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Operation Condor
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Operation Condor







Operation Condor [Image: 200px-Que_digan_d%C3%B3nde_estan.jpg] Background Histories of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil (1960s), Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay · 1973 Chilean coup d'état Events Dirty War · National Reorganization Process · Operation Colombo · Operation Charly Operation Gladio · Night of the Pencils · Operativo Independencia · 1973 Ezeiza massacre · Massacre of Margarita Belén · Death flights · Desaparecidos Dictators Augusto Pinochet · Alfredo Stroessner · Jorge Rafael Videla · Leopoldo Galtieri · Jorge Anaya · Basilio Lami Dozo Notable operatives and responsible people Stefano Delle Chiaie · Michael Townley · Luis Posada Carriles · Virgilio Paz Romero · Orlando Bosch · Hugo Campos Hermida · José López Rega · Paul Schäfer · Alfredo Astiz Responsible organizations DINA · Caravan of Death · Batallón de Inteligencia 601 · CORU · DISIP · SNI/ABIN · SOA · Triple A · CIA · SISMI Places Esmeralda (BE-43) · Estadio Nacional de Chile · Villa Grimaldi · Colonia Dignidad · ESMA Laws Ley de Punto Final Ley de Obediencia Debida Archives and reports Archives of Terror · Rettig Report · Valech Report · National Security Archive Reactions CONADEP · Trial of the Juntas · Augusto Pinochet's arrest and trial · Madres de la Plaza de Mayo · Montoneros · MIR vde
Operation Condor (Spanish: Operación Cóndor), was a campaign of political repressions involving assassination and intelligence operations officially implemented in 1975 by the right-wing dictatorships of the Southern Cone of South America. The program aimed to eradicate left-wing and socialist influence and ideas and to control active or potential opposition movements against the usually conservative governments. Due to its clandestine nature, the precise number of deaths directly attributable to Operation Condor will likely never be known, but it is reported to have caused thousands of victims, possibly even more.[1][2][3]
Condor's key members were the right-wing military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil, with Ecuador and Peru joining later in more peripheral roles.[4] These nations were ruled by dictators such as Jorge Rafael Videla, Augusto Pinochet, Ernesto Geisel, Hugo Banzer, and Alfredo Stroessner. The operation was jointly conducted by the intelligence and security services of these nations during the mid-1970s with Direction and support provided by the United States of America through the CIA.[5].


History

[Image: 250px-Pinochet_y_Videla_2.jpg] [Image: magnify-clip.png]
The Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and the Argentine Jorge Rafael Videla, in 1978


On 25 November 1975, leaders of the military intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay met, with Manuel Contreras, chief of DINA (the Chilean secret police), in Santiago de Chile, officially creating the Plan Condor [6]. However, cooperation between various security services, in the aim of "eliminating Marxist subversion", previously existed before this meeting and Pinochet's coup d'état. Thus, during the Xth Conference of American Armies held in Caracas on September 3, 1973, Brazilian General Breno Borges Fortes, head of the Brazilian army, proposed to "extend the exchange of information" between various services in order to "struggle against subversion".[7] Furthermore, in March 1974, representatives of the police forces of Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia met with Alberto Villar, deputy chief of the Argentine Federal Police and co-founder of the Triple A death squad, to implement cooperation guidelines in order to destroy the "subversive" threat represented by the presence of thousands of political exilees in Argentina [7]. In August 1974 the corpses of the first victims of Condor, Bolivian refugees, were found in garbage dumps in Buenos Aires [7].
According to French journalist Marie-Monique Robin, author of Escadrons de la mort, l'école française (2004, Death Squads, The French School), the paternity of Operation Condor is to be attributed to General Rivero, intelligence officer of the Argentine Armed Forces and former student of the French.[8]
Operation Condor, which took place in the context of the Cold War, had the tacital approval of the United States. In 1968, U.S. General Robert W. Porter stated that "In order to facilitate the coordinated employment of internal security forces within and among Latin American countries, we are...endeavoring to foster inter-service and regional cooperation by assisting in the organization of integrated command and control centers; the establishment of common operating procedures; and the conduct of joint and combined training exercises." Condor was one of the fruits of this effort. The targets were officially leftist guerrillas (such as the MIR, the Montoneros or the ERP, the Tupamaros, etc.) but in fact included all kinds of political opponents, including their families and others, as reported by the Valech Commission. The Argentine "Dirty War", for example, which resulted in approximatively 30,000 victims according to most estimates, targeted many trade-unionists, relatives of activists, etc.
From 1976 onwards, the Chilean DINA and its Argentine counterpart, SIDE, were its front-line troops. The infamous "death flights", theorized in Argentina by Luis María Mendía — and also used during the Algerian War (1954–1962) by French forces — were widely used, in order to make the corpses, and therefore evidence, disappear. There were also many cases of child abduction.
On December 22, 1992 a significant amount of information about Operation Condor came to light when José Fernández, a Paraguayan judge, visited a police station in the Lambaré suburb of Asunción to look for files on a former political prisoner. Instead he found what became known as the "terror archives", detailing the fates of thousands of Latin Americans secretly kidnapped, tortured and killed by the security services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Some of these countries have since used portions of this archive to prosecute former military officers. The archives counted 50,000 persons murdered, 30,000 "desaparecidos" and 400,000 incarcerated.[9]
According to these archives other countries such as Peru cooperated to varying extents by providing intelligence information in response to requests from the security services of the Southern Cone countries. Even though Peru were not at the secret November 1975 meeting in Santiago de Chile there is evidence of its involvement. For instance, in June 1980, Peru was known to have been collaborating with Argentine agents of 601 Intelligence Battalion in the kidnapping, torture and disappearance of a group of Montoneros living in exile in Lima.[10]
The "terror archives" also revealed Colombia's and Venezuela's greater or lesser degree of cooperation (Luis Posada Carriles was probably at the meeting that ordered Orlando Letelier's car bombing). It has been alleged that a Colombian paramilitary organization known as Alianza Americana Anticomunista may have cooperated with Operation Condor. Brazil signed the agreement later (June 1976), and refused to engage in actions outside Latin America.
Mexico, together with Costa Rica, Canada, France, the U.K., Spain and Sweden received many people fleeing from the terror regimes. Operation Condor officially ended with the ousting of the Argentine dictatorship in 1983, although the killings continued for some time after that[citation needed].

Notable cases and prosecution


Argentina

Main article: Dirty War
The Argentine Dirty War was carried on simultaneously with and overlapping Operation Condor. The Argentine SIDE cooperated with the Chilean DINA in numerous cases of desaparecidos. Chilean General Carlos Prats, Uruguayan former MPs Zelmar Michelini, Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz and the ex-president of Bolivia, Juan José Torres, were assassinated in the Argentine capital.
The SIDE also assisted Bolivian general Luis Garcia Meza Tejada's Cocaine Coup in Bolivia, with the help of Gladio operative Stefano Delle Chiaie and Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie (see also Operation Charly). The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, a group of mothers who had lost their children to the dictatorship, started demonstrating each Sunday on Plaza de Mayo from April 1977, in front of the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires, the seat of the government, to reclaim their children from the junta. The Mothers continue their struggle for justice to this day (2007).
The National Commission for Forced Disappearances (CONADEP), led by writer Ernesto Sabato, was created in 1983. Two years later, the Juicio a las Juntas (Trial of the Juntas) largely succeeded in proving the crimes of the various juntas which had formed the self-styled National Reorganization Process. Most of the top officers who were tried were sentenced to life imprisonment: Jorge Rafael Videla, Emilio Eduardo Massera, Roberto Eduardo Viola, Armando Lambruschini, Raúl Agosti, Rubén Graffigna, Leopoldo Galtieri, Jorge Anaya and Basilio Lami Dozo. However, Raúl Alfonsín's government passed two amnesty laws protecting military officers involved in human rights abuses: the 1986 Ley de Punto Final (law of closure) and the 1987 Ley de Obediencia Debida (law of due obedience). President Carlos Menem then pardoned the leaders of the junta in 1989–1990. Following continuous protests by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and other associations, the amnesty laws were repealed by the Argentine Supreme Court nearly twenty years later, in June 2005.
In Argentina DINA's civil agent Enrique Arancibia Clavel, prosecuted for crimes against humanity in 2004, was condemned to life imprisonment for his part in General Prat's murder.[11] In 2003, federal judge Maria Servini de Cubria requested the extradition from Chile of Mariana Callejas, who was Michael Townley's wife (himself a U.S. expatriate and DINA agent), and Cristoph Willikie, a retired colonel from the Chilean army—all three of them are accused of this murder. Chilean appeal court judge Nibaldo Segura refused extradition in July 2005 on the grounds that they had already been prosecuted in Chile.[2]
It has been claimed that Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie—also an operative of Gladio "stay-behind" secret NATO paramilitary organization—was involved in the murder of General Prats. He and fellow extremist Vincenzo Vinciguerra testified in Rome in December 1995 before judge María Servini de Cubría that DINA agents Enrique Arancibia Clavel and Michael Townley were directly involved in this assassination.[3]

Brazil

In Brazil, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso ordered in 2000 the release of some military files concerning Operation Condor.[12] Italian attorney general Giancarlo Capaldo, who is investigating the disappearances of Italian citizens, probably by a mixture of Argentine, Chilean, Paraguayan and Brazilian military, accused 11 Brazilians of involvement. However, according to the official statement, "they could not confirm nor deny that Argentine, Brazilian, Paraguayan and Chilean militaries will be submitted to a trial before December."[13] As of August 2006, nobody in Brazil has been convicted of human rights violations during the 21 years of military dictatorship there.
On April 26, 2000 former governor of Rio de Janeiro Leonel Brizola alleged that ex-presidents of Brazil João Goulart and Juscelino Kubitschek were assassinated as part of Operation Condor, and requested the opening of investigations on their deaths. Goulart died of a heart attack and Kubitschek a car accident.[14][15]

