Deep Politics Timeline

[Tracy Riddle]

• 10/1962 A directive is issued from the Defense Dept leadership instructing all civilian and military personnel at the Pentagon to report, before the end of each working day, on all contacts with newsmen and the subjects discussed. (Mollenhoff, The Pentagon)
  
• 10/1962 Press releases announce that a film version of the novel Seven Days in May, with screenplay by Rod Serling, is already in the works.
  
• 10/1962 Ngo Dinh Diem stated, "Everywhere we are passing to the offensive, sowing insecurity in the Communists' reputedly impregnable strongholds, smashing their units one after another." (Don't Quote Me, Atyeo & Green)
  
• 10/1962 The missile crisis arose because, as Nikita Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, "we were quite certain that the [Bay of Pigs] invasion was only the beginning and that the Americans would not let Cuba alone." To defend Cuba from the threat of another U.S. invasion, Khrushchev said he "had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out they were there until it was too late to do anything about them." His strategy was twofold: "The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought, restrain the United States from precipitous military action against Castro's government. In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call 'the balance of power.' The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you." Khrushchev Remembers, with introduction, commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 492.
  
• 10/1/1962 Secretary McNamara meets with the JCS for a briefing on the latest intelligence on Cuba and to discuss intensified Cuban contingency planning. Defense Intelligence Agency analysts inform the group that some intelligence points to the possibility that MRBMs have been positioned in Pinar del Río Province. After the meeting, Admiral Robert Dennison, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), is directed by McNamara "to be prepared to institute a blockade against Cuba." The commanders-in-chief of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force under the Atlantic Command are also directed to pre-position military equipment and weapons needed to execute the airstrike plan. (USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis, 10/63, p. 8; CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis, 4/29/63, p. 39; Department of Defense Operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2/12/63, p. 2)
  
• 10/1/1962 Maxwell Taylor becomes Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, replacing Lemnitzer. Gen. Earl Wheeler becomes Army Chief of Staff. Even after General Lemnitzer lost his job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JCS still planned false-flag pretext operations at least into 1963. A different U.S. Department of Defense policy paper created in 1963 discussed a plan to make it appear that Cuba had attacked a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) so that the United States could retaliate. The U.S. Department of Defense document says of one of the scenarios, "A contrived 'Cuban' attack on an OAS member could be set up, and the attacked state could be urged to take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and OAS." The plan expresses confidence that by this action, "the U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action against Cuba." Included in the nations the Joint Chiefs suggested as targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Since both were members of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs hoped that by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could incite the people of the United Kingdom into supporting a war against Castro. As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted: "Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U.S. personnel is limited only to the most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of the contrived situation." The U.S. Department of Defense report even suggested covertly paying a person in the Castro government to attack the United States: "The only area remaining for consideration then would be to bribe one of Castro's subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on [the U.S. Navy base at] Guantanamo." (Bamford, Body of Secrets)
  
• 10/1/1962 George de Mohrenschildt drove Marina and June to a friend's house (Adm. Henry C. Bruton) for a swim in their pool. Mr. Bruton was away on travel, and his wife was sympathetic to Marina's plight, portraying her as having been abandoned by her husband. Then Oswald showed up unexpectedly while they were outside, and George became visibly irritated; a friend of the Bruton's, Philip Weinert, was also present. He and Mrs Bruton began talking with Oswald, who acted friendly and articulate. Lee and Marina didn't seem angry at each other, either; George's plan to move Marina in with the Brutons fell apart.
  
• 10/1/1962 US News and World Report stated that "competent authorities at the Navy base [Guantanamo] believe Washington is underplaying the Soviet buildup in Cuba - and are puzzled why."
  
• 10/1/1962 Gen. Edwin Walker is arrested in Mississippi and charged with insurrection. The arresting officer states, "I didn't feel like I was talking to a rational man…There was a wild, dazed look in his eyes. He was unable really to speak too well." (NYT 10/2)
  
• 10/1/1962 NYT reported on 10/2: "Dallas A 22-year-old man has been arrested for trying to transport a small arsenal to Mississippi, the police said today. They said the man, Ashland Burchwell of Dallas, told them he had worked for Edwin A. Walker in the latter's unsuccessful campaign for Governor. Four pistols, a rifle and more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition were seized."
  
• 10/2/1962 As a result of his meeting with the JCS the previous day, Robert McNamara sends a memo to the JCS outlining six circumstances in which military action against Cuba may be necessary: a. Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin... b. Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapons on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors. c. An attack against the Guantanamo Naval Base or against U.S. planes or vessels outside Cuban territorial air space or waters. d. A substantial popular uprising in Cuba, the leaders of which request assistance... e. Cuban armed assistance to subversion in other parts of the Western Hemisphere. f. A decision by the President that the affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing U.S. national security. McNamara asks that future military planning cover a variety of these contingencies, and place particular emphasis on plans that would assure that Fidel Castro is removed from power. (CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis, /29/63, p.-42)
  
• 10/2/1962 Kennedy was making piecemeal concessions to the military on Vietnam. That fall marked one of the worst. On October 2, 1962, he authorized a "limited crop destruction operation" in Phu Yen Province by South Vietnamese helicopters spraying U.S.-furnished herbicides. Dean Rusk had argued against the military's push for crop destruction, saying that even though "the most effective way to hurt the Viet Cong is to deprive them of food, " nevertheless those doing it "will gain the enmity of people whose crops are destroyed and whose wives and children will either have to stay in place and suffer hunger or become homeless refugees living on the uncertain bounty of a not-too-efficient government." While sensitive to Rusk's argument, Kennedy had yielded to the pressures of McNamara, Taylor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved a criminal action. By going along with the military on crop destruction, Kennedy was violating both his conscience and international law. In August he had already approved a separate herbicide operation whose purpose of defoliation, as recommended by McNamara, was to "deny concealed forward areas, attack positions, and ambush sites to the Viet Cong." However, in his August approval, Kennedy had asked "that every effort be made to avoid accidental destruction of the food crops in the areas to be sprayed." In October, the actual purpose of the program he approved was crop destruction. Why did he do it? According to Michael Forrestal, "I believe his main train of thinking was that you cannot say no to your military advisors all the time."
  
• 10/2/1962 Fort Worth Star-Telegram reports that Gen. Walker was being held in a hospital and charged with blocking justice.
  
• 10/2/1962 At a luncheon, JFK said the US would "contain the expansion of Communism from…Cuba and…take those steps which will finally provide for the freedom of the Cuban people."
  
• 10/3/1962 Fort Worth Star-Telegram reports that Gen. Walker is being held for mental evaluation.
  
• 10/3/1962 JFK asked the JCS to draw up plans for a possible air strike on Cuba.
  
