Deep Politics Timeline

[Tracy Riddle]

• 11/1962 Gen. Wheeler said publicly, "It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem is military." (To Move a Nation)
  
• 11/1962 SAC started inactivation planning of the 306th Bombardment Wing at MacDill AFB in Florida, slated for April 1963. Phase down and transfer of B-47s was started, and by 15 February 1963 the Wing was no longer capable of fulfilling its part of the strategic war plan. General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff, recalling his days as the 306th Bomb Group's executive officer, compared its WWII role as "one of the handful of groups" that pioneered strategic daylight bombing and "carried the air war to the enemy during the lean days of 1941-43", to its role in the late forties as pioneer of jet bombardment tactics and combat ready deterrent force. He went on to say that this considerable accomplishment was done while at the same time assuming the staggering mission of maintaining a bomber alert force. On 1 April 1963, SAC inactivated the 306th BW at MacDill and activated it at McCoy AFB, Florida. The 4047th Strategic Wing personnel, equipment, B-52Ds and KC-135As were re-designated the 306th Bombardment Wing.
  
• 11/1962 JFK ordered McCone to stop all raids on Cuba, and McNamara to begin pulling the missiles out of Turkey.
  
• 11/1962 In a conversation that fall with his friend John Kenneth Galbraith, Kennedy again spoke angrily of the reckless pressures his advisers, both military and civilian, had put on him to bomb the Cuban missile sites. "I never had the slightest intention of doing so," said the president. John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life in Our Times ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 388.
  
• 11/1/1962 1:00A.M.: Adlai Stevenson reports to Washington that he has received preliminary reports from U Thant and Indar Jit Rikhye on their visit to Cuba. The U.N. officials report that relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union are, in Rikhye's words, "unbelievably bad." Rikhye states that although they have not had "definitive" discussions about the IL-28 bombers, "the Russians repeated...that they were determined to take out all equipment which the president has regarded as offensive and this would include the IL-28 's..." (Document 61, State Department Cable on Secretary General U Thant's Meetings with Castro, 11/1/62; Report by Rikhye on Impressions from United Nations Visit to Cuba, 11/1/62)
  
• 10:00A.M.: President Kennedy authorizes continued low-level reconnaissance flights over IL-28 airfields and missile bases but decides that no immediate retaliatory measures will be carried out if any U.S. aircraft are shot down. (NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, November 1, 1962, 10:00A.M., Meeting No. 16, 11/1/62)
  
• 2:59P.M.: Instructions approved by President Kennedy are issued to U.S. negotiators in New York for use in upcoming meetings with Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan . Kennedy directs U.S. negotiators to stress the importance of obtaining verification, which he describes as "essential" in "view of the history of the affair." With regard to the Soviet bombers stationed in Cuba, the negotiators are told to try to "elicit a clear confirmation that the IL-28 's are included [in the Kennedy- Khrushchev understanding] and are being dismantled for removal from Cuba." (Points President Kennedy Wishes Made in Conversation with Anastas Mikoyan and Vasily Kuznetsov, 11/1/62)
  
• 7:30P.M.: Anastas Mikoyan meets with John McCloy and Adlai Stevenson shortly after arriving in New York. Stevenson has been instructed to provide Mikoyan with a list of weapons that the United States considers "offensive" and expects the Soviet government to withdraw. However, engrossed in discussions dealing with many matters, Stevenson and McCloy apparently forget to give the list to Mikoyan. The U.S. negotiators remedy this oversight the next day by sending Mikoyan a letter with the list attached (see entry for November 2, 1962--morning). (Meeting between Adlai Stevenson , John McCloy and U Thant on Inspection Issues, 11/2/62; Garthoff 3, pp. 432-33)
  
• 8:30P.M.: Fidel Castro reports on his meetings with U Thant in a speech carried by Cuban radio and television. Castro also discusses the differences that had arisen between the Soviet Union and Cuba over the resolution of the missile crisis. Adopting a conciliatory tone, he states, "we have confidence in the leadership of the Soviet Union...more than ever, we should remember the generosity and friendship that the Soviets have shown us." Castro and Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekseyev meet during the day for the first time since October 27. (Transcript of Interview with Castro on his Meeting with U Thant--in Spanish, 11/1/62; Alekseyev, p. 19)
  
• 11/1/1962 Photoreconnaissance shows that all MRBM sites in Cuba have been bulldozed and that the missiles and associated launch equipment have been removed. Construction at the IRBM sites appears to have stopped, and the installations are partially dismantled. U.S. intelligence further reports that work is continuing on IL-28 s at San Julián airfield but that it is unclear whether the bombers are being assembled or dismantled. (The Soviet Bloc Armed Forces and the Cuban Crisis: A Chronology July-November 1962, 6/18/63, p. 86)
  
• 11/1/1962 Anastas Mikoyan arrives in NY en route to Havana, participates in UN meeting.
  
• 11/1/1962 KINGFISH Dominic High altitude Missile test over Johnston Island Area. Sub Megaton test.
  
• 11/1/1962 High Altitude Russian Nuclear Test conducted at Kapustin Yar. Hydrogen Bomb on Rocket. Yield approx. 300 Kilotons.
  
• 11/1/1962 In a radio and TV address, Castro rejects any international inspection on Cuba soil.
  
• 11/1/1962 USSR launched Mars 1 spacecraft. Korabl 13, launched 11/4 failed in earth orbit and reentered on 11/5. Mars 1 experienced communications failure 3/21/1963. Mars 1 passed within 120,000 miles of Mars 6/19/1963.
  