The Kidnapping of the Uruguayans

The Condor Operation expanded the covered-up repression from Uruguay to Brazil in an event that happened in November 1978 and later known as "o Sequestro dos Uruguaios´, that is, "the Kidnapping of the Uruguayans". On that occasion, under consent of the Brazilian military regime, high officers of the Uruguayan army secretly crossed the frontier, heading to Porto Alegre, capital of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. There they kidnapped a militant couple of the Uruguayan political opposition, Universindo Rodriguez and Lilian Celiberti, along with her two children, Camilo and Francesca, 8 and 3 years old.
The illegal operation failed when two Brazilian journalists – the reporter Luiz Cláudio Cunha and the photographer Joao Baptista Scalco, from Veja Magazine, were warned by an anonymous phone call about the disappearance of the Uruguayan couple. The two journalists decided to check the information and headed to the appointed address: an apartment in the borough of Menino Deus in Porto Alegre [16]. There, they were mistakenly taken as other members of the Uruguayan opposition by the armed men who had arrested Lilian. Universindo and the children had already been clandestinely taken to Uruguay [17]. The unexpected arrival of the journalists disclosed the secret operation which had to be suddenly suspended. Lillian was then taken back to Montevideo. The failure of the operation avoided the murder of the four Uruguayans. The news of a political kidnapping made headlines in the Brazilian press and became an international scandal which embarrassed the military governments of Brazil and Uruguay. A few days after, the children were taken to their maternal grandparents in Montevideo. Universindo as well as Lilian were imprisoned and tortured in Brazil and then taken to military prisons in Uruguay where they remained during the next five years. After the Uruguayan re-democratization in 1984, the couple was released and then confirmed all the details of the kidnapping.[18]
In 1980, two inspectors of DOPS (Department of Political and Social Order, an official police branch in charge of the political repression during the military regime) were convicted by the Brazilian Justice as the armed men who had arrested the journalists in Lilian's apartment in Porto Alegre. They were João Augusto da Rosa and Orandir Portassi Lucas (a former football player of Brazilian teams known as Didi Pedalada), both identified later as participants in the kidnapping operation by the reporters and the Uruguayan couple — which surely confirmed the involvement of the Brazilian Government in the Condor Operation. In 1991, through the initiative of Governor Pedro Simon, the State of Rio Grande do Sul officially recognized the kidnapping of the Uruguayans and compensated them for this, inspiring the democratic government of the President Luis Alberto Lacalle in Uruguay to do the same a year later [19].
Police officer Pedro Seelig, the head of the DOPS at the time of the kidnapping, was identified by the Uruguayan couple as the man in charge of the operation in Porto Alegre. When Seelig was denounced to the Brazilian Justice, Universindo and Lílian were in prison in Uruguay and they were prevented from testifying against him. The Brazilian policeman was then cleared of all charges due to alleged lack of evidences. Lilian and Universindo's later testimony also proved that four officers of the secret Uruguayan Counter-information Division – two majors and two captains – took part in the operation under consent of the Brazilian authorities[20]. One of these officers, Captain Glauco Yanonne, was himself responsible for torturing Universindo Dias in the DOPS headquarters in Porto Alegre [21]. Even though Universindo and Lilian recognized the Uruguayan military men who had arrested and tortured them, not a single one of them was prosecuted by the Justice in Montevideo. This was due to the Law of Impunity which guaranteed amnesty to all Uruguayan people involved in political repression.
The investigative journalism of the Veja Magazine awarded Cunha and Scalco with the 1979 Esso Prize, the most important prize of the Brazilian Press [22]. Hugo Cores, a former Uruguayan political prisoner who was living in São Paulo at the time of the kidnapping and was the author of the anonymous phone call to Cunha, spoke the following to the Brazilian press in 1993: "All the Uruguayans kidnapped abroad, around 180 people, are missing to this day. The only ones who managed to survive are Lilian, her children, and Universindo"[23].
The kidnapping of the Uruguayans in Porto Alegre entered into history as the only failure with international repercussion in the whole Operation Condor, among several hundreds of clandestine actions from the Latin America Southern Cone dictatorships, who were responsible for thousands of killed and missing people in the period between 1975 and 1985. Analyzing the political repression in the region during that decade, the Brazilian journalist Nilson Mariano estimates the number of killed and missing people as: 297 in Uruguay, 366 in Brazil, 2,000 in Paraguay, 3,196 in Chile and 30,000 in Argentina[24]. The so-called "Terror Files" (Portuguese: "Arquivos do Terror") – a whole set of 60,000 documents, weighting 4 tons and making 593,000 microfilmed pages which were discovered by a former Paraguayan political prisoner Marti Almada, in Lambare, Paraguay, in 1992 - provides even higher numbers: the total result of Southern Cone Operation Condor had left up to 50,000 killed, 30,000 missing and 400,000 arrested[25].

Chile

When Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 in response to Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón's request for his extradition to Spain, information concerning Condor was revealed. One of the lawyers who asked for his extradition talked about an attempt to assassinate Carlos Altamirano, leader of the Chilean Socialist Party: it was claimed that Pinochet met Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie during Franco's funeral in Madrid in 1975 in order to have Altamirano murdered.[26] But as with Bernardo Leighton, who was shot in Rome in 1975 after a meeting the same year in Madrid between Stefano Delle Chiaie, former CIA agent Michael Townley and anti-Castrist Virgilio Paz Romero, the plan ultimately failed.
Chilean judge Juan Guzmán Tapia eventually established a precedent concerning the crime of "permanent kidnapping": since the bodies of victims kidnapped and presumably murdered could not be found, he deemed that the kidnapping was deemed to continue, rather than to have occurred so long ago that the perpetrators were protected by an amnesty decreed in 1978 or by the Chilean statute of limitations. Ironically, the perpetrators' success in hiding evidence of their crimes frustrated their attempts to escape from justice.

General Carlos Prats

General Carlos Prats and his wife were killed by the Chilean DINA on September 30, 1974 by a car bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where they lived in exile. In Chile the judge investigating this case, Alejandro Solís, definitively terminated the prosecution of Pinochet for this particular case after the Chilean Supreme court rejected a demand to revoke his immunity from prosecution in January 2005. The leaders of DINA, including chief Manuel Contreras, ex-chief of operation and retired general Raúl Itturiaga Neuman, his brother Roger Itturiaga, and ex-brigadeers Pedro Espinoza Bravo and José Zara, are accused in Chile of this assassination. DINA agent Enrique Arancibia Clavel has been convicted in Argentina for the murder.

Bernardo Leighton

Bernardo Leighton and his wife were severely injured by gunshots on October 5, 1976 while in exile in Rome. According to the National Security Archive and Italian attorney general Giovanni Salvi, in charge of former DINA head Manuel Contreras' prosecution, Stefano Delle Chiaie met with Michael Townley and Virgilio Paz Romero in Madrid in 1975 to plan the murder of Bernardo Leighton with the help of Franco's secret police.[27]

Orlando Letelier

Another target was Orlando Letelier, a former minister of the Chilean Allende government who was assassinated by a car bomb explosion in Washington, D.C. on September 21, 1976. His assistant, Ronni Moffitt, a U.S. citizen, also died in the explosion. Michael Townley, General Manuel Contreras, former head of the DINA, and Brigadier Pedro Espinoza Bravo, also formerly of DINA, were convicted for the murders. In 1978, Chile agreed to hand over Townley to the US, in order to reduce the tension about Letelier's murder. Townley, however, was freed under the witness protection program. The US is still waiting for Manuel Contreras and Pedro Espinoza to be extradited.
In an article published 17 December 2004 in the Los Angeles Times, Francisco Letelier, the son of Orlando Letelier, wrote that his father's assassination was part of Operation Condor, described as "an intelligence-sharing network used by six South American dictators of that era to eliminate dissidents." Augusto Pinochet has been accused of being a participant in Operation Condor. Francisco Letelier declared, "My father's murder was part of Condor."
Michael Townley has accused Pinochet of being responsible for Orlando Letelier's death. Townley confessed that he had hired five anti-Castro Cuban exiles to booby-trap Letelier's car. According to Jean-Guy Allard, after consultations with the terrorist organization CORU's leadership, including Luis Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch, those elected to carry out the murder were Cuban-Americans José Dionisio "Bloodbath" Suárez, Virgilio Paz Romero, Alvin Ross Díaz, and brothers Guillermo and Ignacio Novo Sampoll.[28][29] According to the Miami Herald, Luis Posada Carriles was at this meeting that decided on Letelier's death and also about the Cubana Flight 455 bombing.

Operación Silencio

Operación Silencio (Operation Silence) was an operation to impede investigations by Chilean judges by removing witnesses from the country, starting about a year before the "terror archives" were found in Paraguay.
In April 1991 Arturo Sanhueza Ross, linked to the murder of MIR leader Jecar Neghme in 1989, left the country. According to the Rettig Report, Jecar Neghme's death was carried out by Chilean intelligence agents [30]. In September 1991 Carlos Herrera Jiménez, who killed trade-unionist Tucapel Jiménez, flew away.[31] In October 1991 Eugenio Berríos, a chemist who had worked with DINA agent Michael Townley, was escorted from Chile to Uruguay by Operation Condor agents, in order to escape testifying in the Letelier case. He used Argentinian, Uruguayan, Paraguayan and Brazilian passports, raising concerns that Operation Condor was not dead. In 1995 Berríos was found dead in El Pinar, near Montevideo (Uruguay), his murderers having tried to make the identification of his body impossible.
In January 2005, Michael Townley, who now lives in the USA under the witness protection program, acknowledged to agents of Interpol Chile links between DINA and the detention and torture center Colonia Dignidad,[4] which was founded in 1961 by Paul Schäfer, a Nazi, arrested in March 2005 in Buenos Aires, and since convicted on charges of child rape. Townley also revealed information about Colonia Dignidad and the Army's Bacteriological Warfare Laboratory. This last laboratory would have replaced the old DINA's laboratory on Via Naranja de lo Curro street, where Michael Townley worked with the chemical assassin Eugenio Berríos. The toxin that allegedly killed Christian-Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva may have been made in this new lab in Colonia Dignidad, according to the judge investigating the case.

U.S. Congressman Edward Koch

In February 2004 John Dinges, a reporter, published The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (The New Press, 2004). In this book he reveals how Uruguayan military officials threatened to assassinate US Congressman Edward Koch (later Mayor of New York City) in mid-1976. In late July 1976, the CIA station chief in Montevideo received information about it, but recommended that the Agency take no action because the Uruguayan officers (among them Colonel José Fons, who was at the November 1975 secret meeting in Santiago, Chile, and Major José Nino Gavazzo, who headed a team of intelligence officers working in Argentina in 1976, where he was responsible for more than 100 Uruguayans' deaths) had been drinking when the threat was made. In an interview for the book, Koch said that George H.W. Bush, CIA's director at the time, informed him in October 1976 — more than two months afterward, and after Orlando Letelier's murder — that "his sponsorship of legislation to cut off US military assistance to Uruguay on human rights grounds had provoked secret police officials to 'put a contract out for you'". In mid-October 1976, Koch wrote to the Justice Department asking for FBI protection. None was provided for him. In late 1976, Colonel Fons and Major Gavazzo were assigned to prominent diplomatic posts in Washington, DC, but the State Department forced the Uruguayan government to withdraw their appointments, with the public explanation that "Fons and Gavazzo could be the objects of unpleasant publicity." Koch only became aware of the connections between the threats in 2001.[32]

Other cases

The Chilean leader of the MIR, Edgardo Enríquez, was "disappeared" in Argentina, as well as another MIR leader, Jorge Fuentes; Alexei Jaccard, Chilean and Swiss, Ricardo Ramírez and a support network to the Communist party dismantled in Argentina in 1977. Cases of repression against German, Spanish, Peruvians citizens and Jewish people were also reported. The assassinations of former Bolivian president Juan José Torres and former Uruguayan deputies Héctor Gutiérrez and Zelmar Michelini in Buenos Aires in 1976 was also part of Condor. The DINA entered into contact even with Croatian terrorists, Italian neofascists and the Shah's SAVAK to locate and assassinate dissidents.[33]
Operation Condor was at its peak in 1976. Chilean exiles in Argentina were threatened again, and again had to go underground or into exile. Chilean General Carlos Prats had already been assassinated by the Chilean DINA in Buenos Aires in 1974, with the help of former CIA agent Michael Townley. Cuban diplomats were also assassinated in Buenos Aires in the infamous Automotores Orletti torture center, one of the 300 clandestine prisons of the dictatorship. These centers were managed by the Grupo de Tareas 18 headed by convicted armed robber Aníbal Gordon, who reported directly to General Commandant of the SIDE Otto Paladino. Automotores Orletti was the main base of foreign intelligence services involved in Operation Condor. One of the survivors, José Luis Bertazzo, who was detained there for two months, identified Chilean, Uruguayan, Paraguayan and Bolivian prisoners who were interrogated by agents from their own countries. It is there that the 19-year-old daughter-in-law of poet Juan Gelman was tortured with her husband, before being transported to Montevideo where she delivered a baby which was immediately stolen by Uruguayan military officers.[34]
According to John Dinges's book Los años del Cóndor Chilean MIR prisoners in the Orletti center told José Luis Bertazzo that they had seen two Cuban diplomats, 22-year-old Jesús Cejas Arias, and 26-year-old Crescencio Galañega, tortured by Gordon's group and interrogated by a man who travelled from Miami to interrogate them. The two Cuban diplomats, charged with the protection of Cuban ambassador to Argentina Emilio Aragonés, had been kidnapped on August 9, 1976 at the corner of calle Arribeños and Virrey del Pino by 40 armed SIDE agents who blocked the street with their Ford Falcons, the cars used by the security forces during the dictatorship. According to Dinges the FBI and the CIA were informed of their arrest. He quotes a cable sent by FBI agent in Buenos Aires Robert Scherrer on September 22, 1976 in which he mentioned in passing that Michael Townley, later convicted for the assassination on September 21, 1976 of former Chilean minister Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C., had taken part to the interrogatories of the two Cubans. The former head of the DINA confirmed to Argentine federal judge María Servini de Cubría in Santiago de Chile on December 22, 1999 that Michael Townley and Cuban Guillermo Novo Sampoll were present in the Orletti center, having travelled from Chile to Argentina on August 11, 1976, and "cooperated in the torture and assassination of the two Cuban diplomats." Anti-Castro Cuban terrorist Luis Posada Carriles also boasted in his autobiography, "Los caminos del guerrero", of the murder of the two young men.[34]