• 10/3/1962 Washington: Latin American foreign ministers end two-day talks with Dean Rusk on measures to meet "Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba."
  
• 10/3/1962 Mercury 8: near-perfect flight of Walter Schirra in Sigma 7 for nine-hour endurance test in space. After six orbits, he splashed down and was picked up by the carrier Kearsarge.
  
• 10/4/1962 The SGA meets to discuss the progress of OPERATION MONGOOSE. According to minutes of the meeting, RFK states that the President was "concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program" and believed that "more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations." The attorney general also expresses the president's "concern over [the] developing situation," and urges that "massive activity" be undertaken within the MONGOOSE framework. The group agrees that plans for the mining of Cuban harbors and for capturing Cuban forces for interrogation should be considered. It was established that "General Lansdale's authority over the entire Mongoose operation, and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance, and this was thoroughly understood." (Memorandum of Mongoose Meeting Held on Thursday, October 4, 1962; Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 11/20/75, p. 147; Document: Memorandum of Project Mongoose meeting.)
  
• 10/4/1962 McNamara told JFK that an air strike could work if carried out. A meeting of the US Intelligence Board was held. Looking at photos taken of Cuba, no offensive missiles could be spotted, though there had been no pictures of the western sector of the island since 9/5. McCone ordered overflights of that area stepped up. But the CIA worried that an SA-2 (which had downed Powers) might shoot down another U-2 over Cuba, again involving the CIA; McNamara recommended that the overflight operation be transferred to the Strategic Air Command, and McCone agreed. RFK complained that McCone's covert operations against Cuba hadn't been working.
  
• 10/4/1962 JFK issues an executive order effective in two weeks to curb use of US or foreign ships for Cuban trade. It closes US ports to all ships of any nations that permit their vessels to carry military equipment to Cuba. UK and Canada criticize the move.
  
• 10/5/1962 Fort Worth Star-Telegram reports that ACLU of Houston feels that Gen. Walker's rights are being violated.
  
• 10/5/1962 CIA chart of "reconnaissance objectives in Cuba."
  
• 10/6/1962 CINCLANT directs increased readiness to execute an invasion of Cuba. On October 1, CINCLANT orders military units to increase their readiness posture to execute Oplan 312, the airstrike on Cuba. With the new orders, the pre-positioning of troops, aircraft, ships, and other equipment and supplies are directed to increase readiness to follow an airstrike with a full invasion of the island using one of two U.S. invasion plans known as Oplan 314 and Oplan 316.
  
• 10/6/1962 Dallas Times Herald quoted LBJ as saying that a blockade of Cuba was dangerous: "stopping a Russian ship is an act of war."
  
• 10/7/1962 Fort Worth Star-Telegram reports that Gen. Walker's legal staff had freed him from Springfield under stipulation that he will submit to a psychiatric evaluation in Dallas. He arrived at Love Field this afternoon and was greeted by 200 well-wishers.
  
• 10/7/1962 This afternoon, a gathering of the Russian community takes place at Mercedes St.; George Bouhe, Anna Meller, Elena Hall, Alex Kleinlerer, George and Jeanne DeMohrenschildt, Alexandra and Gary Taylor, and Lee and Marina Oswald. Marguerite briefly appears. It is decided at this gathering that Oswald will come to Dallas to look for a job; Marina will stay with the Taylors for some time in Dallas while she gets her teeth worked on at the Baylor Dental Clinic. Marina will then return to Fort Worth and live with Mrs. Hall until Oswald could get them an apartment in Dallas. Oswald acted as though his job at Leslie Welding was over, though the foreman there thought Oswald was an outstanding worker. George de Mohrenschildt urged his new friend Lee Harvey Oswald to move to Dallas, where more of the Russian immigrants lived. Oswald took him so seriously that the next day he quit his job at a Fort Worth welding company and made the move. (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt) De Mohrenschildt then became Oswald's mentor in Dallas. The Baron's wife and daughter said it was he who organized Oswald's securing a new job, four days after his move, with a Dallas graphic arts company, Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall. The official record is that Louise Latham of the Texas Employment Commission sent Oswald to the firm. Author Henry Hurt interviewed Ms. Latham, who denied that de Mohrenschildt got the job for Oswald. Whoever was responsible for Oswald's immediate hiring, it was a remarkable achievement. Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, described by the Warren Commission simply as "a commercial advertising photography firm," had contracts with the U.S. Army Map Service. Its classified work connected with Oswald's history as an apparent traitor. From interviews with Jaggars-Chiles Stovall employees, Hurt concluded, "Part of the work appears to have been related to the top secret U-2 missions, some of which were then making flights over Cuba." Four days before President Kennedy was shown U-2 photos that confirmed Soviet missiles in Cuba, Lee Harvey Oswald reported to work at a defense contractor that was apparently involved in logistics support for the U-2 mission. According to Oswald's co-workers, some of them were setting type for Cuban place names to go on maps-probably for the same spy planes whose radar secrets the ex-Marine had already offered to the Soviet Union. Oswald was once again, through the intervention of undercover angels, defying the normal laws of government security barriers.
  
• 10/8/1962 JFK's order to McNamara, and from McNamara to the generals, to open up the opposite option of withdrawal from Vietnam, was going nowhere. General Harkins continued to drag his heels on a withdrawal plan. A report on McNamara's next SECDEF conference, held October 8, 1962, in Honolulu, states: "General Harkins did not have time to present his plan for phasing out US personnel in Viet-Nam within 3 years." At this meeting McNamara did not push Harkins, probably because Kennedy did not push McNamara. At the time JFK was preoccupied with the Cuban missile situation.
  
• 10/8/1962 British agreed to let US use the British Bahamas for supply-storage.
  
• 10/8/1962 Oswald worked a full day at Leslie Welding, then left without giving any notice or forwarding address. Jeanne De Mohrenschildt takes Marina to the dentist. (H 21 550-56) This night, Oswald and Elena Hall move the Oswalds' belongings to her house; he gives his landlord no word that he is leaving. 10/8-10/1962 Marina and June Oswald lived with the Taylor family while Lee looked for work.
  
• 10/8/1962 Cuban President Dorticós, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, calls upon the UN to condemn the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. Near the end of his address, Dorticós declares: "If...we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons which we would have preferred not to acquire and which we do not wish to employ." The speech is interrupted four times by anti-Castro demonstrators.
  
• 10/8/1962 A squad of Cuban exiles raided the port of Isabela de Sagua, killing some Russian soldiers.
  
• 10/9/1962 Dallas Morning News reports that Gen. Walker will present himself for examination to Dallas psychiatrist Dr. Robert Stubblefield.
  