• 11/2/1962 10:00A.M.: At a meeting of the ExComm , Kennedy confirms that the United States will press for the removal of the IL-28 bombers currently stationed in Cuba. In other matters, Kennedy states that the quarantine must continue to be maintained but only by hailing all vessels entering the quarantine zone. He reconfirms orders to U.S. Navy vessels not to board Soviet Bloc ships. (Document 63, Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee, November 2, 1962, 10:00A.M., Meeting No. 17, 11/2/62)
  
• 11/2/1962 morning: In a letter to Anastas Mikoyan , Adlai Stevenson lists those items the United States considers to be "offensive weapons," adding, "we trust that the weapons you plan to remove include all those on this list."
  
• 5:30P.M.: In a brief televised address, President Kennedy informs the nation that the U.S. government has concluded "on the basis of yesterday's aerial photographs...that the Soviet missile bases in Cuba are being dismantled, their missiles and related equipment are being crated, and the fixed installations at these sites are being destroyed." (Statement of the President, November 2, 1962, the White House, 11/2/62)
  
• 11/2/1962 Anastas Mikoyan arrives in Havana and immediately announces his support of Fidel Castro 's "five points." Castro, still angry with the Soviet decision to remove the missiles, reportedly does not want to meet Mikoyan but is persuaded to do so by Ambassador Alekseyev. Castro's anger and concern revolve around not only the lack of consultation before the Soviet decision to remove the missiles but a belief that the United States will invade Cuba despite pledges to the contrary resulting from the Kennedy- Khrushchev agreement. Because of his distrust of any agreement, Castro agrees to the missile withdrawal only after receiving assurances from the Soviet government, including a pledge to maintain one Soviet combat brigade on the island. (Blight, pp. 267-68; Khrushchev 1, p. 500)
  
• 11/2/1962 Oswald called Marina and told her he had found an apartment for them at 604 Elsbeth Street, in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas. The photo below shows the building today, long deserted.
  
• 11/2/1962 JFK announced that the Soviets would withdraw their missiles from Cuba; he said that once the missiles were removed the US would "give assurances against invasion of Cuba" and that the US "shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere." Kennedy then assured the Cuban exiles: "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this Hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall someday be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."
  
• 11/2/1962 Press reports that while Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, Castro complains, "We have some reason for discontent with the Soviet Union."
  
• 11/3/1962 9:00A.M.: Anastas Mikoyan holds his first formal meeting with Fidel Castro at Castro's apartment in Havana. Castro meets alone with Mikoyan, Ambassador Alekseyev, and a Soviet interpreter. However, the talks are immediately interrupted by the news that Mikoyan's wife in the Soviet Union has died unexpectedly. Mikoyan later decides to have his son Sergo, who was accompanying him, return to Moscow while he remains in Cuba. (Alekseyev, p. 23)
  
• 4:30P.M.: The nineteenth meeting of the ExComm focuses on inspection questions and the issue of the IL-28 bombers. Adlai Stevenson , who attends the meeting with John McCloy and Charles Yost, brings the group up to date on the slow-moving talks in New York. President Kennedy states his belief that the United States should announce that it considers the IL-28 s to be offensive weapons should be withdrawn from Cuba, but he agrees that the public announcement of this position should be delayed until the next day. (Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 19, November 3, 1962, 4:30P.M., 11/3/62)
  
• 8:44 p.m: President Kennedy issues additional directions to "all concerned with the present negotiations in Cuba." The formal instructions state: "We have good evidence that the Russians are dismantling the missile bases...[But] the assembly of IL-28 's continues. There is some evidence of an intent to establish a submarine-tending facility. The future of the SAM sites is unclear. We have no satisfactory assurances on verification..." Kennedy concludes, "in blunt summary, we want no offensive weapons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28." (Instructions from the President to All Concerned with Present Negotiations in Cuba, 11/3/62; Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 19, November 3, 1962, 4:30P.M., 11/3/62)
  
• 11/3/1962 President Kennedy replies to Premier Khrushchev 's letter of October 30 addressing the issue of inspection and verification before the naval quarantine can be lifted. Kennedy cites "very serious problems" if Fidel Castro cannot be convinced to allow on-site verification, and he suggests that sustaining quarantine "can be of assistance to Mr. Mikoyan in his negotiations with Premier Castro." (Kennedy- Khrushchev Messages Exchanged on the Cuban Crisis, 11/3/62)
  
• 11/3/1962 Sometime after 4pm, Oswald rents the 604 flat at 602 Elsbeth Street in Oak Cliff, Dallas, from Mahlon Tobias.
  
• 11/3/1962 In Washington, NSC wants on-site verification of Soviet base dismantling as precondition for formal US pledge not to invade Cuba.
  
• 11/4/1962 John McCloy lunches with Soviet negotiators at his Stamford, Connecticut, home. Vasily Kuznetsov says all missile sites constructed by the Soviet Union were dismantled as of November 2. Kuznetsov proposes that the United States conduct at-sea inspections: the Soviet Union would give the United States a schedule for the removal of the missiles and allow the United States to bring ships alongside Soviet vessels to examine the cargo on deck. In return, the Soviet government wants the quarantine lifted and a formal protocol of U.S. guarantees, including a pledge that the United States will not invade Cuba or induce other Latin American countries to attempt an invasion. Kuznetsov also seeks a guarantee that no subversive activity will be undertaken against Fidel Castro and suggests U.N. observation in the United States as well as in Cuba. (The Soviet Bloc Armed Forces and the Cuban Crisis: A Chronology July-November 1962, 6/18/63, p. 89)
  
• 11/4/1962 Alexandra and Gary Taylor drive to Fort Worth to help the Oswalds move to their new place. Alex Kleinlerer witnessed a fight between Marina and Lee, in which Lee slapped her hard twice; the Taylors did not see this. Marina hated the new apartment and called it a pigsty. But Oswald persuaded her that it was three rooms for only $68 a month.
  