U.S. involvement

Further information: U.S. intervention in Chile
CIA documents show that the CIA had close contact with members of the Chilean secret police, DINA, and its chief Manuel Contreras. Some have alleged that the CIA's one-time payment to Contreras is proof that the U.S. approved of Operation Condor and military repression within Chile. The CIA's official documents state that at one time some members of the intelligence community recommended making Contreras into a paid contact because of his closeness to Pinochet; the plan was rejected based on Contreras' poor human rights record, but the single payment was made due to miscommunication.[35]
A 1978 cable from the US ambassador to Paraguay, Robert White, to the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was published on March 6, 2001 by the New York Times. The document was released in November 2000 by the Clinton administration under the Chile Declassification Project. In the cable Ambassador White reported a conversation with General Alejandro Fretes Davalos, chief of staff of Paraguay's armed forces, who informed him that the South American intelligence chiefs involved in Condor "[kept] in touch with one another through a U.S. communications installation in the Panama Canal Zone which cover[ed] all of Latin America". According to Davalos, this installation was "employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the southern cone countries". Robert White feared that the US connection to Condor might be publicly revealed at a time when the assassination in the U.S.A. of Chilean former minister Orlando Letelier and his American assistant Ronni Moffitt was being investigated. White cabled that "it would seem advisable to review this arrangement to insure that its continuation is in US interest."
The "information exchange" (via telex) included torture techniques (e.g. near-drowning, and playing recordings of victims who were being tortured to their families).[citation needed]
This demonstrates that the US facilitated communications for Operation Condor, and has been called by J. Patrice McSherry (Long Island Univ.) "another piece of increasingly weighty evidence suggesting that U.S. military and intelligence officials supported and collaborated with Condor as a secret partner or sponsor."[36]
It has been argued that while the US was not a key member, it "provided organizational, intelligence, financial and technological assistance to the operation."[5]
Material declassified in 2004 states that
"The declassified record shows that Secretary Kissinger was briefed on Condor and its 'murder operations' on August 5, 1976, in a 14-page report from Shlaudeman. 'Internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys,' Shlaudeman cautioned. 'We are especially identified with Chile. It cannot do us any good.' Shlaudeman and his two deputies, William Luers and Hewson Ryan, recommended action. Over the course of three weeks, they drafted a cautiously worded demarche, approved by Kissinger, in which he instructed the U.S. ambassadors in the Southern Cone countries to meet with the respective heads of state about Condor. He instructed them to express 'our deep concern' about 'rumors' of 'plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.'"[6]
Ultimately, the demarche was never delivered. Kornbluh and Dinges suggest that the decision not to send Kissinger's order was due to a cable sent by Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman to his deputy in D.C which states "you can simply instruct the Ambassadors to take no further action, noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme."[37]McSherry, adds, "According to [U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay Robert] White, instructions from a secretary of state cannot be ignored unless there is a countermanding order received via a secret (CIA) backchannel." [38] Kornbluh and Dinges conclude that "The paper trail is clear: the State Department and the CIA had enough intelligence to take concrete steps to thwart Condor assassination planning. Those steps were initiated but never implemented." Shlaudeman's deputy Hewson Ryan later acknowledged in an oral history interview that the State Department was "remiss" in its handling of the case. "We knew fairly early on that the governments of the Southern Cone countries were planning, or at least talking about, some assassinations abroad in the summer of 1976. ... Whether if we had gone in, we might have prevented this, I don't know," he stated in reference to the Letelier-Moffitt bombing. "But we didn't."

Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, was closely involved diplomatically with the Southern Cone governments at the time and well aware of the Condor plan. According to the French newspaper L'Humanité, the first cooperation agreements were signed between the CIA and anti-Castro groups, fascist movements such as the Triple A set up in Argentina by Juan Perón and Isabel Martínez de Perón's "personal secretary" José López Rega, and Rodolfo Almirón (arrested in Spain in 2006).[39]
On May 31, 2001, French judge Roger Le Loire requested that a summons be served on Henry Kissinger while he was staying at the Hôtel Ritz in Paris. Loire wanted to question Kissinger as a witness for alleged U.S. involvement in Operation Condor and for possible US knowledge concerning the "disappearances" of 5 French nationals in Chile during military rule. Kissinger left Paris that evening, and Loire's inquiries were directed to the U.S. State Department.[40]
In July 2001, the Chilean high court granted investigating judge Juan Guzmán the right to question Kissinger about the 1973 killing of American journalist Charles Horman, whose execution at the hands of the Chilean military following the coup was dramatized in the 1982 Costa-Gavras film, Missing. The judge’s questions were relayed to Kissinger via diplomatic routes but were not answered. [41]
In August 2001, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba sent a letter rogatory to the US State Department, in accordance with the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), requesting a deposition by Kissinger to aid the judge's investigation of Operation Condor.[42]
On September 10, 2001, a civil suit was filed in a Washington, D.C., federal court by the family of Gen. René Schneider, murdered former Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, asserting that Kissinger ordered Schneider's murder because he refused to endorse plans for a military coup. Schneider was killed by coup-plotters loyal to General Roberto Viaux in a botched kidnapping attempt, but U.S. involvement with the plot is disputed, as declassified transcripts show that Nixon and Kissinger had ordered the coup "turned off" a week before the killing, fearing that Viaux had no chance. As part of the suit, Schneider’s two sons are attempting to sue Kissinger and then-CIA director Richard Helms for $3 million.[43] [44] [45]
On September 11, 2001, the 28th anniversary of the Pinochet coup, Chilean human rights lawyers filed a criminal case against Kissinger along with Augusto Pinochet, former Bolivian general and president Hugo Banzer, former Argentine general and dictator Jorge Rafael Videla, and former Paraguayan president Alfredo Stroessner for alleged involvement in Operation Condor. The case was brought on behalf of some fifteen victims of Operation Condor, ten of whom were Chilean.[citation needed]
In late 2001, the Brazilian government canceled an invitation for Kissinger to speak in São Paulo because it could not guarantee his immunity from judicial action.[citation needed]
On February 16, 2007, a request for the extradition of Kissinger was filed at the Supreme Court of Uruguay on behalf of Bernardo Arnone, a political activist who was kidnapped, tortured and disappeared by the dictatorial regime in 1976.[46]

The "French connection"

French journalist Marie-Monique Robin found in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the original document proving that a 1959 agreement between Paris and Buenos Aires set up a "permanent French military mission" of officers who had fought in the Algerian War, and which was located in the offices of the chief of staff of the Argentine Army. It continued until socialist François Mitterrand was elected President of France in 1981.[47] She showed how Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's government secretly collaborated with Videla's junta in Argentina and with Augusto Pinochet's regime in Chile.[48]. The first Argentine officers, among them Alcides Lopez Aufranc, went to Paris to attend two-year courses at the Ecole de Guerre military school in 1957, two years before the Cuban Revolution and when no Argentine guerrilla movement existed.[47] "In practice", said Robin to Página/12, "the arrival of the French in Argentina led to a massive extension of intelligence services and of the use of torture as the primary weapon of anti-subversive war in the concept of modern warfare." The annihilation decrees signed by Isabel Peron had been inspired by French texts. During the Battle of Algiers, police forces were put under the authority of the Army, and in particular of the paratroopers, who generalized interrogation sessions, systematically using torture and then disappearances.
On September 10, 2003, French Green Party deputies Noël Mamère, Martine Billard and Yves Cochet petitioned for the constitution of a Parliamentary Commission on the "role of France in the support of military regimes in Latin America from 1973 to 1984" before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly, presided by Edouard Balladur. The only newspaper to report this was Le Monde[...
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#2
Plan Condor

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Some history on Plan Condor (aka Operation Condor) can be found in articles in CounterPunch, Scoop, andDissidentVoice.
The United States' determination to destroy opposition to its domination in Latin America stemmed from its defeat in Vietnam. The 1972 team in Paris helping Henry Kissinger negotiate with the Vietnamese included current US ambassador to the UN John Negroponte and Vernon Walters, later a key adviser to Ronald Reagan, then Army Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Paris. In those days George Bush Sr. was ambassador to the UN.
By 1975, Bush Sr. was head of the CIA and working together with Kissinger and Vernon Walters to develop Plan Condor--a coordinated operation against opposition movements throughout Latin America.[4] Plan Condor involved using illegal covert means such as the assassination team coordinated between the Chilean DIN security service and Miami Cuban terrorists like Orlando Bosch, Guillermo Novo and Luis Posada Carriles.[5] It also meant supporting brutal government policies of mass repression in countries throughout South America. Plan Condor was an ambitious and successful attempt to coordinate that repression.
4.The same team helped set up in 1975 the Committee on the Present Danger, in which Paul Dundes Wolfowitz was a leading figure. 5.Hernando Calvo Ospina, "Pinochet, la CIA y los terroristas cubanos", 23 de agosto del 2003, http://www.rebelion.org. [edit]
Plan Condor--alive and well

The progression from Chile, Argentina and Uruguay through Central America to present day Venezuela and Colombia is clear. The same actors appear time after time. Elliott Abrams, John Negroponte, Colin L. Powell, Richard Armitage, John Maisto Roger Noriega and Otto Reich all move between comfortable jobs in US government and the corporate plutocracy that dictates US government policy.
The United States and the European Union are in Latin America for the same reasons as the Spanish, Portuguese, British, French and Dutch colonialists before them--natural resources and cheap labour, compounded these days by neo-colonial extraction of forcibly contrived "debt". The methods are privatisation, dismantling of domestic agricultural economies, and open markets imposed by the IMF and World Bank through local clients to favour multinational corporations like BP-Amoco, Monsanto, Cargill and other all too familiar names.
The principal architects of Condor were General Pinochet and Colonel Manuel Contreras. The program was formally inaugurated in October 1975, when Contreras convened a meeting in Santiago, Chile of the leading heads of the military intelligence services of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina. An accord was crafted formalizing the already existing coordination efforts of member countries.
This transnational terrorist operation, steeped in pathological anti-communism, had deeper roots dating back to the end of World War II. In 1962, the Kennedy Administration made the fateful decision to shift the mission of the Latin American militaries from defense against external threats to internal security. One result was the institutionalization and professionalization of the death squad apparatus that took root in Latin America. Kennedy was an enthusiast of counterinsurgency methods of the most violent sort to deal with radical and/or nationalist movements that posed a threat to US imperial interests in the region.(10) It was in places like the US Army School of the Americas (SOA), then located in Panama, and other military bases in the US where links between Latin American military commanders and dictators were forged.
By the early-1970s, the seeds planted by the CIA and US military intelligence in this effort were beginning to bear fruit. It had long been the goal of the US that there be coordinated efforts by the countries in the region to combat "communist subversion," broadly construed. Condor was the logical child of this US endeavor.
As Argentine journalist Stella Calloni observed, this counterinsurgency campaign went far beyond combating guerrillas. It was a "holy war against the left, which . . . included anyone challenging the status quo, armed or not. Thus, nuns, professors, students, workers, artists and performers, journalists, even democratic opposition politicians" came to be viewed as threats to the body politic. [1]
Washington's plan is to "economically and militarily wipe out the social and indigenous movements in order to obtain their resources and territories, says Bolivian Congressman Evo Morales, echoing a view popular in the region. The undercurrent of these plans is the same programme as has been going on for the last 500 years - the eradication of our indigenous cultures," he told IPS.
"The 'Andean Regional Initiative', which replaced 'Plan Colombia', 'New Horizons', 'Three Plus One', the 'Cabañas', 'Unitas' and Águila military exercises are all components of this plan, added Morales. Viewed as a whole, these elements make up a new and expanded version of the old counterinsurgent 'Plan Condor' of the 1970s", the covertly U.S.-led alliance of the armies of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay, which killed off hundreds of leaders and members of the progressive left, ensuring that it would not come to power in the region and threaten U.S. dominance.
The U.S. military says the legal precedent for its presence throughout Latin America is the Monroe Doctrine, an edict dictated by a U.S. president in 1823, which was never voted on by Congress, much less by those affected - Latin Americans.[2]
Condor must be understood within the context of the global anticommunist alliance led by the United States. We now know that top U.S. officials and agencies, including the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Department, were fully aware of Condor's formation and its operations from the time it was organized in 1975 (if not earlier). The U.S. government considered the Latin American militaries to be allies in the Cold War and worked closely with their intelligence organizations. U.S. executive agencies at least condoned, and sometimes actively assisted, Condor "countersubversive" operations. Although evidence is still fragmentary, it is now possible to piece together information from numerous sources to understand Operation Condor as a clandestine inter-American counterinsurgency system.[3]
[edit]
Books

