01-10-2010, 07:27 AM
Quoting Jewett:
1) What, specifically, was the battlefield information or intelligence available to the US cavalry chain of command (and especially Custer) at the critical moments?
Quoting Drago: "There is a suspicious disconnect between what the government knew and what Custer was told in terms of the cumulative size of hostile bands awaiting him. It should surprise no one who reads this forum that, by most accounts, Custer was led to believe that the number of warriors likely to fight was significantly smaller than the number he actually encountered."
Again, I'd have to dig deep into the records and I did note specificity, but your statement sounds much like Cheney suggesting the Iraqis would throw flowers at the feet of the conquerors and other suggestions that we would be out of Afghanistan soon. The tactics against indigenous tribes will be the same, however: brutal and sometimes mass murder. Was there a similar "disconnect" in understanding the degree to which the local populace would fight to defend their turf? Was there a blindness in some sense to the technique of the ambush? There shouldn't have been, but perhaps they did not think the Indian capable of an ambush on a larger scale than they had experienced.
Quoting Jewett:
2) What factors -- aside from or in addition to the deep politics of US governance and military affairs -- were present in terms of the nature of the encounter... small, highly-mobile forces in a vast wilderness restrained by extremely slow communications? In addition, how did US cavalry mindset and tactics as evolved from the Civil War function in this type of encounter?
Quoting Drago: "The government forces in the Montana campaign were, in the agregate, large. They were divided in order to maximize the chances for picking up the hostile trails and effecting a pincer movement designed to corral hostiles and return them to reservations.
The speed of communications was what it was, and thus commanders were given what by today's standards would be considered extraordinary leeway once in the field...."
Well, the mobility and decison-making wasn't restrained, but you make a good point; what you describe sounds remarkably similar to the way Napoleon used his three corp system as a weighted net, each corps Marshall expecting to act wisely, independently and with audacity within a system. As I re-read the account in Wikipedia, I take note of the lobbying done to free Custer from the restraint of his political disagreement and court martial; it would be interesting to review what he knew or was told as he departed for the front, as he arrived at his departure site, and -- most importantly-- what the communications among the separated generalship was. It's been a while since I've read all this stuff. I look forward to the bibliography.
With regard to point #3, I might take issue with you, but -- as noted-- the material is not in front of me, nor fresh, not had I been introduced to deep political thinking when I read it. I know better than to argue jazz with you, and I'm not sure I want to argue with you in terms of deep politics, either. I'm still learning about both. [Tonight's lesson in jazz was listening to Herb Alpert and Lani Hall and their ensemble on their album "Anything Goes".]
On point #4, I suspect you are correct.
Additionally, it would be well to add detail in terms of the politics, background, and players operating in Washington.
With regard to the communications, I think the Plains Indian was superior at scouting; their very survival depended upon it, and the US Army used friendly Indians for this purpose themselves; there may have been some mission communications interference as a result, though I doubt this was a significant factor, as they used tribal hate in a way that is parallel to today. In addition, at short distances, the Native Americans may have had at their disposal a faster (or more effective) communications system; this deserves some research. In addition, some mechanism of graphically depicting or simulating the speed with which the specific communications flowed would be useful. I have no doubt that the telegraph served the US Army well; the question is the extent to which it extended and penetrated and reached front-line command posts or generals in the saddle.
One thing that might help is if we could find a video or a game or some mechanism that would allow, as is done in the military, for a "command ride" of the ground.
This, by the way, is very similar to the kinds of debates, writing, etc. that surrounds many similar military events; one of the more notable is the one that posits that the South might have actually won at Gettysburg if Stuart had shown up properly, or if Ewell could have pushed his men hard enough to have secured Culp's Hill.
1) What, specifically, was the battlefield information or intelligence available to the US cavalry chain of command (and especially Custer) at the critical moments?
Quoting Drago: "There is a suspicious disconnect between what the government knew and what Custer was told in terms of the cumulative size of hostile bands awaiting him. It should surprise no one who reads this forum that, by most accounts, Custer was led to believe that the number of warriors likely to fight was significantly smaller than the number he actually encountered."
Again, I'd have to dig deep into the records and I did note specificity, but your statement sounds much like Cheney suggesting the Iraqis would throw flowers at the feet of the conquerors and other suggestions that we would be out of Afghanistan soon. The tactics against indigenous tribes will be the same, however: brutal and sometimes mass murder. Was there a similar "disconnect" in understanding the degree to which the local populace would fight to defend their turf? Was there a blindness in some sense to the technique of the ambush? There shouldn't have been, but perhaps they did not think the Indian capable of an ambush on a larger scale than they had experienced.
Quoting Jewett:
2) What factors -- aside from or in addition to the deep politics of US governance and military affairs -- were present in terms of the nature of the encounter... small, highly-mobile forces in a vast wilderness restrained by extremely slow communications? In addition, how did US cavalry mindset and tactics as evolved from the Civil War function in this type of encounter?
Quoting Drago: "The government forces in the Montana campaign were, in the agregate, large. They were divided in order to maximize the chances for picking up the hostile trails and effecting a pincer movement designed to corral hostiles and return them to reservations.
The speed of communications was what it was, and thus commanders were given what by today's standards would be considered extraordinary leeway once in the field...."
Well, the mobility and decison-making wasn't restrained, but you make a good point; what you describe sounds remarkably similar to the way Napoleon used his three corp system as a weighted net, each corps Marshall expecting to act wisely, independently and with audacity within a system. As I re-read the account in Wikipedia, I take note of the lobbying done to free Custer from the restraint of his political disagreement and court martial; it would be interesting to review what he knew or was told as he departed for the front, as he arrived at his departure site, and -- most importantly-- what the communications among the separated generalship was. It's been a while since I've read all this stuff. I look forward to the bibliography.
With regard to point #3, I might take issue with you, but -- as noted-- the material is not in front of me, nor fresh, not had I been introduced to deep political thinking when I read it. I know better than to argue jazz with you, and I'm not sure I want to argue with you in terms of deep politics, either. I'm still learning about both. [Tonight's lesson in jazz was listening to Herb Alpert and Lani Hall and their ensemble on their album "Anything Goes".]
On point #4, I suspect you are correct.
Additionally, it would be well to add detail in terms of the politics, background, and players operating in Washington.
With regard to the communications, I think the Plains Indian was superior at scouting; their very survival depended upon it, and the US Army used friendly Indians for this purpose themselves; there may have been some mission communications interference as a result, though I doubt this was a significant factor, as they used tribal hate in a way that is parallel to today. In addition, at short distances, the Native Americans may have had at their disposal a faster (or more effective) communications system; this deserves some research. In addition, some mechanism of graphically depicting or simulating the speed with which the specific communications flowed would be useful. I have no doubt that the telegraph served the US Army well; the question is the extent to which it extended and penetrated and reached front-line command posts or generals in the saddle.
One thing that might help is if we could find a video or a game or some mechanism that would allow, as is done in the military, for a "command ride" of the ground.
This, by the way, is very similar to the kinds of debates, writing, etc. that surrounds many similar military events; one of the more notable is the one that posits that the South might have actually won at Gettysburg if Stuart had shown up properly, or if Ewell could have pushed his men hard enough to have secured Culp's Hill.
"Where is the intersection between the world's deep hunger and your deep gladness?"