• 11/4/1962 Miami press reports that the anti-Castro Cuban Student Directorate claims that Soviet missiles are being held in caves in Cuba.
  
• 11/5/1962 3:15P.M.: President Kennedy dispatches a brief memo to Robert McNamara warning that "the Russians may try again. This time they may prepare themselves for action on the sea in the Cuban area. Does Admiral Anderson think they could build up a secret naval base which will put them on a near parity with us if we should once again blockade?" Admiral Anderson later advises McNamara that the Soviet Union could base naval forces in Cuba in several ways, but he believes that U.S. intelligence would detect all but the most "austere" buildup. Anderson repeats his earlier recommendation that submarines operating out of, or supported from, Cuban bases should be declared offensive weapons and placed on the list of prohibited materials. (Concern over the Possible Establishment of a Soviet Submarine Base in Cuba, 11/5/62; Johns, p. 259)
  
• 11/5/1962 In a three-page letter to President Kennedy , Premier Khrushchev writes that he is "seriously worried" about the way in which the United States has defined "offensive weapons" that the Soviet Union is to remove from Cuba, that is, as including the IL-28 s and Komar-missile boats. Khrushchev asks Kennedy to withdraw his "additional demands," saying that the Soviet Union views them as "a wish to bring our relations back again into a heated state in which they were but several days ago." (Document 66, Premier Khrushchev 's Letter to President Kennedy , Regarding U.S. List of Offensive Weapons in Cuba, 11/5/62) Soviet ships begin to return the first MRBM missiles and associated launch equipment to the Soviet Union. The process of removing the equipment is completed on November 9. (Department of Defense Press Conference of Robert McNamara , 2/28/63, p. M-1)
  
• 11/5/1962 President Kennedy hands Secretary of Defense McNamara a short memorandum expressing his concern that U.S. plans for an invasion of Cuba seem "thin." Warning that using too few troops could result in the United States becoming "bogged down," Kennedy recommends calling up three Army Reserve divisions and, if necessary, building additional divisions. As a result of the memo, McNamara tells military planners later that day that additional Army divisions might be needed for a successful invasion. The JCS meet on November 7 with CINCLANT to rectify the problem. (U.S. Army in the Cuban Crisis, 1/1/63)
  
• 11/5/1962 Robert Kennedy continues to exert pressure on the IL-28 question in a meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin , telling the Soviet ambassador that "it was very clear that the... IL-28 's had to go." Further pressure to remove the bombers is brought to bear by U Thant, who, at the request of the United States, raises the issue with Vasily Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov replies that the bomber question is "a new issue" and not "covered" in the Kennedy- Khrushchev understanding. (Meeting with Soviet Representatives on On-Site and ICRC Inspection, 11/5/62; Garthoff 1, p. 110)
  
• 11/5/1962 An aerial encounter between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and Cuban-based MiG fighters occurs. Although no shots are known to have been fired, U.S. policymakers express concern that the incident suggests that more attempts to intercept reconnaissance aircraft would be made in the future. Robert McNamara , with the concurrence of the JCS, proposes that the public not be informed of the incident, but that a diplomatic protest be made to the Soviet Union. Both high- and low-altitude reconnaissance flights continue as scheduled the following day. (Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis, 12/21/62, p. 70; Highlights of World Activities and Situations, 11/5/62)
  
• 11/5/1962 Low-level photography documents loading of Soviet missiles at the main Mariel port facility for return to the USSR. On the dock are vehicles later identified by NPIC as nuclear warhead vans.
  
• 11/5/1962 The Oswalds had a violent fight and Marina ran from the house. Marina called Anna Meller from a gas station, and they picked her and June up; she told the Mellers that Lee had beaten her. She promised herself, "I'll never go back to that hell." (Marina and Lee 263)
  
• 11/6/1962 President Kennedy sends another letter to Premier Khrushchev regarding the U.S. definition of "offensive weapons." In it he responds to Khrushchev 's accusation that the United States is trying to complicate the Cuban situation. The IL-28 s are not "minor things" for the United States, Kennedy writes, asserting that the weapons are definitely capable of carrying out "offensive" missions. The president raises the issue of the four reinforced Soviet troop regiments in Cuba for the first time. He also expresses concern over possible Soviet submarine facilities, telling Khrushchev that he attaches "the greatest importance to the personal assurances you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba." (President Kennedy 's Letter to Khrushchev Stressing the Importance of Removing the IL-28 s and Obtaining Verification, 11/6/62)
  
• 11/6/1962 Midterm elections saw Republicans gain several House seats, Democrats gained 3 Senate seats. 47% voter turnout. In Alabama the GOP came close to winning a Senate seat. Ted White noted in 1965, "There was a Southern strategy to be shaped - if the Republican Party did indeed want to court the South." (Making of the President 1964) Democrats benefited from the missile crisis. Newcomers in the Senate included Birch Bayh, Ted Kennedy, George McGovern. Donald Rumsfeld is a newly elected congressman (R-Illinois). Right-wing stalwarts such as Senator Capehart and Rep. Walter H. Judd were defeated.
  