  • J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, June 2005. ISBN 0-7425-3687-4 (Paper); ISBN 0-7425-3686-6 (Cloth)
[edit]
External links

  • J. Patrice McSherry, "Operation Condor: Deciphering the U.S. Role", Crimes of War, July 6, 2001: As human rights organizations, families of victims, lawyers, and judges press for disclosure and accountability regarding human rights crimes committed during the Cold War, inevitable questions arise as to the role of the foremost leader of the anticommunist alliance, the United States. This article explores recent evidence linking the U.S. national security apparatus with Operation Condor. Condor took place within the broader context of inter-American counterinsurgency coordination and operations led and sponsored by the Pentagon and the CIA. U.S. training, doctrine, organizational models, technology transfers, weapons sales, and ideological attitudes profoundly shaped security forces in the region.
  • J. Patrice McSherry,"Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System" Social Justice, Winter 1999 v26 i4 p144: This article shows that Condor was a parastatal system that used criminal me thods to eliminate "subversion," while avoiding constitutional institutions, ignoring due process, and violating all manner of human rights. Condor made use of parallel prisons, secret transport operations, routine assassination and torture, extensive psychological warfare (PSYWAR, or use of black propaganda, deception, and disinformation to conquer the "hearts and minds" of the population, often by making crimes seem as though they were committed by the other side), and sophisticated technology (such as computerized lists of suspects).
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FBI, Operation Condor Cable, September 28, 1976: This cable, written by the FBI's attache in Buenos Aires, Robert Scherrer, summarizes intelligence information provided by a "confidential source abroad" about Operation Condor, a South American joint intelligence operation designed to "eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in the area." The cable reports that Chile is the center of Operation Condor, and provides information about "special teams" which travel "anywhere in the world... to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations." Several sections relating to these special teams have been excised. The cable suggests that the assassination of the Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Orlando Letelier, may have been carried out as an action of Operation Condor.
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

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#4
FBI, Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), January 21, 1982: This report provides a summary of information taken from prison letters written by Michael Townley, the DINA agent responsible for the assassination of Orlando Letelier. This report includes information not directly provided to the FBI by Townley, but drawn from analysis of his correspondence with his DINA handler: details about meetings between Chilean President Pinochet and Italian terrorists and spies, codenames and activities of DINA personnel, collaboration between DINA and anti-Castro Cubans; the creation of a fake terrorist organization to take the blame for a DINA kidnapping in Argentina; DINA involvement in relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and Townley's fear that information about kidnappings and assassinations of prominent critics of Pinochet would somehow be traced back to him.
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

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#5
[Image: fmbermudezc.jpg] [Image: prichterp.jpg]
Former Peruvian President General Enrique Morales Bermudez (left) and and his Army chief Pedro Richter Prada (right) are among 140 South American military officers indicted in the investigation.
SOUTHERN CONE RENDITION PROGRAM: PERU'S PARTICIPATION
OPERATION CONDOR CRIMES FOCUS OF ITALIAN INDICTMENTS
New York Times Story Draws Attention to 1980 Abduction, Disappearance Case
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 244
Posted - February 22, 2008
For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh - 202/994-7116 - peter.kornbluh@gmail.com
Carlos Osorio - 202/994-7061 - cosorio@gwu.edu
Washington, D.C., February 22, 2008 - Declassified U.S. documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org) show that the U.S. government had detailed knowledge of collaboration between the Peruvian, Bolivian and Argentine secret police forces to kidnap, torture and "permanently disappear" three militants in a Cold War rendition operation in Lima in June 1980—but took insufficient action to save the victims.

The Archive's documents are part of a sweeping Italian investigation of Condor that has issued arrest warrants for 140 former top officials from seven South American countries and, in the words of today's New York Times, has "agitated political establishments up and down the continent."

The documents address what has become known as "the case of the missing Montoneros," a covert operation by a death squad unit of Argentina's feared Battalion 601 to kidnap three members of a militant group living in Lima, Peru, on June 12, 1980, and render them through Bolivia back to Argentina. (A fourth member, previously captured, was brought to Lima to identify his colleagues and then disappeared with them.) "The present situation is that the four Argentines will be held in Peru and then expelled to Bolivia where they will be expelled to Argentina," a U.S. official reported from Buenos Aires four days after Esther Gianetti de Molfino, María Inés Raverta and Julio César Ramírez were kidnapped in broad daylight in downtown Lima. "Once in Argentina they will be interrogated and then permanently disappeared."
The case was first detailed at length in The Condor Years, a book by National Security Archive board member John Dinges. In his own book, The Pinochet File, Archive senior analyst Peter Kornbluh identified the Montonero operation as "one of the last recorded cases of a Condor operation." Condor was founded in November 1975, in Santiago, Chile, by the Pinochet regime, which became known as "Condor One." Operation Condor became infamous for terrorist activities after Chilean agents, in collaboration with Paraguay, planted a bomb under the car of former ambassador Orlando Letelier in September 1976, killing him and his colleague, Ronni Moffitt, in Washington D.C.
Peru's former military ruler, General Enrique Morales Bermudez, has admitted authorizing the Montonero kidnappings but continues to deny that Peru was a member of Operation Condor. But a secret CIA report, dated August 22, 1978, and titled "A Brief Look at Operation Condor" described Condor as "a cooperative effort by intelligence/security services in several South American countries to combat terrorism and subversion. The original members included services from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia. Peru and Ecuador recently became members." (Emphasis added) A Chilean intelligence document confirms that Peru formally joined Operation Condor in March 1978.
A State Department cable dated several weeks after the kidnapping stated that "there seems to be little doubt that the Peruvian army, acting in concert with its Argentine counterpart, resorted to the kinds of illegal repressive measures more familiar in the Southern Cone" than Peru.
Italy's indictments include General Morales Bermudez and his military deputy Pedro Richter Prada, among 138 other military officers from Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay who were involved in the kidnapping, torture and disappearances of 25 Latin Americans who had dual Italian citizenship. The indictments, in a 250-page court filing by Italian judge Luisianna Figliolia last December, come after a six-year investigation by investigative magistrate Giancarlo Capaldo, who drew on hundreds of declassified documents provided by the National Security Archive's Southern Cone project. "These documents provide hard evidence of Condor crimes," according to project director Carlos Osorio, "that almost 30 years later still demand the resolution of justice."
The New York Times story, "Italy Follows Trail of Secret South American Abductions," noted that the Italian effort at universal jurisdiction "deals not only with individual cases involving Italian citizens but also with the broader responsibilities of Condor's cross-border kidnapping and torture operations." The story also suggested that Condor's allied effort to track down, kidnap, and secretly transport targets to third countries, according to historians, was "reminiscent of the United States' modern terrorist rendition program."
The Archive's Peter Kornbluh noted "sinister similarities between Condor and the current U.S. rendition, enhanced interrogation, and black site detention operations."
Read the Documents
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Document 1: CIA, Secret report, "A Brief Look at Operation Condor," August 22, 1978.
In August 1978, the CIA prepared a short briefing paper for Department of Justice lawyers who were investigating the September 21, 1976, assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington D.C. The report identifies the members of Condor, including Peru. The report also identifies Condor's use of "executive action"—assassination—against specific targets outside the territory of member nations.
Document 2: State Department, memo, "Meeting with Argentine Intelligence Service, June 19, 1980.
Four days after the Montoneros were seized in a public park in Lima, the Regional Security Officer in Buenos Aires, James Blystone, met with a high-level source in Argentina's intelligence service. Blystone reports to U.S. Ambassador Raul H. Castro in this memo that the source has told him: "The present situation is that the four Argentines will be held in Peru and then expelled to Bolivia where they will be expelled to Argentina. Once in Argentina they will be interrogated and then permanently disappeared." The three seized Argentines are Esther Gianetti de Molfino, who was a member of "Madres del Plaza de Mayo," María Inés Raverta and Julio César Ramírez. A fourth Argentine, Federico Frias Alberga, had been previously captured and taken to Lima by Argentine agents to identify his colleagues. He then disappeared along with them. This document was discovered by Long Island University professor J. Patrice McSherry, who provided it to Newsweek Magazine several years ago.
Document 3: State Department, cable, "Argentine Involvement in Lima Kidnappings," June 19, 1980.
The U.S. Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Raul H. Castro, cables the State Department with some of the information Blystone had learned. The cable states that the rendition operation "hit a snag" because it became public, and that Battalion 601 agents had decided to take the Montoneros to a third country, Bolivia.
Document 4: State Department, INR Report, Argentina-Peru: Attempted Repatriation of Montoneros Apparently Foiled," June 25, 1980.
The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research attempts to analyze the covert rendition operation run by Argentina in Peru. The report concludes that "this incident is not unique. In recent years, there have been several similar cases that attest to the high degree of cooperation among intelligence and security agencies of the southern South American countries and to their tendency to resort to illegal means of treating suspected subversives."
Document 5: State Department, Cable, "Montoneros: Amnesty International Reportedly Claims 3 Killed in Peru; Foreign Minister Comments Further, July 3, 1980.
In this nearly illegible cable, the U.S. Embassy analyzes the uproar in Peru over new allegations made by Amnesty International on the fate of the three Montoneros. On page 3, the cable notes that the situation is "very clearly" a serious matter but that the details are still "obscured." But Embassy analysts conclude that "there seems to be little doubt that the Peruvian army, acting in concert with its Argentine counterpart, resorted to the kinds of illegal repressive measures more familiar in the Southern Cone than here."
Document 6: State Department, Cable, "The Case of the Missing Montoneros," July 11, 1980.
In a cable from Lima, U.S. Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman reports on his conversation with Prime Minister Richter Prada about the missing Montoneros. Richter claims that the three Argentines were "legally expelled and delivered to a Bolivian immigration official in accordance with long-standing practice." Shlaudeman concludes that two other Montoneros who Richter says are fugitives are probably "permanent disappearances."
Document 7: State Department, Cable, "Purported Discovery of Missing Montonero," August 4, 1980.
The body of one of those seized in Peru, Esther Gianetti de Molfino, is discovered in an apartment in Madrid. The apartment is supposedly rented by another of the kidnapped Montoneros. The elaborate effort by Battalion 601 to cover up their disappearances by making her body reappear in Spain is reminiscent of Operation Colombo, when disfigured bodies appeared on the streets of Buenos Aires with identification cards of missing Chilean political figures. (Medical examinations proved that the bodies were not those individuals.) The Argentine Foreign Ministry used the discovery of de Molfino's corpse to denounce the "falseness of the campaign against Argentina and Peru" over the missing Montoneros, according to the cable.