• 10/9/1962 The main post office on Ervay Street in Dallas is the location where Oswald rented box 2915 from October 9, 1962, to May 14, 1963. (WR) Oswald visits the Dallas post office and rents box 2915; he then goes to the Texas Employment Commission, where he has been given the name Helen Cunningham, a friend of the Mellers. On the application he writes the Taylors' address correctly but gives the wrong location for Leslie Welding. On the PO Box application, he writes 3519 Fairmore instead of Fairmount for the Taylors' address. Marguerite discovers that the Oswalds are no longer at the Mercedes St address and storms over to Robert's house to ask where they've gone. She doesn't see Lee again until the time of the assassination.
  
• 10/9/1962 In a report, McNamara noted that "a tremendous amount of progress had been made during the past year" though he thought it was too early to predict that the tide had turned in Vietnam.
  
• 10/9/1962 Walter Lippman warned that Castro was only seeking Soviet aid to defend against another invasion, not to threaten the US, and that "those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been in the right." Twenty years later, Anthony Cordesman described the picture: "During the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the US had approximately 1500 B-47s and 500 B-52s, and had already deployed over 200 of its first generation of ICBMs. In marked contrast, the Soviet strategic missile threat consisted of a few token ICBM deployments whose unreliability was so great that it was uncertain exactly whom they threatened. Soviet long range bomber forces consisted only of 100 Tu-Bears and 35 May Bison, whose range and flight characteristics forced them to fly at medium and high altitudes, and which made them extremely vulnerable to US fighters and surface-to-air missiles." (p. 7, cited in Bobbitt)
  
• 10/9/1962 Tonight, Castro told the Cuban people for the first time that Russian military "technicians" were stationed in their country to defend against a US attack.
  
• 10/10/1962 OSWALD pays $10.00 (postal money order) to State Dept against travel loan. Posted 10/11/62 from 270 Mercedes St., Fort Worth (CE1120) Oswald visits the Texas Employment Service and is interviewed by Mrs. Cunningham; he impresses her as neat and bright. Oswald mails a change-of-address form to Fort Worth redirecting his mail from Mercedes St to Dallas. He also mails a postcard to Robert: "Dear Robert for the new address you can write to Box 2915 Dallas, Texas."
  
• 10/10/1962 JFK went to Baltimore to campaign for Democratic congressional candidates, and more than 200,000 people came out to see his motorcade.
  
• 10/10/1962 AP quoted Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, US Army Vice Chief of Staff: "The training, transportation and logistical support we are providing in Vietnam has succeeded in turning the tide against the Vietcong."
  
• 10/10/1962 Sen. Keating (R-NY) announced that he had confirmed reports that missiles in Cuba could hit the US or the Panama Canal. Among his papers stored at the University of Rochester almost all of the materials from 9-10/1962 are missing. (Missiles of October p15, Thompson)
  
• 10/11/1962 JFK signed into law the Trade Expansion Act which lowered tariffs. He called it the "most important international piece of legislation since the Marshall Plan."
  
• 10/11/1962 Kennedy went to New York to help Robert Morgenthau's campaign against Nelson Rockefeller.
  
• 10/11/1962 Oswald is referred by the Texas Employment Commission to Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, a graphic-arts firm, in answer to a phone call from John Graef, head of the company's photographic department, who is looking for a photoprint trainee. Graef selects the enthusiastic Oswald from a number of applicants.
  
• 10/11/1962 NY Daily News reporter Ted Lewis wrote that JFK was organizing a "private ransom committee [for Bay of Pigs prisoners in Cuba], headed...by Eleanor Roosevelt, Walter Reuther and Milton Eisenhower. And he urged citizens to contribute to it."
  
• 10/11/1062 Alpha 66 claimed responsibility for a raid on the Cuban port of Isabela de Sagua on Monday night.
  
• 10/12/1962 JFK campaigned from NY to New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
  
• 10/12/1962 Gen. Edwin Walker met with Dr. Stubblefield for an interview. (Dallas Morning News)
  
• 10/12/1962 Oswald's first workday at Jaggers-Chiles-Stovall. JAGGARS-CHILES-STOVALL was a graphic arts firm in Dallas that Oswald worked at 10/12/1962-4/6/1963. He worked in the photographic department. The company made maps for the US Army and required a security clearance for employees. (Spy Saga 82-86; Reasonable Doubt 220-224) He was hired as a photo-print trainee, making $1.35 an hour. Gerald Posner says "the company prepared advertisements for newspapers, magazines, and trade publications and was also under contract to the Army's Map Service...Oswald did write the term 'micro-dots' next to Jaggar's listing in his address book. But Jaggar's work for the government was almost entirely unclassified. [Testimony of Robert Stovall, H 10 168] The small percentage that was confidential involved the setting of words, letters and figures for maps, but at no time did the company have any idea of what the material correlated to - the actual maps were never at Jaggars. [ibid, 168-9] The employees who worked in the map section had security clearances. Oswald did not have one, did not work with the Army maps, and never had access to that section. [ibid 169] Jaggars never did work involving microdots. [Posner interview with David Perry, 9/28/1992]" (Case Closed 90-91) Oswald often worked overtime, trying to learn as much as he could about photography; he first made calling cards for himself and De Mohrenschildt (CE 800). Then he sent samples of his work to The Worker and The Militant, which he had begun subscribing to shortly after he returned to the US. He offered his services to both; The Worker thanked him and said it might call him. (Weinstock Exhibit 1, H 21) Michael Eddowes: "A fellow employee testified that he spoke frequently to Lee and had received the impression that Lee went to the Soviet Union as an agent of the United States, because Lee was particularly interested in talking about the military disposition of troops, tanks and aircraft in that country, and appeared to have considerable information as to the methods the Soviets used in placing the various branches of the military in different locations. Lee told him that he had married a White Russian. None of the three Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall staff was asked why Oswald had executed work for the Army Map Service as indicated on his work sheet. [H 10 167-213]" (Oswald File 49) The Dallas Times Herald talked about the firm (without mentioning it by name) 11/29/1963: "'He was very intelligent, I'd say. He was smart enough to do anything he wanted if he wanted to bad enough.' The words belong to a man who worked alongside Lee Harvey Oswald for seven months in a downtown printing firm...[Oswald] was fired from his job for incompetency. 'On the day the President was shot I was riding in a car with a friend. We heard the description of the man they were holding and I turned to my friend and said it sounded just like a guy named Lee Oswald. "He's a real kookie guy," I said.'...The man said Oswald had trouble with some of the employees at the firm, where he worked from October 1962 until May 1963. 'It was with people from another department, though. He never had any trouble with us like that,' said the man, who requested that his name not be used. 'There was a narrow path between two developing sinks and the wall with barely enough room for one person. But Lee would crowd through anyway even though there were many other ways he could have passed. He'd just barge through, never apologizing. Finally, somebody said something to him about it. They had words. Next time, though, Oswald barged through again...There must have been three or four persons he had run-ins with.' (Another employee said his impression was that nearly three-fourths of the other workers had threatened to 'knock his block off.') 'I seldom ever saw him smile or laugh or talk with the others. He was just a misfit more or less...He was definitely a loner. His shoes were awfully, awfully worn. He was pretty badly dressed...And he never showed any money.' The man said he never remembered Oswald joining the others for lunch. 'Usually he had a book that he would read while he ate his sack lunch. Several times he brought some Russian magazines to work and once I saw him with a copy of the Daily Worker.' The firm handles some classified work for the government, but Oswald didn't work in that department."
  