• 11/6/1962 Nixon lost the governor's race in California, and then gave a press conference in which he seemed on the verge of a breakdown: "Now that...all the members of the press are so delighted that I have lost...I believe Governor Brown has a heart, even though he believes I do not...you've had a lot of - a lot of fun - that you've had an opportunity to attack me, and I think I've given as good as I've taken...But as I leave you I want you to know - just think how much you're going to be missing. You won't have Nixon to kick around any more because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference..." RFK recalled in a 1964 oral history interview that JFK didn't think Nixon's political career was really over at this point.
  
• 11/6/1962 In San Francisco, voters approved the BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) bond issue.
  
• 11/6 or 11/1962 De Mohrenschildt arrived at the apartment to get Marina's and June's belongings, but Oswald told him: "By God, you are not going to do it. I will tear all her dresses and I will break all the baby things." (H 9 232) After an argument, Oswald gave in. Later, De Mohrenschildt defended Oswald: "Having had many wives, I could see his point of view. She was annoying him all the time - 'Why don't you make some money?,' why don't they have a car, why don't they have more dresses, look at everybody else living so well, and they are just miserable flunkies. She was annoying him all the time. Poor guy was going out of his mind." (H 9 233) Posner says that De Mohrenschildt was abusive to his first wife, and Marina told Posner in an interview that she never nagged at Lee. (Posner 94)
  
• 11/6/1962 The Republicans bitterly accused the administration of delaying the missile crisis for maximum voter impact. Rep. Bob Wilson (R-Calif.), chairman of the GOP Congressional Committee, charged that the administration knew about the missiles in September. Then Castro refused to allow on-site UN inspections; the GOP charged that the Russian buildup was continuing.
  
• 11/7/1962 4:02P.M.: A cable from U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Foy Kohler reports, "there seems to me no doubt that events of [the] past ten days have really shaken [the] Soviet leadership." One Soviet military official, Kohler recounts, "told my wife he was now willing to believe in God." Kohler reports seeing no evidence of any split within the ruling elite at a Kremlin reception held during the evening, and he states that Premier Khrushchev has privately discouraged an immediate summit with President Kennedy , saying that the two sides should not "rush" into such a meeting. (Some Footnotes to Kremlin Reception, 11/7/62)
  
• 5:00P.M.: After being informed that the Soviet missiles withdrawal was continuing, President Kennedy tells the ExComm that the United States "wouldn't invade with the Soviet missiles out of Cuba." Kennedy suggests that a formal non-invasion commitment might be issued once the Soviet Union remove the IL-28 bombers and the U.S. receives "assurances that there will be no reintroduction of strategic missiles." Apparently, some uncertainty still exists on how to handle the IL-28 s, for Kennedy requests that the ExComm reconvene the next day to "decide whether we should go to the mat on the IL-28 bombers or whether we should say that the Soviets have now completed their agreement to remove the missiles and move on to other problems." (Document 65, Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting, November 5, 1962, 11/5/62; Washington Embassy Reports Re Events in Cuba, ca. 11/5/62)
  
• 9:32P.M.: In a cable to Adlai Stevenson , Secretary of State Rusk advises, "our primary purpose is to get the MRBMs and IL-28 bombers out [of Cuba], and we would go far in reducing our list of offensive weapons in order to achieve this purpose." The United States eventually drops its demands for the removal of Komar-class missile boats in order to focus on the IL-28 bombers. (Instructions for Negotiations Using a Minimum List of Offensive Weapons, 11/7/62)
  
• 11/7/1962 Billy Sol Estes was sentenced to eight years in prison for swindling a Texas farmer.
  
• 11/7/1962 Forrestal sent a memo to RFK: "I became concerned about the kind of information you seem to be getting on South Vietnam. Both Averell and I feel that the war is not going as well out there as one might be led to believe..."
  
• 11/8/1962 4:30P.M.: The ExComm discusses the ways in which the United States can pressure Cuba into removing the IL-28 bombers. According to minutes of the meeting, President Kennedy "was inclined not to reimpose the quarantine, but he did favor pressure on our allies to keep their ships out of Cuba." Various other ideas are offered, including tightening the quarantine, initiating new covert action against Castro, and launching air attacks on the IL-28 aircraft. (Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 23, November 8, 1962, 4:30P.M., 11/8/62; Notes on 4:30P.M. ExComm Meeting, 11/8/62)
  
• 11/8/1962 A six-man CIA sabotage team dispatched as part of Task Force W blows up a Cuban industrial facility (see entry for October 30, 1962). The incident is never raised in U.S.-Soviet talks and remains unknown to most if not all members of the ExComm . (Garthoff 1, p. 122)
  
• 11/8/1962 The Defense Department announces that "all known" MRBM and IRBM Soviet missile bases in Cuba have been dismantled, and that a "substantial" number of missiles have been loaded aboard Soviet ships or are being moved to port areas. (Defense Department Statement on Evidence That All MRBM and IRBM Bases Have Been Dismantled, 11/8/62)
  
• 11/8/1962 U Thant offers a new on-site inspection proposal in which five ambassadors to Cuba from Asian, African, European and Latin American countries would verify the withdrawal of the missiles. Cuba rejects this proposal, as it does all other unilateral inspection formulas, on November 11. (Discussion of Draft Letter from U Thant to Castro on Verification by Latin American Ambassadors, 11/9/62; U Thant's Proposal for On-Site Verification by a Group of Ambassadors in Havana-Includes Revised Copy, 11/8/62)
  