Document 8: State Department, Memo, "Hypothesis—The GOA as Prisoner of Army Intelligence," August 18, 1980.
A political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Townsend Friedman, offers a strange assessment of the implications of the Montonero case on the equations of power in the Argentine military regime. "Disappearance is 601 work," he writes. Due to the embarrassment factor, he suggests, "Anyone with an ounce of political sense in the GOA would have aborted, if he had been able, these operations." Rather than obvious collaborators, Friedman concludes that General Videla and the Junta are "victims" of Battalion 601 and the secret police.
Document 9: State Department, Memo, "The Case of the Missing Montoneros," August 19, 1980.
In another memo to the Embassy Charge, Townsend Friedman provides a short chronology and reevaluation of the Montonero case. He focuses on what he calls "the intimate relationship" between Argentina's and Bolivia's intelligence services. He cites a July communication between Prime Minister Richter and Argentine Army Commander, Galtieri, who tells Richter that there could be "an interesting development" in the case. That development turns out to be the discovery of the corpse of Esther Gianetti de Molfino in an apartment in Madrid, clearly planted there by agents of Battalion 601 to suggest that the Montoneros had not been kidnapped after all.

Document 10: State Department, Memo, "Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source," April 7, 1980.
The interest of Italian judge Giancarlo Capaldo in the case of the Montoneros derives from his belief that it is connected to other Condor operations that took the lives of Italian-Argentines, among them the case of the disappearance of Horacio Campiglia who was abducted in March 1980 in Rio de Janiero by Argentine agents collaborating with Brazil's intelligence service. This report from Regional Security Officer James Blystone provides perhaps the most comprehensive detail on joint secret police collaboration to track down, abduct and render targeted victims in the Southern Cone. Blystone reports on the communications, travel, and even type of plane used in this rendition operation, and on the steps taken to provide a cover up of the plot.
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

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#6
ARGENTINE MILITARY BELIEVED U.S. GAVE GO-AHEAD FOR DIRTY WAR

New State Department documents show conflict between Washington and US Embassy in Buenos Aires over signals to the military dictatorship at height of repression in 1976 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 73 - Part II
Edited by Carlos Osorio
Assisted by
Kathleen Costar, research and editorial assistance
Florence Segura, research assistance
of the National Security Archive
Natalia Federman, research assistance and Spanish translation
of CELS

Washington, D.C., 21 August 2002 - State Department documents released yesterday on Argentina's dirty war (1976-83) show that the Argentine military believed it had U.S. approval for its all-out assault on the left in the name of fighting terrorism. The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires complained to Washington that the Argentine officers were "euphoric" over signals from high-ranking U.S. officials including then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The Embassy reported to Washington that after Mr. Kissinger's 10 June 1976 meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Guzzetti, the Argentine government dismissed the Embassy's human rights approaches and referred to Kissinger's "understanding" of the situation. The current State Department collection does not include a minute of Kissinger's and Guzetti's conversation in Santiago, Chile.
On 20 September 1976, Ambassador Robert Hill reported that Guzzetti said "When he had seen SECY of State Kissinger in Santiago, the latter had said he 'hoped the Argentine Govt could get the terrorist problem under control as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti said that he had reported this to President Videla and to the cabinet, and that their impression had been that the USG's overriding concern was not human rights but rather that GOA 'get it over quickly'."
After a second meeting between Kissinger and Guzzetti in Washington, on 19 October 1976, Ambassador Robert Hill wrote "a sour note" from Buenos Aires complaining that he could hardly carry human rights demarches if the Argentine Foreign Minister did not hear the same message from the Secretary of State. "Guzzetti went to U.S. fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warnings on his government's human rights practices, rather than that, he has returned in a state of jubilation, convinced that there is no real problem with the USG over that issue," wrote Hill.
The U.S. Embassy also disagreed with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence 19 July 1976 assessment that there was a "murderous three-cornered battle going on in Argentina amongst left-wing terrorists, government security personnel and right wing goon squads." On 23 July 1976, Deputy Chief of Mission Maxwell Chaplin cabled Washington that "The battle is a two-sided affair, not tri-cornered" since "the only 'right-wing assassins' operating in Argentina at this point, however, are members of the GOA security forces."

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: Subject: Conversation with Undersecretary of the Presidency, May 25, 1976
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During May, several Argentines working with U.S. universities and Ford Foundation grantees, and at least two American citizens, were kidnapped or abused by Argentine security forces. The Department and the Embassy discussed asking the Videla government for reassurances that his government did not plan to expel refugees as the rumor went. The Embassy suspected that Argentine security forces were involved in the killing of two Uruguayan former Senators living in Buenos Aires - Michellini and Gutierrez Ruiz.
This cable summarizes a cordial morning conversation between Ricardo Yofre, the Undersecretary General of the Office of the Presidency, and Ambassador Robert Hill. Although five pages long, Ambassador's Hill's concern for the human rights situation in Argentina is evident in only three lines at the beginning of the cable and there is no reaction to Mr. Yofre's forewarning of more human rights violations:
"Dr. Yofre noted that there are two distinct complications in checking the hardliners and in bringing the human rights problem under control: a) the first is that the country is in an all-out war against subversion. In the heat of the battle there will inevitably be some violations of human rights. And Yofre warned that the government plans to drastically step up its campaign against the terrorists very shortly. b) Secondly, he said, there are a number of groups who are operating on their own…"
Document 2: Subject: Request for instructions, May 25, 1976
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At noon on May 25, the Embassy was shocked to learn of the kidnapping of Fulbright program coordinator, Elida Messina, and in this cable asked for the Department's permission to launch a demarche on human rights on these terms:
"We fully understand that Argentina is involved in an all-out struggle against subversion. There are however, some norms which can never be put aside by governments dedicated to a rule of law. Respect for human rights is one of them. The continued activities of Triple A-type squads which have recently murdered Michellini, Gutierrez Ruiz and dozen of others and have just kidnapped a member of the Fulbright Commission, Miss Elida Messina, damaging the GOA's generally good image abroad. These groups seem to operate with immunity and are generally believed to be connected with Argentine security forces. Whether they are or not, their continued operation can only be harmful to the GOA itself and cause consternation among Argentina's friends abroad."
Document 3: Subject: Demarche to Foreign Minister on Human Rights, May 28, 1976
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"I then proceeded with demarche as outlined in refs A and B. I concluded by noting that some sort of statement on part of GOA deploring terrorism of any kind, whether from left or right, and reaffirming GOA's resolve to enforce law and respect human rights might have very salutary effect." "Comment: Though [Foreign Minister] Guzzetti indicated his understanding of the problem, I did not have the impression he really got the point. We will keep working on him and others in GOA. Hill"
Document 4: Subject: Murders in Argentina - No intergovernmental Conspiracy, June 4, 1976
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For the previous two weeks, the Department of State had requested its Embassies in the region to analyze suspected cooperation among Southern Cone security forces (subsequently known as "Operation Condor"). Edgardo Enriquez, leader of the Chilean MIR, had been captured by Argentine security forces and handed to the Chileans, along with Maria Regina Pinto Marcondes, a Brazilian; former Bolivian president Juan Jose Torres has been killed in Buenos Aires; and several refugees mainly from Chile and Uruguay had been kidnapped.
This report from the head of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Secretary Kissinger denies the cooperation, and outlines a somewhat benign view of Southern Cone security forces and of President Videla's responsibility for human rights violations during all 1976 - claiming that the killing of refugees in Argentina is not coordinated between intelligence agencies and President Videla's government is not involved in the Argentine carnage. This view was repeated in subsequent INR reports, to which the Embassy objected (see Chaplin cable below): Here INR concluded:
"There is no evidence to support the contention that Southern Cone governments are cooperating in some sort of international "Murder Inc." aimed at leftist political exiles resident in one of their countries…
The fact that these incidents are occurring in Argentina and not elsewhere in the Southern Cone suggests that they are attributable to a uniquely Argentine set of circumstances. Amidst the murderous three-cornered battle going on in Argentina amongst left-wing terrorists, government security personnel and right wing goon squads, exiles can become victims for a number of reasons:
  • Operational involvement with one of the Argentine terrorist groups, as appears to have been the case with Chilean MIR leader Edgardo Enriquez.
  • Past association with foreign and/or Argentine leftist groups, a fact that, in and itself, is sufficient cause for death in the eyes of fanatical Argentine right-wingers. This may have been the crime of Michelini, Gutierrez Ruiz and Torres.
  • Efforts by hardliners in the Argentine government to force President Videla into more stringent suppression of terrorists, a motivation which also may lie behind the death of the prominent Uruguayan and Bolivian exiles.
In all likelihood, the assassinations are the work of right-wingers, some of whom are security personnel. Argentine President Videla probably does not condone or encourage what is happening, but neither does he appear capable of stopping it."
Document 5: Subject: Secretary's Calendar of Events (Santiago/Mexico City), June 10, 1976
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The recent declassification does not include a single document reporting on the meeting of more than one hour between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Cesar Augusto Guzzetti at the OAS General Assembly (OASGA) meeting in Santiago, at Hotel Carrera. Kissinger was traveling later to Mexico City. The National Security Archive obtained this copy of Secretary Kissinger's agenda for that day (from files at the National Archives) and has filed MDR and FOIA requests to obtain any other related documents.
Document 6: Subject: Abduction of Refugees in Argentina, June 16, 1976
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Deputy Chief of Mission, Maxwell Chaplin reported on a meeting held on June 14 with "Mr. Pereya," the highest civilian in the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chaplin was acting under instructions of the Department of State to raise concern for the recent kidnapping of Uruguayan and Chilean refugees in Buenos Aires who had been tortured and released on June 12.
"2. Charge expressed USG concern over refugee abductions, and raised broader issue of human rights. To illustrate for him how foreign press covered such matters and how Congressional critics dealt with them, he was also provided with copies of Washington Post story on abduction and remarks of Congressman Koch at CIAR on June 7…
3. [excised] response was an impassioned, almost fanatic defense of GOA. With regard to substance of the issue, Pereya [sic] contended that GOA was doing best it could in an all-out war with extremists; that it was not possible to prevent occasional excesses by embattled security forces… he and president Videla were as deeply and genuinely concerned about the problems of human rights as any foreign observe. He did not comment directly on the truth or falsehood of the abduction reports
4. When he reached the topic of the UNHCR, [excised]'s indignation was barely controlled. He said that Argentina had provided refuge for over 500,000 Aliens since 1973 most of them Chileans. The country had made an enormous effort to deal with this problem, and the effort was totally unrecognized…
5. In a review of events at the OASGA, [excised] expressed satisfaction over his conclusion that Secretary Kissinger was realistic and understood the GOA problems. On human rights, he stated that the Secretary had quoted from Herodotus a reference to refugees taking over the city that gave them refuge, and this indicated his implicit agreement with the GOA's position."
Document 7: Subject: South America - Southern Cone Security Practices, July 23, 1976
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Deputy Chief of Mission, Maxwell Chaplin disagreed with two points of recent report No. 526 by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in Washington. Chaplin wrote Washington that cooperation between Southern Cone countries was tighter than the INR estimates, as evidenced by the presence of Uruguayan and Chilean military operating with Argentine security units. In addition, Chaplin clarified that it was inaccurate to portray the situation in Argentina as a struggle between the extreme right, the extreme left and the government in between. Chaplin asserted that "The battle is a two-sided affair, not tri-cornered" since "the only 'right-wing assassins' operating in Argentina at this point, however, are members of the GOA security forces."
Document 8: Subject: Other aspects of September 17 conversation with Foreign Minister, September 20, 1976
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Ambassador Robert Hill had just come back from Washington where massacres of prisoners and widespread human rights violations by Argentine security forces, as well as mounting evidence of assassinations of foreigners under Operation Condor, were cause for concern. Hill was charged to raise the human rights issues at the highest level of the Argentine government. But, as Hill reported to Washington, "the Foreign Minister said that GOA had been somewhat surprised by indications of such strong concern on the part of the USG in human rights situation in Argentina. When he had seen SECY of State Kissinger in Santiago, the latter had said he 'hoped the Argentine Govt could get the terrorist problem under control as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti said that he had reported this to President Videla and to the cabinet, and that their impression had been that the USG's overriding concern was not human rights but rather that GOA "get it over quickly."
Document 9: Subject: Ambassador discusses U.S.-Argentine Relations with President Videla, September 24, 1976
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"President said he had been gratified when FONMIN Guzzetti reported to him that Secretary of State Kissinger understood their problem and had said he hoped they could get terrorism under control as quickly as possible. Videla said he had the impression senior officers of the USG understood situation his govt faces but junior bureaucrats do not. I assured him this was not the case. We all hope Argentina can get terrorism under control quickly - but to do so in such a way as to do minimum damage to its image and to its relations with other governments. If Security Forces continue to kill people to tune of brass band, I concluded, this will not be possible. I told him Secretary of State had told me when I was in US that he wanted to avoid human rights problem in Argentina."
Document 10: Subject: Foreign Minister Guzetti Euphoric over visit to United States, October 19, 1976
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Admiral Guzetti had just returned from the U.S. and Ambassador Robert Hill wrote what Assistant Secretary of State Schlaudeman termed "a sour note" to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger protesting that the Argentine military were not receiving a strong disapproving signal from Washington for their human rights violations. Hill wrote that the Embassy was now in an awkward position to present demarches on human rights. Hill wrote that:
"Guzzetti's remarks both to me and to the argentine press since his return are not those of a man who has been impressed with the gravity of the human rights problem as seen from the U.S. Both personally and in press accounts of his trip Guzzetti's reaction indicates little reason for concern over the human rights issue. Guzzetti went to us fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warning of his govt's human rights practices. Rather than that, he has returned in a state of jubilation. Convinced that there is no real problem with the USG over this issue. Based on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the GOA, it must now believe that if it has any problems with the U.S. over human rights, they are confined to certain elements of Congress and what it regards as biased and/or uninformed minor segments of public opinion. While that conviction lasts it will be unrealistic and unbelievable for this embassy to press representations to the GOA over human rights violations."
Document 11: Subject: U.S.-Argentine Relations, February 2, 1977
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As Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, the Department of State informed the U.S. Embassy in Argentina of the points that were raised with Political Counselor Beauge at the Argentine Embassy in Washington. The Department told Beauge that the new administration attaches tremendous importance to human rights. Beauge remarked that "it is essential for your same message to come from all channels. This did not happen in the past."
Document 12: Subject: Henry Kissinger Visit to Argentina, June 27, 1978
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U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro expressed concern that while visiting Argentina, former Secretary of State Kissinger's "repeated high praise for Argentina's action in wiping out terrorism and his stress on the importance of Argentina may have gone to some considerable extent to his hosts' heads." Castro feared that the Military Junta will use "Kissinger's laudatory statements as justification for hardening their human rights stance."
Document 13: Subject: Evolution of U.S. Human Rights Policy in Argentina, September 11, 1978
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This INR study for Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Interamerican Affairs, highlighted that before the Carter administration, the Argentine Military Junta thought the U.S. government's human rights policy was mainly rhetoric and that "Argentina would be protected for the duration of its 'dirty war' by friends in the US executive and Congress and/or the Pentagon."
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
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[Image: elclarin.jpg] U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger meets with Argentine foreign minister, Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti, at a later meeting on October 7, 1976 (Photo courtesy of Clarín.com (Argentina))
KISSINGER TO THE ARGENTINE GENERALS IN 1976:
"IF THERE ARE THINGS THAT HAVE TO BE DONE, YOU SHOULD DO THEM QUICKLY"
Newly declassified document shows Secretary of State
gave strong support early on to the military junta

