Deep Politics Timeline

[Tracy Riddle]

• 9/1967 Coup d'Etat November 22, 1963 by Medford Evans AMERICAN OPINION, September 1967, pp. 73100 This article is taken from the introductory chapter to Dr. Evans' forthcoming book on the Johnson administration. [The Usurpers, Western Islands Press, Boston, 1968, 249 pp.KAR]
  
• 9/1/1967 The National New Politics convention met in the Palmer House ballroom in Chicago and advocated organization of "white civilizing committees in all white communities to humanize the savage and beast-like character that runs rampant through America exemplified by George Lincoln Rockwell and Lyndon Johnson." (NYT 9/2)
  
• 9/1/1967 Jim Garrison writes a foreward for Harold Weisberg's upcoming book, Oswald in New Orleans.
  
• 9/4/1967 Peter Grose (NYT) WASHINGTON, Sept. 3-- United States officials were surprised and heartened today at the size of turnout in South Vietnam's presidential election despite a Vietcong terrorist campaign to disrupt the voting. According to reports from Saigon, 83 per cent of the 5.85 million registered voters cast their ballots yesterday. Many of them risked reprisals threatened by the Vietcong. The size of the popular vote and the inability of the Vietcong to destroy the election machinery were the two salient facts in a preliminary assessment of the nation election based on the incomplete returns reaching here. Pending more detailed reports, neither the State Department nor the White House would comment on the balloting or the victory of the military candidates, Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, who was running for president, and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, the candidate for vice president. A successful election has long been seen as the keystone in President Johnson's policy of encouraging the growth of constitutional processes in South Vietnam. The election was the culmination of a constitutional development that began in January, 1966, to which President Johnson gave his personal commitment when he met Premier Ky and General Thieu, the chief of state, in Honolulu in February. The purpose of the voting was to give legitimacy to the Saigon Government, which has been founded only on coups and power plays since November, 1963, when President Ngo Dinh Deim was overthrown by a military junta. Few members of that junta are still around, most having been ousted or exiled in subsequent shifts of power. The fact that the backing of the electorate has gone to the generals who have been ruling South Vietnam for the last two years does not, in the Administration's view, diminish the significance of the constitutional step that has been taken. The hope here is that the new government will be able to maneuver with a confidence and legitimacy long lacking in South Vietnamese politics. That hope could have been dashed either by a small turnout, indicating widespread scorn or a lack of interest in constitutional development, or by the Vietcong's disruption of the balloting. American officials had hoped for an 80 per cent turnout. That was the figure in the election in September for the Constituent Assembly. Seventy-eight per cent of the registered voters went to the polls in elections for local officials last spring. Before the results of the presidential election started to come in, the American officials warned that the turnout might be less than 80 per cent because the polling place would be open for two or three hours less than in the election a year ago. The turnout of 83 per cent was a welcome surprise. The turnout in the 1964 United States Presidential election was 62 per cent. Captured documents and interrogations indicated in the last week a serious concern among Vietcong leaders that a major effort would be required to render the election meaningless. This effort has not succeeded, judging from the reports from Saigon.
  
• 9/7/1967 Barry Goldwater wrote in a syndicated editorial: "There are signs that the administration is getting fed up with the deceit, wrong decisions and dictatorial arrogance of Robert Strange McNamara, the man who never yet has been right about Vietnam or any other military matter...for the first time, military men seem free to voice the opposition to McNamara which always has been present..."
  
• 9/10/1967 NASA's Surveyor 5 landed on the moon and began testing lunar soil.
  
• 9/12/1967 Richard Helms told LBJ in a highly secret memo (that was recently declassified), CIA analysts predicted that if the US lost the war, it would be a short-term setback for the US and Southeast Asia, but not a catastrophic one, and US prestige and Asian stability would recover in the not-too-distant future. Only LBJ saw this memo at the time. (In Retrospect)
  
• 9/15/1967 Garrison included elements of "the invisible Nazi substructure" in the assassination plot. ("Joe Dolan Talk Back" Program, KNEW, Oakland, CA.)
  
• 9/18/1967 McNamara announces that the US will develop a "thin" antiballistic missile system (made up of Nike X and Spartan missiles) to defend against a possible nuclear attack from China; this program would cost $5 billion, whereas a rejected "heavy" system would have cost $40 billion.
  
• 9/20/1967 A CIA memorandum of 20 September 1967 describing the first meeting of a "Garrison Group" within the Agency. MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Garrison Group Meeting No. 1 - 20 September 1967 PRESENT: Executive Director, General Counsel, Inspector General, DD/P, DD/S, Mr. Raymond Rocca of CI Staff, Director of Security, and Mr. Goodwin. 1. Executive Director said that the Director had asked him to convene a group to consider the possible implications for the Agency emanating from New Orleans before, during, and after the trial of Clay Shaw. 2. General Counsel discussed his dealings with Justice and the desire of Shaw's lawyers to make contact with the Agency. 3. Rocca felt that Garrison would indeed obtain a conviction of Shaw for conspiring to assassinate President Kennedy. 4. Executive Director said the group should level on two objectives: (a) what kind of action, if any, is available to the Agency, and (b) what actions should be taken inside the Agency to reassure the Director that we have the problem in focus. The possibility of Agency action should be examined from the timing of what can be done before the trial and what might be feasible during and after the trial. It was agreed that OGC and Rocca would make a detailed study of all the facts and consult with Justice as appropriate prior to the next group meeting.
  