• 11/8/1962 The SWP politely turns down Oswald's request for membership because there are no other members in the Dallas area, and they don't want to start a branch for one person. (H 19 518) Probably on this day Lee met with Marina at De Mohrenschildt's house to discuss their problems. They came to no agreement. (H 1 11)
  
• 11/9/1962 The last of the ships removing Soviet MRBM missiles from Cuba leave the island. Six vessels, the Bratsk, Dvinogorsk, I. Polzunov, Labinsk, M. Anosov and Volgoles, have left Mariel since November 5, and two ships, the F. Kurchatov and the L. Komsomol depart from Casilda during this period. During the day, five of the ships are inspected at sea, with the Soviet ships pulling canvas covers off the missile transporters to allow U.S. ships to observe and photograph their contents. Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester later tells reporters that the "responsible people of this government are satisfied" that the ships are in fact carrying missiles. (Department of Defense Press Conference of Robert McNamara , 2/28/63, p. M-1; The Missiles Leave Cuba, ca. 12/62; NYT, 11/10/62)
  
• 11/9/1962 JFK and Warren were seen by reporters on Air Force One laughing over news stories of Nixon's defeat. (Chief Justice 398)
  
• 11/9/1962 Enver Hoxha of Albania criticized Khrushchev for losing the Cuban Missile Crisis showdown.
  
• 11/11/1962 Press reports that Soviets ship captains were not letting inspectors see all of the missiles they supposedly have on board.
  
• 11/12/1962 11:00A.M.: Adlai Stevenson reports to the ExComm that negotiations in New York on the IL-28 issue are deadlocked. At President Kennedy 's prompting, the group discusses various ways in which the United States might strike a deal with the Soviet Union over the bomber issue. The possibility of offering further non-invasion assurances, ending the quarantine, and lifting on-site inspection demands are raised as possible inducements, but the meeting ends without a firm decision on how to proceed in the negotiations. President Kennedy decides not to lower SAC alert levels at the time, with Robert McNamara noting that such a decision could send the wrong "signals" to the Soviet Union. (Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 24, November 12, 1962, 11:00A.M., 11/12/62)
  
• 11/12/1962 Premier Khrushchev sends President Kennedy a message confirming the removal of the missiles. The letter adopts a friendly tone, commenting on the outcome of the November 6, 1962 elections in the United States: "You managed to pin your political rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat," the letter comments on the fact that Nixon lost his bid to become governor of California. "This did not draw tears from our eyes either." (Document 69, Premier Khrushchev 's Letter to President Kennedy , 11/12/62)
  
• 11/12/1962 night: President Kennedy instructs his brother Robert to inform Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that Khrushchev 's "word" on the IL-28 s will "suffice" and the U.S. will not insist on an immediate withdrawal of the bomber planes. Robert Kennedy tells the Soviet Ambassador that the U.S would hope the planes are removed "within, say, 30 days." (Document 70, President Kennedy 's Oral Message to Premier Khrushchev , On the Subject of the IL-28 Aircraft, 11/12/62)
  
• 11/12/1962 FBI Los Angeles memo to Hoover about Edward Becker.
  
• 11/12/1962 George Bouhe moves Marina and June from the Mellers' apartment to the home of Katya Ford.
  
• 11/13/1962 morning: ExComm members continue to discuss the IL-28 issue. The group's recommendations, incorporated into a paper by U. Alexis Johnson , include a proposed sequence of actions designed to end the deadlock. To begin with, the group recommends a "last chance" private message to Premier Khrushchev , warning that further actions could be taken shortly. If the message fails to produce the desired outcome, the group suggests tightening the blockade, arranging for other countries in Latin America and elsewhere to apply diplomatic pressure on Fidel Castro , and using intense low-altitude reconnaissance as a form of psychological warfare. The ExComm also notes that one other option exists but recommends that it only be used as a last-ditch measure: "provoking" an attack on U.S. reconnaissance planes and responding by striking a variety of Cuban targets, including the IL-28 bombers. (Cuban Contingency Paper: Next Steps on the IL-28 's, 11/14/62)
  
• 11/13/1962 The Socialist Labor Party in NY receives a request from Oswald for literature. This party advocated non-violent, democratic socialism.
  
• 11/14/1962 Premier Khrushchev sends another message to President Kennedy on the IL-28 issue. Khrushchev hedges on when the Soviet Union will remove the bombers, but states that "it can be done in 2-3 months." He also complains that the U.S. is "not carrying out its commitments [sic]" to end overflights and quarantine, nor has it agreed to "register" the non-invasion pledge. (Document 71, Premier Khrushchev 's Letter to President Kennedy Regarding Removal of the IL-28 Aircraft, 11/14/62)
  
• 11/14/1962 President Kennedy discusses the Cuban situation with Harold MacMillan over the telephone. Kennedy admits that no firm strategy for ironing out the remaining issues has been decided upon: "We do not want to crank up the quarantine again over the bombers. The only question is whether we should do that or take some other action. For example, we might say the whole deal is off and withdraw our no invasion pledge and harass them generally." (MacMillan, p. 215)
  