While military dictatorship committed massive human rights abuses in 1976,
Secretary Kissinger advised: "you should get back quickly to normal procedures."

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 133
Edited by Carlos Osorio and Kathleen Costar
Posted August 27, 2004
For more information contact:
Carlos Osorio: 202 994 7061 - cosorio@gwu.edu
Peter Kornbluh: 202 994 7116

Washington, August 27, 2004 - A newly declassified document obtained by the National Security Archive shows that amidst vast human rights violations by Argentina's security forces in June 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti:
"If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly. But you should get back quickly to normal procedures."
Kissinger's comment is part of a 13-page Memorandum of Conversation reporting on a June 10 meeting between Secretary Kissinger and Argentine Admiral Guzzetti in Santiago, Chile.
After a series of pleasantries, Guzzetti went into the substance of the meeting by stating: "Our main problem in Argentina is terrorism. It is the first priority of the current government that took office on March 24. There are two aspects to the solution. The first is to ensure the internal security of the country; the second is to solve the most urgent economic problems over the coming 6 to 12 months. Argentina needs United States understanding and support…."
Replying to Guzzetti's report on the situation, Secretary Kissinger said: "We have followed events in Argentina closely. We wish the new government well. We wish it will succeed. We will do what we can to help it succeed."
At a time when the international community, the U.S. media, universities, and scientific institutions, the U.S. Congress, and even the U.S. Embassy in Argentina were clamoring about the indiscriminate human rights violations against scientists, labor leaders, students, and politicians by the Argentine military, Secretary Kissinger told Guzzetti: "We are aware you are in a difficult period. It is a curious time, when political, criminal, and terrorist activities tend to merge without any clear separation. We understand you must establish authority."
Only two weeks earlier, on May 28, Ambassador Robert Hill had presented a U.S. demarche on human rights to Admiral Guzzetti. The Embassy was deeply concerned about the kidnapping and torture of three American women, among them the Fulbright coordinator for Argentina, Elida Messina, and the wave of attacks against political refugees from the Southern Cone. In contrast to Hill's efforts, according to the memorandum of conversation Secretary Kissinger told Guzzetti:"In the United States we have strong domestic pressures to do something on human rights… We want you to succeed. We do not want to harrass [sic] you. I will do what I can…."
Another document recently unearthed by the National Security Archive and posted for the first time here, shows that on July 9, 1976, Secretary Kissinger was explicitly briefed on the rampant repression taking place in Argentina: "Their theory is that they can use the Chilean method," Kissinger's top aide on Latin America Harry Shlaudeman informed him, "that is, to terrorize the opposition - even killing priests and nuns and others."
Documents published earlier by the National Security Archive show that in September 1976 Ambassador Hill complained again to Guzzetti about the astounding human rights violations occurring in Argentina. Guzzetti rebuffed him saying that, "When he had seen SECY of State Kissinger in Santiago, the latter had said he 'hoped the Argentine Govt could get the terrorist problem under control as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti said that he had reported this to President Videla and to the cabinet, and that their impression had been that the USG's overriding concern was not human rights but rather that GOA "get it over quickly."
Kissinger reiterated this message during another meeting with Guzzetti in New York on October 7 telling him "the quicker you succeed the better." Later, Ambassador Hill sent a bitter complaint to the Department of State that Guzzetti had returned to Argentina in a "state of jubilation" after meeting the Secretary. [See Kissinger to Argentines on Dirty War: "The quicker you succeed the better", December 4, 2003]
"The Memorandum of Conversation explains why the Argentine generals believed they got a clear message from the Secretary that they had carte blanche for the dirty war," said Carlos Osorio, Director of the Southern Cone Documentation Project at the National Security Archive. "It appears that Secretary Kissinger gave the 'green light' to the Argentine military during the June 1976 meeting with Guzzetti in Santiago," he added.
The June10 Memorandum of Conversation was obtained by the National Security Archive's Southern Cone Documentation Project through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of State filed in August 2002 and appealed in February 2004. The document was misdated June 6, 1976. The meeting took place during the morning of June 10, 1976, when Secretary Kissinger met with several foreign dignitaries attending the OAS General Assembly in Santiago. That afternoon he traveled to Mexico City [See Secretary Kissinger's travels at the Department of State Historian's web page and the Secretary's calendar of events for that day].
In Santiago, Guzzetti told Secretary Kissinger of the difficulties the Argentine security forces faced in dealing with the refugees, mostly because of lack of information: "[refugees] do not want to register… We have no names. Only the refugee committees know something in detail…"
A day earlier, on June 9, 1976 clandestine Argentine security forces had ransacked the Catholic Commission for Refugees in Buenos Aires and stolen refugee records. The day after Guzzetti and Secretary Kissinger met, on June 11, twenty-four Chilean and Uruguayan refugees were kidnapped, held illegally for two days, and tortured by a combined Argentine-Chilean-Uruguayan squadron.
Guzzetti also described the intelligence coordination with neighboring dictatorships: "The terrorist problem is general to the entire Southern Cone. To combat it, we are encouraging joint efforts to integrate with our neighbors… All of them: Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil." This collaboration was codenamed Operation Condor.
At the time of the meeting, the Department of State suspected that the Southern Cone military regimes were carrying out a coordinated attack against refugees in Argentina; indeed Kissinger received a special telegram from Washington briefing him on this issue just before he met with Guzzetti that morning. But the Memorandum of Conversation contains no reference by Secretary Kissinger regarding the human rights concerns posed by the Southern Cone security cooperation.
By the end of 1976, 10,000 Argentines had been disappeared or assassinated by the Argentine security forces; half a dozen American citizens had been kidnapped and tortured. On the international front, the cooperation between Argentine military and intelligence forces and other Southern Cone militaries left hundreds of Uruguayans, Chileans, Bolivians, Paraguayans, and Brazilians disappeared, tortured, and/or dead.

What follows are excerpts from the Memorandum of Conversation and a chronology of events surrounding the June 10 meeting, based on previously declassified documents.
Excerpts from the meeting:
"Guzzetti: Our main problem in Argentina is terrorism. It is the first priority of the current government that took office on March 24. There are two aspects to the solution. The first is to ensure the internal security of the country; the second is to solve the most urgent economic problems over the coming 6 to 12 months. Argentina needs United States understanding and support…
The Secretary: We have followed events in Argentina closely. We wish the new government well. We wish it will succeed. We will do what we can to help it succeed. We are aware you are in a difficult period. It is a curious time, when political, criminal, and terrorist activities tend to merge without any clear separation. We understand you must establish authority.
Guzzetti: The foreign press creates many problems for us, interpreting events in a very peculiar manner. Press criticism creates problems for confidence. It weakens international confidence in the Argentine government…
The Secretary: The worst crime as far as the press is concerned is to have replaced a government of the left.
Guzzetti: It is even worse than that.
The Secretary: I realize you have no choice but to restore governmental authority. But it is also clear that the absence of normal procedures will be used against you.

Guzzetti [on thousands of refugees in Argentina]: They have come from all our neighboring countries: Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, as well as Chile… Many provide clandestine support for terrorism. Chile, when the government changed, resulted in a very large number of leftist exiles. The Peronist government at the time welcomed them to Argentina in large numbers.
The Secretary: You could always send them back.
Guzzetti: For elemental human rights reasons we cannot send them back to Chile… No one wants to receive them. There are many terrorists.
The Secretary: Have you tried the PLO? They need more terrorists. Seriously, we cannot tell you how to handle these people. What are you going to do?

The Secretary: I understand the problem. But if no one receives them, then what can you do?
Guzzetti: We are worried about their involvement in the terrorism problem. But many fear persecution, and do not want to register.

The Secretary: And how many of these do you feel are engaged in illegal activities?
Guzzetti: It is difficult to say. Perhaps 10,000. Only 150 Chileans are legal. We have no names. Only the refugee committees know something in detail. But their problems create unrest, and sometimes even logistic support for the guerrillas
The Secretary: We wish you success.