• 9/21/1967 The Salans Report DEPARTMENT OF STATE The Legal Adviser September 21, 1967 TO: U -- The Under Secretary THROUGH: S/S FROM: L -- Carl F. Salans SUBJECT: "The Liberty" -- Discrepancies Between Israeli Inquiry and U.S. Navy Inquiry -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM As you requested, we have compared the decision of the Israeli Judge, dated July 21, 1967, with the findings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, and the Clifford Report, concerning the Liberty incident. The following discrepancies are noteworthy: I. Speed and Direction of the "Liberty" The Israeli report indicates that the torpedo boat Division Commander reported and reconfirmed the target's (Liberty's) speed at 28 to 30 knots and that it had changed its navigational direction shortly after 1341 hours. The U.S. Navy inquiry established that the Liberty had been on a steady course at 5 knots from 1132 hours until the attack. II. Aircraft Surveillance The Israeli report indicates that a ship was reported in the area by reconnaissance aircraft at 0600 and that another report was received of a contact between an Israeli aircraft and a surface vessel about 0900. The Navy Court finding of facts, plus testimony of various members of the crew indicate reconnaissance overflights of the Liberty at 0515, 0850, 1030, 1056, 1126, 1145, 1220, and 1245. III. Identification by Israeli Aircraft The Israeli report indicates that the fighter aircraft carried out a run over the ship in an effort to identify it. The Navy Inquiry reports no such identification run. Commander McGonagle testified that he observed one aircraft of similar characteristics to those on earlier reconnaissance flights approximately five to six miles from the ship at an altitude of 7,000 feet. He did not see it approach the ship. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard from the port side of the ship, apparently resulting from a rocket, launched by a second aircraft. IV. Identification by Torpedo Boats The Israeli report indicates that the torpedo boats approached the Liberty in order to establish visual contact and to identify it, and that in addition, the Commander of the torpedo boats signalled the Liberty requesting its identification. The Liberty reportedly answered, "Identify yourself first," and opened fire on the torpedo boats. Commander McGonagle's testimony indicated that the only signals from the torpedo boats were those made during the high-speed approach from a distance of approximately 2,000 yards and that it was not possible for the Liberty to read the signals because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames. No reply signal was sent. Immediately after the Liberty was struck by a torpedo, the torpedo boats stopped at a range of approx- imately 500 to 800 yards and one signalled by flashing light in English "Do you require assistance?" Commander McGonagle testified that he had no means to communicate with the boat by light but hoisted "CODE LIMA INDIA". ("I am not under command", i.e., not able to control movements of ship.) V. Flag and Identification Markings The Israeli report indicates that the fighter aircraft which reportedly made an initial pass over the Liberty was looking for a flag but found none; likewise no other identification mark was observed. "...Throughout the contact no American or any other flag appeared on the ship...." (Elsewhere the report had indicated that at 1055 the ship had been identified as the Liberty "whose marking was GTR-5.") The Navy inquiry confirms by testimony of five members of the crew that they had personally observed the Ensign flying during the entire morning and up until the air attack. The Ensign was subsequently shot away during the air attack. Before the torpedo attack, a second Ensign was hoisted. The Navy report also found that "hull markings were clear and freshly painted." The Clifford report noted that "the Liberty's U.S. Navy's distinguishing letters and number were painted clearly on her bow. The Liberty's name was clearly painted in English on her stern. The ship's configuration and her standard markings were clearly sufficient for reconnaissance aircraft and waterborne vessels to identify her correctly...." The report noted that at all times prior to the air attack the Liberty was flying her normal size American flag (5 ft. by 8 ft.) at the masthead. Five minutes prior to the attack by the torpedo boats, the Liberty put up a flag measuring 7 ft. by 13 ft. to replace the flag which had been shot down in the air attack. VI. Identification of Ship as "El-Kasir" The Israeli report indicates that shortly before the torpedo boat attack the torpedo boat Division Commander reported the certain identification of the vessel as an Egyptian transport ship named "El Kasir". Identification of the target was made both by the Division Commander and the commander of another torpedo boat. The Israeli Judge indicated in his decision that "on examining photographs of the two ships, I am satisfied that a likeness exists between them, and that an error of identification is possible, especially having regard to the fact, that identification was made while the ship was clouded in smoke." The Clifford report noted "That the Liberty could have been mistaken for the Egyptian supply ship El Quseir is unbelievable. El Quseir has one-fourth the displacement of the Liberty, roughly one-half the beam, is 180 feet shorter, and is very differently configured. The Liberty's unusual antenna array and hull markings should have been visible to low-flying aircraft and torpedo boats. ...Trained Israeli naval personnel should have been able easily to see and identify the larger hull markings on the Liberty." Additional Observations Regarding Israeli Report I. Speed of Liberty and "El Kasir" as Identification Factors The Israeli report states that the initial speed of the target reported by the torpedo boat commander at 1341 hours as 30 knots was verified within minutes and confirmed as a speed of 28 knots. The report notes that it was the speed of the target which led to the final conclusion that there was no reason for surmising that the target could possibly be the Liberty. The reported speed would have ruled out the "El Kasir" as the target, as well as the Liberty since the top speed of the "Kasir", published in Janes Fighting Ships, is in the range of 14 knots. The Liberty's top speed is 18 knots. II. Failure to Relate "Liberty" to Bombardment Capability The Israeli report emphasizes that the attack originated with reports that the El Arish area was being shelled from the sea. The implication of such reports was obviously that a ship capable of such shelling was present in the immediate offshore area, i.e., within gun range of the shore. It would be clear to any trained observer that the armament aboard the Liberty was incapable of shore bombardment. It appears nevertheless that neither the aircraft, torpedo boats, nor the command headquarters to which they presumably reported evaluated the ship's capability for shore bombardment. III. Time Sequence of Attacks The Israeli report indicates that it had been agreed that as soon as the torpedo boats located the target, aircraft would be dispatched. At 1341 hours the torpedo boat located the target. "A few minutes later", the dispatch of aircraft was requested. The first air attack occurred at approximately 1400 hours. Assuming "a few minutes later" would mean four or five minutes, the request for aircraft must have occurred about 1345. One may infer from the fact that within a period of approximately 15 minutes, the request was transmitted, received, a command decision made, aircraft dispatched, and the attack launched, that no significant time was expended in an effort to identify the ship from the air before the attack was launched. IV. Attack by Torpedo Boat After "Do Not Attack" Order The Israeli report confirms that during the final attack by aircraft the marking "CPR-5" was noted on the hull and an order was transmitted to the torpedo boat division not to attack. The order was recorded in the log book of the flag boat at approximately 1420 hours. The torpedo boats nevertheless began their attack run at approximately 1428. The Division Commander later "claimed that no such message ever reached him." The Deputy Commander testified that "he received the message and passed it on to the Division Commander."
  