• 11/15/1962 7:00P.M.: In a five-page letter to U Thant, Fidel Castro warns that Cuba will fire on U.S. reconnaissance planes: any aircraft flying over Cuban airspace, he says, do so "at the risk of being destroyed." Noting that the United States has already inspected Soviet ships at sea, he also declares that Cuba will continue to reject "unilateral inspection by any body, national or international, on Cuban territory." U.S. intelligence has reported during the day that Soviet control of the Cuban air defense system has tightened sharply. Cuban fighter aircraft are detected practicing low-level flight tactics in the Havana area. (Summary of Items of Significant Interest Period 160701-170700 November 1962, 11/17/62)
  
• 11/15/1962 President Kennedy writes to Premier Khrushchev on the continuing IL-28 issue. His letter complains that the "three major parts of the undertakings on your side--the removal of the IL-28 's, the arrangements for verification, and safeguards against introduction--have not yet been carried out." During the day, Anatoly Dobrynin is informed that the IL-28 issue has "reached a turning point," and that unless the matter is resolved, the United States and Soviet Union will "soon find ourselves back in a position of increasing tension." (Document 72, President Kennedy 's Letter to Premier Krushchev, 11/15/62; Status of the Negotiations on Removal of IL-28 's, 11/16/62)
  
• 11/15/1962 RFK compiles notes about the Cuban Missile Crisis. About LBJ he writes, "…After the meetings were finished, he would circulate and whine and complain about our being weak, but he never made…any suggestions or recommendations." (RFK and His Times)
  
• 11/16/1962 7:00A.M.: The largest amphibious landing since World War II begins as part of an exercise at Onslow Beach, North Carolina. The two-day exercise, a full-scale rehearsal for an invasion of Cuba, includes six Marine battalion landing teams, four by assault boats and two by helicopter assault carriers. ( CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis, 4/29/63, p. 151; Summary of Items of Significant Interest Period 090701-100700 November 1962, 11/10/62)
  
• 11/16-18/1962 Johnny Rosselli takes a trip: he buys a ticket -- in his own name -- to Phoenix, booked reservations at a Mountain Shadows resort (with two female guests) also in his own name. The FBI then finds out Rosselli is on his way to Washington DC to see a congressman so feeling he is developing an alibi, they tail him. (Mahoney p284)
  
• 11/16/1962 4:05P.M.: The JCS meets with President Kennedy to report on the readiness status of forces that would be involved in any military action against Cuba. U.S. forces massed for a Cuban invasion have reached their peak strength, the JCS reports: some 100,000 Army troops, 40,000 Marines and 14,500 paratroopers stand ready, with 550 combat aircraft and over 180 ships available to support an invasion. Kennedy is advised that this advanced state of readiness can be maintained for about thirty days. The talking paper prepared for Maxwell Taylor for this meeting spells out the JCS position on the IL-28 deadlock: they recommend that the United States continue to press the Soviet Union to remove the bombers, suggesting that the quarantine be extended to POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) if no progress is made. If the quarantine does not succeed in having the aircraft removed, the Joint Chiefs warn that the United States "should be prepared to take them out by air attack." (Document 73, Talking Paper for General Maxwell Taylor 's Meeting with President Kennedy , 11/16/62; Department of Defense Operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2/12/63, pp. 8, 12-14; Summary of Items of Significant Interest Period 180701-190700 November 1962, 11/19/62)
  
• 11/16/1962 LBJ sends a get-well card to J. Edgar Hoover, who is in the hospital at George Washington University. The nature of his illness remains unknown to this day. (LBJ presidential library)
  
• 11/17/1962 James Baldwin's "Letter from a Region in My Heart" is published in The New Yorker; it will later be published in book form as The Fire Next Time.
  
• 11/17/1962 Marina and June are moved to the house of Valentina Ray.
  
• 11/18/1962 John McCloy and Adlai Stevenson have a long meeting with Vasily Kuznetsov and Valerian Zorin to try to force the dispute over the IL-28 s to a head. McCloy repeatedly warns Kuznetsov that President Kennedy is scheduling a press conference for 6:00P.M. on November 20, and that the United States must have a pledge that the bombers will be removed by that time. McCloy also continues to raise U.S. concerns over the lack of on-site verification, the possibility that new "offensive weapons" might be introduced into Cuba and the continued presence of four reinforced Soviet troop regiments in Cuba. Stevenson reports to the ExComm that the negotiations ended with "no indication from Kuznetsov that they would give way in regard to [the] IL-28 's." (Cuba-Meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov, Sunday, November 18, 1962, 11/19/62)
  
• 11/18/1962 Marina and Lee Oswald decide to get back together again. Lee also got into an argument with Frank Ray about economics.
  
• 11/18/1962 Press reports that three pro-Castro Cubans have been arrested by the FBI in alleged conspiracy to plant explosives in NY and New Jersey.
  
• 11/19/1962 10:00A.M.: At a morning ExComm session, President Kennedy authorizes high-level reconnaissance flights but again suspends low-level sorties. Robert Kennedy scrawls notes on the back of an envelope during the meeting: "President reluctant to send in low-level flights...How far can we push K[hrushchev?]." During the day, the attorney general meets with Georgi Bolshakov and warns him that low-level reconnaissance will begin again unless the Soviet Union promises to remove the bombers. Robert Kennedy states that he needs a response to the IL-28 issue before the president's press conference the next day. (NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, November 19, 1962, 10:00A.M., Meeting No. 27, 11/19/62; Schlesinger, p. 526)
  