• 10/12/1962 This night an exile gunboat sank a Cuban boat off Cardenas.
  
• 10/12/1962 The Los Angeles Times reported Rep. A. Paul Kitchin (R-Penn.) revealing information that "contradicts government figures on arms buildup in Cuba."
  
• 10/13/1962 (Sat) The Second Vatican Council, convened by Pope John XXIII to break down the barriers separating Christians of different denominations and to reform the structure of the Catholic Church, opened in Rome.
  
• 10/13/1962 JFK campaigned in the Midwest. He denounced Sen. Capehart's call for US intervention in Cuba.
  
• 10/13/1962 Alpha 66 bragged to reporters that they were planning more raids on Cuba, including a raid against British shipping to Cuba.
  
• 10/13/1962 Chester Bowles has a long conversation with Dobrynin. Bowles, after having been briefed by Thomas Hughes of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, tells Dobyrnin that the US "had some evidence" indicating that Soviet nuclear missiles were in Cuba. Dobyrnin, who had not been told of the missile deployment by the Kremlin, repeatedly denies that the Soviet Union harbored any intention of placing such weapons in Cuba.
  
• 10/14/1962 (Sun) Kennedy finished campaigning and flew back to Washington.
  
• 10/14/1962 Early morning: A U-2 flies over western Cuba from south to north. The reconnaissance mission, piloted by Major Richard Heyser, is the first Strategic Air Command (SAC) mission after authority for the flights is transferred from the CIA to the Air Force. The photographs obtained by the mission provide the first hard evidence of MRBM sites in Cuba, at San Cristobal.
  
• 10/14/1962 Soviet truck convoy deploying missiles near San Cristobal, Cuba, on Oct. 14, 1962. Taken by Maj. Steve Heyser's U-2, it was the first picture proving Soviet missiles were being emplaced in Cuba. U-2 photograph of MRBM site two nautical miles away from the Los Palacios deployment the second set of MRBMs found in Cuba. This site was subsequently named San Cristobal no. 1 (the photo is labeled 15 October for the day it was analyzed and printed).
  
• 10/14-15/1962 National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in Washington to analyze photos taken by Heyser's U-2 mission. Late in the afternoon, one of the teams finds pictures showing the main components of a Soviet MRBM in a field at San Cristóbal. Analysis of reconnaissance photos during the day also identifies all but one of the remaining twenty-four SAM sites in Cuba. Other photographs of San Julián airfield show that IL-28 light bombers are being uncrated. A senior officer at NPIC phones CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Ray Cline to inform him of the discovery. The officials at NPIC have tried to contact CIA Director McCone but are unable to reach him en route to Los Angeles. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, who is given the news by Ray Cline, decides to wait until morning to alert President Kennedy. Bundy later states that he chose to wait because it was not possible to prepare a presentation information until morning and because he feared that a hastily summoned meeting at night would jeopardize secrecy.
  
• 10/14 or 15/1962 The SGA orders the acceleration of covert activities against Cuba. In particular, the group agrees that "considerably more sabotage should be undertaken" and that "all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime." (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 11/20/75, p. 147)
  
• 10/14 or 15/1962 A major U.S. military exercise named PHIBRIGLEX-62 is scheduled to begin. The two-week long maneuver was to have employed twenty thousand Navy personnel and four thousand Marines in an amphibious assault on Puerto Rico's Vieques Island and the overthrow of its imaginary tyrant, "Ortsac"-"Castro" spelled backwards. (However, because of the impending crisis, PHIBRIGLEX62 is used primarily as cover for troop and equipment deployments aimed at increasing military readiness for a strike on Cuba.) (CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis, 4/29/63)
  
• 10/14/1962 McGeorge Bundy, on 'Issues and Answers,' downplayed the significance of the Soviet military aid to Cuba.
  
• 10/14/1962 Tonight an Alpha 66 boat sank a Cuban patrol boat.
  
• 10/15/1962 (Mon) Eisenhower campaigned for GOP candidates, attacking JFK's "dreary foreign record of the past twenty-one months."
  
• 10/15/1962 Reports surface that US chopper crews in Vietnam have begun to fire first upon VC formations.
  
• 10/15/1962 Oswald moved into the YMCA on this date, according to the WC, and left 10/19. The Report failed to account for where he stayed the previous several days. He stayed at the YMCA at 605 N. Ervay for awhile as he looked for work in Dallas, but thought it was too expensive at $2.25 a night. (WR 718-9) De Mohrenschildt and Bouhe both tried to find work for Oswald; he scored well on aptitude tests given by the Texas Employment Commission, indicating that he could do clerical work. Oswald rented the PO Box in Dallas that day, under the name "Lee H. Oswald." The application for the P.O. box was in Oswald's handwriting. (WR) Marina comes to Dallas for a dental appointment and stays overnight with the De Mohrenschildts.
  
• 10/15/1962 Morning: Quick readout teams at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in Washington analyze photos taken by Richard Heyser's U-2 mission. Late in the afternoon, one of the teams finds pictures showing the main components of a Soviet MRBM in a field at San Cristóbal. Analysis of reconnaissance photos during the day also identifies all but one of the remaining twenty-four SAM sites in Cuba. Other photographs of San Julián airfield show that IL-28 light bombers are being uncrated.
  
• 10/15/1962 U-2 photograph of IL-28 bomber crates at San Julian airfield.
  
• 10/15/1962 Late afternoon: A senior officer at NPIC phones Ray Cline to inform him of the discovery. The officials at NPIC have tried to contact McCone but are unable to reach him en route to Los Angeles. Cline requests that NPIC completely recheck the photographs and consult with missile experts outside of the agency. Cline asks that he be called again between 8:00 and 10:00P.M. to be informed of the results of these additional analyses. ("A CIA Reminiscence." Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1982) Key administration officials are tracked down in Washington and briefed about the discovery of the missiles. McGeorge Bundy, who is given the news by Ray Cline, decides to wait until morning to alert President Kennedy. Bundy later states that he chose to wait because it was not possible to prepare a presentation information until morning and because he feared that a hastily summoned meeting at night would jeopardize secrecy. McNamara was at a dinner party that night, so Roswell Gilpatric was told about the photos of missiles in Cuba by the Pentagon and CIA.
  