Guzzetti: The terrorist problem is general to the entire Southern Cone. To combat it, we are encouraging joint efforts to integrate with our neighbors… All of them: Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil.
The Secretary: I take it you are talking about joint economic activities?
Guzzetti: Yes. Activities on both the terrorist and the economic fronts.
The Secretary: Oh. I thought you were referring only to security. You cannot succeed if you focus on terrorism and ignore its causes.

The Secretary: Let me say, as a friend, that I have noticed that military governments are not always the most effective in dealing with these problems…
So after a while, many people who don't understand the situation begin to oppose the military and the problem is compounded.
The Chileans, for example, have not succeeded in getting across their initial problem and are increasingly isolated.
You will have to make an international effort to have your problems understood. Otherwise, you, too, will come under increasing attack. If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly. But you must get back quickly to normal procedures.

The Secretary: It is certainly true that whatever the origin, terrorism frequently gains outside support. And this outside support also creates pressures against efforts to suppress it. But you cannot focus on terrorism alone. If you do, you only increase your problems.
Guzzetti: Yes, there is a need for balance between political rights and authority.
The Secretary: I agree. The failure to respect it creates serious problems. In the United States we have strong domestic pressures to do something on human rights.
Guzzetti: The terrorists work hard to appear as victims in the light of world opinion even though they are the real aggressors.
The Secretary: We want you to succeed. We do not want to harrass [sic] you. I will do what I can…

[At 9:10 the Secretary and Guzzetti leave for a word alone. At 9:14 they re-emerge, and the meeting ends.]"
Thanks to:
Martin Andersen, author of Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the 'Dirty War' (Westview, 1993) and first to report on Secretary Kissinger's "green light" in The Nation in 1987; John Dinges, author of The Condor Years (The New Press, 2004); and Peter Kornbluh, author of The Pinochet File (The New Press, 2003) for their instructive books and advice.


"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
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THE CASE AGAINST PINOCHET
EX-DICTATOR INDICTED FOR CONDOR CRIMES
Washington, D.C., December 14: With the decision by Chilean judge Juan Guzmán to indict Augusto Pinochet for ten crimes relating to Operation Condor, the National Security Archive reposted a series of declassified U.S. documents relating to Condor's acts of international terrorism--including the September 1976 carbombing assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington D.C. The documents record the progression of U.S. intelligence gathering on Condor and U.S. foreign policy actions.
According to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive's Chile Documentation Project and is the author of the book The Pinochet File, the judicial decision in Chile represents a strong statement on international terrorism. "With the new indictment of Pinochet, Chile has sent a message to the world that there is no statute of limitations on terrorist crimes."
Operation Condor is the subject of a book by Archive Advisory board member John Dinges, The Condor Years. Dinges commented to The New York Times, "If there were ever a case that shows that a head of state had to be involved in these atrocities, it is Condor. I have evidence that Pinochet was actually at the meeting when Condor was formed, and it is impossible to believe that subordinates would create something as elaborate as Condor without the explicit approval of the head of state."
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Documents
Document 1: State 137156, June 4, 1976
This "immediate action" cable is the State Department reaction to a succession of violent deaths of major exile leaders in Argentina following the military coup on March 24, 1976. It instructs ambassadors to report any evidence that the governments of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil are making "international arrangements" to carry out assassinations of exile leaders. The assassination victims up to this point include: Edgardo Enriquez, leader of the Chilean MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the leftist coalition, the Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria (JCR); Zelmar Michelini, Uruguayan senator; Hector Gutierrez, president of Uruguay's house of deputies; and Juan Jose Torres, former president of Bolivia.
Document 2: CIA "Weekly Summary" July 2, 1976
This is the first document, of those that have been declassified, to mention "Operation Condor." The CIA reports that the six governments (listed above) met in Santiago in June and agreed to coordinate operations in Argentina. It also mentions a joint operation involving security officers from Chile and Uruguay to raid a human rights office in Buenos Aires and steal records of refugees. The arrest of Edgardo Enriquez is mentioned, and the summary reports that the leftist leader was "subsequently turned over to the Chileans and is now dead."
Document 3: Montevideo 2702, July 20, 1976 [Obtained by John Dinges]
In a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Uruguay, Ambassador Ernest Siracusa argues that the military governments' "increasingly coordinated approach to terrorism" is understandable in light of the coordination of the leftist organizations in the JCR. He adds: "The U.S. has long urged these countries to increase their cooperation for security. Now that they are doing so our reaction should not be one of opprobrium. We must condemn abhorrent methods, but we cannot condemn their coordinated approach to common perceived threats or we could well be effectively alienated from this part of the world."
Document 4: ARA - CIA Weekly Meeting - 30 July 1976, "Operation Condor"
CIA officials meet with their counterparts at the State Department and inform them for what is believed to be the first time that Operation Condor is more than a mere exchange of intelligence: It is now involved in "locating and 'hitting' guerrilla leaders." Other documents specify that "hits" are being planned in Paris and London. This report, in its firm conclusion that Condor is an international assassination organization, goes considerably beyond previous speculations about a link between the countries and the series of assassinations carried out in Argentina.
Document 5: ARA Monthly Report (July) "The 'Third World War' and South America" August 3, 1976
This 14-page memo was written by Assistant Secretary for Latin America Harry Shlaudeman, who had been following the reporting on intelligence coordination in recent months and had several times solicited reports on the subject from the ambassadors. He combines the information on Condor and other disturbing trends in a report addressed directly to Secretary of State Kissinger. Shlaudeman states that the Southern Cone governments see themselves as engaged in a Third World War against terrorism and that they "have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists … in their own countries and in Europe." Their definition of terrorist, however, is so broad as to include "nearly anyone who opposes government policy."
Document 6: State 209192, "Operation Condor", drafted August 18, 1976 and sent August 23 to the embassies of all the countries known to be members of Condor
This is an action cable signed by Secretary of State Kissinger. It reflects a decision by the Latin American bureau in the State Department to try to stop the Condor plans known to be underway, especially those outside of Latin America. Kissinger instructs the ambassadors of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to meet as soon as possible with the chief of state or the highest appropriate official of their respective countries and to convey a direct message, known in diplomatic language as a "demarche." The ambassadors are instructed to tell the officials the U.S. government has received information that Operation Condor goes beyond information exchange and may "include plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad." Further, the ambassadors are to express the U.S. government's "deep concern," about the reports and to warn that, if true, they would "create a most serious moral and political problem."
Document 7: Santiago 8210, August 24, 1976, Ambassador David Popper to the State Department
U.S. ambassador to Chile David Popper answered the Kissinger Condor cable immediately. He has met with the CIA station chief Stewart Burton and deputy chief of mission Thomas Boyatt and they have decided that Pinochet would be "insulted" if the Ambassador raised the issue of assassinations with him. Popper offers an alternative: that Burton present the warning to DINA chief Manuel Contreras. Popper than writes: "Please advise." (The names of Burton and Contreras are blanked out in the cable, but have been confirmed in interviews with former officials.)
Document 8: ARA/CIA weekly Meeting, 27 August 1976, "Operation Condor"
This heavily redacted memo concerns the CIA-State Department meeting on Condor which followed Kissinger's cable instructing the ambassadors to take action. Most of the substance of this important discussion is redacted, but two points are clear: Shlaudeman reports on the concerns that led to the drafting of the Kissinger cable and the strategy of "making representations concerning Operation Condor" which, according to interviews, was a strategy originally advocated by Undersecretary of State Philip Habib. The second point is that Shlaudeman announces that "we are not making a representation to Pinochet as it would be futile to do so." There appears also to be discussion of alternatives to confronting Pinochet.
Document 9: San Jose 4526, September 20, 1976, "Operation Condor", addressed "For ARA-Luers from Shlaudeman" [Obtained by Carlos Osorio]
Writing to his deputy, William Luers, Shlaudeman orders him to "instruct the ambassadors to take no further action." The title and filing "tags" identifying Chile, Argentina and Uruguay as the countries of relevance make clear that the "action" Shlaudeman refers to is the August 23 demarche to those countries' heads of states that the United States knows about Condor assassination plans and opposes them. This key document was sent from San Jose, Costa Rica, where Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman was visiting at the time. The crucial cable to which Shlaudeman is responding, referenced as "State 231654," has been somehow "lost" from the State Department filing system.
Document 10: Buenos Aires, 6177, "My Call on President Videla," and
Document 11: Buenos Aires 6276, "Ambassador discusses US-Argentine Relations with President Videla"

These documents are the reports by Ambassador Robert Hill of his first meeting with military ruler, General Videla, on September 21, 1976. It would have been Hill's opportunity to present the demarche warning about Operation Condor, if that instruction had been still in force. But these cables provide no evidence that such a representation was made. The discussion on human rights is notable for another reason. In the second cable, Hill presents strong criticism of the recent murder of a priest and what appeared to be mass killings at a nearby town and reminds Videla that the US Congress is taking a strong stand against governments perceived to be human rights violators. Videla dismissed the criticism by pointing to the recent visit by his foreign minister to Washington: "President said he had been gratified when Fonmin Guzzetti reported to him that Secretary of State Kissinger understood their problem and had said he hoped they could get terrorism under control as quickly as possible. Videla said he had impression senior officers of USG understood situation his govt faces but junior bureaucrats do not."
Document 12: State 246107, October 4, 1976, "Operation Condor"
Dated 13 days after the Letelier assassination, this cable from Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman to ambassador Popper is the long belated reply to Popper's "Please advise" cable of August 24. Shlaudeman, over Kissinger's signature, approves Popper's proposed plan to bypass Pinochet with the Condor warning and go directly to DINA chief Contreras. The six week delay in replying to Popper is unexplained. And it is further mystifying that this cable, concerning a warning about Chile's reported plans to kill dissidents abroad, would make no reference to the actual assassination of Letelier only a few days before. (Other cables make clear that the two redactions refer to CIA station chief Stewart Burton.)
Two additional documents establish that there were other channels of intelligence indicating that Condor countries Chile and Uruguay may have been planning operations in the United States.
Document 13: "Condor One" cable to Paraguay, July 17, 1976 [Obtained by John Dinges]
Around the time the CIA was detecting the assassination plans of Operation Condor, Chile's chief of intelligence, Col. Manuel Contreras, made use of the new Condor system to prepare for the planned assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC. This document is an FBI transcript in English of a telex message sent by Contreras, identified as "Condor One," to his counterparts in Paraguay, seeking their assistance. The Paraguayans provided false passports to two Chilean agents who intended to use them to travel to the United States. The mission was leaked to the US ambassador, who reported the planned Chilean mission (whose actual purpose he did not know) to the CIA.
Document 14: CIA letter to Koch declassifying information about a death threat against Koch in late July 1976 [Obtained by John Dinges]
In late July 1976, amidst the other intelligence about Condor's assassination plans, the CIA station chief in Uruguay learns that two Uruguayan officers have threatened to kill U.S. Congressman Edward Koch, a prominent human rights critic. The information is reported to CIA headquarters but no action is taken because the treats were delivered while the men were drinking, and because the CIA did not believe the Southern Cone governments were capable of such a mission in the United States. Only after the Letelier assassination did the CIA reconsider and inform Koch of the threat made two months earlier.
Document 15: Oral History Interview with former deputy assistant secretary for Latin American Affairs Hewson Ryan, conducted by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, April 27, 1988
Ryan, one of Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman's deputies, participated in many of the meetings at which Operation Condor was discovered. In this interview several years before his death, he expresses regret that the warnings on Condor were never delivered to the heads of state of the Condor countries and raises the possibility that "we might have prevented this [the Letelier assassination]. There are some differences in his recollections of the events, compared to the cable record. He recalls that he tried unsuccessfully to get a cable cleared to warn the countries on Condor. In fact, the cable was drafted by another deputy assistant secretary (William Luers) and sent to the ambassadors. The end result was the same as Ryan recalled: the Condor demarche was never delivered to the three countries planning assassinations.
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
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[Image: phone350.jpg]
NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING
AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
Nixon Vetoed Proposed Coexistence with an Allende Government
Kissinger to the CIA: “We will not let Chile go down the drain.”
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 255
Posted - September 10, 2008
For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh- (202) 994-7116, peter.kornbluh@gmail.com
Washington D.C., September 10, 2008 - On the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the military coup in Chile, the National Security Archive today published for the first time formerly secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger told CIA director Richard Helms in one phone call. “I am with you,” the September 12, 1970 transcript records Helms responding.
The telephone call transcripts—known as ‘telcons’—include previously-unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers. Just eight days after Allende's election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to “see what we can work out [with Allende].” Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: “Don’t let them do it.
After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed that “we ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it,” but warned it should be done “discreetly so that it doesn’t backfire.” Secretary Rogers predicted that “after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.”
The telcons also reveal that just nine weeks before the Chilean military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and supported by the CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973, Nixon called Kissinger on July 4 to say “I think that Chilean guy might have some problems.” “Yes, I think he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responded. Nixon then blamed CIA director Helms and former U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry for failing to block Allende’s inauguration three years earlier. “They screwed it up,” the President declared.
Although Kissinger never intended the public to know about these conversations, observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, he “bestowed on history a gift that keeps on giving by secretly taping and transcribing his phone calls.” The transcripts, Kornbluh noted, provide historians with the ability to “eavesdrop on the most candid conversations of the highest and most powerful U.S. officials as they plotted covert intervention against a democratically-elected government.”
Kissinger began secretly taping all his incoming and outgoing phone conversations when he became national security advisor in 1969; his secretaries transcribed the calls from audio tapes that were later destroyed. When Kissinger left office in January 1977, he took more than 30,000 pages of the transcripts, claiming they were “personal papers,” and used them, selectively, to write his memoirs. In 1999, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force Kissinger to return these records to the U.S. government so they could be subject to the freedom of information act and declassification. At the request of Archive senior analyst William Burr, telcons on foreign policy crises from the early 1970s, including these four previously-unknown conversations on Chile, were recently declassified by the Nixon Presidential library.
On November 30, 2008 the National Security Archive will publish a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Comprising 15,502 telcons, this collection documents Kissinger’s conversations with top officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including President Richard Nixon; Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. Bush; and White House Counselor Donald Rumsfeld; along with noted journalists, ambassadors, and business leaders with close White House ties. Wide-ranging topics discussed in the telcons include détente with Moscow, military actions during the Vietnam War and the negotiations that led to its end, Middle East peace talks, the 1970 crisis in Jordan, U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, and Chile, rapprochement with China, the Cyprus crisis (1974- ), and the unfolding Watergate affair. When combined with the Archive’s previous electronic publication of Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation -- The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977 -- users of the DNSA will have access to comprehensive records of Kissinger’s talks with myriad U.S. officials and world leaders. Like the Archive’s earlier publication, the Kissinger telcons will be comprehensively and expertly indexed, providing users with have easy access to the information they seek. The collection also includes 158 White House tapes, some of which dovetail with transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon and others. Users of the set will thus be able to read the “telcon” and listen to the tape simultaneously.