• 9/24/1967 Garrison accused Jack Ruby and certain members of the Dallas police of being involved in the plot. He charged that RFK was "without any question of a doubt...interferring with the investigation of the murder of his brother" and was making "a real effort to stop it." ("Page One," WABC-TV, New York)
  
• 9/24/1967 Sirhan Sirhan begins work at Organic Pasadena Health Food Store. Also of interest in this regard is the fact that in late 1967 Sirhan had virtually dropped out of sight. LAPD efforts to trace his location and activities for approximately three months in the period after he left his job at the Corona ranch drew a blank. In fact his mother began to be concerned as even she did not know his whereabouts for a period of time. And when he returned, his interest in the occult had seriously deepened.
  
• 9/25/1967 LBJ and Lady Bird "talked and talked and talked about when and how to make a statement that Lyndon is not going to be a candidate again." (White House Diary)
  
• 9/26/1967 A 26 September 1967 CIA memo describing the second meeting of the "Garrison Group." MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Garrison Group Meeting No. 2 - 26 September 1967 PRESENT: Executive Director, General Counsel, Inspector General, DD/P, DD/S, Mr. Raymond Rocca and Mr. Donovan Pratt of CI Staff, Director of Security, and Mr. Goodwin 1. General Counsel said that Nathaniel E. Kossack, First Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of Justice, had met with Shaw's lawyers. They gave him a list of questions and names of individuals that they believed might be implicated in the trial. Justice did not want the Agency to contact Shaw's lawyers, but rather to maintain the safety of our executive privilege. 2. Executive Director asked how complete our records are of contacts with Cubans. DD/P explained that they are adequate where contacts were with individuals but not when they were with Cuban groups. The Executive Director remarked on the impressive number of contacts we seem to have had who might now be implicated by Garrison. He said we should also think of what our course of action should be in the event our position on executive privilege becomes unstuck. 3. Rocca felt that McCone should be briefed, and perhaps also Hoover and Clifford. Executive Director said we should be prepared in the near future to bring the Director up to date and present him with alternative action. 4. Rocca noted that he had prepared a hypothetical scenario and given it to the General Counsel for comment. OGC will subsequently disseminate this with his comments. 5. DD/P said the Director complained of the lack of explanation as to where and how he is liable to get into trouble, and suggested that we ask the General Counsel to pinpoint this. Executive Director added that the Director also wanted to know how he could fight back. In this regard, Goodwin suggested the Director needed "conversational" material. 6. Pratt called attention to that part of Garrison's story which was based on alleged CIA involvement in a plot to kill Castro. DD/S suggested that Rocca might work up a graphic of the organization as conceived by Garrison. This was agreed. 7. Goodwin noted the Life magazine article linking Garrison to the Cosa Nostra in New Orleans. 8. General Counsel said that the judge should be setting the trial date this week.
  