• 10/15/1962 Rudolph Anderson, an Air Force major on loan to the CIA, flew a U-2 over Cuba (Deep Black 122-23)
  
• 10/16/1962 (Tue) JFK signed his investment incentive plan to encourage business to buy more equipment and expand factories. He called it a "good start on bringing our tax structure up to date," though some of his reform ideas had been eliminated by Congress. The same month, there was a sharp increase in orders for machine tools. By the spring of 1963 companies cited his tax plan as an important reason for increased business investment. (Business Week 4/27/1963) Kennedy was able to persuade Congress to pass an act that removed the distinction between repatriated profits and profits reinvested abroad. While this law applied to industry as a whole, it especially affected the oil companies. It was estimated that as a result of this legislation, wealthy oilmen saw a fall in their earnings on foreign investment from 30 per cent to 15 per cent. Kennedy decided to take on the oil industry. On 16th October, 1962, Kennedy was able to persuade Congress to pass an act that removed the distinction between repatriated profits and profits reinvested abroad. While this law applied to industry as a whole, it especially affected the oil companies. It was estimated that as a result of this legislation, wealthy oilmen saw a fall in their earnings on foreign investment from 30 per cent to 15 per cent.
  
• 10/16/1962 Dr. King meets with JFK for an hour at the White House.
  
• 10/16/1962 JFK signed a bill extending Secret Service protection to the Vice President. (NYT 10/17/62)
  
• 10/16/1962 Oswald finished his training at Jaggers and began working in the camera department. His work sheet showed that he executed a job that morning for the Army Map Service. Marina has daughter June baptized by a Russian Orthodox priest in Dallas; she doesn't tell Oswald about this.
  
• 10/16/1962 The USIB meets to examine U-2 photographs and to coordinate intelligence on the crisis. During the meeting, the USIB directs the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) to prepare an immediate evaluation of the Soviet missile sites. The GMAIC concludes that the missiles are clearly under Soviet control and that there is no evidence that nuclear warheads are present in Cuba. It also concludes that the missile installations thus far identified do not appear to be operational. (The Cuban Crisis, 1962, ca. 8/22/63, p. 36)
  
• 10/16/1962 Premier Khrushchev receives U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler for a three-hour conversation on a variety of subjects. Khrushchev reassures Kohler that the Cuban fishing port that the Soviet Union has recently agreed to help build will remain entirely non-military. Khrushchev adds that the Cuban government has announced the agreement without consulting Soviet officials, and that when he learned of the leak, he "cursed them and said they should have waited until after the U.S. elections." Once again, Khrushchev insists that all Soviet activity in Cuba was defensive and sharply criticizes U.S. bases in Turkey and Italy. (Report on Khrushchev Kohler Meeting, October 16 (Part IV: Discussion of U-2, Cuban Fishing Port, Nuclear Test Ban and U.S. Elections) In Two Sections, 10/16/62; Sorensen, p. 691; Hilsman 1, p. 166)
  
• 10/16/1962 JFK described Sen. Homer Capehart's call for a blockade or invasion of Cuba "irresponsible warmongering."
  
• 10/16/1962 A Gallup poll showed that 51% of Americans feared an invasion of Cuba would trigger war with Russia.
  
• 8:45am (EST) McGeorge Bundy informs President Kennedy that "hard photographic evidence" has been obtained showing Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. Kennedy immediately calls a meeting for 11:45am.
  
• 9:00am: (EST) RFK was called to the White House by the President: "he told me that a U-2 had just finished a photographic mission and that the Intelligence Community had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba." (13 Days) President Kennedy briefs his brother Robert, who expresses surprise at the news. JFK and RFK determine they have two missions: to get the missiles out and to contain war impulses. (Mahoney p200) Kennedy also telephones John McCloy, who recommends that the president take forceful action to remove the missiles, even if that involves an airstrike and an invasion. (The Missile Crisis, Abel; The Wise Men)
  
• 11:15am (EST) Kennedy confers for half an hour with Charles Bohlen, who later recalls that at this early stage in the crisis, "there seemed to be no doubt in [Kennedy's] mind, and certainly none in mine, that the United States would have to get these bases eliminated...the only question was how it was to be done." Bohlen participates in the first ExComm meeting later that morning but leaves for France on the following day.
  
• 11:50am: (EST) Cabinet Room, White House. The first meeting of the ExComm (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council) convenes. JFK, RFK, LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Bundy, Taylor, Carter, Sorensen, Dillon, Ball, Edwin M. Martin, McCone, Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett. (Robert S. Thompson says that McCone was not present; Bohlen, Alexis Johnson, O'Donnell, Arthur Lundahl of CIA, were present). The meeting was tape-recorded. Note: JFK decides not to "attend all the meetings of our committee," to keep discussions from being inhibited." (Kennedy, p33)
  
• 10/16/1962 On the morning of October 16, CIA imagery analysts brief the president on the results of U-2 photo reconnaissance overflights of Cuba on Sunday that had discovered the existence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) in Cuba. The briefing begins with an interpretation of the images by Arthur Lundahl from CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), who speaks loud and clearly, with supporting analysis from the CIA's Acting Director Marshall Carter, whose voice is low and often difficult to hear. The president then asks Lundahl several questions about the images. Lundahl then introduces Sidney Graybeal ("our missile man") who shows the president photos of similar weapons systems taken during Soviet military parades. Obviously concerned, the president then asks Graybeal when the missiles will be ready to fire. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara then joins the discussion, adding that he doubts that the missiles are yet ready to fire since there is no indication that nuclear warheads are present. The CIA showed photos of what they said were missiles sites being constructed. The missiles are initially identified by photoanalysts as nuclear tipped SS-3s by their length; by evening, the MRBMs are correctly identified as longer range SS-4 missiles. No nuclear warheads are reported seen in the area. CIA photoanalyst Sidney Graybeal informs the group that "we do not believe [the missiles] are ready to fire." RFK recalled, "I, for one, had to take their word for it. I examined the pictures carefully, and what I saw appeared to be no more than the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house. I was relieved to hear later that this was the same reaction of virtually everyone at the meeting including President Kennedy." (13 Days) The first part of the noon meeting covers questions regarding the validity and certainty of the evidence, Soviet military capabilities in Cuba and what additional U.S. surveillance might be required. Further U-2 flights are ordered, and six U-2 reconnaissance missions are flown during the day. In the freewheeling discussion, participants cover a number of different options for dealing with the Cuban situation. The principle options discussed are: (1) a single, surgical airstrike on the missile bases; (2) an attack on various Cuban facilities; (3) a comprehensive series of attacks and invasion; or (4) a blockade of Cuba. Preliminary discussions lean toward taking some form of military action. As discussions continue on proposals to destroy the missiles by airstrike, RFK passes a note to the president: "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor." This phase of the meeting ended at 12:57pm. (Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: Signet, 1969)
  
