6, partly because MI6 had a de facto immunity from invest*ig*a*tion into alleg*a*tions of crime on the part of the ser*vice under the Royal Prerog*at*ive. It demon*strates why MI6 was put on a legal foot*ing in the 1994 Intel*li*gence Ser*vices Act. The invest*ig*a*tion was not of course ideal. The police were only look*ing to gather admiss*ible evid*ence, which could be used to secure a con*vic*tion of the two MI6 officers who planned and car*ried out the plot, rather than try*ing to assess all rel*ev*ant mater*ial, includ*ing intelligence."
This whole pro*cess once again calls into ques*tion the over*sight arrange*ments for the ser*vices and the abil*ity of min*is*ters and offi*cials to dis*charge their legal duties. In the future, we will be seek*ing per*mis*sion to have the record*ing on which David's sworn testi*mony was based pub*lished so that the Brit*ish people and, it is hoped, Par*lia*ment can see for them*selves the truth of his words.
Fur*ther con*firm*a*tion of the plot
That, again, might have been that but for a book pub*lished by two French journ*al*ists, shortly before David went to trial in Octo*ber 2002. Guil*laume Dasquié, pub*lisher of Intel*li*gence On-line, and Jean-Charles Bris*ard, a former adviser to French Pres*id*ent Jacques Chirac who worked for the French intel*li*gence ser*vices, pub*lished For*bid*den Truth. The book con*firms that the Islamic Fight*ing group was the Libyan Al Qaeda cell respons*ible for the attempt on Gaddafi's life. The book added that the Islamic Fight*ing Group also included Anas al-Liby, a lead*ing Al Qaeda mem*ber who is wanted for his involve*ment in the African embassy bomb*ings and remains on the US government's most wanted list with a reward of $25 mil*lion for his cap*ture. Al-Liby was with Osama bin Laden in Sudan before the Al Qaeda leader returned to Afgh*anistan in 199632. Dasquie said:
"Bin Laden wanted to settle in Libya in the early 1990s but was hindered by the gov*ern*ment of Muam*mar Gad*dafi. Enraged by Libya's refusal, bin Laden organ*ised attacks inside Libya, includ*ing assas*sin*a*tion attempts against Gaddafi.".
This provides yet more con*vin*cing evid*ence that Tun*worth was involved with Al Qaeda. At the very least, MI6 and MI5's under*stand*ing of Al Qaeda was so lim*ited that neither ser*vice real*ised the implic*a*tions of Tunworth's pro*posed coup in Libya: by assas*sin*at*ing Gad*dafi the West would have lost a valu*able ally in the battle with Al Qaeda and instead would have had to face the threat of an Al Qaeda in con*trol of Libyan oil.
Given the tim*ing of the MI6 pay*ments along with the close rela*tion*ship between the IFG and bin Laden it appears that Brit*ish tax*pay*ers' money was used to fund Al Qaeda attacks in Libya. Ashur Sha*mis, a Libyan expert on Islamic extrem*ism, also added sup*port to David's allegation:
"There was a rise in the activ*it*ies of the Islamic Fight*ing Group from 1995 [around the time of the first pay*ment]," he said, "but many in Libya would be shocked if MI6 was involved.".
Issues raised by the MI6/Al Qaeda conspiracy
Nearly all experts who work in counter-terrorism as opposed to people on the "out*side" believe that assas*sin*a*tions, par*tic*u*larly in the case of heads of state only serve to destabil*ise a region. This was a view held by the US National Secur*ity Coun*cil until George W Bush became pres*id*ent. Although cer*tain Third World lead*ers do not share our stand*ards of demo*cracy, they do provide a cer*tain amount of sta*bil*ity to their coun*try and region. Remove such a leader from power by assas*sin*a*tion and you will only cre*ate a vacuum, which will lead to unrest and viol*ence as fac*tions com*pete for power.
Under inter*na*tional law, assas*sin*a*tion oper*a*tions are illegal. The only moral argu*ment for assas*sin*at*ing any dic*tator or ter*ror*ist is that such action would lead to con*sid*er*ably fewer deaths, than leav*ing him in power to con*tinue to sup*port viol*ence against the West. By 1996, Gad*dafi had ceased to sup*port the IRA or indeed any ter*ror*ism. There were, though, a few uncon*firmed reports that he had provided funds to Palestinian res*ist*ance move*ments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, ter*rit*or*ies illeg*ally occu*pied by Israel and sub*ject to UN res*ol*u*tions. In this con*text, Gad*dafi was fund*ing organ*isa*tions fight*ing for their own free*dom, not terrorists.