• 9/26/1967 CIA memo from Raymond Rocca that was apparently the subject of considerable discussion at the September 27th "policy meeting." This is a survey of possible courses of action. There are arguments for and against action in each instance. The purpose is not to make an evaluation but to suggest the choices available. 1. The FBI representative from the inception of the Garrison investigation has strongly endorsed a course of action involving close and continuous interaction with the Attorney General or his designee. In effect, this has been done by Mr. Houston's office. 2. The following specific lines of action could be taken in complementing what has already been done in discussion with the Attorney General: a. File a specific bill of particulars on all aspects of the Garrison investigation that have become public. In effect this would mean making available to the Attorney General or his designee the substance Memoranda 1-7 in the Garrison investigation series. It would include a detailed consideration of those charges made by Garrison against the Agency growing out of the Oswald case and the Warren Commission Report. b. Initiate action with the Attorney General to bring charges of unlawful impersonation against Gordon NOVEL and Donald P. NORTON. Committees of Oversight in House and Senate. 1. Mr. Warner should be fully briefed on the entire background of Garrison's efforts to involve the Agency in his investigation. There are certain Congressmen who were members of the Warren Commission, and a specific effort should be made to stay alert and sensitive to Garrison's destructive reading of the Warren Commission Report. 2. Certainly an effort should be made to block or head off any attempts to put the Playboy article into the Congressional Record. 3. Who in the Senate or House would have the influence to induce Senator Long, who has endorsed Garrison, to consider the facts rather than the fanciful theories? 4. Consideration could be given to providing a designated group in the Senate and/or House with a White Paper summarizing the information that has already been provided to the Attorney General. 5. Consideration could be given to introducing formally in one of the CIA legislative committees a request for the extension of present federal legislation applicable to misrepresentation in situations not involving financial gain. It is our understanding that the Houma rule now deprives the Agency of any remedy except when it can be shown money is involved. In other words CIA does not have the same protection for its people in the U.S. as the FBI and certain other agencies have for their operations. Other Organizations and Individuals In and Out of Government. 1. The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities as a body, or Clark Clifford as Chairman, could be briefed in detail on all of the problems growing out of Garrison's false charges. 2. Mr. McCone could be fully briefed along the lines already discussed above. He is in a position to exert extensive influence in Catholic and Republican Party circles. The events under discussion took place during his Directorship. 3. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover is probably the single most important person to be considered in reacting to Garrison's false charges. Garrison has obviously made a play in the past four months to detach the FBI from CIA. (When he began his investigation, apparently he considered both the FBI and CIA equally vulnerable.) If Mr. Hoover can be persuaded of the basic merits of the Agency's position in the Garrison matter and if he will take a public stand thereon, we will have gone a long way toward preserving an overall favorable balance of opinion in the country. The facts of our case, therefore, should be pressed not only with the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but with the Director of the FBI as well. We have in the past months kept the FBI liaison fully informed of all aspects of our findings with respect to Garrison's charges. Mass Media Approaches. 1. Careful thought should be given to the extent to which Mr. Goodwin or the Director can assure that the newspaper outlets receive a coherent picture of Garrison's "facts" and motives. In anticipation of a trial, it would be prudent to have carefully selected channels of communication lined up in advance.
  
• 9/27/1967 In early fall, 1967, Attorney General Clark asked John Doar, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, to report on the Department's facilities for organizing information on individuals involved in civil disorders. On September 27, 1967, Doar recommended establishment of a 'single intelligence unit to analyze the FBI information we receive about certain persons and groups who make the urban ghetto their base of operation.' The FBI was to constitute only one source of information for the proposed unit. As additional sources, Doar suggested federal poverty programs, Labor Dept programs, and neighborhood legal services....the intelligence united of the Internal Revenue Service and perhaps the Post Office Department. The CIA was not among the proposed sources. (Rockefeller Commission report)
  