• 12:15 PM (EST) Afternoon: McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and the JCS hold a luncheon meeting to begin preparing the military for any actions that might be ordered. At the State Department, additional discussions continue with Dean Rusk , Undersecretary of State George Ball , Adlai Stevenson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson , and State Department Soviet specialist Llewellyn Thompson . (Chronology of the Cuban Crisis October 15-28, 1962, 11/2/62, p.1; Taylor, p. 269) The SGA convenes in the White House prior to the second ExComm meeting. According to Richard Helms's notes, Robert Kennedy expresses President Kennedy's "general dissatisfaction" with progress under the MONGOOSE program. The SGA discusses but rejects several alternatives for eliminating the newly discovered Soviet missile sites in Cuba, including a proposal to have Cuban emigrés bomb the missile sites. (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 11/20/75, p.146; Hurwitch, p. 33) Following the CIA briefing, McNamara and then General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, brief the president on his military alternatives. Taylor's presentation is followed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk's voice is faint, but he warns the president that an air strike on the missile installations may actually trigger a "general nuclear war" if the event that they are in fact armed and the Soviets decide to launch them before they are destroyed on the ground. McNamara disagrees. The president then questions the Soviet motive for establishing the missile sites, with subsequent comments from McNamara and then Taylor. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy then asks whether a military strike on Cuba would include all airfields. McNamara responds. Rusk is then faintly heard asking again about the Soviet motive, suggesting that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev may want the U.S. to "live under the fear" of Soviet nuclear weapons the same way the Soviets live with missiles in Turkey. The clip ends with the president asking how many missiles are in Turkey.
  
• 12:45 PM (EST) Cabinet Room, The White House. Later in the same meeting the president sums up the military options. His brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, adds that a full invasion is also an option, but warns that this would probably provoke a response from the Soviets. A short conversation then ensues in which McNamara and Taylor explain how much time is needed to prepare for a full invasion of Cuba.
  
• 1:00 PM (EST) Cabinet Room, The White House. At the end of the Tuesday session, the president states that the group should consider the various proposed responses to the situation, adding that photo reconnaissance flights should continue and that preparations for strikes against the missile installations should continue since "that's what we're going to do anyway . . . We're going to take out these missiles." He is not yet sure, however, whether to proceed with a larger air strike or an invasion. Bundy then asks whether they have ruled out a political solution, and discussion then ensues about various tracks that could be followed. Bundy and the president then discuss the importance of keeping the plans secret. McNamara mentions the importance of careful contact with Khrushchev. The president then asks how long it will be before preparations for air strikes are complete. Carter and Lundahl respond that cloud cover makes the reconnaissance mission difficult. Near the end of the clip, Robert Kennedy inquires as to how long it would take invading U.S. military forces to gain control of Cuba.
  
• 6:30pm (EST) At the second ExComm meeting, Marshall Carter states that the missiles could be "fully operational within two weeks," although a single missile might achieve operational capability "much sooner." After the intelligence report is presented, Robert McNamara outlines three broad options for action. The first is "political," involving communications with Fidel Castro and Premier Khrushchev ; the second is "part political, part military," involving a blockade of weapons and open surveillance; the third is "military" involving an attack on Cuba and the missile sites. The ExComm members debate, but do not resolve, which option should be used. (Document 16, Transcript of the Second Executive Committee Meeting, 10/16/62) The meeting resumed with Nitze and Adlai Stevenson joining the group. McNamara sounded very hawkish; he suggested "a very large-scale moblization, certainly exceeding the limits of the authority we have from Congress." Taylor warned that an air strike might have little effect against mobile missiles. Adlai Stevenson suggested that once the missiles were removed, the US would promise not to invade Cuba and would withdraw its obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey. They also discussed the idea of a blockade. The meeting ended at 7:55pm. Source: U.S., Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Transcripts.
  
• 7:00 pm Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, October 16, 1962 Source: U.S., Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.
  
• 10/17/1962 (Wed) McCone was back in Washington and arrived at the White House.
  
• 10/17/1962 Morning: Adlai Stevenson writes to President Kennedy that world opinion would equate the U.S. missiles stationed in Turkey with Soviet bases in Cuba. Warning that U.S. officials could not "negotiate with a gun at our head," he states, "I feel you should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything. "Stevenson suggests that personal emissaries should be sent to both Fidel Castro and Premier Khrushchev to discuss the situation. (Document 19, U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson 's Opinions Against an Airstrike on Cuba, 10/17/62)
  
• 10/17/1962 Morning: Further debate on the Cuban situation takes place at the State Department. Dean Acheson and John McCone attend discussions for the first time, though President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson are absent. By this time, Robert McNamara has become the strongest proponent of the blockade option. McNamara reports that a "surgical" airstrike option is militarily impractical in the view of the JCS and that any military action would have to include attacks on all military installations in Cuba, eventually leading to an invasion. McNamara urges seeking alternative means of removing the missiles from Cuba before embarking on such a drastic course of action. However, critics of the blockade, led primarily by Dean Acheson, argue that a blockade would have no effect on the missiles already in Cuba. Airstrike proponents also express concern that a U.S. blockade would shift the confrontation from Cuba to the Soviet Union and that Soviet counteractions, including a Berlin blockade, might result. (Chronology of the Cuban Crisis October 15-28, 1962, 11/2/62, p. 2; Kennedy, pp. 34-35)
  
• 10/17/1962 Around this time, Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet embassy official who served as an authoritative back channel for communications between Soviet and U.S. leaders, relays a message from Premier Khrushchev to Attorney General Robert Kennedy that the arms being sent to Cuba are intended only for defensive purposes. Bolshakov had not been told by Khrushchev that the Soviet Union is actually in the process of installing MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. By the time Bolshakov's message reaches President Kennedy , he has been fully briefed on the Soviet missile deployment. (Hilsman, p. 166; Kennedy, p. 27; Schlesinger, pp. 499-502)
  
• 10/17/1962 An SS-5 IRBM site, the first of three to be identified, is detected in Cuba. The SS-5s have ranges of up to 2,200 nautical miles, more than twice the range of the SS-4 MRBMs . The GMAIC estimates that the IRBM sites would not become operational before December but that sixteen and possibly as many as thirty-two MRBMs would be operational in about a week. No SS-5 missiles actually reach Cuba at any time, although this is not completely confirmed by U.S. officials during the crisis. (The Cuban Crisis, 1962, ca. 8/22/63, p. 36; Department of Defense Press Conference of Robert McNamara , 2/28/63, p. F-2; Garthoff 1, p. 209)
  
• 10/17/1962 More photos of Cuba are taken, showing more missile installations. (13 Days) There is little news from Washington on Cuba because the administration has imposed a blackout. Kennedy approved the blockade of Cuba. Acheson and Dillon wanted to invade Cuba, while McNamara and RFK wanted a blockade. RFK feared that air strikes against the targets in Cuba would make the US look bad to the rest of the world.
  