• 8:25P.M.: Letters from President Kennedy to Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, and Harold Macmillan are transmitted by the State Department. Kennedy warns the European leaders that if the IL-28 s are not withdrawn, further U.S. action might result, including the extension of the quarantine to include POL and the possibility of an air attack against Cuba in response to attacks on U.S. reconnaissance planes. Although the overall situation is said to be "somewhat less dangerous than it was in October," Kennedy warns that getting Premier Khrushchev to back down again in some ways might be more difficult than it was during the missile crisis. Similar messages for Latin American heads of state are also sent during the evening. (Text of Personal Message from President Kennedy to Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer and Harold Macmillan on the IL-28 Situation, 11/19/62)
  
• 11/19/1962 Fidel Castro informs U Thant that the Cuban government will not object if the Soviet Union removes the IL-28 s from Cuba, thereby ending the crisis over the Soviet bombers. In a letter announcing his new position, Castro renounces any claim to the aircraft, stating that the IL-28 aircraft are "the property of the Soviet Government." However, the letter warns again that any "warplane invading Cuban airspace could do so only at the risk of being destroyed" and again rejects any unilateral inspection of Cuban territory. The Cuban government apparently had been persuaded to allow the bombers to be removed by the signing of a new Cuban-Soviet agreement under which the Soviet Union would leave an instruction center on the island where Cuban troops could be trained in the use of Soviet military equipment. (Document 75, Prime Minister Castro's Letter to Secretary General U Thant, Withdrawing Opposition to Removal of IL-28 Aircraft, 11/19/62; Alekseyev, p. 26)
  
• 11/19/1962 Time magazine commented (in "California: Career's End"): "Barring a miracle…[Nixon's] political career ended last week." Newsweek called Nixon a "political has-been at 49."
  
• 11/19/1962 OSWALD pays $10.00 (postal money order) against travel loan from State Dept. Posted 11/20/62 from Box 2915, Dallas. (CE1120)
  
• 11/20/1962 President Kennedy directs an oral message through the Soviet ambassador for Chairman Khrushchev stating that he will announce a lower state of alert for U.S. forces at his press conference.
  
• 11/20/1962 Premier Khrushchev formally agrees to remove the IL-28 s from Cuba in a fourteen-page letter to President Kennedy . In his letter, Khrushchev complains that during their exchange of correspondence in October, Kennedy had not made "a single mention of bomber planes...I informed you that the IL-28 planes are twelve years old and by their combat characteristics they at present cannot be classified as offensive types of weapons." Nonetheless, he added that "we intend to remove them within a month." In a separate transmission, Khrushchev urges that Kennedy refrain from "hurting the national feelings of the Cubans" during his upcoming press conference. (Document 76, Premier Khrushchev 's Letter to President Kennedy , Announcing Withdrawl of IL-28 Aircraft from Cuba, 11/20/62; Khrushchev Transmission, 11/20/62)
  
• 3:30P.M.: After discussing Premier Khrushchev 's letter agreeing to remove the IL-28 s, the ExComm agrees to lift the quarantine. In addition, the SAC alert is ordered canceled and no low-altitude flights are authorized for November 21. U-2 missions are scheduled to verify the dismantling and withdrawal of the bomber aircraft. (Document 77, Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee, November 20, 1962, 3:30P.M., Meeting No. 28, 11/20/62)
  
• 6:00P.M.: President Kennedy announces at a press conference, "I have today been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers in Cuba will be withdrawn in thirty days...I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine." Kennedy suggests that because no on-site inspection has occurred, the preconditions for a U.S. non-invasion guarantee has not been met. Nonetheless, he states, "If all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future...and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean." (The President's News Conference of November 20, 1962, 11/20/62)
  
• 11:21P.M.: The JCS orders SAC to return to its normal airborne alert status, effective immediately. During the day, SAC forces lower their alert status from DEFCON 2, and other U.S. military commands reduced their alert status from DEFCON 3 to DEFCON 4. (Summary of Items of Significant Interest Period 200701-210700 November 1962, 11/21/62; Sagan 2, p. 101)
  
• 11/20/1962 JFK tells the press that Castro will let the Russians take back their bombers, and the quarantine of Cuba will be lifted. In a less intense sense the crisis continued until November 2 0 , when President Kennedy announced at a press conference that two outstanding issues had been resolved: In addition to its nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union had agreed to remove from Cuba its IL-28 bombers, which the U.S. regarded as offensive weapons. Although there would be no UN inspections because Premier Fidel Castro would not cooperate in a process verifying the missiles' and bombers' removal, the Soviets agreed to leave the weapons on the decks of their departing ships for observation by the United States.
  
• 11/20/1962 Hoover sends a memo to RFK, refering to a hospital stay and his health. (Powers, Secrecy & Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover)
  
• 11/20/1962 By executive order, JFK barred racial discrimination in federally funded housing.
  
• 11/21/1962 9:49P.M.: In a cable to Adlai Stevenson and John McCloy , Dean Rusk summarizes the status of crisis following the IL-28 agreement: The loose ends still remaining unfulfilled...are these: On [the] Soviet side, on-site U.N.-supervised verification of removal of offensive weapons, and longer-term safeguards against their reintroduction. On our side, formal assurances against invasion of Cuba. Rusk notes that the United States favors settling the issue by having the U.S. and Soviet Union issue parallel declarations before the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. declaration, he writes, will state "our non-invasion assurances, contingent on Cuban behavior." (Next Steps in New York Negotiations, 11/21/62)
  