• 9/29/1967 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Clay L. Shaw's Trial and the Central Intelligence Agency 1. This memorandum is for information 2. The investigation of District Attorney Garrison of New Orleans into the assassination of President Kennedy, and his attack on the Warren Commission report, now focuses on one facet the trial of Clay L. Shaw, who has been indicted for conspiracy to assassinate the President. In his public announcements Garrison has been careful not to reveal his theory of the trial. Technically, he could restrict himself to an attempt to prove a conspiracy among Shaw, Oswald, the pilot Ferrie, and possibly others without involving CIA at all. As we understand Louisiana law, Garrison will have to prove at least one overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, and with Oswald and Ferrie both dead, we do not at the moment know of such an act which he could prove. 3. We speculate, therefore, that he will try to involve others and bring out testimony that they were involved in such things as the movement of arms and money in pursuance of the conspiracy. Again, conceivably, this could be done without involving CIA. Indeed, in his most recent pronouncements, Garrison has been concentrating on an unidentified group of Dallas oil men of the extreme right-wing type, who he says were the instigators, backers, and real controllers of the conspiracy. He plays the recurring theme, however, that those who actually carried out the assassination were people who had been associated with CIA and that CIA had set up Oswald as the "patsy" to detract attention from the true assassins. He also says that CIA is a part of a giant conspiracy on the part of "the establishment" and the Dallas oil men to conceal the true facts. It would seem probable, therefore, that Garrison would attempt to involve CIA in the Shaw trial, and from what we know, he should be able to produce witnesses who can testify at least to some peripheral connection with his case. Despite the fact that Garrison's theories are basically and preposterously false, therefore, he may well be able to involve CIA in the Shaw trial. 4. Garrison has thrown out so many theories, names, and efforts in different contexts that it is difficult to construct a clear scenario, but the following speculations will serve to illustrate the problems with which we will be faced if Garrison pursues this course: a. A witness, Carlos Quiroga, might testify that Ferrie was a friend of Sergio Arcacha Smith, who was associated with the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front (CDRF) until January or February 1962 and that Ferrie and Arcacha Smith were involved in a cache of arms in 1961. Garrison attempted to extradite Arcacha Smith from Texas to testify before the Grand Jury but was not successful. The CDRF was funded by CIA in Miami, and Arcacha Smith was with the New Orleans branch. b. Rudolph Ricardo Davis might testify about a training camp across the lake from New Orleans, possibly at Lacombe, Louisiana, run by a Cuban exile group (MDC) not affiliated with CIA, and that connected with this camp were Victor Paneque and Fernando Fernandez. Davis claims he met Oswald in the fall of 1963 in connection with anti-Castro activities. Paneque was also identified by Quiroga, the possible witness mentioned above, as having been in charge of the training camp at Lacombe, which Garrison falsely asserts was run by CIA. Our Miami Station was interested in Paneque in August 1964 and requested a provisional clearance, but a report of 5 October 1965 stated that Paneque would be dropped at the end of that month for lack of any immediate operational use for him. The Fernandez mentioned by Davis was also identified by one Michael W. Laborde as being the head of the Cuban organization for which Laborde's father, Lawrence J. Laborde, had worked. Fernandez was a contact of the Miami Station. [SENTENCE REDACTED] Lawrence Laborde was a contact of the Miami Station in 1961 and 1962 and served as an officer on a ship used for CIA Cuban operations. c. Garrison has questioned a Cuban named Santana after which Garrison inferred that Santana owned a rifle like Oswald's. Garrison alleges that Santana was in Dealy [sic] Plaza at the time of the assassination on orders of the alleged conspirators Shaw, Oswald, Ferrie, and Arcacha Smith. In June 1964 Santana listed CIA as his employer on a loan application for purchase of a car. In fact, he was [ABOUT 10 WORDS REDACTED] a guide for an infiltration operation in Cuba which was carried out in May 1963. He was dropped by the Miami Station on 15 October 1963. He knew some CIA staff members and agents by their true names. d. Garrison's office has questioned a Carlos Bringuier, who denied any CIA contact. But, according to reports, Garrison will try to introduce evidence that Bringuier had knowledge of an alleged affiliation of Oswald with CIA. Also, according to the Warren Commission report, there was an altercation and fight between Oswald and Bringuier in August 1963 and a radio debate between them on 21 August 1963 when Oswald identified himself as a Marxist. Bringuier had some contact with the Domestic Contact Service's New Orleans office and was formerly the New Orleans leader of the Student Revolutionary Directorate, which was an anti-Castro organization [REDACTED] funded by CIA. e. Garrison has falsely stated that Gordon D. Novel was a CIA agent and that one of his lawyers, Stephen Plotkin, was paid by CIA. Garrison says he can prove that Novel, along with Arcacha Smith and others, robbed a munitions bunker at Houma, Louisiana at the instigation of CIA. Garrison may claim that this robbery was one of the overt acts of the conspiracy. Actually, Novel has never at any time had any association with the Agency nor has his lawyer, Stephen Plotkin. f. Donald P. Norton has been questioned at length by Garrison, and Norton has falsely claimed in a newspaper article that he worked for CIA from 1957 to 1966, and that in 1962 Clay Shaw gave him $50,000, which he took to Monterrey, Mexico and gave to Oswald. Here again Garrison may claim that this is the overt act in the conspiracy. There is no truth in Norton's story in any respect. 5. We could continue to speculate about some of the other names involved, but the forgoing is sufficient to illustrate the potential problem. Certainly, the story of CIA's connections and interrelationships would be enough to at least confuse a jury thoroughly. Shaw's lawyers have no way of refuting these stories except by attacking the credibility of the witnesses or introducing other witnesses to impeach their stories. They have so far no Government information which they can use for this purpose. The Government, and particularly CIA, is placed in a quandary. If it were to deny the Norton and Novel stories, which are wholly untrue, it would have to make some partial admissions at least in connection with Laborde, Santana, and possibly Paneque, Bringuier, and others. Shaw himself was a contact of the Domestic Contact Service's New Orleans office from 1948 to 1956 and introduced General Cabell, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, when he addressed the New Orleans Foreign Policy Association in May 1961. In view of this dilemma, the Department of Justice has so far taken the position that if any effort is made by either the prosecution or defense to involve CIA in the trial, the Government will claim executive privilege. This, too, can be turned by Garrison into a claim that it is part of the whole cover up by the establishment and particularly by CIA. No alternative to the claim of privilege appears to be available, however. To protect the Government's position on privilege, it would appear that the Government cannot take any action publicly to refute Garrison's claims and the testimony of his witnesses, as the Louisiana judge would almost certainly take the position that any such public statement would negate the privilege. 6. At the present time, therefore, there is no action we can recommend for the Director or the Agency to take. If during the trial it appears that Shaw may be convicted on information that could be refuted by CIA, we may be in for some difficult decisions. There is one positive aspect at the present time, which is that outside of Louisiana the U.S. press and public opinion appear to be extremely skeptical if not scornful of Garrison's allegations. We can only wait and see whether the trial will influence this attitude either way. LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON General Counsel
  