• 10/17/1962 U-2 photograph of first IRBM site found under construction.
  
• 10/17/1962 JFK went ahead with campaign trips to create the appearance that all was normal; a trip to St Louis and Seattle that weekend was called off, with Salinger announcing that Kennedy had a cold.
  
• 10/17/1962 GOP Congressman James B. Utt (Calif.) called JFK a "compulsive liar, at least a pathological liar." This was in response to a speech JFK had made claiming that the Cuban economy was collapsing.
  
• 10/17/1962 As Marine reinforcements pour into Guantanamo, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria is in Havana and agrees with Castro that the US base must go. (Dallas Times Herald 10/18)
  
• 10/17/1962 Tonight the spacecraft Ranger V was launched from Canaveral, but it quickly burned up.
  
• 10/18/1962 (Thur) Today is Lee Oswald's 23rd birthday. He registers at the YMCA for the last time. Mrs. Hall, with whom Marina has been staying in Fort Worth, is injured in a traffic accident and hospitalized until 10/26. Marina, unable to speak English, is aided by Mrs. Max Clark, Russian-speaking wife of the lawyer, and Alex Kleinlerer.
  
• 10/18/1962 11:00A.M.: The ExComm convenes for further discussions. The JCS, attending part of the meeting, recommends that President Kennedy order an airstrike on the missiles and other key Cuban military installations. However, Robert Kennedy responds by asking whether a surprise air attack would be a morally acceptable course of action. According to Robert Kennedy , the ExComm spent "more time [deliberating] on this moral question during the first five days than on any other single matter." (Kennedy, pp. 38-39; Taylor, p. 269) An Excomm meeting discussed a CIA memo which detailed evidence from 3/1962 of Soviet missiles being shipped into Cuba. "Now the question really is what action we take which lessens the chances of a nuclear exchange, which obviously is the final failure." Sheldon M. Stern, Averting "The Final Failure " ( Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2003) , pp. 95, 1 05-6.
  
• By the morning of October 18 CIA analysts had discovered that, in addition to the medium-range missiles spotted two days earlier, the Soviets were also installing intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) on the island, with twice the range of the MRBMs. While this discovery hardened the positions of those advocating a swift military response, others, like Under Secretary of State George Ball, warned about the consequences of such an escalation "without giving Khrushchev some way out."
  
• 10/18/1962 Discussion between Ball and McNamara about the consequences of an unannounced U.S. air strike on the military installations. Ball argues that they need to consider the consequences of such an attack and the likely reaction of Khrushchev in Turkey or elsewhere. Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon states, "I think they'll take Berlin." The president replies that Khrushchev will "take Berlin" whether or not the strikes are announced ahead of time. McNamara echoes this point. After an unidentified speaker mentions that a blockade might buy some time, the president again asserts that Khrushchev will "grab Berlin" over missiles that do not even threaten the NATO allies. Soon thereafter, McNamara raises the specter of a Soviet invasion of Berlin which Ball says will lead to "general war." This prompts the president to ask, "You mean a nuclear exchange?" After some more discussion the president tries to bring some focus to the discussion suggesting that they try to determine what course of action would most lessen the chance of nuclear war, "which," he notes, "is obviously the final failure." Discussion then turns to the option of a blockade of Cuba, and the president asks whether this would require a declaration of war.
  
• 2:30P.M.: More discussions take place in Dean Rusk 's conference room at the State Department. President Kennedy , who does not attend the talks, confers privately with Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara at 3:30P.M. During the day, Kennedy also meets privately with Dean Acheson for over an hour. When the president raises his brother's concern over the morality of a "Pearl Harbor in reverse," Acheson reportedly tells Kennedy that he was being "silly" and that it was "unworthy of [him] to talk that way." Acheson again voices his opinion that the surgical airstrike was the best U.S. option. Acheson, however, is in the minority in dismissing the Pearl Harbor analogy. Although Paul Nitze also recalls thinking that the analogy was "nonsense," others like George Ball find it persuasive. In some cases, as with Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, the moral argument becomes the deciding factor behind their support for the blockade. (Blight, pp., 142, 152; Schlesinger, p. 508; Issacson, p. 622) Some of his advisors urge him to invade Cuba, but Kennedy resists. RFK informed JFK this night that Excomm recommended a blockade. JFK told Excomm to go back and work on other possible solutions. (13 Days)
  
• 5:00P.M.: Andrei Gromyko and President Kennedy meet at the White House. White House photograph of President Kennedy meeting with Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in which JFK does not reveal he knows about the missiles, and Gromyko asserts that Soviet military assistance is purely defensive. Gromyko states that Premier Khrushchev plans to visit the United Nations following the U.S. elections in November and that he believes a meeting with Kennedy at that time would be useful. After Kennedy agrees to meet the Soviet Premier, Gromyko turns the discussion to Cuba, charging that the United States is "pestering" a small country. According to the minutes of the meeting, "Gromyko stated that he was instructed to make it clear...that [Soviet military] assistance, [was] pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba...If it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never had become involved in rendering such assistance." Kennedy has decided not to discuss U.S. awareness of the missiles with Gromyko. So, without taking exception to Gromyko's claim, Kennedy responds by reading a portion of his September 4 statement warning against the deployment of offensive weapons in Cuba. After a discussion of other issues, the meeting ends at 7:08P.M. Following the talk with Gromyko, Kennedy directs Llewellyn Thompson to inform Ambassador Dobrynin that a summit would not in fact be appropriate at that time. Kennedy then meets with Robert Lovett, a former government official brought in to give advice in the crisis. Lovett warns that an airstrike would appear to be an excessive first step. He argues that a blockade is a better alternative, although he expresses a preference for blocking the movement of all materials into Cuba except for food and medicine, rather than limiting the quarantine to offensive weapons. (The Cuban Crisis, 1962, ca. 8/22/63, pp. 56-58; Memoranda of Conversations on Kennedy-Gromyko Meeting [in Four Parts], 10/18/62; Bundy , p. 399; Garthoff 1, p. 48)
  
• 9:00 P.M.: Meeting at the White House, the ExComm presents its recommendations to President Kennedy . By this time, most members of the committee support the blockade option. As the meeting progresses however, individual opinions begin to shift and the consensus behind the blockade brakes down. Kennedy directs the group to continue its deliberations. (Kennedy, pp. 43-44)
  
• Evening: Robert Kennedy phones his deputy, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, to request the preparation of a brief establishing the legal basis for a blockade of Cuba. The legality of a blockade is also examined independently at the State Department by Leonard C. Meeker, the deputy legal adviser. (NYT, 11/3/62)
  
• 10/18/1962 The first of a series of daily "Joint Evaluation" intelligence reports is disseminated. The evaluation, the product of collaboration between the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), states that the MRBMs in Cuba could probably be launched within eighteen hours. (The Cuban Crisis, 1962, ca. 8/22/63, pp. 45-46, 53)
  
• 10/18/1962 CHAMA Dominic Airdrop test over Johnston Island area. 1.59 Megaton yield Hydrogen bomb test by US.
  