READ THE DOCUMENTS
l. Helms/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon.
Eight days after Salvador Allende’s narrow election, Kissinger tells CIA director Richard Helms that he is calling a meeting of the 40 committee—the committee that determines covert operations abroad. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger declares. Helms reports he has sent a CIA emissary to Chile to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation.
2. President/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m.
In the middle of a Kissinger report to Nixon on the status of a terrorist hostage crisis in Amman, Jordan, he tells the president that “the big problem today is Chile.” Former CIA director and ITT board member John McCone has called to press for action against Allende; Nixon’s friend Pepsi CEO Donald Kendall has brought Chilean media mogul Augustine Edwards to Washington. Nixon blasts a State Department proposal to “see what we can work out [with Allende], and orders Kissinger “don’t let them do that.” The president demands to see all State Department cable traffic on Chile and to get an appraisal of “what the options are.”
3. Secretary Rogers, September 14, 1970, 12:15pm (page 2)
AfterNixon speaks to Secretary of State William Rogers about Chile, Kissinger speaks to him on September 14. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should “encourage a different result” in Chile, but warns it should be done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically-elected government be exposed. Kissinger firmly tells Secretary Rogers that “the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.”
4) President/Kissinger, July 4, 1973, 11:00 a.m.
Vacationing in San Clemente, Nixon calls Kissinger and discusses the deteriorating situation in Chile. Two weeks earlier, a coup attempt against Allende failed, but Nixon and Kissinger predict further turmoil. “I think that Chilean guy may have some problems,” Nixon states. “Oh, he has massive problems. He has massive problems…he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responds. The two share recollections of three years earlier when they had covertly attempted to block Allende’s inauguration. Nixon blames CIA director Richard Helms and former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry for failing to stop Allende; “they screwed it up,” he states. The conversation then turns to Kissinger’s evaluation of the Los Angeles premiere of the play “Gigi.”
5) President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)
In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende, and the adverse reaction in the new media. When Nixon asks if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as great as possible.” The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states, “we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy this crap from the liberals on this one.”
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
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#10
Ernesto Sabato, writer who led investigation of Argentina's Dirty War,' dies at 99

( Gary Cameron / THE WASHINGTON POST ) - Argentine writer Ernesto Sabato, photographed in Washington in 1986.

By Peter Eisner, Published: April 30

Ernesto Sabato, 99, a celebrated Argentine writer and intellectual who was chosen to lead an official investigation of thousands of killings by the military during the Dirty War of the 1970s and 1980s, and whose long life included careers as a physicist, public servant and artist, died April 30 at his home near Buenos Aires.

He had complications from bronchitis, according to the Associated Press.

Dr. Sabato took his place among Latin America's greatest writers, such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Mario Vargas Llosa and Jorge Luis Borges, and he followed a singular literary path that distinguished him from the writers of the Latin American "boom" of the 1960s and 1970s whose work was often experimental, frequently incorporating anti-authoritarian themes.

His work earned the Cervantes Prize, the highest award for literature in the Spanish language, and praise from authors as varied as Thomas Mann, Albert Camus and Salman Rushdie.

Dr. Sabato's best-known novels, "The Tunnel" and "On Heroes and Tombs," were crime stories that ranged into fantasy and the surreal, while examining the depths of love, melancholy and murder. His articles and essays touched on philosophy and world literature, and his social criticism sometimes chided Borges and other fellow writers for failing to speak out on current events.

As Dr. Sabato emerged as a prominent Argentine intellectual, his politics often took center stage. He had been a Communist youth leader in the 1930s and was forced underground for a time when a military government took over the country; he abandoned the party five years later, appalled by Stalinism. He became a strong opponent of all forms of authoritarianism. His book, "The Other Face of Peronism," published in 1956, examined the phenomenon of Juan Peron, the nation's populist president, as Dr. Sabato sought common ground among Peronist supporters and opponents.

Although he and other well-heeled Argentines applauded the fall of Peron in a 1955 coup, he noted, "many millions of the dispossessed and workers shed tears at a moment that was hard and sobering for them."

After another military junta left power in 1983, the newly elected president, Raul Alfonsin, appointed Dr. Sabato to the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons. Voting Dr. Sabato as their leader, the commissioners gathered documents and assembled often-wrenching testimony from survivors and family members about those tortured, disappeared and killed by the military from 1976 to 1983.

So central was his role that the commission's concluding document, "Nunca Mas" (Never Again), has come to be known as the Sabato Report. The report, published in 1984, shocked Argentinians with details of almost 9,000 disappearances and 300 secret interrogation sites across the country. It was the first effort to systematically describe and document the stories of the dead and disappeared; subsequent updates list as many as 30,000 deaths.

The Dirty War, Dr. Sabato wrote, "the most terrible [tragedy] our nation has ever suffered, will undoubtedly serve to help us understand that it is only democracy which can save a people from horror on this scale. . . . Only with democracy will we be certain that NEVER AGAIN will events such as these, which have made Argentina so sadly infamous throughout the world, be repeated in our nation."

The Sabato Report was praised as a first step toward the return to the rule of law, but Dr. Sabato received criticism from left and right. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, an organized group of women who protested the disappearance of their children during the Argentine dictatorship, rejected Dr. Sabato's opening statement that Argentina "was torn by terror from both the extreme right and the far left" in the 1970s. They and many other Argentinians contended that the leftist threat was insignificant compared with the military response. Among those who disappeared were students, teachers, workers and other government opponents, few of whom were involved in an organized movement.

After one military supporter said the report appeased human rights groups, Dr. Sabato complained that the commission's task was monumental and thankless.

"This is like taking water from the sea with a bucket," he said. "All we get are threats and insults."

Ernesto Sabato was born June 24, 1911, in Rojas, a small town in the pampas about 160 miles from Buenos Aires. He was the 10th of 11 children born to Italian immigrants who owned the local flour mill. He entered the National University of La Plata in 1929, studying science and mathematics, although he told interviewers he had always preferred writing and painting.

He completed a doctorate in physics in 1937 and won a research fellowship at the prestigious Curie Laboratory in Paris. When friends encouraged him to leave France as war closed in, he continued his research at MIT. By that time, he wanted to escape the sciences.

"It makes me laugh and I feel disgusted with myself," he wrote. He added that "war was approaching, a war in which science which according to those gentlemen had come to free mankind from all its physical and metaphysical ailments was going to be the instrument of mechanized slaughter."

He returned to Argentina and taught physics at La Plata and Buenos Aires for five more years, earning money while jump-starting his literary career. He was fired from his teaching jobs in 1945 after protesting the killing of a student by authorities in Buenos Aires. The dismissal served as his chance for a clean break.

In 1948, he published "The Tunnel," a 135-page novella that is the rambling confession of an artist imprisoned for murder, describing his deadly obsession with a beautiful married woman. The book was first published in the United States under the title "The Outsider." "The Tunnel" was translated in many languages and had several movie versions.

Dr. Sabato's second novel, "On Heroes and Tombs," appeared in 1961. It is a tour de force involving a young man, Martin; the beautiful Alejandra; her insane father, Fernando; and Martin's confessor, Bruno, a friend of all three. Again, crime and murder are close at hand.

Critics recognized Dr. Sabato's unique role in literature.

"Sabato stands apart from most of the writers of the Boom' and for good reason," author and literary critic Robert Coover wrote in the New York Times. "Not only does he not participate in their communal voice, he is at war with it."

Dr. Sabato served short stints at U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, as a magazine editor and at the Argentine foreign ministry, but resigned in each case within months, complaining about bureaucracy or protesting policies.

He met his wife, Matilde Kusminsky, when she was still in high school; they married in 1936 and were together until her death in 1998. The older of their two sons, Jorge, a former Argentine government minister, died in a car crash in 1995. Their surviving son, Mario, is a filmmaker whose work includes a 2008 documentary, "Ernesto Sabato, Mi Padre" (Ernesto Sabato, My Father).

The younger Sabato told an interviewer at the Spanish newspaper El Pais that his father was hard to know, even for his son. The effort was to penetrate "what was going on behind those black glasses, who the person was behind that character, that statue."

Mr. Sabato's compact memoir, "Antes del Fin" (Before the End), published in 1998, is a sober leave-taking and assessment of the world. It contrasts his faith with his pessimistic view of politics, poverty and the environment.

In his later years, Dr. Sabato's eyes began to fail, and he virtually stopped writing. He shifted to painting. His artwork, often depicting surreal, fantastic themes, sometimes including portraits of his literary heroes, has been exhibited worldwide alongside his books.

"What is admirable," Dr. Sabato said, "is that man keeps fighting and creating beauty in the midst of a barbaric, hostile world."



[What an epitaph.... What a goal for us all.]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obit...ltoafriend
"Where is the intersection between the world's deep hunger and your deep gladness?"
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