• 9/29/1967 A CIA memo from 29 September 1967 describing a September 27th "policy meeting on Garrison's investigation." MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Garrison Investigation 1. On 27 September 1967 there was a policy meeting on Garrison's investigation. [approximately four lines redacted] 2. The Legal Counsel discussed his coordination with the Justice Department. The DD/S developed the thesis that CIA should take no action against Garrison at this time because to do so would deny us the protection of executive privilege and also because Garrison has not shown his hand yet. 3. The [REDACTED] passed out copies of a memorandum dealing with possible lines of action and explained that these were not recommendations but rather suggestions for consideration. 4. The DD/S said that he found it difficult to follow the cast of characters in Garrison's case and asked whether a chart could be provided. The [REDACTED] agreed to do so.
  
• 9/30/1967 LBJ signed $70 billion defense bill (biggest in US history, with an income tax surcharge of 10% financing it).
  
• 9/30/1967 LBJ announced appointment of Dean Griswold as Solicitor General to replace Thurgood Marshall.
  
• 10/1967 Ray's story told to William Pepper: "Some time in late September or early October, Ray received a general delivery letter from Raul asking him to call New Orleans, which he did. This would be the first of several such calls he would make. Raul himself never got on the phone, but Ray instead always talked with a man who knew where Raul was and who relayed instructions. Ray never met the man he spoke to on the phone and didn't think he could now identify his voice, but he had the impression that the contact kept tabs on persons other than Raul. Ray was told to drive to Baton Rouge and make another phone call to receive instructions for a rendezvous in Mexico."
  
• 10/1967 Playboy interview with Jim Garrison; he stated "In over five years of office I have never had a single case reversed because of the use of improper methods..." "There is something very wrong today with our government in Washington DC, inasmuch as it is willing to use massive economic power to conceal the truth from the people." When asked by Playboy's Eric Norden for the evidence for CIA complicity, Garrison cited 1) a missing CIA photo of Oswald that shows him in the company of a CIA agent in Mexico; 2) classified files on Ferrie; 3)suppressed autopsy materials; 4) CIA files that allegedly would show that Oswald was involved in the U-2 project; 5) the fact that the CIA had destroyed a document requested by the WC; 6) the identification of Oswald's CIA "babysitter"; 7) the identification of a CIA "courier"; 8) "the consistent refusal of the federal government" to provide him with "any information" about the role of the CIA in the assassination. Garrison called this last item "the clincher." He also spoke of a "second Oswald" sent to impersonate the real Oswald during the assassination. Also, "...a number of the men who killed the President were former employees of the CIA involved in its anti-Castro underground activities in and around New Orleans. The CIA knows their identity. So do I. We must assume that the plotters were acting on their own rather than on CIA orders when they killed the President. As far as we have been able to determine, they were not in the pay of the CIA at the time of the assassination...The CIA could not face up to the American people and admit that its former employees had conspired to assassinate the president ...the Agency attempted to sweep the whole conspiracy under the rug..." He claimed that Ruby was a self-hating Jew who smuggled guns with neo-Nazis and that "Oswald would have been more at home with Mein Kamp than Das Kapital." He related Jones Harris' theory that a pickup truck shown in a photo hid two more gunmen. He also told Playboy that "some of the gunmen appear to have used frangible bullets." "I've taken unusual steps to protect the right of the defendant and assure him a fair trial. Before we introduced the testimony of our witnesses, we made them undergo independent verifying tests, including polygraph examination, truth serum and hypnosis. We thought this would be hailed as an unprecedented step in jurisprudence..." Internal files and memos at Playboy revealed that the editors were impressed with Garrison's intelligence and charisma, and found him mostly credible. Whether he was right or wrong, the magazine felt that Garrison would be "very big news." (Counterplot 157-9) "To facilitate the publication of his Playboy interview, Garrison provided the editors of the magazine with 'secret evidence,' which, he claimed, was to be used in his court case and was 'not for publication.'" When Gordon Novel sued Playboy for libel, the "secret evidence" was examined by Novel's lawyer, Elmer Gertz, and entered into the court record. "Virtually all of the 'secret evidence' consists of uncorroborated allegations of volunteer witnesses." (Ibid. 77-8)
  