• 10/18/1962 The NY Times reported large-scale US military maneuvers in the Caribbean.
  
• 10/18/1962 Tonight, LBJ called The Dallas Morning News' managing editor, Jack Krueger, and told him to be ready to cover a possible invasion of Cuba very soon. Hugh Aynesworth was sent to Washington to cover the story. (Washington Times 10/26/1987)
  
• At some point during the discussions on invading Cuba, Marine Corps Commandant Shoup displayed a map of Cuba during a meeting by overlaying it on a map of the US; everyone was surprised at how big the island was. Then he placed a red dot over the map of Cuba, and explained that this represented the island of Tarawa, which cost 18,000 Marines to capture in WWII. Shoup would become Kennedy's favorite general. (The Best and the Brightest p85; RFK and his Times p484)
  
• 10/19/1962 (Fri) Senate Armed Services Committee issued its report showing that military leaders were being censored and restrained from attacking Communism.
  
• 10/19/1962 A major South Vietnamese offensive against VC guerillas ends with few results.
  
• 10/19/1962 A memo to Kirk Douglas and John Frankenheimer on the promotional efforts being made to publicize the soon-to-be-made film based on the book Seven Days in May.
  
• 10/19/1962 Excomm met all day over the missile crisis, and RFK talked with the President several times. (13 Days)
  
• 10/19/1962 Dallas Morning News reports that a squadron of the latest jet fighters were transferred to Key West on 10/6.
  
• 10/19/1962 Khrushchev became concerned that an invasion of Cuba was imminent. Similar stories were circulating throughout Washington.
  
• 11:00A.M.: At the State Department, Nicholas Katzenbach and Leonard Meeker provide the ExComm with their legal opinions regarding a blockade of Cuba. As the meeting progresses, it becomes apparent that sharp disagreements about how the United States should proceed still exist. In order to provide clear options to President Kennedy , the ExComm decides that independent working groups should be established. Separate groups are to develop the blockade and airstrike options, drafting speeches for each plan and outlining possible contingencies. (The Cuban Crisis, 1962, ca. 8/22/63, p. 63; Document 21, Minutes of October 19, 1962, 11:00A.M. ExComm Meeting, 10/19/62; Schlesinger 1, p. 515)
  
• Early afternoon: Discussions continue in the ExComm . The papers developed by the separate working groups are exchanged and critiqued. In the course of this process, airstrike proponents begin to shift their support to the blockade option. The airstrike speech is abandoned, and Theodore Sorensen agrees to try to put together a speech for President Kennedy on the blockade. Sorensen completes the speech at 3:00A.M. the following day. (Chronology of the Cuban Crisis October 15-28, 1962, 11/2/62, p. 3; Kennedy, pp. 45-47; Sorensen, pp. 692-93)
  
• 8:40P.M.: U. Alexis Johnson and Paul Nitze meet to develop a specific timetable for carrying out all of the diplomatic and military actions required by the airstrike or the blockade plan. The schedule includes raising military alert levels, reinforcing Guantanamo naval base and briefing NATO allies. All timing revolves around the "P Hour"--the time when President Kennedy would address the nation to inform Americans of the crisis. (Quarantine, 10/20/62; Blight 1, p. 145; Johnson, pp. 383-86)
  
• Evening: Responding to questions about an article by Paul Scott and Robert Allen dealing with Soviet missiles in Cuba, a Defense Department spokesperson replies that the Pentagon has no information indicating that there are missiles in Cuba. Reports that emergency military measures are being implemented are also denied. (Chronology of the Cuban Crisis October 15-28, 1962, 11/2/62, p. 4; The Cuban Crisis, 1962, ca. 8/22/63, p. 71a)
  
• SNIE 11-18-62, entitled "Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba," reports that a direct approach to Premier Khrushchev or Fidel Castro is unlikely to halt the ongoing deployment of missiles to Cuba. On the other hand, a total blockade of Cuba, the SNIE projects, would "almost certainly" lead to "strong direct pressures" elsewhere by the Soviet government. Any form of direct military action against Cuba would result in an even greater chance of Soviet military retaliation. In such a situation, the report notes, there exists "the possibility that the Soviets, under great pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war..." The SNIE is read by President Kennedy and most of the main policy planners the following day. SNIE 11-19-62, produced on October 20, draws similar conclusions. (Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba, 10/19/62; Document 24, CIA SNIE, Major Consequences of Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba, 10/20/62; The Cuban Crisis, 1962, ca. 8/22/63, p. 68)
  
• JFK secretly taped the White House meetings during the crisis. The tapes were declassified, transcribed, and published in the late 1990s. [(In 1997 Ernest R. May and Philip D . Zelikow edited and published transcripts of the Cuban Missile Crisis tapes in their book The Kennedy Tapes ( Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1997). In 2000 the accuracy of their transcripts was challenged in two articles by Sheldon M. Stern, historian at the JFK Library from 1977 to 1999: "What JFK Really Said, " Atlantic Monthly 285 (May 2000): pp. 122-2 8 , and " Source Material: The 1997 Published Transcripts of the JFK Cuban Missile Crisis Tapes: Too Good to Be True ? " Presidential Studies Quarterly 30 ( September 2000 ) : pp. 5 8 6-93. When Zelikow, May, and Timothy Naftali brought out a revised set of missile crisis transcripts, The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: Volumes 1 -3, The Great Crises (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), Stern critiqued their revision for further inaccuracies in his article " The JFK Tapes: Round Two, " Reviews in American History 30 (2002) : pp. 680-88. Sheldon M. Stern has written a comprehensive narrative account of the missile crisis deliberations of President Kennedy and the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) , citing his own transcripts of the tapes, Averting "The Final Failure ": John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings ( Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2003 ) . My citations of the tapes are taken from Averting "The Final Failure."] The transcripts reveal how isolated the president was in choosing to blockade further Soviet missile shipments rather than bomb and invade Cuba. Nowhere does he stand more alone against the pressures for a sudden, massive air strike than in his October 19, 1962, meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this encounter the Chiefs' disdain for their young commander-in-chief is embodied by Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, who chall...