• 11/21/1962 President Kennedy sends a brief letter to Premier Khrushchev welcoming the Soviet leader's decision to remove the IL-28 s. Kennedy writes, "I have been glad to get your letter of November 20, which arrived in good time yesterday. As you will have seen, I was able to announce the lifting of our quarantine promptly at my press conference, on the basis of your welcome assurance that the IL-28 bombers will be removed within a month." Kennedy also reassures Khrushchev that "there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course." (Message for Chairman Khrushchev , 11/21/62) The president officially lifts the naval quarantine of Cuba, and measures are taken promptly by the U.S. Navy to return to a normal readiness posture. Secretary McNamara authorizes the secretary of the Air Force to release 14,200 air reservists, and the Defense Department removes involuntary extensions for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Almost simultaneously, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations announce the cancellation of the special military preparedness measures that had been put into effect on October 23. ( Khrushchev 's Cuban Venture in Retrospect, 12/7/62; Department of Defense Operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2/12/63, pp. 14, 19; Garthoff 1, p. 114)
  
• 11/21/1962 Edward Becker was referred to in an FBI report which dealt with an alleged counterfeiting ring and a Dallas lawyer who reportedly had knowledge of it. This report noted that Becker was being used as an "informant" by a private investigator (Blodgett) in the investigation. (HSCA vol 9)
  
• 11/21/1962 The only document at the Pentagon that supported awarding the TFX contract to General Dynamics was a five-page memo of justification, dated today, signed by McNamara, Eugene Zuckert (Sec of the Air Force) and Fred Korth. The memo was filled with inaccuracies about the cost of the project and the performance claims for the GD plane. (Mollenhoff)
  
• 11/22/1962 Premier Khrushchev sends a five page letter to Kennedy regarding the Soviet leader's views on Cuba and opinions on Fidel Castro . Cuban leaders, he observes, are "young, expansive people--Spaniards in a word, to use it far from the pejorative sense." Given nationalist sensitivities in Cuba, Khrushchev asks Kennedy to avoid steps "capable of causing scratches to national pride and prestige" of the Cuban leadership. (Premier Khrushchev 's Letter to President Kennedy , 11/22/62)
  
• 11/22/1962 Press reports that 14,000 Air Reservists will be demobilized.
  
• 11/22/19623 Press reports that Gen. Walker has been found mentally competent to stand trial. Dr. Stubblefield found that Walker had a "superior level of intelligence."
  
• 11/22/1962 On this Thanksgiving Day, the Oswalds go by bus to Robert's house in Fort Worth. John Pic is there, but not Marguerite. This is the first time in ten years Lee has seen his half-brother. They refrain from discussing politics or his defection; John will never see Lee again, and Robert won't see him again until the assassination weekend.
  
• 11/24/1962 The Pentagon announced that the TFX contract would be awarded to General Dynamics. Henry M. Jackson was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate Government Operations Committee and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. He learned that: "Boeing's bid was substantially lower than its competitor's. Reports indicated Boeing's bid was $100 million lower on an initial development contract and that the cost difference might run as high as $400 million on the total $6.5 billion procurement."
  
• 11/25/1962 Anastas Mikoyan pledges to Cuba that USSR is still their "friend and protector." Privately, Castro is very disappointed in Khrushchev.
  
• 11/26/1962 Mikoyan in NY tells the press that the agreement between JFK and Khrushchev "opens up the possibility" of better relations between the US and USSR.
  
• 11/26/1962 Stars and Stripes story: "Prof Says Beings From Outer Space Visited Earth." A 28-year-old assistant professor of astronomy at Harvard, Dr. Carl Sagan, told members of the American Rocket Society that it was a mathematical probability that intelligent beings existed elsewhere in the universe, and may have visited Earth sometime in its past.
  
• 11/26/1962 Havana announces it will permit UN on-site inspection only if the US allows similar inspection of the dismantling of camps and bases from which attacks on Cuba have been launched.
  
• 11/29/1962 10:00A.M.: The ExComm meets with President Kennedy to discuss intelligence and diplomatic reports on Cuba, U.S. declaratory policy on the IL-28 issue, the future of OPERATION MONGOOSE and "post mortems of Oct. 15-28." Kennedy directs the State Department to prepare a long-range plan to "keep pressure on Castro." (NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, November 29, 1962, 10:00A.M., Meeting No. 31, 11/29/62; Executive Committee Meeting, November 29, 1962, 10A.M. Agenda, 11/28/62)
  
• 11/29/1962 Kennedy: "...I am certain that after the dust of centuries has passed over our cities, we, too, will be remembered not for victories or defeats in battle or in politics, but for our contribution to the human spirit." Closed-circuit television broadcast on behalf of the National Cultural Center from the National Guard Armory in Washington, D.C.
  
• 11/29/1962 4:30P.M.: In a three-hour meeting with President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk , Anastas Mikoyan repeatedly presses for a clarification and a confirmation of a U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba. Kennedy reassures Mikoyan that the United States has no intention of invading Cuba, but he backs away from the idea of issuing further formal guarantees, stressing that other conditions set out in his exchange of letters with Nikita Khrushchev have not been met (in particular, international on-site verification and safeguards on the reintroduction of strategic weapons into Cuba). However, Kennedy does state that if the Soviet Union abides by the exchange of correspondence, the United States will as well. (U.S. Policy toward Cuba and Related Events 1 November 1961- 15 March 1963, ca. 3/16/63, pt. 3, p. 11; Garthoff 1, pp. 126-27)
  
• 11/29/1962 Hoover responded to a get-well note from JFK: "I am happy to say that I am feeling fine and expect to be back at my desk before too long." (JFK presidential library) It is not known whether Hoover was still in the hospital at this point, or what his illness was.