• 10/1967 John Keel wrote for Saga magazine an article "UFO Agents of Terror" referring to the Men in Black phenomenon.
  
• 10/2/1967 Thurgood Marshall is sworn in as the first black justice of the Supreme Court.
  
• 10/5/1967 "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara I-35994/67 Washington, October 5, 1967. SUBJECT: Daniel Boone As result of recommendations by the Joint State/Defense/CIA Study Group for Cambodia, CINCPAC was authorized on 22 May 1967 to conduct limited cross-border ground reconnaissance operations into the northeast corner of Cambodia, using U.S.-South Vietnamese Special Forces teams (Daniel Boone). The specified area of operations and other conditions for the initial Daniel Boone program are shown on the map at Tab A./2/ The map at Tab B/3/ shows a sampling of Daniel Boone operations June-September 1967. It illustrates that present restrictions result in Daniel Boone operations having limited value for tactical or other intelligence purposes. "
  
• 10/7/1967 LBJ complained to Wheeler, "Your generals almost destroyed us with their testimony before the Stennis Committee. We were murdered in the hearings."
  
• 10/7/1967 James Earl Ray drives to Mexico. Ray's story told to William Pepper: "When Ray got to Baton Rouge, Raul was gone, having left instructions for Ray to go directly to a motel in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, just across the border. Ray checked in there on October 7. Raul joined him and they went back across the border to the United States carrying some kind of contraband inside the spare tire. Ray surmised that it was drugs or jewelry. Raul gave him $2,000 and assured him that he would get the travel documents next time, along with enough money for Ray to go into business in another country. Raul gave him a second New Orleans number to replace the first and told him that his next operation would involve transporting guns and accessories. Raul said he would contact him again, when the time came, through general delivery. After traveling in Mexico for some time, Ray headed for the California border. Before crossing over, however, he went through the car to see if there was anything that might make customs agents suspicious. Down the left side of the front passenger seat he found a cigarette packet with a business card slipped into it. On the front of the card was printed a name that had been inked out, the name of a city (a two-word name that appeared to be New Orleans), and "L.E.A.A." Written on the back was the name Randy Rosen. There were some additional letters after Rosen that James couldn't identify (he later came to believe that the name was Rosenson) and an address, 1180 Northwest River Drive, Miami. Ray wasn't certain how the card got in the car but believed that somehow it was connected to Raul -- perhaps the cigarette packet had slipped out of Raul's pocket. Ray only threw it away in Los Angeles after copying the information. Subsequently Ray's brother Jerry and others spent a fair amount of time and energy trying to find Rosenson."
  
• 10/8-9/1967 Che Guevara is captured by government forces in Bolivia. He was executed in a mud-walled schoolhouse in the village of La Higuera in the south-central mountains. In a canyon near the hamlet of La Higuera, Bolivia, Che Guevara is ambushed and wounded in the leg. Felix Ramos, from the CIA's Operation 40, is with the Bolivian ambushers. Ramos immediately begins photographing the contents of the wounded man's knapsack. Although the Bolivian government announces that Che has been killed in the fire fight, he is actually taken to La Higuera and locked in the local school house. Bolivian military brass, including a rear admiral of the armed forces of this landlocked nation arrive by helicopter in La Higuera, Bolivia to view their captured "prize" -- Che Guevara. With them, according to eyewitnesses, is the CIA agent known as Gonzales. Later in the afternoon, Che Guevara is machine-gunned to death in the schoolhouse by a Bolivian Ranger. His body is strapped to a helicopter and flown to the larger town of Vallegrande where the two CIA Operation 40 agents (Felix Ramos and Eduardo Gonzales) supervise the embalming process. A Reuters dispatch from Vallegrande mentions that a CIA agent is present but this information does not appear in American newspapers. It will later be disclosed that the embalmers cut off Che's hands before he is cremated, to prove that he is dead.
  
• 10/8/1967 A secret memo by the CIA's Richard Helms shows that, in the fall of this year, the CIA's most senior analysts believe the U.S. could withdraw from Vietnam without any permanent damage to U.S. or Western security.
  
• 10/13/1967 LBJ signed an executive order to eliminate discrimination in government based on gender.
  