In addi*tion, MI6 had given its bless*ing to an indi*vidual who was lead*ing a group of Islamic extrem*ists with links to the Al Qaeda net*work. If Tun*worth, the indi*vidual the Liby*ans caught in the act, had suc*ceeded in assas*sin*at*ing Col*onel Gad*dafi, his sup*port*ers would in all prob*ab*il*ity have set up an Islamic Extrem*ist state in North Africa, fur*ther destabil*ising a region already sub*ject to viol*ence from Islamic fundamentalists.
Once Al Qaeda had Libya, it would have been all too easy for the group to take con*trol of neigh*bour*ing states like Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, which already have their own internal prob*lems with Al Qaeda. In con*trol of a state like Libya or a region like North Africa, Al Qaeda would have had:
- Ready access to Libyan funds, run*ning into £billions.
- Con*trol of the Libyan oil industry, destabil*ising world oil prices.
- The abil*ity to launch many more attacks like Septem*ber 11[SUP]th[/SUP], killing and maim*ing thou*sands of UK and US citizens.
- A land bor*der with Israel and there*fore a greatly increased capa*city to attack the state of Israel.
- The means to destabil*ise world secur*ity on an enorm*ous scale.
"This was an act of ter*ror*ism, in which Bri*tain became a state spon*sor of Islamic extrem*ism. To put this in con*text, the Pro*vi*sional IRA tries to avoid harm*ing civil*ians on the basis that it pro*duces bad pub*li*city (although inev*it*ably civil*ians are maimed and murdered when bombs go off on our streets). Islamic extrem*ists and Al Qaeda have no such restraint. MI6 con*sciously sup*por*ted ter*ror*ists who pose a greater threat to the national secur*ity of the UK than the Pro*vi*sional IRA ever did.
"Although my boss, Paul Slim did not seem to want to know, I made it clear to him that it was his respons*ib*il*ity to take it up the man*age*ment chain. This whole oper*a*tion was clearly a viol*a*tion of the rule of law that my recruiter had told me the ser*vices must observe.
"I could also clearly see that the rela*tion*ship between Tun*worth and MI6 was flawed. MI5 had no secur*ity record of Tun*worth and MI6 had only a couple of traces or brief men*tions. Yet less than six months later, after a hand*ful of meet*ings, MI6 had given him £100,000 of tax*pay*ers' money to assas*sin*ate a for*eign head of state. There was no way that MI6 could in that time have estab*lished a close enough rela*tion*ship with him to make any real*istic assess*ment of his char*ac*ter and reli*ab*il*ity he really could have been anybody."
If this sort of MI6 activ*ity only went on abroad and did not affect Brit*ish cit*izens, it might be less fright*en*ing for us. How*ever, MI6 routinely oper*ates in the UK. In addi*tion to IOPs35, UKG (now PT16B/OPS) ran agents in the UK and UKZ car*ries out surveillance.
If our elec*ted rep*res*ent*at*ives are not allowed to access MI6 doc*u*ments about the con*spir*acy then per*haps they should try using the US Free*dom of Inform*a*tion Act to obtain final con*firm*a*tion of MI6 fund*ing Tun*worth and the IFG and Al Qaeda.
Con*clu*sions
As David went on the record pre*cisely because of the MI6 fund*ing of Al Qaeda, it is worth look*ing at what he would have said in his defence in court, had he been allowed one:
Cover-up: There is over*whelm*ing evid*ence to indic*ate that the then For*eign Sec*ret*ary Robin Cook was eco*nom*ical with the truth'. His state*ment pro*tec*ted mur*der*ers in the intel*li*gence ser*vices and ensured that David was thrown in prison with a view to extra*di*tion. The media has been slow to put this to Cook and the head of Britain's intel*li*gence ser*vices, Prime Min*is*ter Tony Blair. Once the MI6 doc*u*ment appeared on the Inter*net and the police recovered rel*ev*ant mater*ial, it must have been clear to the Prime Min*is*ter that his For*eign Sec*ret*ary had not told the whole truth to the Brit*ish people. In that situ*ation, he had a simple choice under the min*is*terial code: either cor*rect the state*ment of his min*is*ter or enter into the. This is a cover up of monu*mental pro*por*tions. Its implic*a*tions for our demo*cracy and the rule of law are enormous.
Justice: Although the deaths of a few Liby*ans may not carry as much weight with news*pa*per edit*ors as the deaths of Brit*ish cit*izens, they are still somebody's sons and daugh*ters. They are human beings and not col*lat*
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx
"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.
“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.
“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.