30-03-2010, 08:12 PM
Paul Rigby Wrote:Viewed in splendid isolation, the subway attacks could be interpreted as home-grown false-flag work. But they did not occur in isolation. There are two related contexts: the CIA's war on the Cheka, which began almost at the outset of the US drang nach osten in the early 1990s, with a wave of targeted assassinations in Russia's former Caucasian republics...
Just to give the reader some idea of what I'm getting at, here's an extract from an essay I began 10 years ago:
Quote:On Sunday, 1 August 1993, a motorcade bearing senior Russian government personnel left the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz. Among its occupants was a significant figure in late Soviet/early post-Soviet diplomacy.
Victor P. Polyanichko, a former journalist and Red Army member, had served as Moscow’s “special counsellor” to President Najibullah (1) for three years, 1985-88, at the height of the CIA-orchestrated war against Afghanistan’s Russian invaders – an invasion the US worked assiduously to provoke, as Zbigniew Brzezinski was later to boast (3). Post-Kabul, Polyanichko had served as number 2 in the Azerbaijan party apparat, where he was accused – by the CIA’s paper of record, the New York Times, no less - of inciting ethnic warfare between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh (4); and survived, in May 1991, a grenade attack at his office by unidentified humanitarians doubtless resolved to give peace an even better chance than their intended victim (5).
In June 1993, Polyanichko was appointed by Yeltsin as senior administrator “in the embattled Russian Federation republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia” (6). Polyanichko had gone to Vladikavkaz at the beginning of August to mediate settlement of a bitter conflict between the Christian Ossetians and Muslim Ingush. He had proposed ending hostilities by resettling the 80,000 Ingush driven out of Ossetia the previous year after the former had sought, as the conventional story had it, to regain land and political recognition stripped from them by Stalin during WWII (7). The New York Times – as noted above, ever the dutiful servant of the CIA in such matters - was to omit all reference to this reason for Polyanichko’s presence in Vladikavkaz; and erroneously claim that the dispute he sought to end was between North Ossetia and Chechnya, not Ingushetia (8). Chechnya, of course, was of special interest to the Agency: Jihadists, trained by Langley’s ISI proxies in the same camps as the Taliban and Al Qaeda (9), were there engaged in a bloody insurgency designed to prevent the establishment of a projected Russian pipeline (10).
On the outskirts of Vladikavkaz, Polyanichko’s motorcade was raked by machine gun fire, killing not merely Polyanichko, but also an unnamed bodyguard; Major-General Anatoly Karetsky, the commander of the region’s resident Russian army corps; and an unnamed “official of the Russian Security Ministry” (11). The Ingush president, Ruslan Aushev, denounced Polyanichko’s murder as “a provocation which shows the danger threatening anyone who tries to solve the problem of the refugees” (12).
Polyanichko’s slaying was only the latest in a regional string which claimed the lives of both active and nominally retired senior Soviet-era intelligence officers. In Armenia, only weeks before, seventy year-old Marius Yuzbashian, head of the Armenian KGB for a decade (1978-1988), had been “shot three times in a park near his home” (13); while in June, Ambartsum Kandilian, a former head of Armenian railways by now lecturing at the country’s national security school, had been assassinated in his car (14). The assassinations point us to the dark, and, in the West, necessarily unexamined, heart of the grotesque oxymoron that is “liberal interventionism”: The assassinations, terrorism and organised ethnic pogroms which are the essential preludes to, and pretexts for, militarised “humanitarian” intervention by America and its client elites in Europe and elsewhere.
Four days later, the State Department moved to capitalise on the successful Polyanichko hit, which could now be seen for what it was – the raising of the curtain on the next act of the intended global spread of Pax Americana, this time to “a vast region of ex-Soviet republics” (15).
On 5 August, at a briefing for representatives of the US foreign policy establishment’s more literate mouthpieces, the State Department unveiled its blueprint for the long-planned direct US military interventions throughout the former republics of the Soviet empire. Directive 13 paid lip service to the key euphemisms and tenets of “liberal interventionism” – US invasion forces “must be welcomed by all parties to the dispute, adopt a neutral stance, respect all borders, preserve democratic policies;” and their stays must “be of finite duration and remain under strict political control by UN officials in New York” (16) – but no one was fooled, certainly not in the European chancelleries in which the charter for invasion was already circulating, or Moscow, where it had likely arrived even earlier, either through espionage or deliberate leak (17) : The American drang nach osten, begun unofficially several years before by trailblazers like General Singlaub, was set to become government policy.
As part of the US offensive, the Director of Central Intelligence was despatched to Moscow no doubt to offer emollient words on, we may safely assume, and among many other matters, Directive 13. James Woolsey could be forgiven an air of confidence in his meetings with Yevgeny Primakov, the head of the SVR (17): Russia looked terminally weak and divided, and its once-feared intelligence bureaucracy, passive and ineffectual. Woolsey was to receive a rude awakening.