• 10/16/1967 Joan Baez and 123 other anti-draft protestors are arrested for blocking the entrance to the Oakland, Calif., induction center.
  
• 10/16/1967 Steve Roberts dies after a long illness. Roberts is West Coast coordinator for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and a SWP functionary. According to his obituary in The Militant, he had made "many visits to campuses to talk about the Cuban revolution and to mix with the students as though he was one of them ..." Roberts had traveled to Cuba from Mexico City in 1962 "as a guest of the Cuban government."
  
• 10/16/1967 Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent hired by H.L. Hunt as an investigator, writes the Hunts (H.L. Hunt and sons) that: "I have information tot he effect that (Jim) Garrison is referring to either you or Bunker as the wealthy oilman in his probe." In another memo a few months later, Rothermel writes, "The source of the information reports that Garrison is convinced that the assassination was carried out by General Edwin Walker with the financial support and backing of Herman and George Brown of Houston and H.L. Hunt of Dallas. He said that Garrison is a heavy drinker and lives extravagantly despite a modest salary as district attorney." Jim Garrison is referred to by Rothermel in another memo to the Hunts as: " ... a most vindictive left Winger, that he is bisexual and a clever blackmailer. Garrison understands public opinion, and can without introducing evidence of proof, harass, intimidate, and smear whomever he wishes."
  
• 10/17/1967 On file at the JFK Library in Boston was an exchange between Dr. George Burkley and an interviewer from this date; he was asked if he agreed with the WC "on the number of bullets that entered the President's body." Burkley responded, "I would not care to be quoted on that." (Reasonable Doubt) Despite that fact that Burkley was the only individual present at both Parkland and Bethesda, he did not testify before The Warren Commission.
  
• 10/18/1967 In a meeting, Rusk, McNamara, Katzenbach, Rostow, Taylor and Kissinger urged keeping open the Pennsylvania channel of contacts with Hanoi. Fortas and Clifford urged that it be abandoned. LBJ told Kissinger to impress upon Hanoi the US' willingness to talk. But the channel soon collapsed because of continued heavy bombing by the US.
  
• 10/18/1967 JFK researcher Harold Weisberg wrote a letter to Playboy, saying "He [Garrison] and his staff are dedicated, and sincere and, I am convinced from my own work, right."
  
• 10/19/1967 The trial of Sam Bowers, Cecil Price and others accused of murdering the three civil rights workers in 1964: it took place in a federal courtroom in Mississippi before judge William Cox, who had not been sympathetic to the government's case. Today, the jury reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked. Cox strongly urged the jury to reach a decision.
  
• 10/19/1967 NASA's Mariner 5 interplanetary space probe passes within 2500 miles of Venus and transmits data back to earth on the planet's atmosphere. Mariner reports that there is no appreciable amount of oxygen, which contradicts reports from the Soviet Venera 4, which touched down on the planet 10/18.
  
• 10/20/1967 Lady Bird: "At dinner there was much talk of tomorrow - the day of the big gathering in Washington of dissenters on Vietnam...there is a ripple of grim excitement in the air, almost a feeling of being under siege." (White House Diary)
  
• 10/20/1967 NY Times quotes Charles de Gaulle as saying that the JFK assassination was the work of the police and that Oswald had been framed.
  
• 10/20/1967 An all-white federal jury convicted 7 of 18 defendants in the slayings of three civil rights workers in Mississippi in '64, including deputy sheriff Price of Neshoba County and Klan leader Sam Bowers. They were convicted of conspiring to deprive their victims of their civil rights. As U.S. District Judge Harold Cox put it at the time of sentencing: "They killed one nigger, one Jew, and a white man. I gave them what I thought they deserved."
  
• 10/21-22/1967 between 50,000 and 150,000 anti-war protestors gathered on the Washington mall. A crowd of 20,000 activists demonstrated outside the Pentagon, vowing to shut it down. Trouble flared up as a smaller bunch, radicals led by David Dellinger and Jerry Rubin taunted military police, but the unarmed soldiers circling the building acted with restraint. Norman Mailer was among a handful that were arrested after breaking into the building. Eventually, the crowd dispersed. 647 were arrested. Smaller demonstrations were held on many campuses and in Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia. 20,000 angry antiwar demonstrators march on the Pentagon, determined to shut it down. Robert McNamara decides to surround the building with troops armed with rifles, standing shoulder-to-shoulder in the middle of the asphalt ring, and to station U.S. marshals between them and the protesters. McNamara observes the scene from the roof of the Pentagon building - among other places. Years later, he will write "... had the protesters been more disciplined -- Gandhi-like -- they could have achieved their objective of shutting us down."
  
• 10/21/1967 LBJ and his aides are privately worried about McNamara's mental health. LBJ says: "We can't afford another Forrestal," referring to the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal who had jumped out of a hospital window in 1949.
  
• 10/26/1967 Mexican president Diaz Ordaz came to Washington.